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Battles and leaders of the Civil War (vol. 1)... : being for the most part contributions by Union and Confederate officers : based upon "The Century War series" / edited by R.U. Johnson and C.C. Clough Buel.

Battles and leaders of the Civil War (vol. 1)... : being for the most part contributions by Union and Confederate officers : based upon "The Century War series" / edited by R.U. Johnson and C.C. Clough Buel. 400dpi TIFF G4 page images University of Kentucky, Electronic Information Access & Management Center Lexington, Kentucky 2002 b92-74-27213332v1 Electronic reproduction. 2002. (Beyond the shelf, serving historic Kentuckiana through virtual access (IMLS LG-03-02-0012-02) ; These pages may be freely searched and displayed. Permission must be received for subsequent distribution in print or electronically. Battles and leaders of the Civil War (vol. 1)... : being for the most part contributions by Union and Confederate officers (vol. 1) : based upon "The Century War series" / edited by R.U. Johnson and C.C. Clough Buel. Century, New York : [1887-88] 4 v. : facsims., illus., maps, port. ; 29 cm. Coleman Microfilm. v. 1-4. Atlanta, Ga. : SOLINET, 1993. 2 microfilm reels ; 35 mm. (SOLINET/ASERL Cooperative Microfilming Project (NEH PS-20317) ; SOL MN02822-2823 KUK) Printing Master B92-74. Vols. 1-2 on Reel 2822; vols. 3-4 on Reel 2823. IMLS This electronic text file was created by Optical Character Recognition (OCR). No corrections have been made to the OCR-ed text and no editing has been done to the content of the original document. Encoding has been done through an automated process using the recommendations for Level 1 of the TEI in Libraries Guidelines. Digital page images are linked to the text file. United States History Civil War, 1861-1865 Campaigns.Johnson, Robert Underwood, 1853-1937. Buel, Clarence Clough, 1850-1933. BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR VOLUME ONE THE BUGLE (CAIlI. FROMI THlE INTVNl i BY' WILL IAM -M. I!UNT. BATT LES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WARv BEING FOR THE MOST PART CONTRIBUTIONS BY UNION AND CONFEDERATE OFFICERS. BASED UPON "THE CENTURY WAR SERIES." EDITED BY ROBERT UNDERWOOD JOHNSON AND CLARENCE CLOUGH BUEL, OF THE EDI- TORIAL STAFF OF "THE CENTURY MAGAZINE"' NEW-YORK 'Z4e (euturp Qao. Copyright, 1887, By THE CENTURY CO. TuE DE VUNNE PRESS. This page in the original text is blank. PREFACE. ITITH the main purpose in its origin of interesting veterans in their own Ai memories and of instructing the generation which has grown up since the War for the Union, the " Century War Series," through peculiar circum- stances, has exerted an influence in bringing about a better understanding 1)etween the soldiers who were opposed in that conflict. This influence, of which substantial evidence has been given, North and South, lends additional historical interest to the present work. Many commanders and subordinates have here contributed to the history of the heroic deeds of which they were a part. General Grant, who, in accord with the well-known purpose of President Lincoln, began at Appomattox the work of reconciliation, contributed to the War Series four papers on his greatest campaigns, and these are here included. They were written before his severe illness, and became the foundation of his " Personal Memoirs." The narrative of his battles, continued under the tragic circumstances of the last year of his life, retrieved his fortunes and added a new laurel to his fame. The good temper and the unpartisan char- acter of his articles, and of the papers by the leading writers on both sides, are the most significant signs in these pages. For the most part, each side has confined controversy to its own ranks, and both have emphasized the benefit as well as the glory of the issue. Coincident with the progress of the series during the past three years, may be noted a marked increase in the number of fraternal meetings between Union and Confederate veterans, enforcing the conviction that the nation is restored in spirit as in fact, and that each side is contributing its share to the new heritage of manhood and peace. On the 17th of July, 1883, Mr. Bued, Assistant-Editor of "The Century" magazine, proposed in detail a magazine series by prominent generals of ix both sides. The original suggestion (based upon the succes of two articles from different points of view on the John Brown raid, in " The Century" for that month) was of eight or ten articles on the decisive battles of the war, and included in the main the features of the expanded series. Mr. R. W. Gilder, the Editor-in-Chief, at once cordially adopted the suggestion, com- mitting the charge of its execution to Mr. Johnson, the Associate-Editor, assisted by Mr. Buel; from the start Mr. Gilder has aided the work by his counsel, and by the support of his confidence in its success and public use- fulness-ends which could not have been attained except for the liberal and continued support of Roswell Smith, Esq., President of The Century Co. The elaboration of the first plan, the securing of the contributions, and the shaping and editing of the series were shared by Mr. Johnson and Mr. Buel, the former devoting the more time to the work duiing the months of organ- ization, and the latter having entire charge of the editing for nearly the whole of the second year. The course of the series in magazine form was from November, 1884, to November, 1887. That the plan and the time of the enterprise were alike fortunate, may be estimated from the unprecedented success Ad the articles. Within six months from the appearance of the first battle paper, the circulation of " The Century " advanced from 127,000 to 225,000 copies, or to a reading audience estimated at two millions. A part of this gain was the natural growth of the periodical. The still further increase of the regular monthly issue during the first year of the serial publication of Messrs. Nicolay and Hay's Life of Lincoln (1886-87) has proved the permanent character of the interest in important contribu- tions to the history of the Civil War. The present work is a natural sequence of the magazine series, and was provided for before the publicatik - 4 the first paper. Both the series and this expansion of it in book form are, in idea as well as in execution, an outgrowth of the methods and convictions belonging to the editorial habit of "The Cen- tury" magazine. The chief motive '8ss been strict fairness to the testimony of both sides, and the chief endeavors hlasse been to prove every important state- ment by the " Official Records " and 'ther trustworthy documents, and to spare no pains in the interest of elucidation and accuracy. These ends could not have been attained without the cordial cooperation as writers, and assistance as interested actors, of the soldiers of both sides; in these respects the aid rendered by veterans, from the highest rank to the lowest, has been unstinted, and would be deserving of particular mention if such were possible within the bounds of an ordinary preface. Nearly every writer in the work, and very many others whose names do not appear, have been willing sources of suggestion and information. Special aid has been received from General James B. Fry, from the late Colonel Robert N. Scott, who was the editorial head of the "War Records" office, and from his successor, Colonel H. M. Lazelle; and thanks are due to General Adam Badeau, George E. Pond, Colonel John P. Nicholson, Colonel G. C. Kniffin, and to General Marcus J. Wright, Agent of the War Department for the Collection of Confederate Records. PREFACE. x PREFACE. xi Material for the illustrations, which form a most striking and not the least important feature of the work, has been received from all sides, as will be noted in the table of contents. Special acknowledgment is due to the Boston Commandery of the Loyal Legion, to whose complete set of the Gardner and the Brady photographs, as well as to other material, access has been had from the beginning of the series. Colonel Arnold A. Rand, Secretary of the Boston Commandery, and General Albert Ordway have rendered valuable aid in connection with the Brady and the Gardner photographs and in other ways. The importance of accuracy has been kept constantly in view in tie preparation of the illustrations-a laborious work which has been exe- tnted under the direction of Alexander W. Drake, Superintendent, and W. I wis Fraser, lManager, 4f the Art Department of The Century Co. THE EDITORS. NEW YORK, November, 1887. CORRECTIONS IN THE FIRST EDITION. Papg 1. FYr Aditral Charh's A. Davis (o printed in part of the edition), r-m;o Admiral Charlet It. Da'lu. P.age ,; nd page 10H. F-r Charles t;. Mtiniuger, ret 'bristophier ii. Meinmioger. Page- 4t. 'From Moultric to 8umter," by t-eneral Doubleday. C.onernig tbh statemuent that Major Robert Audersou, of Kentucky. '- was a regular ofer and owner of a sla e plantation in Georgia." Major Anderson's widow writes to the Editors that he never onued a plantation anywhere, and that be nerer reided In Georgia. She adds, " He inberited 8laves in Kenttieky from his father, Colonel Richard tlough Atiderson, and these he liberated ininediately on coming tnto poses8ion of them, whieh was a f.-w years after he waa graduated at the Military Academy of Weot Potit." General Doubleday will nodify tht statement for other edMitio- P'age S1. For Lieutenant James A. Yates (so priate.1 i, part of the edition). rcAd I i-utettaut Joseph A. Yates. Page 2:6. For Sergeant 'i'hots ShotoFabte (so printed I larlrt of the editti.... r),a Srergua.t Joseph Shu-ate. Page-21 "The-runed rate (' t-iinlssariadt at Manassa-," by touclNorthrop Xear the aiddic of the second cIolumnu-for" Lieutenaut-Clonie Rob-ert B. Lee was addel...' .l.ad "I.ieutenant-Colonel Ricbard B. Lee was added." 1'aige 43. In the foot-note: For :eneral (ticore W r ' olton is. printed I pilrt of the cdititn., read (tener-i (;.-orge W. Culbun. i'5ge 67t;. " The Campaign if ithiloh," by ( ...eral t;. T. tS'atiregtrtl. lit-! 27,- fir the lath of February, read the 13th of March. Pa.e A,-i. Title to i ortralt. Fr 'ulonel ZA'bulou Bi. te lead Brigadier-Ucuerau Bobert B. Vance. CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE. PvalS FRONTISPIECE, "THE BUGLE CALL." From the lithograph by D. C. Fabronius of the painting by William M. Hunt . ................. , .... ... . V PREFACE ....................... ......... ............ IX ILLUSTRATION.S: Camp Gossip, from (4ardner photo.; and Confederate Wooden Canteen (Wl. Taber). LIST OF MAPS ............ ......................... ...................i. .... XXII LIST OF ARTISTS ...... . ................. ............... ................ . XXIII LIST OF DRAUGHTSMEN ....... ... .... ..............X................ ...... .. XXIII LIST OF ENGRAVERS .......... .... . ...... .. ............ .......... ........ . . XEI INTRODUCTION. PRELIMINARY EVENTS. From the Charleston Convention to the first Bull Run . . . ... I ILLUTrATION;: The Reveille (WU. rTtb-,. ORGANIZATION OF THE TWO-GOVERNMENTS ......... .................... .... . The United States Government: The Buchanan Administration; The Lincoln Administra- tion; The United States War Department; The United States Navy Department. The Confederate States Government: Provisional Organization; Reorganization ; Confed- erate States War Department; Confederate States Navy Department. Governors of the States during the War. SIGNS OF WAR. WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR ....... GENERAL CHARLES P. STONE . 7 ILLIsTRATfIs R: Rotunda oftle Caitol i U1861, from photo. Ient by General M. C. Meiga (fE. .r. Jr-k- )- Map of the United States in 1861, sowing Military Posts oecnpled by United States Troops January 1, lni. and Approximate Limit of Territory controlled by the United States Force July, 1861 (Jamb Wefla)-Uniform of the National Rifles; Uniform of the Potomae Light Infantry (H. A. Ogden) --Brevet LleUt.-General Winlield Scott, from Brady photo.- Headquarters of General Scott f(Teo. R. Daeis) - Washington Arsenal, from Russell photo. (E. J. feeker)-The Columbian Armory ('. R. Dartet-Joseph Holt, Secretary of War, from Brady photo. - President Bucbanan. fron Brady photo.- General Charles 1. Stone, from.. Braty photo. -President Lincoln, from ambrotype taken May 20, 18Bo-Vice-President Hamlin, from Brady photo. - South or Garden Side of the White Honse (F. H. Cacke) -The White House at Night (Joseph Pennell) - Inauguration of President Lincoln, from photo. lent by General MI. C. Mega. WITH SLEMMER IN PENSACOLA HARBOR ........ COLONEL J. H. GILMAN . .......... 26 ILLUSTrATIONs: Pensacola Harbor from the Bar (TA-. f. Drnsr - The Mail who refused to baul down the Union Flag (WiUia.s Wand) - Map of Pensacola Bay. redrawn. from "Frank Lestlie'" (Fred. IL. ifft)-Confederate Water-battery, from photo. lent by Loyall Farragut (W'. Taber) - Lieutenant Adalm J. Slemmer, from Brady photo. RECOLLECTIONS OF THE TWIGGS SURRENDER.. MRS. CAROLINE BALDWIN DARROW. 33 ILLUSTRATION8: A Texan Ranger. front amtbrotype (.i. C. trdeood)-The Alamo, San Antonio (Abroan Hosier)-Colonel Dantel H. Vinton, from photo. In onter t asne - not.-I repetition. Particula-r crdit I. here gIl iven to the Boston Comaiantdery ofthe t.vsi I.diW in tcl. eele- Aroold A. Rand. (-eneral Albert Ordway, Charle B. Hall, aid W. H. Whit-o, for tIhe ue of photograph .n.l drawig. W-r time photographere whose work 1i of the greatest historivalue, osdl ha been freely draw .1pon in thte pretarution r4 th-e Illistrations, are M. B. Brarl, Alesonder Gardner, and iaptain A. J. R.-ell ID the North; ad D. H. Andle-son of ftichiaond. Vs.. and George S. Cook of Charleston. S.C.- tie latter ince the wa.'havlng succeeded to the o..nerhip oF the Ander-on .e tl-. xlii xiv CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE. FORT SUMTER. PAGE FROM MOULTRIE TO SUMTER ............. ... GENERAL ABNER DOUBLEDAY .... 40 ILLIJ8TRATIONS: VIew of Charleston fro. Castle Pinckney (T. R. Dorix) - Major Robert Anderson, front Brady photo.- Major Anderson and hi. Officers, from Cook phItl.- The Sea-battery at Fort Mon1- trie, front photo. -Map of Charleston Harbor (Jacob Wells) - The Hot-shot Furnace, Fort Moultrie, fron photo.- Major Anderson's Men Crossing to Fort Sumter (Thco. R. Daris). INSIDE SUMTER IN '6i ............. . ....... CAPTAIN JAMES CHESTER .... 5o ILLUSTRATIONS: South-we-t or Gorge Front of Fort 8umter. fron. photo. Ienit by the Washington Light Infantry, Charlestou, S. C. (W. Taer) - The Sally-port of Fort Suniter, from photo.- Ground Plan of Fort Sumter (F. E. Silts) - interior of Fort Sumter after the S8rrender, troai photo. (W. Taber) - Interior of Fort Sumter after the Bombardment, showing the Gate and the Gorge Wall, from photo.- Interior of Fort Sumter, showing the 10-inch Colmtihiad hearing oni Charleston, fro- photo. lent by G. L. G.. Cook (W. Tober) - Etfect of the Bombardment on the Barbette GIIs, from photo. lent by the Rev. John Johnson (E J. Meker) - The Sumter Garrison Watching the Firing on the "S 8tar i)f the West" (T. R. Daris) - Confederate Floatilg Battery in Ai-tiou (T. R Daria) - Pliu of the Floating Battery, fromn a Sketch by Colonel Jo-eph A. Yates - Sergeant Carmody Firing th- Barrlbte Ginns of Sumter (T. R. Daria) -A C(asemate G(n during the Conflagration (T. R. Daris) - Ruins of the Casemates and of the Barbette Tiler of GUns, from photo's. THE FIRST STEP IN THE WAR ................... GENERAL STEPHEN D. LEE .74 ILLUSTRATI-IX5: Bursting of the Signal-shell from Fort Johnson n-er Fort Sumter (T. R. Daris) - Governor Francis W. Pickena, from photoi. lent by Louis ManigaIit-Con federate Mortar-battery on Morris Island, front photo.-General G. T. Beauregard, from Anderson-Cook photo.-Secession Hall, Charle.ton, from Cook Ithbito. (E. J. Meeker) - Fort Sumter at the close of the Bombardment (T. R. Daria) -Jefferson DatVis, from Brady photo.-View of Cumming's Point (T. R. Dor;ij. NOTES ON THE SURRENDER OF FORT SUMTER,.,COLONEL A. R. CHISOLM .82 ORGANIZING FOR THE CONFLICT. WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH ..........G ENERAL JACOB D. COX .84 ILLusTRATioNs: The Awkward Squad (W1. Taker) - Life-mask of Stephen A. Dougla, from photo.- Portrait of Stephen A. Douglas, from daguerreotype taken in 152 - Major-General George B. McClellan, from photo. by R. W. Addis- Major-General Gordon Granger, from Brady photo.- Camp Dennison, near Cinclnnati. based upon photo. (W. Taber). THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONT-) GOMERY. By the Editor of the Charleston . R. BARNWELL RHETT ............... 99 'Mercury" in 1iS0-'2 .. . ..... . ILLIusTATIONs: Montgomery, Alabama, in 1861, showing the Confederate Capitol (T. R. Daris)- Alexander H. Stephens, from Brady photo.- William L. Yancey, from Cook photo.- Robert Toombs, from photo.- Leroy Pope Walker, from Brady photo.- R. Barnwell Rhett, from Cook photo.- Howel1 Cobb, from photo. lent by General Marcus J. Wright - Stephen B. Mallory. from daguerreotype - Judah P. Benjamin, from photo. lent by James Blair - Charles G. Memminger and John H. Reagan, from ateel-engravings, by permisson of D. Appleton Co. FIRST OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA. JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN i8bi..... G.... ENERAL JOHN D. IMBODEN . 11 ILLUSTHATIONS: Rtichmond, Va., In 1861 (Thea. R. Davi) - Palmetto Regiment parading in Charleston, S. C., e rode for Richmond (Thea. R. Daori) - Map of Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland (JErcob Wells) - Court-house, Charleston, Va., where John Brow. and his Associates were Tried and Sentenced, froti phbt.t. by W. G. Reed (Hang F.,..)-Map of Harper's Ferry (0. H. Broj - Portr ait of John Brown. front photo. by J. W. Black Co. with Autograph) - Engine-bouse, Harper's Ferry (Joseph Pem-sl) -Portrait of Colonel Robert E. Lee, from photo. taken before the War, lent by General G. W. C. Lee - View of Harper' Ferry looking down the Potomac, front photo. (W. Taler) - Harper's Ferry from the Maryland side, from photo. (W. Taber)- Lieut.-General Thomas J. IE Stonewall ) Jackson, C. S. A., from photo. by Tanner Vant Nes - General Jackson In 1861, from pen sketch lent by Mrs. Harriet Coxe Bledane (A. J. Vokk) - Colonel Roger Jones, from Brady photo. CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE. xv PACE McCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA .................. GENERAL JACOB D. COX ........_. u126 ILLutrrRATa07so: An Affair of Outposts (W. ber) -MajorC-General Lew Waltace, from Brady photo.- Map of Campaigns in West Virginia (Jacob We) - Brig.-General T. A. Morris, fro Brady photo.- Plan of Combat at Rich Mountain (J. WeUle) - Brig.-General John Pegram, C. S. A., from Anderson-Cook photo.- Brig.-Gencral R. S. Garnett, C. S. A., from photo.-M tajor-General W. S. Rose- i-rans, from photo. by Bogardus - Brig.-General R. A. Wise, C. S. A., from Brady photo.- Brig.-General J. B. Floyd, C. S. A., froin photo.- Pot-hospital and Wagon-shop at Kanawha Falls, from photo. lent by General J. D. Co. (Harry ,n-) - Plan of Gauley Bridge and Vicinity (Jacob Wells) -View-of Galey Bridge and Ne- River Cliff., from photo's lent by General J. D. Cox (Harry Feca) -Plan of Affair at Caratfex Ferry (Jecob Well.) - Floyd's Command Recrosaing the Gauley River, and Preparing to shell Rosecraus " Camp at Gahley Bridge, from sketches by W. D. Washington owned by J. F. Gibson (W. L. Sheppard) -View of Romtney, Va. (A. R. Wand). FIRESIDE AND FIELD OF BATTLE. GOING TO THE FRONT (Recollectiois of a Private-i). WARREN LEE GOSS. ... .... 149 ILLUtSTRxTioNs: Fac-stinile of the Concluison of General Dix'. -American Flag" Dispatch, from the origiIal lent by the Rev. Morgan Dix, D. D.- Arrival of the New York 7th at Annapolis (Thea. R. IDris) - Unlform of the tth Massachusetts (H. A. Ogden)- 'And the Corporl did" (E. W. Keaelbe) - A Mother's Parting (ift (El. W. Kemsble) - Militia Uniform tf '61, from photo. of the statue by J. Q. A. Ward - The New York 7th Marching down Broadway (W. aber) - Federal Hill. Baltimore (. H. ,ehell) -Pnnsylvanlia Avenue, Washington, in '61 (The.. B. Dris) - The New York 7th at Camp Cam- t r on, Washington (M. J. Burns). VIRGINIA SCENES IN '6i ......................... MRS. BURTON HARRISON ......... 160 ILLUSTRATION8: Confederate Battle-flag, from original flag lent by Mrs. Karrison (E. J. Meteker) -A Virginla Homeatead, from sketeh lent by Mrs. Harrison (E. 3. eeer- Confederates on the Way to Manasas (E. W. Kesmble) - Listening for the First Gun (E. W. Keble) -Fac'simile of Autographic Copy of the First Stana of "My Maryland." CAMPAIGN OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. McDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN ........... GENERAL JAMES B. FRY ............ 167 IIIL'sTaATION5: Scratiitzing a Pas at the Long Bridge, based on photo. (WF. H. 8hdt-er)-Unitorm of the 14th New York at Bull Run (iW. Taber) - Simon Cameron, Secretary of War, from Brady photo. - Uniform of the 1st Massachusetts at Bull Run (H. A. Ogden)- General Irvin McDowell, from photo. by Fredericks-Uniform of the 2d Ohio at Bull Ran (H. A. Ogden) -Map of the Defenses of Washing. to., July, 1861 (Jacob nWell) - Fac-imile of a Washington Pass of 1861 (obverse and reverse), lent by Murat 1aistead- View of Washington from the Signal Camp, two cuts (Thco. R. Doria) - The Stone Church, Centreville, from Gardner photo. (Harry Fen.) - Uniform of the 11th New York (Fire Zounves) at Bull Run (H. A. Ogden) - Outline Map of the Battle-field of Bull Run (Jaeob Wells) -Sudley Springs Hotel (Joseph Pennell) - Sudley Springs Ford in I14 (Joseph Pennell)- Sudley Springs Ford, from Gardner photo. (Harry Fn) - The Stone Bridge over Bull Run (Joseph Pennell) - Fatigue Uniform and Kilts of the 79th New York (H. A. Ogden) - The 8udley Springs Road, from photo. hy Captain J. E. Barr (J. D. Woodaeard) - Major-General Charles Griflin, and Major-Gneral James B. Rlcketts, from photo's lent by General James B. Pry -The Contest for the Henry Hill (W1. Taber) - Unifosm ea lbe Garibaldi Guards (H. A. Ogden) -Uniform of Bleaker's 8th New York Volunteers (H. A. O_)- Brig.-General Louis Bleaker, from Brady photo. THE OPPOSING ARMIES AT THE FIRST BULL RUN. Table of Strength, Composituo., and Losses .............. ... .... ........................... . . ...... 194 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. .. ......... GENERAL G. T. BEA4UREGARD. . 196o ILLUsTRATIONS: A LouIsiana 1'Tigert (A. C. Redwood) -Arlington, the Home of General Robert E. Lee (J. H. Coek) - Map of the Bull Ron Campaign (Jaeob Wells) - The McLean House, General Beaure- gard's Headqnarters, near Manassas, from Gardner photo. (W. Taber) -Topographical Map of the Bull Run Battle-tleld (Jacob Welld) - Rallying the Troops of Bee, Bartow, and Evans behind the Robinson Rouse (T. de Thustrap) - A Louisiana ' Pelican" (A. a. Redwood) -The Robinson House, from Gardner photo. (J. D. Woodward) -The Main Battle-ground, two views, from photo's (Harry Fena) - Colonel F. S. Bartow. from photo. lent by Georgia H1storical Society-Fairfa ('ourt-house, from Gardner photo. ( . Taber) - Ruins of the Stone Bridge, looking along the Warrenton Turnpike toward the Battle- field, from Gardner photo.- Confederate Quaker Guns, from Gardner photo. (A. C. Redwood) - Generals B. E. Lee and J. E. Johnston, from photo. by D. J. Ryan (with Autographs). xvi CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE. INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN ............ GENERAL JOHN D. IMBODEN ...... 229 ILLIJ5TRATIoN: The X.t. Henry Houwe and the Monument of the First Battle, from photo. (WI. Taber) - Confederate Fortification about Manastut Junetion, and the Stone loua- on the Warrentont Turnpike. from (Gardser photo'. (Harry Peat.)-Plan of the Bull Run Battle-fl-dl (Jacob WelaJ) -Brigm- dier-General Barnard E. Bee, from photo. by Tunker Perkiu. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN ......G FNERAL JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON .... 24t ILLU5TBRATION: tQuaker (uin f lund in the Confederate Work. at Manuasa, fron (Gardner photo. (WI. Taber) - Gn-neral 9tainu-l Cooper, from phote. by Da-is lent by General Manrus J. Wright - Lienteit- ant-0eneral Ric-hard S. E-11, fronm Anderson-Cook photo.- "Stonewall" Jackson asa First-lieutenant of Artill-ry, from tdauerreotype lent Iby his niece, Mis Alice E. Underwood. GENERAL EWVELL AT BULL RUN.... .... ....MAJOR CAMPBELL BROWN ... THE CONFEDERATE COMMISSARIAT AT MANASSAS .COLONEIL L. B. NORTHROP 21il WILSON'S CREEK. LEXINGTON, AND) PEA RIDGE. THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI ..... COLONEL THOMAS L. SNEAD ....... 24;2 ILLU.TIATIUON.: A V-ry Raw Reruilt (E. W. KMebfej - Map of Op1erations 1in Mis1ouri, 1861 (Jacob W,11fl,)- ,rernor Cttzibornuc F. Jatt-ksou, from phototype lent by I ...leeral Mar-us J. Wright-Brigdier- General D. M. Frost, from photo. by Seholten-- Fat--siuil- ..f Missouri War S-rip, lent by R. 1. Ho]- -otnte- Makjur-Geao-rdl Sterling PrIce, from Ande-rson-took photo.- Mafjor-tl-nn-rtal D,:vicd Hunter, fron IR-oly photo.- lapr-Clenerti Henry W. Italinick, front photo. IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI .. . GENERAL JOHN C. FREMONT ...... 2 s ILsL5TR AT10: Off to tIn- War (WI. Tuber) -F.ajor;encrai 1F 1. IJlr, Jf, fI .... Brudy hibt.lo-lrig.- t;ento-rttl NatbanitI Lynn,, from BRrndy photo.-Mttor-(lenernt Franz .it.. -I. ft-ot pIoto.-lajur-Ot-ucra Joli.t C. F'.-( mut. frtnt sitl ttortrait lenxt by Mrs. Frt(,aont. WILSON'S CREEK, AND THE DEATH t)F LYON ... GENE'RA.L WILLI4AM M. WHERRY . 2SI) IL.LUsTRATIONs: tavait-"ntitof I tI- Unlit-d States Reg"larsr In 1861 (II. A. Ohdet)- M.lt of Wit.,.'. (-r-ek, tar (tatk Hilla (Jtob ifefla)-njttr-teneral John. M. St-bohtl-, fr,,ill rIaIIy pltoto.-Battle-fetld .,f Wilttou' ('reX-k frt- Is-luinti l'-ur-e't ('nImp, frpt t titlo,,'s (E. J. fee-ker)-Briani-tenerat X. B. Pearce, ('. S. A.. f-ttn Bratty photto. ARKANSAS TROOPS IN T-HE BATTILE R N B. OF WILSON'S CREEK.NRA J .N........ . (ENR ILLUSTRATIONS: Bloody 11111 fruit titt- East, frotit photo. by Sittler t-nt bIy R. 1. llolctnije thU. 'abt-r)- MkJor-Gen-rtnl Be-. it-'tth1it(-t. C. S. A., frotin pihtot,.-Brigttler-.ent-ral W. Y. Slat-k, C. Y. A., frtnn Brady pituto. THE FLANKING COLUMN A( WILSON'S CREEK.. (;ENERAL FRANZ SIGEL. ..0 THE OPPOSING FORCES AT WILSON'S CREEK, MO. nntpo.siti.tt., Strength, a-tI Losset.. .: THE SIEGE OF LEXINGTON .................... C'OLONEL JAMf:S A. MULLIGAN. :l407 ILLUSTuATINS: Confetterates Fighting behind Henip,-bales (Wt. Tuber) - M, tof the Siege of Lexing- ttit (Jacob WIelt) - Battle tf L-xington. as seen front Partotua's positilon, after sketelt by F. B. Wilkie it - Frattk lit'" (F. 11. Nhtel) - Coltel Jtuttea A. Mtllilgau, from photo. (.Yidney L.. Stbifh). THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN .......... ........ GENERAL FRANZ SIGEL .......... :4.. 1 tI.LLUTRATION: Uniftort of the United States Regulars in 18B1, fromu photo. (H. .A. 0gden)--Major- I-t-eral Samuel B. caurti, from photo.- Major-General Earl Van Dora, C. S. A., frtto pt4tot.. by Earle soi (vwith Autntgrapht -3Malt of the Battle-field of Pea Ridge, or Elkhorn Taveru (J.e-b Weila) - Major- tttealn 1 Peter J. Ost-rhau-, from photo. by Frederieks-MaJor-tGenerul nrgene A. Carr, frotm Brady hoto.- Brgadk-r-neral Jitmes McIntosh, C. S. A., from photo.-The Union Right under General Carr at Pratt's Store, 8'coud Dtty of the Battle - and Last Hour of the Battle of Pea Ridge, frtntt paintitgs by IllNtt P. Wilson owned by Southern Hstortcal Society of St. Louis (.Shel and Hogan) - Brigadier- General Albe-rt Pike, C. S. A., from photo. by Seholl, and Brigadier-General Slannd W:ntie, C. S. A., front phtt', I-nt le, Gt-0 rttl M!arcus J. Wrngbt. CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE. xvii UNION AND CONFEDERATE INDIANS I PAGE IN HE IVI WA., ,, f ......................WILEY BRITTON .................... ..... 3.,3.,1 IN THE CIVIL WAR .... . WIE.RTTN: ILLUSTRATION: Elkhorn Tavern, Pen Ridge. from photo. (W. Tabr). THE OPPOSING FORCES AT PEA RIDGE. Composition, Strength, and Losses .... ..:.1..... :7, BELMONT AND FORT HENRY. RECOLLECTIONS OF FOOTE AND THE GUN-BOATS CA4PTAIN JAMES B. EADS ...... ILLUSTRATIONS: Building the Eads Gun-boats at Carondelet (Theo. R. D.ris) - The "De Kalb," for- merly the "S t. LoDU " (Typ of the ' Carondelet, CInclnnati" t- Isxolville," - Mound City,-, Cairn," and Pittsburgh j, fromn photo. lent by Captain Eadg - Captain James B. Eads, from photo.-Th. 0sage" (Twin of the XNeosho") - and the ' Chiekasaw" (Type of the "M ilwaukee," Winnebago," and" Kiekal- u), from photo's lent by Captain Eads (P. J. Meeker) - Rear-Admiral Andrew Hull Foote. from photo. by E. Anthony - Rear-Admiral lienry Walke. front anlibrotype. NOTES ON THE LIFE OF ADMIRAL FOOTE. k JOHN A. FOOTE. Ity hiY Brother.... ..... .. J GENERAL POLK AND THE BATTLE OF BELMONT. W By his Son .......CPAN WLLIM M. POLK. [From the MS. of the " Life of Leonidas Polk" (unpublished).] ILLUSTRATIONS: Portraits of Confederate l'rivates of the West, from ambrotypes (H. .t. ()dea)- Malt of the Battle-lield near Belmont, Mo. (.Y. . Kcmp) -Lieute-nsut-Geuner-t Leonidas Polk, Bishop of l ouniana-, frotim photo. lby Morse -Brigadier-General U. 1. Grant (1861), front photo. lent by 0. Hfelan.d -The (ann-boats "lTyler" an i Lextlagton- figihting t,' ('olIntbus Batteries during the Battle of Bein.ont, from drawing hy Rear-Admiral Waike (F. f. Sehefl and T. Ifga)ss -Confederate Fortifica- lions at Colnutbus, Ky., front sketch made for '1 Frank eIslie' " antd lent by G. N. Putnam (J. D). W-d-tar,) - Captain Jobh A. Rawllns (t161). front phottt. tent by 0. Hufelanhd - Rci7barkatlon of (ratits. Troops after the Battle, frotm drawitig by Rear-Admiral WnIke (F. H. Scheflo intd T. Hragt. THE GUN-BOATS AT BELMONT AND FORT HENRY REAR-ADMIRAL HENRY WALKE . ::5. tLLUsITaATIO.s : Army Transports-at tile Cairo Levee (T7.. R. Doria) -FlFqg.-Ofibr Foot- it it, Wltil-h-bomse of the Cineiunati" at Fort Iteatry (1W. Ttter) - Wharf-boat at rairo, froto photo. lent ty Major J Et. Benton (W. Gafer ) -The Gun-abotn " Tyler" and "- Lexington" engaging the Batteries of Columbus, from sketch by Rear-Admiral Walke (Harry Feat.) -lap of the Region of Footel' Operit- tIoRs (Jacob Wells) -United States Gun-boat "Tyler," from drawing ty Rear-Admiral Walks- Map of Ftrt ffenry (Jacob Well.) - Cross-seetion of a Contederat, Torpedo fottud in the Tennessee River (E. .J. Heeker) - Between Dceks: Serving the Gntt, front drawing by Rear-Admiral Walke e A. C. Redr-eod) - General Lloyd tilghman, from phboto. THE DEFENSE OF FORT HENRY.. . . .CAPTAIN JESSE TA YLOR . :1418 Ilt.LSTRATION: The Attack upon Ftrt Henry, fro..t drawing by ear-.Admliral W.ltk-. MILL SPRINGS, THE BIG SANDY, AND FORT DONELSON. HOLDING KENTUCKY FOR THE UNION - .. COLONEL R. M. KELLY .. I. . ILLI5TRATtONS: Military Water-sled (Fnl. H. ehill) -R,-,,. RotI-rt J. Breetkitridge, D. D., froito steel portrait-Major-General Williant Nelson, from Brady photo .-Major-Geateral J,,hn C.. Breckin- ridge, C. S. A., frttm daguerreotype lent by Anson Malttby- Malt of Kenttueky and Ten-nes-s (.Jacb WeWIs) - Jobn C. Crittenden, from daguerreotype -Camp Dick Robinson -T tt Fttrm-bhous, frtmn sketch leItt Sy Mrs. M. B. Robinson-Major-(eneral Lo-ell. H. Rotuseamt, front Brady photo.-Major-Gent-ral George B. Crittenden, C. S. A., from photo. - Major-GeneralJ D. '. BuelL frotti photo. Iettt by Gent'ral Jaites B. Fry- Map of the Battle of Logan's Cro Roads, or Mill Springs, Ky. (Jacob Wells) - Brigadtr- Getteral Felix K. Zollicoffer, C. S. A., from photo. - Brigadier-General Speed S. Fry, from photo. taket In 1862-National Cemetery at Logan's Cross Roads, fr m photo. (F. J. M-eker) -View on the Battle- field of Logan's Cross Roads, from photo. (E. .. ceeker). xviii CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE. IAGE THE OPPOSING FORCES AT LOGAN'S CROSS ROADS, KY. (MILL SPRINGS OR FISHING CREEK). Composition, Strength, and Losses ...... ................................. 39 MARSHALL AND GARFIELD IN I EASTERN KENTUCKY.REV. EDWARD 0. GUERRANT. ILLUSTRATIONs: Confederate Private, from ambrotype (Prank Day) - Mli of Big Sandy RIver and Middle Creek Battle-Hfeld (Jacob Well.) - Brigadier-General James A. Garfield, from Brady photo. - Brigadier-General Hunphrey Marshall, C. S. A., from photo. THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON ....... .... GENERAL LEW WALLACE. 39S ILLUSTRATIONS: Headquarters in the Field (R F. Zogbau.)- the Town uf Dover from Robinson's Hill, from photo. (W. H. Drae) - Map of Fort Donelon as Invested by General Grant (Jacob Wells) - Ollmlps of the Cumberland River where the Gun-boat first appeared, from,, photo. (Harry F---)- Major-General John A. MeClernand, from photo. - Major-General Simon B. Buckner, C. S. A., from photo. by Anthony- Dover Tavern, General Buckuer's Headquarters and the Scene of the Surrender, from photo. (Harry Fe.n) -Major-General Morgan L. Smith, from photo. lI-nt by Miss D. Morgan Smith -3Msjor-General C. F. Smith, from Brady photo.- The Crlis Farm - General Grant's Headquarters- Front View of Mrs. Crisp'. House. from photo's (W. H. Drake) -The Position of the Gun-boats and the West Bank, from photo's (Harry F-e-) -The Bivouac in the Snow on the Line of Battle (R. F. Zogbainn)-Braneh of Hickman's Creek near James Crisp's House, the LeAft of General C. F. Smith's Line, from photo. (Harry F.ea) - MeAllster'. Battery in Action (W. Taber) - View on the Line of Pillow's Defenses in front of MeClernand, showing Water in the Old Trenes", fromu photo. (Harry Fn,,-Major-General Gideon J. Pillow, C. S. A., from Anderson-Cook photo.- Rowlett's Mill, from photo. (Wt-. Taber)- Foe-simile of tbe original "Unconditional Surrender" Dispatch-View from the National Cemetery, from photo. (C. H. Stephes). THE OPPOSING FORCES AT FORT DONELSON, TENN. Composition, Strength, and Losses ... 420 THE RIVER GUN-BOATS FROM FORT DONELSON TO NEW MADRID. THE WESTERN FLOTILLA AT FORT ) DONELSON, ISLAND NUMBER TEN, . REAR-ADMIRAL HENRY WALKE . 430 FORT PILLOW, AND MEMPHIS.... ) ILLUsTRATIONs: The ' Carondelet" Fightlng Fort Donelson, from sketch by Rear-Adiuiral Walke (F. H. Schell and T. Hayan) - Eplosio of a Gun o.n board the Carondeh-t" during the Attack on Fort Donelson, from sketch by Rear-Admiral Walke (if. J. Brn,) -The Gun-boats at Fort Donelson- The Land Attack In the Distauce, fromn sketch by Rear-Admiral Walke (Harry Feni) -Map of the Region of the Flotilla Operation. (Jacob WlfsJ-b Map of Military and Naval Operations about Island Number Ten (Jacob Well.) -The -Mortar-biiats at Island Number Ten (E. J. eekel-r) -The "Caron- delet" Running the Confederate Batteries at Island Number Ten, from sketch by Rear-Admiral Walke (Harry FenN) -The Levee at New Madrid (A. B. Wand) -Major-General John Pope, from Brady photo.- Brigadier-General W. W. Mackall. C. S. A., from photo. by G. W. Davis - The 1' Carondelet" and " Pittsburgh" Capturing the Confederate Batteries I.-low NXew Madrid, from drawing by Rear- Admiral Walke (P. H. Shell and T. Hogan) - Flag-Oflicer Charles Henry Davi, from Brady photo.- Fort Pillow and the Water-battery, and the Battle of Fort Pillow, from sketches by Rear-Admiral Walke (F. H. 8hell aid T. Hogaan)-The Battle of Memphis looking South), from drawing by Rear-Admiral Walke (Pran-k H. Schell) - Brigadier-General M. Jeff. Thompson, C. S. A., from photo. ELLET AND HIS STEAM-RAMS AT MEMPHIS .... G... ENERAL ALFRED W. ELLET. 453 ILLUSTRATIONS: The Battle of Memphis (looking North) - Retreat of the Confederate Fleet, from draw- ing by Rear-Admiral Walke (F. H. hcU11 and T. Heogn) - Colonel Charles Ellet, Jr., from photo. by Rehn hu. - Cloe of the Battle of Meniphis, fro- drawing by Rear-Admiral Walke (P. H. 8dch11 amd T. Hag.) - Practicing on a River Picket (fW. Taber,. SAWING OUT THE CHANNEL ABOVE ISLAND NUMBER TEN.... COLONEL J. W. flSSELL.. 4 ILLUsTrATIONS: Method of Cutting the Channel (W. Tberi - Map of the Corrected I.ne of the Channel above Island Number Ten, cut by the Engineer Regiment (Jacob WeCU). COMMENT ON COLONEL BISSELL'S PAPER . GENERAL SCHUYLER HAMILTON ...462 THE OPPOSING FORCES AT NEW MADRID (ISLAND NUMBER TEN), FORT PILLOW, AND MEMPHIS Composition, Strength, and Losses 4.......... 43 CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE. xix SHILOH. PAGE THE BATTLE OF SHILOH ... ... . ... GENERAIL ULYSSES S. GRANT ...... 465 ILLUSTRATIONS: (teneral U. S. Grant, fron. photo. (with Autogruph) -On the Skirmish Line (W. Taber) - Outlite Malp of the Shbiih Campaign (J-acb WelltJ - Mrs. Crump's House and the Landing belo- the House, fro- photo'r (George Gib-o) - New Shiloh Church and Shiloh Spring, in the Ra-lne Soluth of the Chapel, front photo's (WI'. H. Drake) - Map of the Field of Shiloh, from tieneral Gralt O M emoirs"- First l'osition of Waterhouse's Batt-ry, from, sketch by E. W. Andrews, 3I. D. (E. J. Meeker) - Con- federate Charge upon Pren.tiss's Camp on Sunday Morning (A. C. Red,,ood)-Checking theConfederate Advance on the Evening of the First D'Ay (Edwvi Forbes) - Presnt Aspect of the Old Hamburg Road which led up to the lHornets' Nst," from photo. (Fred. B. Schefl) -Mjior-General B. M. Prelitss. from Brady photo. - Brigudier-Gnernl W. It. L. Wallace, from photo.- Ford where the Hamburg Road Crosses Lick Creek, from photo. (Fred. B. Shelf) -Bridge over Snake Creek by which General Lew Wallace's Troops reached the Field, from ploto. (Fred. B. Se/helf - Bvonae of the Federal Troolp (r. dc Thadolrup) - Wounded and Str'.gglers on. the Way to the La.l-ng (T. de Thmda rtp) - Above the Landing: The Store. and a part of the National Cemetery, from photo. lent by Captain A. T. Audresas ( E. .1. M1eeker). SHILOH REVIEWED .......... ...... ............ GENERAL DON CARLOS BUELL ..... 4S7 ILLUSTRATIONS: Battery Forward! (W. Tabc) - Pittsbnrg Landilg, viewed from the Ferry Landing on the opposite Shore, from. photo,. Ilet by Captain A. T. Anlreas (E'. J. Meeker) - Pittaburg Landing. from pioto. lent by W. tl. Chamberln (.J. f0. Daridso) -The Lannding at Savannah, front photo. (F. B. Sch ell)- Major-General Alexander McID. _McCosk, fron, Bra ly photo.- Pittmburg Landing in the S.......er of 1884, from photo. (F. B. ,shef) - Map Showing the Union Camips at Shiloh, fa-seimile of original- Malp of the Field of Shiloh. rev-ses and somended by General Rtnell (Jarob We/l)-The HlornAets Nest : Prentiss's Troops and Hickenlooper' Battery repulsing Hardee's Troops, and GIt- son's Brigale charging Hurlbut's Troops in the " HEornets' Nest," frun the Cy,-orama of Shiloh at Chicago (Hf. A. Ogde.) - The Official, or Thor, Map of the Battle of Shiloh (Jcob Wells) - In the "-Horets Nest- (two viess oil W. H. L. Wallace's Line), front the Cyclorama at Chicago (H. C. Edwards) -The 8iege-battery, bov-e the Landing, from phot . lent by W. H. Chamberlin (W. Taber) - Buell'a Troops debarking at Pittsburg Landing (7T. de Th/lsfrsp) - Major-General Thomas J. Wood, from steel portrait, by permission of D. Van Nostrand - Majr General Thomas L. Crittenden, from Brady photo. - Capture of a Confederate Battery (T. de Thu/ltrep) -Scene in a Union Field-hospital (A. C. Redwood). SKIRMISHING IN SHERMAN'S FRONT ... . ......... ROBERT W. MEDKIRK ......3..... 7.,37 THE OPPOSING FORCES AT SHILOH. Composition, Strength, and Losses .............. I. 7T ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SHILOH. t . COL. WILLIAM PRESTON JOHNSTON. .540 By his Son ..................,. I ILIUSTRATIONS: Albert SidneyJohntton at the Age of Thirty-ve, from miniatare- General Albert Sidney Johnston at the Age of Fifty-seven, fronm photo.- Fs -sAI.Ile of Autograph found inside the Cover of General Johnston's Pocket-map of Tennessee - Birthplace of Albert Sidney Johnston, Washington, Ky., fromt photo. (C. A. Tander/s0f) - Fort Anderaon, Paducah, in April, 1862, after lithograph from sketch by A. E. Mathews (MI. C. Edwards) -Camp Burgess, Bowling Green, after lithograph from sketch by A. E. Mathews (E. J. Meeker) -Map of Kentucky and Tennessee (Jacob Wells) -Battle of Logan's Cross Roads, or Mill Springs, after lithograph from drawing by A. E. Mathew, (iT. Taber) - Col- onel Sehoepf's Troops crossing Ftishing Creek on the way tojoin General Thomas, after lithograph front sketch by A. E. Mathews (E'. J. Meeker) -Contederate Types of 1862 (A. C. Redwood) - Map used by the Confederate Generals at Shiloh, by permiss on of D. Appleton Co.- Lieutenant-General W. J. Hardee, C. S. A., frtnm photo. tent by Colonel Charles C. Jones, Jr.-Map of Battle of Shiloh (Part 1.) and Map of Battle of Shiloi (Part II.), by Wpnlssion of D. Appletoss Co.-Vicinityof the 1 Hornets' Nest," from photo's lent by Captain A. T. Andreas (W. L. Lathrop) -Scene of General Albert Sidney Johuston's Death, from photo. (WF. Taber) -Map of Battle of Shiloh jPart Itl.), by permisnthm of D. Apple- toln Co. THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.. . ........ ...... GENERAL G. T. BEAUREGARD . 569 ILLUSTRATIONS: Preaching at the Union Camp Dick Robinson, Kentucky, after lithograph from sketeh by A. E. Mathews (E. J. Meeker) - Lieutenant-General John C. Breekinridge, C. S. A., from Anderson- Cook photo- Slaves Laboring at Night on the Confederate Earth-works at Corinth (WF. L. Sheppard) - Five Corinth Dweliings, from photo's (WF. J. Fenn) - Major-General Bushrosl R. Johnson, C. S. A., from Anderson-Cook photo.- The "H Hornets' Nest," from photo. tent by Captain A. T. Andreas (E. J. Meeker) -The Union Gun-boats at Shiloh on the Evening of the First Day, after lithograph from sketch by A. E. Mlathews CH. M. Eato.). NOTES OF A CONFEDERATE STAFF-OFFICER I AT SHILOH ....GENER..THOMAS..RDAN . 59 ILLUSTRATIONS: A Confederate Private of the West, front ambrotype -A Union Battery taken hiy Surprise (E. F. Zogbea.)-The Last Stand made by the Confederate Line (R. F. Zogba-om). xx CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE. PA-r SURPRISE AND WITHDRAWAL AT SHILOH ... . COLONEL S. H. LOCKETT.. 004 ILLl"TRATION: Iliitial (R. F: Zoyb anm). THE SHILOH BATTLE ORDER AND THE COLONEL A. R. CHISOLM.0(10 WITHDRAWAL SUNDAY EVENING THE MARCH OF LEW WALLACE'S DIVISION TO SHILOH. With Documents submitted by General Lew Wallace . .. . ....;.T7 Map of the' BRotes by whdieh Clenera1 (lrant was rel-nforcmt (J/c'b Wells). NAVAL PREPARATIONS. THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAVIES . ........ PROFESSOR J. R. SOLEY .. 11 ILLI'STRATIONS: A Frigate of the Olden. Time: the Independence," built in 1814, from photo. (Gare- rifle Per/in)-Roman War G(alley-Line-of-battle Ship of the 17th Century-TThe U. S. Frigate "Mer- ritenac" beflore and after Conversion into an Iron-clad (J. 0. aridson,) -Tht Navy Yard, Ws-hington, in 1t.1, from war-ti-e sketcb (A. R. Wend) - The Old Naivy Department Building, Washington, frout photo. (W. Tabr) - Lauch of the "DIetator," from photo. lent by Delamauter Co. (W. Tber) -Monitor - Weehahwken' In a Storm (Grafrillc Perkins) - Gideon Welle-s Secretary of the U. 8. Navy, from, Btrady photo.- (Gustavna V. Fox, Assistant-Secretary of the 1'. S. Navy, from photo.- William Fason, Chlef Clerk of the U. S. Navy Department during the War. fro-e phot. by Prescott White. COAST OPERATIONS IN THE CAROLINAS. EARLY (:OAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL RUSH C. HAWKINS.... ... :12 (Incltding Capture and Defense of Hatteras bIland, Lamed atdl Water Fighting at Roanoke lslantd, the Two Squadrons at Elizabeth City, Battle of New Bermne, Siege of Fort Macon, Battle (If South Mills, and other Operations.) ILLUsTRATIO;s: Uniform of Hawkins's Zouaves, front photol. (/1. 1. Oiden) - Rear-Aduiral SilaSU H. stringhli.fromn Brady photo.-Map of Early Coast Operations ill N-orth Carolina (Ja-ob Wels) - Forts llatteriis and Clark. from war-thie sketeh (A. R. Wenl)-The ',Cui0mberla I " Sailing into Aetioie, and tniou Fleet Botllardilig Forts HIatteras and Clark, from war-timen sketches (F. H. Sehell aed Thomas g - Retreat of the Confederates to t'eir Boats after their Attaek upon Itfatteros (WI'. Taber) - Laud- iteg (f the Unin Troops at Hatteras. from war-tillu sketch '(A. U. W-eed) - Map of the Operations ait R(allooke Island. frm Offieial Recorls- Map of tbe Battle-tield of Roanoke Islauld, front Official Reeords - Union Assault lspo. the Thr,-(-gtu Battery, Roanoke slaand, from, war-tir.e sketch (T: H. 8ehell)-Viec-Admiral S. C. RBuwanl, from Brady photo.-Brigadier-G;eneral L. O'B. Branch, fron phote.- Boltlltrdment of Fort Thompson during the Battle of New Be-rne, from war-time sketch (F. H. fXehelI) - Mar-General Johil G. Foster. fron- Brady photo.- Mapof OperatIons in the Battle of New lera,- (Jaob Wells) - Assault of Union Troops poisn Fort Thompson. froe war-ti-e sketch (F. H. Shel) - Furt Maeon after its Capture by the Ufeloui Foree., fro- war-time sketch by F. H. Sc-helt (Thomets llag-n) - Map of the Engage ent at South Mills (Fred. Ef. .Sills) - Passage of the Union Boats through 1t1(1 Dismal Swamp Canal, from war-time sketch by Horatio L. Wadt (F .T. J eek-es'). THE BURNSIDE EXPEDITION ........ .... . . GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE.. .. ..... ILL7s8TRATIONS: Union Lookout. Hatteras Beach, from war-time sketch (.A. R. Waed)-Unifor- eef the First Rhode Island (H. A. Ogden) -Brevet Brigadier-General Rnsh C. Hawkins, from Brady photo. - Rear-Aduiral L. M. Goldaboroagh, from photo. lent by Henry Carey Baird-General Bnrnside'8 Head- quarters, Roanoke Island, from war-time sketch by F. H. Selwl. (Tho.a. Hogan) -General Burnside at the Confederate Cotton Battery, New Berne, from. war-time sketch by F. H. SchelO (Thomaes Hogn) - Brigadier-Genelral Robert B. Vance, from tintype. THE OPPOSING FORCES AT ROANOKE ISLAND AND NEW BERNE, NORTH CAROLINA .... (,70 DU PONT AND THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION . REAR-ADMIRAL DANIEL AMMEN .... 871 ILLUSTRATIONtS: Gelleral View of Hiltonl Head after its Capture by the Union Forces and View of Posot- offic, Hilton Head, frol.l war-time sketches (Xeathus Smfih) - Brevet Miajor-General Thomas W. Shber- manl. from Brady photo.- M,.p of the Coast of South Carolina and hart of North Carolina (Jacob Wells) - Rear-Admiral Samuel F. DU Pont. from photo. lent by Horatio L. Wait - Gnu-boat "Seneca" and Slpoop f War "Vandala,'" fromu war-time sketehes (Xenthals S..ih) -iNaIp of Naval Attack at Hilton CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE. xxi Head, Nov. 7, 1961 (Jacob WeOW) - .m-boat "1 Mohawk," the Guard-ship at Port Royal - Attack of the Union, Fleet at Hilto- Hlead-Ten-inch hhell-gnu which threw the Opening Shot from the Flag-hip - Wabash "-Bay Point and Fort Beauregard after Capture, and Rifle-gun at Fort Beauregard, fIIe piletures from war-tiune sketchea (Xaalnths Smith)-Battle of the Union Fleet with Fort. Beauregard and Walker, and Hoisting the Start and Strilpes over Fort WMalker, from war-time sketches (FTaak H. Sthell) -Brigadier-General Thomas F. Drayton, C. S. A., from Br.idy photo.- Captaln Pereival Drayton, U. S. N., from Brady Pthoto. -Old Headquarter., Hilton Head, and Pope'e Itonse, Hilton Head, ueed by the Uniont Army ai Signal Statitt, front war-time sketches (Xathtts, Ntith) - Union Signal Statiltn, Beanfort. S. C., House of J. G. Baruwell aud Fuller's House, Beaufort, S. C., from Gardner photo's (T. g. lfocsitaer). IlHE OPPOSING FORCES AT PORT ROYAL. Composition and Losses... .t I "MONITOR" AND "MERRIMAC." THE FIRST FIGHT OF IRON-CLADS ...... ...... COLONEL JOHN TAYLOR WOOD.... t92 ILLITsTRATION'S: I1ead-pieee (W. 11. Dake) - Blrnilng of Frigate " Merrimae " and of Gspoelrt Navy Yard, atid Remodelibg " Merrntae " at (Inspt Xavy Yard (.J. 0. Derid n) - Fac-simile of sketeih of "M Merrbttne" ittade the day before tbt- light by Lieutenant B. L. Blackford- Liettenautt Cateeby ap 1t. J,).tce, froto Pthoto. by C.tntret lt-rinaits, Litna. Peru - Admiral Frn-tklult Buehanan, C. S. N., ntd Commodore Josiah TattInall, C. S. N., fronti piloto. by D. J. Ryato-Colonel Johit Taylor Wood, from oil- Iporrait by Galt -Malt of HItnqti tiot toads atnd Adjaeent Shores (Jacob llefls)-The -Merrimaee" ramming the ''Cumberladll" (J. 0. ItcidSOt)-Littmtenautt George 1. Morrie, fromt pboto.-The "Merrimal" drimittg thlt Cttttgre-s" frt-lt her anehorage (J. 0. Darid-o)-Eseape of part of the Crew of the "Cotn- great" (J. O. Daridson)-Exploeion ott the bitrning "Congrees" (.J. 0. D-rid-oa)-Lhlt'tenant Jo-sPh B. Smith, frotut photo. by Black and Batthelder-Etleounter between the 'MoniMtor" and the "Merri- mac" at short rtngt' (.. 0. Darid-ott)-Captain G. J. Va-t Brtnt, frm photo.-Tbe ,Monitor" li Battic-trim, from triluitn-h lttt by Commander S. D. (ireete. WATCHING THE "MERRIMAC" .......... GENERA4L R. E. COLSTON ...... ... 712 It.LLUSTRATION: The "Mcrrimac" passing the Coitfederate Battery ott Cttrey Ilanld (.1. 0. DTeidett). HOW THE GUN-BOAT "ZOUAVE" AIDED THE A "CONGRESS" ...... .... . . A CTING MA STER HENRY REANEY .71-1 THE PLAN AND CONSTRUCTION OE THE COMMANDER JOHN M. BROOKE. 713 " MERRIMAC" ........ . .. ... CONSTRUCTOR JOHN L. PORTER , 1W ILLIUSTRAT1ON: Cross-section .tf tite M,-t-rhila,," ftontt a tlrmtwitg by Johtt L. Porter. NOTES ON THE "MONITOR"-"MERRIMAC" FIGHT SURGEON DINWIDDIE B. PHILLIPS...717 IN THE "MONITOR" TURRET ............ .... . COMMANDER S. DANA GREENE .......7 11) ILit-TCATIONS: Arrival of the "'Monitor" at Hampton Roade (J. 0. Darideoa)-Rear-Adniral John L. Worden, fr-tm photo. -Sidte Ele-ation and Deck-Itlan of the "- Monitor," lent by Captain Jobht Erison-Bird's-eye view tif "Monitor"-" Merrimac" Fight (.7. 0. Daridan)-Part of the Crew of the " Monitor," fron Gardner photo.- Commander Saonnel Dana Greene, from photo. by Halleck. THE BUILDING OF THE "MONITOR. . CAPPTAIN JOHN ERICSSON ...........70 714 ILLUeSTaTIoNIS: Cattalt John Ericsson. from Brady photo.- Longitnldinal Plan throngh Center Line tif Original Monitor: 1, aft set tion; 2, central section; 3, forward sectin -Plan of Berth-deck of Original Monitor - and Transverse Section tf Hull of Original Monitor, from drawings lent by Captain Ericsson- View showing Effect of Shttt on the "4Monitor" Turret, from Gardner photo.-Side Eleva- tion of Floating Revolving Circtlar Tower, published by Abraham Bloodgood in 1807-Flonting Circular Citadel suttoitted to French Directory in 1798, from " Engineertng" (W. Tlaber) - Side Eleva- tion and Transverse Section of Iron-clad Steam Battery proposed by Captailn Ericsson to Napoleon III. in 1854, lent by Captain Ericsson -Engineer Isaac Newton, from medallion portrait by Latmt Thompson-Transverse section of the "Monitor" through the center of the turret, lent by Captain Ericson - Sinking of the " Mottitou,' December 22, 1862 (J. 0. Daridson). THE LOSS OF THE "MONITOR" .............. ... FRA4NCIS B. BUTTS . 74. NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE BUILDING OF THE "MONITOR" ......................... 4s (Including Letters from C. S. Bushnell, Captain John Ericsson, and Secretary Gideon S. Welles.) I.LU9TRATUIo: Uniot, Soldier's Candlestick (W. Taber). xxii CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE. MAPS. PAGE T Showing posts oceupied by U. S. troops Jan. 1, 1861; limit of ter- THE UNITED STATES ritory controlled by U. S. forces July, 1861; and bloekade stations.. 8 PENSACOLA HARBOR, FLORIDA, MAY 27, i... '28 CHARLESTON HARBOR AND VICINITY, SOUTH CAROLINA . .................. 44 EASTERN VIRGINIA AND MARYLAND .. 113 HARPER'S FERRY, VIRGINIA ....... ............. .............. . ..... . 115 CAMPAIGNS IN WEST VIRGINIA, 8oi ......... .... ...... . ......... ..... .... 129 COMBAT AT RICH MOUNTAIN, WEST VIRGINIA ...... ............ 131 GAULEY BRIDGE AND VICINITY, WEST VIRGINIA ........... ................ 142 AFFAIR AT CARNIFEX FERRY, WEST VIRGINIA.. .......... ...... .. 145 DEFENSES OF WASHINGTON, D. C., JULY, i86i .. .......... ............. ... 172 OUTLINE MAP OF THE FIRST BULL RUN BATTLE-FIELD.... .. ..... .. ... 180 THE FIRST BULL RUN CAMPAIGN .. 199 TOPOGRAPHICAL MAP OF THE FIRST BULL RUN BATTLE-FIELD ..... .... .. 204 PLAN OF THE FIRST BULL RUN BATTLE-FIELD . . 233 OPERATIONS IN MISSOURI, i86i .................... .. .. ............ 263 BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK, OR OAK HILLS, MISSOURI. ........... 290 SIEGE OF LEXINGTON, MISSOURI ........................0.9. . ................... :309 BATTLE OF PEA RIDGE, OR ELKHORN TAVERN, ARKANSAS . ........3. ....... 322 BATTLE-FIELD NEAR BELMONT, MISSOURI ......... ...... .......:............. . I50 REGION OF FOOTE'S OPERATIONS .............. .... .... ............ ..... 36 . 1 3 FORT HENRY, TENNESSEE ................. ......... .............3 6:3 KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE. ... .... .. .... 37S BATTLE GF LOGAN'S CROSS ROADS, OR MILL SPRINGS, KENTUCKY ..... ...... . 388 BIG SANDY RIVER AND MIDDLE-CREEK BATTLE-FIELD, KENTUCKY . . : 394 FORT DONELSON, TENNESSEE ..4.............. ....... .... . 402 REGION OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE WESTERN FLOTILLA . . 430 MILITARY AND NAVAL OPERATIONS ABOUT ISLAND NUMBER TEN, MISSISSIPPI RIVER, 437 CORRECTED LINE OF THE CHANNEL ABOVE ISLAND NUMBER TEN ......... ..... . 461 OUTLINE MAP OF THE SHILOH CAMPAIGN, WEST TENNESSEE ....... . ............. 466 THE FIELD OF SHILOH. From General Grant's "Personal Memoirs.' .. .. ....... . . 470 LOCATION OF THE UNION CAMPS AT SHILOH ..... ................ .. . . . 496-497 THE FIELD OF SHILOH. From the Official Map, revised and amended by Geii. D. C. Buell, 502-503 OFFICIAL, OR THOM, MAP OF SHILOH .........5. .......... .08 KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE 55................ .. ............ 6 45 MAP USED BY THE CONFEDERATE GENERALS AT SHILOH.. ........... .... 5 51 BATTLE OF SHILOH. PART 1. From Col. W. P. Johnston's "-Life of Gen. A. S. Johnston." 556 .II " " 5 "560 III. " " " " 566 ROUTES BY WHICH GENERAL GRANT WAS REENFORCED AT PITTSBURG LANDING ... 608 EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA ... .. ......................... 634 OPERATIONS AT ROANOKE ISLAND, NORTH CAROLINA ..... ........................ 641 BATTLE-FIELD OF ROANOKE ISLAND .................. ....... .................... 643 BATTLE OF NEW BERNE, NORTH CAROLINA . . 651 CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE. xxiii PAGE ENGAGEMENT AT SOUTH MILLS, NORTH CAROLINA . . (3.. COAST OF NORTH AND SOUTH CAROLINA. . 673 NAVAL ATTACK AT HILTON HEAD, SOUTH CAROLINA . . 673 HAMPTON ROADS, VIRGINIA, AND ADJACENT SHORES . ............................ 69,' ARTISTS. BRIDWELL, H. L. BURNS, M. J. COCKS, J. H. DAVIDSON, J. 0. DAVIS, THEO. R. DA Y, FRANK DRAKE, WILL. H. FEATON, HUGH M. EDWARDS, G. W. FDWARDS, H. C. FENN, HARR Y FENN, WAL TER J. FORBES, EDWIN GIBSON, GEORGE GOATER, WALTERH. HOGAN, THOMAS HOSIER, ABRAM HUNT, WILLIAM M. KFMBLE, E. W. LATHROP, W. L. MEEKER, EDWIN J. MOESSNER, T. F. OGDEN, HENRY A. PENNELL, JOSEPH PERKINS. GRANVILLE REDWOOD, ALLEN C. SCHELL, FRANK H. SCHELL, FRED. B. SHEL TON, W. H. SHEPPARD, W. L. SMITH, SIDNEY L. SMITH, XANTHUS STEPHENS, C. H. TABER, WAIL TON THULSTRUP, T. DE VANDERHOOF, C. A. VOLCK, A. J. WALKE, HENR Y, U. S. N WAUD, ALFRED R. WAUD, WILLIAM WOODWARD, J. D. ZOGBAUM, RUFUS F. DRAUGHTSMEN. BROWN, G. H. KEMP, J. S. SITTS, FRED. E. ENGRAVERS. AITKEN, PETER ANDREWS, JOHN ATWOOD, K. C. BABCOCK, H. E. BARTLE, G. P. BOGERT, J. A. BUTLER, T. A. CLEMENT, E. CLEMENT, J. COLE, TIMOTHY COLLINS, R. C. DANA, W. J. DAVIDSON, H. DAVIS, SAMUEL ERTZ, EDWARD EVANS, J. W. FA Y, GAS TON FILLEBROWN, F. E. GARDNER, E. D. HA YMAN, AR THUR HEARD, T. H. HEINEMANN, E. HELD, E. C. HIRSCHMANN, W. A. HOSKINS, ROBERT IRWIN, ALLEN JOHNSON, THOMAS JUNGLING, J. F. KARST, JOHN KILBURN, S. S. KINGSLEY, ELBRIDGE KLASEN, W. KRUELL, G. LINDSA Y, A. LOCKHARDT, A. MOLLIER, WILLIAM MORSE, WILLIAM H. MULLER, R. A. NAYLOR, JESSIE NEGRI, A. NICHOLS, DAVID OWENS, MARY L. PECKWELL, H. W. POWELL, C. A. REED, C. H. ROBERTS, W. SCHUSSLER, T. SCHWARTZBURGER, C. SPIEGLE, CHARLES STATE, CHARLES SYLVESTER, H. E. TICHENOR, E. R. TIETZE, R. G. TYNAN, JAMES VELTEN, H. WHITNEY, J. H. E. WILLIAMS, G. P. WINHAM, E. A. WOLF, HENRY WRIGHT, C. WELLS, JACOB s-wW0Wm This page in the original text is blank. PRELIMINARY EVENTS. FROM THE CHARLESTON CONVENTION TO THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 1S60. APRIL 23. The National Convention of the Democratic Party assembled at Charleston, S. C. Dissensions arising ill regard to the question of congressional protection of slavery in the territories, the Southern delegates with- drew, organized another convention in Charles- ton, and adjourned May 4th, to meet in Rich- mond, Va., June 11th. May 3. The Douglas, or Northern, wing of the Convention adjourned, to reassemble at Balti- more, Md., June 18th. Xay 9. The Convention of the Constitutional Union Party (formerly the American, or " Know- Nothing," Party), held at Baltimore, Md., nomi- nated John Bell, of Tennessee, for President, and Edward Everett, of Massachusetts, for Vice- President, and adopted a platform evading the slavery issue. May 18. The National Convention of the Repub- licanParty, held at Chicago, nominatedAbraham Lincoln, of Illinois, for President, and Hannibal Hamlin, of Maine, for Vice-President, and pro- nouneed in favor of congressional prohibition of slavery in the territories. June 23. The Northern " Democratic National Convention," at Baltimore, nominated Stephen A. Douglas, of Illinois, for President, and Be,,- jamin Fitzpatrick, for Vice-President. (The latter declined, and the National Committee substituted Herschel V. Johnson, of Georgia.) The convention declared in favor of leaving the question of slavery in the territories to the people of the territories, or to the Supreme Court of the United States. June 28. The Southern "Democratic National Convention" (adjourned from Richmond) nomi- .nated, at Baltimore, Md., John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, for President, and Joseph Lane, of Oregon, for Vice-President. The conven- tion declared that neither Congress nor a ter- ritorial legislature had the right to prohibit slavery in a territory, and that it was the duty of the Federal Government, in all its depart- ments, to protect slavery in the territories when necessary. November 6. Presidential election, resulting as follows: le enil Pouter Lineoln. .. 17 180 1.864,352 Breckinridge 11 72 845,763 Dourlas 2 12 1,375 157 Bell 3 39 159,351 December 3. Meeting of Congress. Message from President Buchanan arguing against the right of secession, but expressing doubt as to the con- stitutional power of Congress to make war upon a State. December 8. Select Committee of Thirty-three appointed by the House of Representatives to take measures for the perpetuity of the Union. (See " February 28.") December 10. Resignation of Howell Cobb, of Georgia, Secretary of the Treasury. December 12. Arrival of General Winfield Seott in Washington, to advise with the President. December 14. Resignation of Lewis Cass, of Michigan, Secretary of State. December 20. Ordinance of secession adopted in South Carolina by a convention called by the Legislature of the State. December 26. United States troops, under Major Robert Anderson, transferred from Fort Moul- trie to Fort Sumter, S. C. December 27. Castle Pinckney and Fort Moul- trie, Charleston Harbor, seized by the South Carolina authorities. December 27. Surrender of the United States Revenue cutter William Aiken to the authori- ties of South Carolina. December 27. Arrival in Washington of Messrm Barnwell, Orr, and Adams, Commissioners from South Carolina, to treat with the administration. December 29. Resignation of John B. Floyd, of Virginia, Secretary of War. December 30. United States Arsenal, at Charles- ton, S. C., seized by the State authorities. PRELIMINARY EVENTS. 1861. January 2. Fort Johnson, Charleston Harbor, seized by State authorities. January S. Fort Pulaski, Ga., seized by State authorities. January 4. United States Arsenal, at Mt. Vernon, Ala., seized by State authorities. January 5. Forts Morgan and Gaines, Mobile Bay, Ala., seized by State authorities. January 5. Departure of first expedition for re- lief of Fort Sumter, S. C., from N. Y. Harbor. January 8S. United States Arsenal, at Apalachi- cola, Fla., seized by State authorities. January 7. Fort Marion, St. Augustine, Fla., seized by State authorities. January 8. Resignation of Jacob Thompson, of Mississippi, Secretary of the Interior. January 9. Ordinance of secession adopted in Mississippi. January 9. Fort Johnston, N. C., seized by citi- zens of Smithville. January 9. The Star of the lJest, conveying relief to Fort Sumter, fired upon at the entrance to Charleston Harbor and driven back. January 10. Fort Caswell, N. C., seized by citi- zens of Smithville and Wilmington. January 10. Ordinance of secession adopted in Florida. January 10. United States troops, under Lieut. Adam J. Slemmer, transferred from Barrancas Barracks to Fort Pickens, Pensacola, Fla. January 10. Refuforcements for the troops at Pensacola sailed from Boston, Mass. January 10. United States Arsenal and Barracks at Baton Rouge, La., seized by State authorities. January 11. Ordinance of secession adopted in Alabama. January 11. Surrender of Fort Sumter, S. C., demanded by Governor Pickens, of South Caro- lina, and refused by Major Anderson. January 11. Forts Jackson and St. Philip, La., seized by State authorities. January 11. United Sties Marine Hospital, near New Orleans, La., seized by State authorities. January 12. Barrancas Barracks, Forts Barran- cas and MeRee, and the Ilavy Yard at Pensa- cola, Fla., seized by State authorities. January 12. Surrender of Fort Pickens, Fla., demanded by the Governors of Florida and Ala- bama and refused by Lieutenant Slemmer. January 14. Fort Taylor, Key West, Fla., gar- risoned by United States troops. January 14. Fort Pike, La., seized by State authorities. January 15. United States Coast Survey steamer Dana seized at St. Augustine, Fla. January 15. Second demand for the surrender of Fort Pickens, Fla. January 18. Third demand for the surrender of Fort Pickens, Fla. January 19. Ordinance of secession adopted in Georgia. January 20. Fort on Ship Island, Miss., seized by State authorities. January 24. Reftforcements for Fort Pickens, Fla., sailed from Fort Monroe, Va. January 24. United States Arsenal, at Augusta, Ga., seized by State authorities. January 26. Oglethorpe Barracks and Fort Jack- son, Ga., seized by State authorities. January 26. Ordinance of secession adopted in Louisiana. January 28. Fort Macomb, La., seized by State authorities. January 28. United States property in hands of army officers seized at New Orleans, La. February 1. Ordinance of secession adopted in Texas. February 1. United States Mint and Custom House, at New Orleans, La., seized by State authorities. February 4. Meeting at Washington of a Peace Conference, representing 13 Free and 7 Border States, cailed at the request of the Virginia Legislature. (See " February 28.") February 4. Convention of seceded States met at Montgomery, Ala. February 6. The Brooklyn arrived off Pensacola with reenforcements for Fort Pickens, Fla. February 7. The Choetaw Nation of Indians de- clared its adherence to the Southern States. February 8. United States Arsenal, at Little Rock, Ark., seized by State authorities. February 8. A " Constitution for the Provisional Government of the Confederate States of Amer- ica" adopted at Montgomery, Ala., by deputies from the States of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. February 9. Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, elected President, and Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia, Vice-President, of " the Confederate States of America," by the Montgomery Con- vention, or Provisional Congress. February 13. Abraham Lincoln and Hannibal Hamlin officially declared elected President and Vice-President of the United States. February 15. Resolution passed by Confederate Congress for appointment of Commissioners to the Government of the United States. February 16. United States Arsenal and Bar- racks at San Antonio, Tex., seized by State authorities. February 18. All United States military posts in Texas surrendered to the State authorities by General David E. Twiggs, U. S. Army. February 18. Jefferson Davis and Alexander H. Stephens inaugurated at Montgomery, Ala. February 20. Act passed by Confederate Con- gress to provide munitions of war. February 21. Camp Cooper, Texas, abandoned by United States troops. (During the next six months other United States military posts in Texas and New Mexico were abandoned.- See map, page 8.) February 23. Abraham Lincoln arrived in Wash- ington. February 26. Act passed by Confederate Con- gress to organize a general staff for the army. February 28. Adoption by the United States House of Representatives of the amendment offered by the Committee of Thirty-three, for- 2 PRELIMINARY EVENTS. bidding any interference by Congress with slavery in the States. (This amendment was adopted by the Senate March 2, but was never adopted by the necessary number of States.) February 28. Act passed by Confederate Con- gress to raise provisional forces. March 1. The President of the Confederate States assumed control of military affairs in the States of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mis- sissippi, South Carolina, and Texas. March 2. United States Revenue cutter Dodge seized at Galveston, Tex., by State authorities. March 2. Texas admitted as a member of the Confederate States of America. March 3. Brig.-General G. T. Beauregard, C. S. Army, assumed command at Charleston, S. C. March 4. Abraham Lincoln inaugurated as Presi- delnt of the United States. March 6. Confederate Congress passed act for the establishment of an army, not to exceed 100,000 men, for 12 months' service. March 7. Ringgold Barracks, Tex., abandoned. March 7. Camp Verde, Tex., abandoned. March 11. Brig.-General Braxton Bragg assumed command of the Confederate forces in Florida. March 11. Adoption of the "Constitutioii of the Confederate States of America," at Montgomery, Ala., following in general the Constitution of the United States, but prohibiting the passage of any " law denying or impairing the right of property in negro slaves"; prohibiting "the im- portation of negroes of the African race from any foreign country other than the slave-holding States and territories of the United States of America," and giving to the Confederate Con- gress "power to prohibit the introduction of slaves from any State not a member of, or terri- tory not belonging to," the Confederacy. The preamble included a declaration of the " sover- eign and independent character" of each State. March 15. Confederate Congress passed act au- thorizing the construction or purchase of ten gun-boats. April 7. Reenforcements for Fort Pickens sailed from New York. April 10. Second expedition for the relief of Fort Sumter sailed from New York. April 11. Evacuation of Fort Sumter demanded by General Beauregard. April 12. Reenforcements from Fort Monroe, Va., landed at Fort Pickens, Fla. April 12. Bombardment of Fort Sumter com- menced. April 13. Fort Sumter surrendered. April 14. Fort Sumter evacuated by its garrison and occupied by Confederate troops. April 15. President Lincoln issued a call for 75,000 militia for 3 months' service, and a summons to Congress to assemble on July 4th. April 15. Fort Macon, N. C., seized by State authorities. April 16. Forts Caswell and Johnston, N.C., seized by State authorities. April 17. Reeinforcements from New York landed at Fort Pickens, Fla. April 17. Confederate President called for 32,000 troops, and offered letters of marque against United States commerce. April 17. Ordinance of secession adopted in Vir- ginia by Convention, subject to popular vote. April 18. United States Armory at Harper's Ferry abandoned and burned. April 19. President Lincoln announced the blockade of Southern ports, from South Carolina to Texas inclusive. April 19. Conflict between U. S. troops and mob in Baltimore, Md. April 19. Major-General Robert Patterson, Penn- sylvania Militia, assigned to command over the States of Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, and the District of Columbia. April 20. Expedition from Fort Monroe to destroy dry-dock at Norfolk, Va. April 20. United States Arsenal at Liberty, Mo., seized by armed secessionists. April 21. United States Branch Mint at Charlotte, N. C., seized by State authorities. April 21. Colonel Earl Van Dorn, C. S. Army, assumed command ill Texas. April 22. United States Arsenal at Fayetteville, N. C., seized by State authorities. April 23. Fort Smith, Ark., seized by State au- thorities. April 23. United States army officers at San An- tonio, Tex., seized as prisoners of war. April 23. Company of 8th U. S. Infantry (Lee's) captured near San Antonio, Tex. April 23. Captain Nathaniel Lyon, U. S. Army, assumed temporary command of the Department of the West. April 23. Major-General Robert E. Lee assigned to the command of the forces of Virginia. April 26. Major-General Joseph E. Johnston, Vir- ginia Volunteers, assigned to command of the State forces in and about Richmond, Va. April 27. Blockade of Virginia and North Caro- lina ports announced. April 27. Major-General Robert Patterson, Penn- sylvania Militia, assigned to command of the Department of Pennsylvania. April 27. Brig.-General B. F. Butler. Massachu- setts Militia, assigned to command of the Department of Annapolis. April 27. Colonel J. K. F. Mansfield, U. S. Army, assigned to command of the Department of Washington. April 27. Colonel T. J. Jackson, Virginia Volun- teers, assigned to command at Harper's Ferry. May 1. Volunteer forces called for by the Gov- ernor of Virginia. May 3. Additional forces called for in Virginia. May 3. President Lincoln issued call for volun- teers to serve three years; ordered the regular army to be increased, and directed the enlist- ment of additional seamen. Kay 4. Colonel G. A. Porterfield, Virginia Vols., assigned to command in Northwestern Virginia. May 6. Ordinance of secession adopted in Ar- kansas. Kay 6. Confederate Congress passed act "ree- ognizing the existence of war between the United States and the Confederate States, and 3 PRELIMINARY EVENTS. concerning letters of marque, prizes, and prize goods." May 7. Tennessee entered into military league with the Confederate States. May 7. Arlington Heights, Va., occupied by Vir- ginia troops. May 7. Virginia admitted as a member of the Confederate States of America. May 9. Exchange of shots between U. S. steamer Yankee and the batteries at Gloucester Point, Va. Xay 10. Major-General Robert E. Lee assigned to command of Confederate forces in Virginia. May 10. Camp Jackson, St. Louis, Mo., captured by U. S. forces under Captain Nathaniel Lyon. May 11. Riot in St. Louis, Mo. Xay 11. Brig.-General W. S. Harney, U. S. Army, resumed command of the Department of the West. May 13. Brig. -General Beil. McCulloch, C. S. Army, assigned to command in the Indian Territory. Xay 13. Baltimore occupied by General Butler. Xay 13. Major-General G. B. McClellaim, U. S. Army, assigned to command of the Department of Ohio, including a portion of West Virginia. Xay 15. Brig.-General J. E. Johnston, C. S. Army, assigned to command near Harper's Ferry, Va. May 15. Brevet Major-General George Cadwal- ader, Pennsylvania Militia, superseded General Butler in the Department of Annapolis. Xay 17. Acts passed by Confederate Congress providing, upon certain conditions, for the ad- mission of North Carolina and Tennessee as members of the Confederate States of America. May 18. Naval attack on batteries at Sewell's Point, Va. Xay 20. Ordinance of secession adopted in North Carolina. Xay 21. Brig.-General M. L. Bonham, C. S. Army, assigned to command on the "Alex- andria Line," Va. Xay 21. Colonel J. B. Magruder, Provisional Army of Virginia, assigned to command at Yorktown. Xay 21. Convention between General Harney, U. S. Army, and General Sterling Price, Mis- souri State Guard, with a view to the preserva- tion of order in the State. Xay 22. Brig.-General B. F. Butler assigned to command at Fort Monroe, Va. May 23. Demonstration against Hampton, Va. Xay 23. Brig.-General Benj. Huger, Virginia Vol- unteers, assigned to command at Norfolk, Va. May 24. Resolutions of mediation and neutrality adopted in Kentucky. May 24. Union troops advanced into Virginia and occupied Arlington Heights and Alexandria. Xay 26-30. Union troops advanced from the Ohio River and occupied Grafton, West Virginia. May 27-29. Union troops advanced from Fort Monroe and c. eupied Newport News, Va. May 28. Brig.-General Irvin McDowell, IT. S. Army, assumed command of the Department of Northeastern Virginia. May 31. Brig.-General Nathaniel Lyon super- seded General W. S. Harney in command of the Department of the West. May 81. Naval attack on batteries at Aquia Creek, Va. June 1. Skirmishes at Arlington Mills and Fair- fax Court House, Va. June 2. Brig.-General BeauregardsupersededGen- eral Bonham in command on the "Alexandria Line." June 3. Action at Philippi, W. Va. June 5. Naval attack on batteries at Pig Point, Va. June 6. Brig.-General Henry A. Wise, C. S. Army, ordered to command in the Kanawha Valley, W. Va. June 6. Virginia State military and naval forces transferred to the Confederate States. June 7. Confederate reconnoissance from York- town to Newport News, Vsa. June 8. Brig.-General R. S. Garnett, C. S. Army, assigned to command in Northwestern Va. June 10. Engagement at Big Bethel, or Bethel Church, Va. June 10. Brig.-General Beauregard in command of all Confederate forces in Prince William, Fair- fax, and Loudoun counties, Va. June 11. Maj.-General Cadwalader superseded by Maj.-General Banks in Department of An- napolis. June 13. Descent of Union troops upon Romney, W.Va. June 15. Harper's Ferry, Va., evacuated by Con- federate forces. June 17. Engagement at Booneville, Mo. June 17. Action at Camp Cole, Mo. June 17. Action at Vienna, Va. July 2. General Patterson's command crossed the Potomac at Williamsport. July 2. Advance of General George H. Thomas's command, and engagement at FallingWaters,Va. July 5. Engagement near Carthage, Mo. July 8. Brig.-General Henry H. Sibley, C. S. Army, ordered to Texas to expel Union forces from New Mexico. July 9. Skirmish at Vienna, Va. July 10. Skirmish at Laurel Hill, W. Va. July 11. Engagement at Rich Mountain, W. Va. July 13. Major-GeneralLeonidasPolk. C. S. Army, assumed command of Department No. 2, with headquarters at Memphis. July 13. Action at Carrick's Ford, W. Va. July13. Surrender of Pegram's Confederate forcee in Western Virginia. July 14. Brig.-General H. R. Jackson ordered to command of Confederate forces in Western Va. July 15. Military forces, stores, etc., of Arkansas transferred to the Confederate States. July 18. Union advance toward Manassas, Va. July 17. Confederate army retired to the line of Bull Run, Va. July 17. Skirmish at Fairfax Court House, Va. July 18. Skirmish at Mitchell's Ford, Vs. July 18. Action at Blackburn's Ford, Va. July 18-21. Confederate forces from the Shenan- doah Valley, under General Joseph E. Johnston, reinforced the army of General Beauregard at Manassas, Va. July 20. Brig.-General William W. Loring, C. S. Army, assigned to command of "Northwestern Army" (Western Virginia). July 21. Battle of Bull Run, or Manassas, Va. 4 ORGANIZATION OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. I. THE BUCHANAN ADMINISTRATION. (1817 - 1861.) president: JAMES BUCCANAN (Pa.) rie-President: JolEN C. BRECKINRIDGE' (Ky.) ,ecretary oqf Sate: LEWIS CASS (Miebh; JEREMIAH S. BLACK (Pa.), oppoiuted Dec. 1, 1860. -Scretary of War: JOIIN B. FLOYD (Va.); JOSEPH HOLT (Ky.) rad iWterim), Dec. 31, 1860; regularly ap- pointed Jan. 18,18f61. Secretary of the Nary: ISAAC TOIuCEY jClBm.) secetoary Of the ISeasury: HOWELL COBBH (Georgia) PHILIP F. TROMAS (Md.), appoietd1 Dec. 12,1860; Jonx A. DIX (N. Y.), appolnted Jan. 11, 1861. Attorney-Geseral: JEREMIAH S. BLACK; EDWIN M. STANTON (Pa.), appointed Dec. 20, 1860. Secretary of the Interior: JACOB ThOMPSON (Miss.) Postmaater-Gencrat: AARON V. BROWN (Tenn.), died Mar. 8, 1859; JOSEPH HOLT (Ky.), appointed Mar. 14, 1859; HORATIO KING (Maine), appointed Feb. 12, 1861. II. THE LINCOLN ADMINISTRATION. (I 861 - 1865.) President: ABRAHAM LINCOLN (Ill.) rice-President: HANNIBAL HAMLIN (Maine). Secretary ofState: WILLIAM H. SEWARD (New York). secretary of War: SIMON CAMERON (Pa.); El-WIN Mt. STANTON (Pa.., appointed Jan. 18, 1862. Seeretary of the Sacy: GIDEON WELLEs (Coon.) Secretary of the Treasury: SALMON P. CHASE (Ohio); W. P. FE8SKEDEN (Maine), appointed July 1, 1864; HoGH MCCULLOCII (Ind.), appointed Siareh 7,1865. Seeretary of the Interior: CALEB B. SuiTH mlud.); JOHN P. UIsHnR (Ind.), appointed January S, 1863. Attorney-General: EDWARD BATES (Mo.); JAMES SPEEID (Ky.), appointed Dcc. 2,1864. PFbsinaaler-ii6seral: MONTGOMERY BLAIR (Md.); WILLIAM DENNISON (Ohio), appointed September 24, 1864. THE UNITED STATES WAR DEPARTMENT. Secretary of War: JOSEPH HOLT (appointed Jan. 18, 1861); SIMON CAMERON (appointedMareh 5,1861); EDWIN M1. STANTON (appointed January 15, 1862). Asistant Scecrtaries of War: THOMAS A. ScoTr (ap- pointed Aug. 3, 1861; PETER H. WATSON appointed Jan. 24, 1862): Joint TUCKER lappointed Jan. 29,1862); CHRIS- TOPHER P. WOLCOTT (appointed June 12, 1862; resigned Jan. 23, 1863); CHARLES A. DANA (appointed August. 1863). (Colonel Seott was regularly commissioned under the act of August 3, 1861, authortzing the p- pointment of one assistant secretary of war. Sub- sequently three assistant secretaries were authorized by law.) AdJmltaat-Generat' Department: Colonel SAMUEL COOPER (resigned Mareh 7, 1861); Brig.-Gen. LORENZO THOMAS (assigned to other duty March 23,1863); Colonel EIIWARD D. TowNSEND. Qnartermaster's Department: Brig.-Gcen. JOPEiPm F. JOHNSTON (resigned April 22, 1861); Brig.-Gen. MOXT- ,OMERY C. MEmGS. Slbsiseunee Department: Colonel GEORGE GIISON (dhid Sept. 29,1861); Brig.-Gen. JOSEPH P. TAYLOR (died Jan. 29, 1864); Brig.-Gen. AMOS B. EATON. Medical Department: Colonel THOMAs LAWSON (died May 15, 1861); Colonel CLEMENT A. FINLEY (retired April 14, 1862); Brig-Gen. WILLIAM A. HAnOND; Brig.-Gen. JoSEPH K. BARNES (appointed Aug. 22, 1864). Pay Department: Colonel BENJAMIN F. LARNED (died Sept. 6, 1862); Colonel TIXOTHY P. AxN)REws (retired Nov. 29, 1864); Brlg.-Gen. BENJAMIN W. BRECE. Corps of Topographical Engiteers: Colonel Joux J. AsRET (retired Sept. 9, 1861); Colonel STEPHEN H. LoNG. (This corps was consolidated with the "Corps of En- gineers," under act of March 3,1863.) Corp of Engineers: Brig.-Gen. JOSEPH G. TOnTEx (died April 22, 1884); Brig.-Gel. RICHARD DELAFIELD. Ordnanee Department: Colonel HENRY K. CRAIG (untill April 23, 1861); Brig.-Gen. JAMES W. RIPLEY tr- tired Sept. 15, 1863); Brig.-Gen. GEORGE D. RAMSAY (retired Sept. 12, 1864); Brig.-Gen. ALEXANDER B. DYER. Rnreais of Military Ji'stie: Malor JOHN F. LEE (re- signed Sept. 4, 1862); Brig.-Gen. JOSEPH HOLT. Rnrea, of the Prorost Marshal General (created by aet of March 3, 2863): Brig.-en. JAMES B. FRY. General Offlcers of the anited States Army, January 1, 1861: Brevet Lient.-Cen. WINPIEI.D ScoTw Geeiral-ili- chief); Brig.-Generals: JOHN- E. Wool., DAVID E. Twloos. WILLIAM S. HARNEY. (NOTn.-E. V. Soinner was promoted Brigadier-General March 16, 1861, rice David E. Twiggg, dismissed March 1,1861.) THE UNITED STATES NAVY DEPARTMENT. Secretary of the Nary: GIDEON WELLES. Assistant Secretary: GUSTAvUS V. FOX. Yards and Docks: Rear-Admiral JOSEPn Suns. Ordlnance ad Hydrography: Captain GEORGE A. MA- GRUDER (dismissed April 22, 1861); Captain AlDREW A. HARWOOD (relUeved Jnly 22,1862); Rear-Admiral JOHN A. DABLGREN (relieved June 24, 1863); Commander HENRY A. WISE. (By act of Congress of July 5,1862, "Hydrog- raphy" was transferred to the Bureau of Navigation.) Narigation (established by act of July 5, 1862): Rear- Admiral CRARLES A. DAVIS. Equipment and Recruiting (established by act of July 5, 1862): Rear-Admiral ANDREW H. FOOTE (relieved June 3,1863); Commander ALBERT N. SMITII. Canstrnetion, Equipmnt., asd Repair: Chief Naval Construetor JouN LENTHAI.L. (By act of July 5, 1862, the "Equipment and Recruiting" Bnurean was -rgnai- ied, and thereafter the old bnrean was designated as Construction and Repair.") Prarisions and Clothing: Pay-Director HORATIO1 BRIDGE. Medicine and Snrgery: Surgeon WILLIAM WHELAN. Steam-Elngise-ring (established by act of July 5,18ft): Engineer-In-Chietf BENJAMIN F. ISHERWOOD. - Afterward in the Confederate Service. 6 ORGANIZATION OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. THE CONFEDERATE STATES GOVERNMENT. 1'residenl: JEFFEIIoN DAvIs (Miss) 1iee-Pvcsidet(: ALEXANDER 11. STEPHENS (Ga.) 1. PROVISIONAL ORGANIZATION. (Feb. 8, 1861.) Rerefury of seate: ROBERT TooM.B(Ga.), Feb. 21, 1861; it. .M. T. IIUJTEIt, (Va., July 24, 1861. ecretatry of W-r: LEROY 1'. WALKER (Ala.), Feb. 21, 1861; J IiAII 1'. ISENJAMIN ULa), SIept. 17, 1861. .-erar-y of the Nary: STEPHEN Rt. MALLORY (Fla.), FMI2. 1, 1861. Seretatry of the Treasury: CHARLES G. MEMMINGER (S. C.), Fel0. 21.1861. Atto;ruy-Oeuerl: JUIIAII P. BENJAMIN, Feb. 25,1861; TBomMAS BRAGG, (Al ). S-pt. 17, 1861. Iostuvaater-tGeural: J. II. REA1GAN (Texa.), March 6. 18fi1. UNION STATES: Califor.ia, JOHN G. DOW CEY 1860-1), LELASI, STANFORD (1861-3). FREDERICK F. LoW (1862)); Counectir, WILLIAM A. BUCKINIA;LAM (1858-66); Denlaare, WILLIAM BURTOIN (1839-6), WIlLIAM CANNIIN (1862-7); Illinois. RICUARD YATES (1861-5); Indiana. OLIVER P. .MORT1.N 11861-7); Iowea, 4AlIEL J. KItKwOoD (186041i, WIL.LIAM M. SToNE (1864-5); Kansas, CHIARLES ROBINSON (1861-3). TlloM.A CARNEY (13-1; ,ai.,e, Is- RAEL WASIlHUtRN. JR. (1861-3;, ABNER CoHuRN (18624), SAMUEL CoNY (1864-4); ssaehusets. JOHN A. ANDREW 118614-6J; MichIa, AU;STIN BLAIR (1861-4), HENRY II. CRAIcO (1865-9); JMineolaALEXANDER RAMSEY (185943). STEPHEN MILLE (1618364;; Nerada (State adliitted 1864). HENRY G. BLAFISELL 1864-71); Ne llaapshire. ICHA- Boh, GOODWIN 18591. NATH -NIEI. S. BERRY (1861-5', J4,SEI-H A. GILMORE (18634s); Neir Jersey. CHARLES S. OLDEN (I860-3). JIEL PARKER (I86436); N-e ork, EDWIN 2).3MOuGAN (1829-4i. HORATIO SEYMOUR (186325), REU- BEN E. FENTON 189); Ohio, WILLIAM DENNIsoN (1880-D), ISAVID ToD (186924). JoHN BROUGH (18644); ,regon, JOHN WHITTAKER (1859426), AIJIHSON C. (,IRBE (1862-4); "enstylvania, ANDREW (. CrRTIN (1861-7); Rhode I.land, WILLIAM SPRAGUE (1860-1), JoHN IL BART- LETT, -ctIng (1861-2), WILLIAM C. COZZENS, acting (1863). JAMES Y. SMITH (1863-); VeroNot, ERAHTU8 FAIRBANKS (1860-1), FREDERIC HO1LBROOK (18.1-5(, J. GREGORY SMITH (1863-5); Wet Virginia (admiitted 1008), Provi- .;onal Govern,,r, FRANCI8 H. PEIRPOINT (1861-3), AR- II. REORGANIZATION. (Feb. 22, 1862, to April, 1865.) Sertary of Slate: R. M. T. IIUNTER, July 24, 1861; JUDASI P. BENJAMIN, March 17, 1862. SeretaVry of War: JUDAU P. BENJAMIN, Sept. 17, 1861; GEORGE W. RANDOLPH, March 1T, 1862; GUsTAvuS W. SMITH, acting, Nov. 17, 1862; JAMES A. SeoDoN, Nov. 20,1862; JOaN C. BRECKINRIDGE, Jan. 28,1865. Secretary of the Nary: SPTEHEN H. MALLORY. Seretary of the Treasr y: C. G. MEMMINGER; GEORI.E A. TRENHOLM, Julie, 1164. Attorney-Ge-cral: TuoY.A8 BRAGG; THOMA8 H. WATTS (Ala), March 17, 1862; (GEoRGE DAVIS (N C.), 1864-1. Postmasktr-Gen-ral: JOHN H. REAoAN. THUR I. BOREMAN (1863-9); Wieonsin, ALEXANDER W. RANDALL (1857-G1) LouIs P. HARVEY (1861-2), EDWARD SALOMON (1862-8), JAMES T. LEWI8 (18634). CONFEDERATE STATES: Alabama, ANDREW B. MOORE (1857-1), JOHN GILL SHORTER (1861-3), THOMAS H. W ATTS (1860-5); Arkansas, HENRY M. RECTOR (I8604), HARRIS FLANAGIN 1863-4;, ISAAC MURPHY (1864-8); Floridq, MADI-N S. PERRY (185741), JoHN MILTON 11861-5); Georgia JOSEPH E. BROWN (1857-45); Louisni.a TIIOYAH 0. MoRm (1860-o4), HENRY W. ALLEN (1864-5); UIniou Military G.overnors, GEORGE F. SHEPLEY 11862-41, MICHAEL HAHN (1864-5); MisiPpi, JOHN J. PETTUS 1I8602), CHARLES CLARKE (1863), JACOB THOMPSON (1865-4); V.4oh Croina JOHN W. ELLIS (1858-611, H. T. CLARK, acting 11861-2), ZEBULON B. VANCE 186245); South Carolina, FRANCIS W. PICKENS (1860-2), M. L. RONBAM (1862-4;, A. G. MAGRATH (1864-5); Tennesee, ISHAM G. HARRIS (186745), ANDREW JOHNSON, Union MIlitary Governor (186245); Texas, SAMUEL HOUSTON (181861), EDWARD CLARK, aCting (1861), FRANCIS R. LUBBOCK 1861-3), PENDLETON MURRAR (1863-5); Virginia, JoHN LETCHZR (1860-4), WILLIAM SMITHN, (1864). BORDER STATES: Kentuky, BERIAH MAGOFTIN (185962), JAMES F. ROHINsoN (1862-3); THOMAS E. BRAI- LETTE (1862-7); Maryland, THOMAS H. HICKS (186761), A. W. BRADFORD (1861-I); Misouri C. F. JACKSON (1861); Union, H. R. GAMBLE (18614), T. C. FLETCHER (1864-8). N. B.-The Confederate Governulent of Kentucky was provIsional in its character. George W. Johnon Was elected (;overnor by the Rusmellville Convention in November, 1861. He served until he was killed in action at the battle of Shiloh. Richard Hawes was elected by the ProviSional Councel of Kentucky to succeed him, and acted as the Contederate -rovlsional Governor of Kentucky troam 1862 until the close of the war.-In Mjsowuri Thomas C. Reynolds was the Confederate Governor from 1861 to 1865; but after 1861 a Confederate Goveimor of Mlisouri was little mnure than a name.- In Tennessee, Governor Harris being lneligible to a fourth term, Robert L. Caruthers was elected Governor in AuguSt, 1865. Tennessee and her capItal being then occupied by the United States forces. Mr. Caruthers was never inaugurated, and Governor Harris held over under the laiw. THE CONFEDERATE STATES WAR DEPARTMENT. Seretary of War: (eo above). Ord--ane Dep'(: Brig.-Gen. JOSIAH GORGA8. Asistant S-eary of War: ALBERT T. BLDSOE Eugincer Bateatu;: MJ.-en. JEREMY F. GILMER. (April 1, 1862); JOHN A. CAMPBELL (October 2o,1862). MdkIcal Dep't: Brig.-Geu. SAMUEL P. MoORE. Adjt. aod In p.-Ges DWIep't: (Gemeral SAMUEL COOPER. NWitr and MiRiIgSJ Burea.: Brig..Ge.. 1. M. ST. JOHN; V..t.ernasler-taerats Dep't: C.oloel ABRAM C. Colonel RicnARD MORTON (Feb. 16,1861). MYERS (Marcb 15, 186i); Brig.-en-. A. R. LAWTON (Aug. CoUneriplion Bureau: Brig.-Gen. JoBN S. PRESTON. 10, 186;3. Chief; Col. T. P. AUGUST, Supt. (o.n. issary-GnraI's DeI't: Colonlel Lucius R NoR- Friion Ca ps: Brig.-Gen. JOHN H. WINDER. TIIRoP (March 16,1861); Blrig.-(len. 1. M. ST. JOHN WFeb- Eehange ofPrisoncrs: Col. ROBERT OULD, Chietf rary 1IC, 186). Commisioncr of P'atents: RUFUS R. RHODES. THE CONFEDERATE STATES NAVY DEPARTMENT. Secretary of the .Nary: STEPHEN II. MALLORY. Prorisions and Clothing: As.ig t Surgeon JoHN DE Or ders ad Detail: Captain FRENCH FORREST; CoInI- BREE. mander JOHN Kt. MITCHELL. Medicine and Surgery: Surgeon W. A. W. SPOTS- MrdNaaee and Hydrography: Co wmander GEORGE WOOD. MINOR: Con-.andec Joi" M. BRoRoKE. GOVERNORS OF THE STATES DURING THE WAR. WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR. BY CHARLES P. STONE, BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V. LL who knew Washington in the days of December, A 1860, know what thoughts reigned in the minds of thinking men. Whatever their daily occupations, they went about them with their thoughts always bent on the possible disasters of the near future. The country was in a curious and alarming condition: South Caro- lina had already passed an ordinance of secession, and other States were preparing to follow her lead. The only regular troops near the capital of the country were 300 or 400 marines at the marine barracks, and 3 offi- cers and 53 men of ordnance at the Washington arsenal The old militia system had been abandoned (without being legally abolished), and Congress had passed no law establishing a new one. The only armed vol- unteer organizations in the District of Columbia were: The Potomac Light Infantry, 1 company, at Georgetown; the National Rifles, 1 company, in Washington; the Washington Light Infantry, of about 160 men, and another small organization called the National Guard Battalion. It had been evident for months that, on assembling in December, Congress would have far dif- ferent work to consider than the organization of the District of Columbia militia. Nor in the delicate position of affairs would it be the policy of Presi- dent Buchanan, at the outset of the session, to propose the military organiza- tion of the Federal District. It was also evident that, should he be so disposed, the senators and representatives of the Southern States would oppose and denounce the project. What force, then, would the Government have at its disposal in the Federal District for the simple maintenance of order in case of need Evidently but a handful; and as to calling thither promptly any regular troops, that was out of the question, since they had already all been distributed by the Southern sympathizers to the distant frontiers of the Indian country,- Texas, Utah, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington Territory. Months would have been In December, 1860, the military forces of the United States consisted of 1108 officers and 15,- 259 men of the regular army; total, 16,367. The distribution of the army may be inferred from the map printed on page 8, and from the following "memorandum" (made on the 6th of December, 1875), by Adjutant-General E. D. Townsend, exhibiting " certain changes in the sta- tions of troops made under the orders of the Sec- retary of War, John Bi. Floyd, during the years 1858-60": "After the removal of the troops to Kansas and Utah at the close of Indian hostilities in Florida, in June, 1858, there were left in the coun- try east of the Mississippi River 16 companies of artillery. From that time (June, 1858) till Decem- ber 31, 1860, some changes of stations occurred, by which the Department of the East gained 3 com- panies (2 of artillery and 1 of engineers), so that at the end of 1860 there were 18 companies of artillery and I of engineers serving east of the Mississippi River. There were no troops in the neighborhood of Washington during the whole of Secretary Floyd's term of office. In the spring and summer of 1860 the force in Utah was reduced to 3 companies of dragoons, 3 companies of artillery, and 4 companies of infantry. The remainder (13 companies of infantry and 2 of dragoons) were sent to New Mexico, relieving 1 regiment of infantry al- ready there, which thereupon proceeded to Texas. No other changes of importance were made during the period iu question."- EDITORS. t p Ik ' ''''i i "f'X 4 i2'eegtXr and;:,/ ,7 I' AJ'' 45-i' EC 4 "if/if 4 / X'.3. XK :t,.::E,,'', ,, k ',2 , X , 7t1 , HBheaSeSe Wt S X'i Get ti -I4 414 1 :f w WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR. necessary to concentrate at Washington, in that season, a force of three thousand regular troops. Even had President Buchanan been desirous of bring- ing troops to the capital, the feverish condition of the public mind would, as the executive believed, have been badly affected by any movement of the kind, and the approaching crisis might have been precipitated. I saw at once that the only force which could be readily made of service was a volunteer force raised from among the well-disposed men of the Dis- trict, and that this must be organized, if at all, under the old law of 1799. By consultation with gentlemen well acquainted with the various classes of Washington society, I endeavored to learn what proportion of the able-bodied population could be counted on to sustain the Government should it need support from the armed and organized citizens. On the 31st of December, 1860, Lieutenant-General Scott, General-in-Chief of the army (who had his head- quarters in New York), was in Washington. The Presi- dent, at last thoroughly alarmed at the results of continued concessions to secession, had summoned him for consulta- tion. On the evening of that day I went to pay my respects to my old commander, and was received by him at Worm- ley's hotel. He chatted pleasantly with me for a few I'M OF T NATIwONAL minutes, recalling past service in the Mexican war, etc.; HROMI A VOTOGRAP11.) and when the occasion presented itself, I remarked that I was glad to see him in good spirits, for that proved to me that he took a more cheerful view of the state of public affairs than he had on his arrival -more cheerful than we of Washington had dared to take during the past few days. " Yes, my young friend," said the general, " I feel more cheerful about the affairs of the country than I did this morning; for I believe that a safer policy than has hith- erto been followed will now be adopted. The policy of entire conciliation, which has so far been pursued, would soon have led to ruin. We are now in such a state that a policy of pure force would precipitate a crisis for which we are not prepared. A mixed policy of force and concilia- tion is now necessary, and I believe it will be adopted and carried out." He then looked at his watch, rose, and said: "I must be with the President in a quarter of an hour," and ordered his carriage. He walked up and down the (lining-room, but suddenly stopped and faced me, saying: " How is the feeling in the District of Columbia I What proportion of the population would sustain the Govern- ment by force, if necessary" a oF THED POT "It is my belief, General," I replied, " that two-thirds of A lTOGRAEl Y NAC 9 I 'MIF R11'1S WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR. WII.qrtVW 0C) Ot ETt MM ThNANT-1O4EXERAI. U . KA. (V1 A UvTOORAP0t Genrad Selet mwa Gen erain-i4. of the army it Nidovem I." 1M, weiw he was placM nrM the : rehtidli tg ho i twspi e niv a ndt -ads it bl Mt rail ( U A A R lie dat at WA PO il May, 1it, hiu fi ghtgth year. the fighting stock of this population would sustain the Government in defend- ing itself, if called upon. But they are uncertain as to what can be done or what the Government desires to have done, and they have no rallying-point." The general walked the room again in silence. The carriage came to the door, and I accompanied him toward it. As he was leaving, he turned sud- denly, looked me in the face, placed his hand on my shoulder, and said: 10 WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR. " These people have no rallying-point. Make yourself that rallying- point!" The next day I was commissioned by the President colonel in the staff and inspector-General of the District of Columbia. I was mustered into the service of the United States from the 2d day of January, 1861, on the special requisi- tion of the General-in-Chief, and thus was the first of two and a half millions called into the mili- tary service of the Government to de- fend it against seces- I immediately en- tereduponmyduties, commencing by in- slpections in detail of the existing orgaii- zations of volunteers. The Potomac Light Infantry company, of Georgetown, I 1 found fairly drilled, well armed, and, from careful infor- V;B .. mation, it seemed to :t At IVAU-Tt" X.. me certain that the majority of its members could be depended upon in case of need, but not all of them. On the 2d of January, I met, at the entrance of the Metropolitan Hotel, Captain Schaeffer, of the " National Rifles" of Washington, and I spoke to him about his company, which was remarkable for drill. Schaeffer had been a lieutenant in the Third United States Artillery, and was an excellent drill- master. He had evidently not yet heard of my appointment as Inspector-General, and he replied to my complimentary remarks on his company: " Yes, it is a good company, and I suppose I shall soon have to lead it to the banks of the Susquehanna!" "Why so ! " I asked. "Why! To guard the frontier of Maryland and help to keep the Yankees from coming down to coerce the South! " I said to him quietly that I thought it very imprudent in him, an employee of the Department of the Interior and captain of a company of District of Columbia volunteers, to use such expressions. He replied that most of his men were Marylanders, and would have to defend Maryland. I told him that he would soon learn that he had been imprudent, and advised him to think more seriously of his position, but did not inform him of my appointment, which he would be certain to learn the following morning from the newspapers. It must be admitted that this was not a very cheerful beginning. I I WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR. On inspecting the " National Rifles," I found that Schaeffer had more than 100 men on his rolls, and was almost daily adding to the number, and that he had a full supply of rifles with 200 rounds of ball cartridges, two mountain howitzers with harness and carriages, a supply of sabers and of revolv- ers and ammunition, all drawn from the United v States arsenal. I went to the Chief of Ordnance, X,. to learn how it was that this company of riflemen happened to be so un- usually armed; and I found at the Ordnance Office that an order ha been given by the late IH, immediatel presented the matter to the new Secretary of War (John HTi Wand V ArSENAL. from hi twoR--M 1orders,-oneB. Floyd) directing the Chief of Ordnance to cause to be issued to Captain Schaeefer "all the ordnance and ordnance stores that he might require for his company!" I ascertained also that Floyd had nominated Captain Schaeffer to the President for the commission of major in the District of Columbia Militia, and that the commission had already been sent to the President for his signature. I immediately presented the matter to the new Secretary of War (Joseph Holt), and procured from him two orders,-one, an order to the Chief of Ordnance to issue no arms to any militia or volunteers in the District of Columbia unless the requisition should be countersigned by the Inspector- General; the other, an order that all commissions issued to officers of the District of Columbia should be sent to the Inspector-General for delivery. An office was assigned me in the War Department, convenient to the army- registers and near the Secretary of War, who kindly gave orders that I should at all times be admitted to his cabinet without waiting, and room was made for me in the office of Major-General Weightman, the senior major-general of the District, where each day I passed several hours ini order to confer with him, and to be able promptly to obtain his authority for any necessary order. The Washington Light Infantry organization and the National Guard were old volunteers composed of Washington people, and were almost to a man faithful to the Government. Of their officers, Major-General Weightman, though aged, and Major-General Force, aged and infirm, were active, and true as steel; Brigadier-Generals Bacon and Carrington were young, active, and true. Brigadier-General Robert Ould, who took no part in the preparations of the winter, joined the Confederates as soon as Virginia passed her ordinance of secession, and his known sentiments precluded consultation with him. 12 WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR. Having thus studied the ground, and taken the first necessary steps toward security, I commenced the work of providing a force of volunteers. I addressed individual letters to some forty well-known and esteemed gentle- men of the District, informing each one that it would be agreeable to the Government should he in his neighborhood raise and organize a company of volunteers for the preservation of order in the District. To some of these let- ters I received no replies; to some I received replies courteously declining the service; to some I received letters sarcastically declining; but to many I received replies enthusiastically accepting the service. In about six weeks thirty-three companies of infantry and riflemen and two troops of cavalry were on the lists of the District volunteer force; and all had been uniformed, equipped, and put under frequent drill. The Northern Liberties fire companies brought their quota; the Lafayette Hose Company was prompt to enroll; the masons, the carpenters, the stone- cutters, the painters, and the German turners responded: each corporation formed its companies and drilled industriously. Petty rivalries disappeared, and each company strove to excel the others in drill and discipline. While the newly organized companies thus strove to perfect themselves, the older organizations resumed their drills and filled their ranks with good recruits. The National Rifles company (Captain Schaeffer's) was carefully observed, and it was found that its ranks received constant accessions, including the most openly declared secessionists and even members of Congress from the Southern States. This company was very frequently drilled in its armory, and its recruits were drilled nearly every night. Having, as Inspector-General, a secret service force at my disposition, I l)laced a detective in the company, and had regular reports of the proceed- ings of its captain. He was evidently pushing for an independent command of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, having his rifles, cannon, sabers, and revolv- ers stored in his armory. He also began to prepare for action, ordering his men to take their rifles and equipments home with them, with a supply of ammunition, so that even should his armory be occupied, they could assemble on short notice, ready for action. Meantime, his commission as major was signed by the President and sent to me. I reported these matters to General Scott, who ordered me to watch these proceedings carefully, and to be ready to suppress any attempt at violence; but to avoid, if pos- sible, any shock, for, said he, "We are now i such a state that a dog-fight might cause A. Aft tt 00 y0;0the gutters of the capital to run with 4N4N bloodY While the vohmnteer force for the support TUE COLUMBUX ARMORY, WAINT (FROM A WAR'TIME SKETCH.) of the Government 13 WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR. was organizing, another force with exactly the opposite purpose was in course of formation. I learned that the great hall over Beach's livery stable was nightly filled with men who were actively drilled. Doctor B-, of well-known seces- sion tendencies, was the moving spirit of these men, and he was assisted by other citizens of high standing, among whom was a connection of Governor Letcher of Virginia. The numbers of these occupants of Beach's hall increased rapidly, and I found it well to have a skillful New York detective officer, who had been placed at my disposition, en- rolled among them. These men called themselves "National Volunteers," and in their meetings openly discussed the seizure of the national capital at the proper moment. They drilled industri- ously, and had regular business meetings, full reports of which were regularly laid before me every following morning by " the New York member." In the meet- \ ing at which the uniform to be adopted was discussed, the vote was for gray Ken- tucky jeans, with the Maryland button. A cautious member suggested that they OFiiWA.R OFruiiFROM DiE. 31. must remember that, in order to procure IWA, UTL M 4. (FROM A PIiMiMdiAiL) arms, it would be " necessary to get the requisition signed by I Old Stone,' and if he saw that they had adopted the Maryland button, and not that of the United States, he might suspect them and refuse the issue of arms!" Doctor B- supported the idea of the Maryland button, and said that, if Stone refused the arms, the Governor of Virginia would see them furnished, ete. These gentlemen probably little thought that a full report of their remarks would be read the next morning by "Old Stone "to the General- in-Chief. The procuring of arms was a difficult matter for them, for it required the election of officers, the regular enrolling of men, the certificate of elections, and the muster-rolls, all to be reported to the Inspector-General. The subject was long discussed by them, and it was finally arranged that, out of the 360 men, a pretended company should be organized, officers elected, and the demand for arms made. This project was carried out, and my member brought to me early the next morning the report of the proceedings, inform- ing me that Doctor B- had been elected captain, and would call on the Inspector-General for arms. Sure enough Doctor B- presented himself in my office and informed me that he had raised a company of volunteers, and desired an order for arms. He produced a certificate of election in due form. I received him courteously, and informed him that I could not give an order for arms without having a muster-roll of his men, proving that a full one hundred had signed the rolls. It was desirable to have the names of men holding such sentiments and nursing such projects as were known to be theirs. 14 WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR. He returned, I think, on the following day, with a muster-roll in due form, containing the names of one hundred men. This was all that I wanted. I looked him full in the face, smiled, and locked the muster-roll in a drawer of my desk, saying: " Doctor B-, I am very happy to have obtained this list, and I wish you good-morning." The gallant doctor evidently understood me. He smiled, bowed, and left the office, to which he never returned. He subsequently proved the sincerity of his principles by abandoning his pleasant home in Washington, his large and valu- able property, and giving his earnest service to the Confederate cause. The "National Volunteer" organization broke up without further trouble. Next came the turn of Captain Schaeffer. He entered my office one day with the air of an injured man, holding in his hand a requisition for arms and ammunition, and saying, that, on presenting it at the Ordnance Office, he had been informed that no arms could be issued to him without my approval. I informed him that that was certainly correct, and that the order of the Sec- retary of War was general. I told him that he had already in his possession more rifles than were required for a company, and that he could have no more. He then said, sulkily, that with his company he could easily take the arms he wanted. I asked him, "Where" and he replied: " You have only four soldiers guarding the Columbian armory, where there are plenty of arms, and those four men could not prevent my taking them." "Ah ! " I replied, " in what part of the armory are those arms kept " He said they were on the upper floor, which was true. " Well," said I, " you seem to be well informed. If you think it best, just try taking the arms by force. I assure you that if you do you shall be fired on by 150 soldiers as you come out of the armory." The fact was, that only two enlisted men of ordnance were on duty at the Columbian armory, so feeble was the military force at the time. But Barry's battery had just arrived at the Washington arsenal, and on my application General Scott had ordered the company of sappers and miners at West Point to come to Washington to guard the armory; but they had not yet arrived. The precautions taken in ordering them were thus clearly proved advisable. The time had evidently come to disarm Captain Schaeffer; and when he reached his office after leaving mine, he found there an order directing him to deposit in the Columbian armory, before sunset on that day, the two howitz- ers with their carriages which he had in his possession, as well as the sabers and revolvers, as these weapons formed no part of the proper armament of a company of riflemen. He was taken by surprise, and had not time to call together men enough to resist; so that nothing was left to him but to comply with the order. He obeyed it, well knowing that if he did not I was prepared to take the guns from his armory by means of other troops. Having obeyed, he presented himself again in my office, and before he had time to speak I informed him that I had a commission of major for his name. He was much pleased, and said: " Yes, I heard that I had been appointed." I then handed him a slip of paper on which I had written out the form of 15 WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR. oath which the old law required to be taken by officers, that law never having been repealed, and said to him: "Here is the form of oath you are to take. You will find a justice of the peace on the next 4 floor. Please qualify, sign the form in du- \ plicate, and bring I _ Ax both to me. One will be filed with your let- ter of acceptance, the other will be filed in the clerk's office of the Circuit Court of the " He took the paper with a sober look, and stood near my table several minutes look- "q Uing at the form of oath and turning the paper over, while I, apparently very busy with my papers, was observing him closely. I then said: "Ah, Schaeffer, have you already taken the oath i" "No," said he. Well, please be quick about it, as I have no time to spare" N " He hesitated, and said slowly: 11In ordinary times I would not mind tak- ing it., but in these tunes ____" "Ah! "saidI," 64YOU MRSUUAMN.PRSIDNTOFTU UITI STATEFRMACH4 154 s decline to accept your UNTI mn t isit ilu l A SlamoSH commission of major. Very well!I" and I returned his commission: to the drawer and locked it in. " Oh, no," said Schaeffer, " I want the commissions" " But, sir, you cannot have it. Do you suppose that, in these times, which are not, as you say, ' ordinary times,' I would think of delivering a commiission 3X i6 WASHING TON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR. of field-officer to a man who hesitates about taking the oath of office Do you think that the Government of the United States is stupid enough to allow a man to march armed men about the Federal District under its authority, when that man hesitates to take the simple oath of office ! No, sir, you can- iot have this commission; and more than that, I now inform you that you hold no office in the District of Colum- bia volunteers." "Yes, I do; I am captain, and have miny commission as such, signed by the '. President and delivered to me by the major-general." i YI am aware that such a paper was delivered to you, but you failed legally to accept it." YTOE ' N "I wrote a letter of acceptance to the adjutant-general, and forwarded a a it through the major-general." wa e "Yes,I am aware that you did; but Coas Sv and I I know also that you failed to inclose hi t in that letter, according to law, the pa h b f f form of oath required to accompany all letters of acceptance; and on the a raegister of the War Department, while t the issuance of your commission is h recorded, the acceptance is not re- N N eordled. You have never legally au - ceppted your commission, and it is now '' 3 too late. The oath of a man who hesitates to take it will not now be f r h accepted." So Captain Schaeffer left the "'Na- CHARLES P. STONEfl1 RJGAIEROMU RAL, U-8 V- tional Rifles," and with him left the of the PHOmp oGRap secession members of the company. I induced qite a number of true men to loin its ranks; a new election was ordered, and a strong, loyal man (Lieu- tenant Smead of the 2d Artillery) was elected its captain. Smead was then on duty in the office of the Coast Survey, and I easily procured from thle War Department permission for him to accept the position. If my information was correct, the plan had been formed for seizing the Ipu-blic departments at the proper moment and obtaining possession of the seals of the Governmeiit. Schaeffer's part, with the battalion he was to form, was to take possession of the Treasury Department for the benefit of the new Pro- Nisional Government. Whatever may have been the pi oject, it was effectually foiled. With the breaking up of the "National Volunteers"; with the trans- formation of the secession company of "National Rifles" into a thoroughly faithful and admirably drilled company ready for the service of the Govern- "lent; with the arrival from West Point of the company of sappers and VOL. I.-2 17 18 WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR. miners, and, later, the arrival of the Military Academy battery under Griffin; and with the formation in the District of thirty new companies of infantry and riflemen from among the citizens of Washington and Georgetown, the face of things in the capital had much changed before the 4th of March. I must now go back a little in time, to mention one fact which will show in how weak and dangerous a condition our Government was in the latter part of January andl the early part of February, 1861. The invitations which I had issued for the raising of companies of volunteers had, as already stated, been enthusiastically responded to, and companies were rapidly organized. The preparatory drills were carried on every night, and I soon found that the men were sufficiently advanced to receive their arms. I began to approve the requisitions for arms; but, to my great astonishment, the captains who first received the orders came back to me, stating that the Ordnance Department had refused to issue any arms! On referring to the Ordnance Office, I was informed by the Chief of Ordnance that he had received, the day before, an order not to issue any arms to the District of Columbia troops, and that this order had come from the President! I went immediately to the Secretary of War (Mr. Holt) and informed him of the state of affairs, telling him at the same time that I did not feel disposed to be employed in child's play, organizing troops which could not be armed, and that unless the order in question should be immediately revoked there was no use for me in my place, and that I must at once resign. Mr. Holt told me that I was perfectly right; that unless the order should be revoked there was no use in my holding my place, and he added, with a smile, " and I will also say, Colonel, there will be no use in my holding my place any longer. Go to the President, Colonel, and talk to him as you have talked to me." I went to the White House, and was received by Mr. Buchanan. I found him sitting at his writing-table, in his dressing-gown, wearied and worried. I opened at once the subject of arms, and stated the necessity of immediate issue, as the refusal of arms would not only stop the instruction of the volun- teers, which they needed sadly, but would make them lose all confidence in the Government and break up the organizations. I closed by saying that, while I begged his pardon for saying it, in case he declined to revoke his order I must ask him to accept my resignation at once. Mr. Buchanan was evidently in distress of mind, and said: " Colonel, I gave that order acting on the advice of the District Attorney, Mr. Robert Ould." " Then, Mr. President," I replied, " the District Attorney has advised your Excellency very badly." " But, Colonel, the District Attorney is an old resident of Washington, and he knows all the little jealousies which exist here. He tells me that you have organized a company from the Northern Liberty Fire Company." "Not only one, but two excellent companies in the Northern Liberty, your Excellency." "And then, the District Attorney tells me you have organized another com- pany from among the members of the Lafayette Hose Company." FROMA AhA1IBROTYPE TAKEN FOR MARlCUiR 1. WARD (AFTVERWARD (OVER OR OF NEW JERSEY) IS SPRIUNGFIELD. ILL., MAY 20, 180, TMWO D)AYS AFTER XR. LUNCOLN'S FIU'T NOMINATION. 19 WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR. " Yes, your Excellency, another excellent company." "And the District Attorney tells me, Colonel, that there is a strong feeling of enmity between those fire companies, and, if arms are put in their hands, there will be danger of bloodshed in the city." " Will your Excellency excuse me if I say that the District Attorney talks nonsense, or worse, to you f If the Northern Liberties and the Lafayette Hose men wish to fight, can they not procure hundreds of arms in the shops along the avenue Be assured, Mr. President, that the people of this District are thinking now of other things than old ward feuds. They are thinking whether or not the Government of the United States is to allow itself to crumble out of existence by its own weakness. And I believe that the District Attorney knows that as well as I do. If the companies of volunteers are not armed, they will disband, and the Government will have nothing to protect it in ease of even a little disturbance. Is it not better for the public peace, your Excellency, even if the bloody feud exists (which I believe is for- gotten in a greater question),- is it not better to have these men organized and under the discipline of the Government " The President hesitated a moment, and then said: " I don't know that you are right, Colonel; but you must take the responsi- bility on you that no bloodshed results from arming these men." I willingly accepted this responsibility. The prohibitory order was revoked. My companies received their arms, and made good use of them, learning the manual of arms in a surprisingly short time. Later, they made good use of them in sustaining the Government which had furnished them against the faction which soon became its public enemy, including Mr. Robert Ould, who, following his convictions (no doubt as honestly as I was following mine), gave his earnest services to his State against the Federal Government. I think that the country has never properly appreciated the services of those District of Columbia volunteers. It certainly has not appreciated the difficulties surmounted in their organization. Those volunteers were citizens of the Federal District, and therefore had not at the time, nor have they ever had since, the powerful stimulant of State feeling, nor the powerful support of a State government, a State's pride, a State press to set forth and make much of their services. They did their duty quietly, and they did it well and faith- fully. Although not mustered into the service and placed on pay until after the fatal day when the flag was fired upon at Sumter, yet they rendered great ser- vice before that time in giving confidence to the Union men, to members of the national legislature, and also to the President in the knowledge that there was at least a small force at its disposition ready to respond at any moment to his call. It should also be remembered of them, that the first troops mustered into the service were sixteen companies of these volunteers; and that, during the dark days when Washington was cut off from communication with the North, when railway bridges were burned and tracks torn up, when the Poto- mac was blockaded, these troops were the only reliance of the Government for guarding the public departments, for preserving order and for holding 20 WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR. the bridges and other outposts; that these were the troops which recovered possession of the railway from Washington to Annapolis Junction and made practicable the reopening of communications. They also formed the advance guard of the force which first crossed the Potomac into Virginia and captured the city of Alexandria. Moreover, these were the troops which insured the regular inauguration on the steps of the Capitol of the constitutionally elected President. I firmly believe that without them Mr. Lincoln would never have been inaugurated. I believe that tumults would have been cre- ated, during which lie would have been killed, and that we should have found our. A selves engaged in a struggle, without prep- aration, and without a recognized head at the capital. In this I may be mistaken, of course, as any other man may be mis- taken; but it was then my opinion, when \ I had many sources of information at my command, and it remains my opinion now, when, after the lapse of many years and a somewhat large experience, I look back in cool blood upon those days of political madness. HAIN'NTRAL HtAMLINI 'lt ,S13T OF THlE One day, after the official declaration of UNITED STATES MM MAUCH 4. 1g1, TO the election of Mr. Lincoln, my duties M'ARCH1 4, 186.1. (FROM A PHOTOGEXANIJ called me to the House of Representa- tives; and while standing in the lobby waiting for the member with whom I had business, I conversed with a distinguished officer from New York. We were leaning against the sill of a window which overlooked the steps of the Capitol, where the President-elect usually stands to take the oath of office. The gentleman grew excited as we discussed the election of Mr. Lincoln, and pointing to the portico lie exclaimed: " He will never be inaugurated on those steps !" "Mr. Lincoln," I replied, " has been constitutionally elected President of the United States. You may be sure that, if he lives until the fourth day of March, he will be inaugurated on those steps." As I spoke, I noticed for the first time how perfectly the wings of the Capi- tol flanked the steps in question; and on the morning of the 4th of March I saw to it that each window of the two wings was occupied by two riflemen. I received daily numerous communications from various parts of the coun- try, informing me of plots to prevent the arrival of the President-elect at the eapital. These warnings came from St. Louis, from Chicago, from Cincin- nati, from Pittsburgh, from New York, from Philadelphia, and especially from Baltimore. Every morning I reported to General Scott on the occurrences of the night and the information received by the morning's mail; and every evening I rendered an account of the day's work and received instructions for 21 WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR. the night. General Scott also received numerous warnings of danger to the President-elect, which he would give me to study and compare. Many of the communications were anonymous and vague. But, on the other hand, many were from calmn and wise men, one of whom became, shortly afterward, a cabi- net minister; V onewas a railwaypresi- dent,another a distinguish- ed ex-gover- Doubtless, Mr. Licln t i hm n pinfelm. e etc. In every case where the indica- tions were me, ben tdistinct, they werefollowed coln alup to learnif real danger existed. So many mclear indica- vsi OR wTith E OF THE WHITE d myself TREASURY BUILDING supos alE8 tions pointed to Baltimore, that three good detectives of the New York police force were constantly em- ployed there These men reported frequently to me, and their statements were constantly- compared with the information ieceived from independent sources. Doubtless, Mr. Lincoln, at his home in Springfield, Ill. received many and contradictory reports from the capital, for he took his own way of obtaining information. Omie night, between 11 o'clock and midnight, while I was busy in my study over the papers of the dlay and evening, a card was brought to me, bearing the nanie " Mr. Leonard Swett," and upon it was written in the well-known hand of General Scott, " Colonel Stone, Inspector-General, may converse freely with Mr. Swett." Soon a tall gentleman of marked features entered my room. At first I thought it was Mr. Lincoln himself, so much, at first glancee did Mr. Swett's face resemble the portraits I had seen of Mr. Lin- coln, and so nearly did his height correspond with that attributed to the President-elect. But I quickly found that the gentleman s caid bore his true name, and that Mr. Swett had come directly from Mr. Lincoln, having his full confidence, to see for him the state of affairs in Washington, and report to huim in person. Mr. Swett remained sev eral day s in the ciapital, had frequent and long con- versations with General Scott and myself (and I suppose also with many others), and with me visited the armories of some of the volunteer companies. As he drov e with me to the railway station on his departure, Mr. Swett said: 22 801 WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR. " Mr. Lincoln, and in fact almost everybody, is ignorant of the vast amount of careful work which has been (lone here this winter, by General Scott and yourself, to insure the existence of the Government and to render certain and safe the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln. He will be very grateful to both." I replied, with more sincerity than tact: " Mr. Lincoln has no cause to be grateful to me. I was opposed to his elec- tion, and believed in advance that it would bring on what is evidently coming, a fearful war. The work which I have done has not been done for him, and lhe need feel under no obligations to me. I have done my best toward saving the Government of the country and to insure the regular inauguration of the constitutionally elected President on the 4th of next month." As President Lincoln approached the capital, it became certain that desper- ate attempts would be madte to prevent his arriving there. To be thoroughly informed as to what might be expected in Baltimore, I directed a detective to be constantly near the chief of police and to keep up relations with him; while two others were instructed to watch, without the knowledge and independent of the chief of police. The officer who was near the chief of police reported regularly, until near the last, that there was no danger in Bal- timore; but the others discovered a band of desperate men plotting for the destruction of Mr. Lincoln during his passage through the city, and by affilia- ting with them, these detectives obtained the details of the plot. Mr. Lincoln passed through Baltimore in advance of the time announced for the journey (in accordance with advice given by me to Mr. Seward and THll WHITIE ;OU.L AT "ItaI. 23 WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR. I. 'AOUBATION OF BRAIHAM LINCOLN, MARer 4, 61O. wFROm A PIITOGRAPH.i which was carried by Mr. Frederick W. Seward to Mr. Lincoln), and arrived safe at Washington on the morning of the day he was to have passed through Baltimore. But the plotting to prevent his inauguration continued; and there was only too good reason to fear that an attempt would be made against his life during the passage of the inaugural procession from Willard's hotel, where Mr. Lincoin lodged, to the Capitol. On the afternoon of the 3d of March, General Scott held a conference at his headquarters, there being present his staff, General Sumner, and myself, and then was arranged the programme of the procession. President Buchanan was to drive to Willard's hotel, and call upon the President-elect. The two were to ride in the same carriage, between double files of a squadron of the District of Columbia cavalry. The company of sappers and miners were to march in front of the presidential carriage, and the infantry and rifle- men of the District of Columbia were to follow it. Riflemen in squads were to be placed on the roofs of certain commanding houses which I had selected, 24 WASHINGTON ON THE EVE OF THE WAR. along Pennsylvania Avenue, with orders to watch the windows on the oppo- site side and to fire upon them in case any attempt should be made to fire from those windows on the presidential carriage. The small force of regular cav- alry which had arrived was to guard the side-street crossings of Pennsylvania Avenue, and to move from one to another during the passage of the proces- sion. A battalion of District of Columbia troops were to be placed near the steps of the Capitol, and riflemen in the windows of the wings of the Capitol. On the arrival of the presidential party at the Capitol, the troops were to be stationed so as to return in the same order after the ceremony. To illustrate the state of uncertainty in which we were at that time con- eerning men, I may here state that the lieutenant-colonel, military secretary of the General-in-Chief, who that afternoon recorded the conclusions of the General in conference, and who afterward wrote out for me the instructions regarding the disposition of troops, resigned his commission that very night, and departed for the South, where he joined the Confederate army. During the night of the 3d of March, notice was brought me that an attempt would be made to blow up the platform on which the President would stand to take the oath of office. I immediately placed men under the steps, and at daybreak a trusted battalion of District troops (if I remem- ber rightly, it was the National Guard, under Colonel Tait) formed in a semi- eircle at the foot of the great stairway, and prevented all entrance from without. When the crowd began to assemble in front of the portico, a large number of policemen in plain clothes were scattered through the mass to observe closely, to place themselves near any person who might act suspi- ciously, and to strike down any hand which might raise a weapon. At the appointed hour, Mir. Buchanan was escorted to Willard's hotel, which he entered. There I found a number of mounted "marshals of the day," and posted them around the carriage, within the cavalry guard. The two Presidents were saluted by the troops as they came out of the hotel and took their places in the carriage. The procession started. During the march to the Capitol I rode near the carriage, and by an apparently clumsy use of my spurs managed to keep the horses of the cavalry in an uneasy state, so that it would have been very difficult for even a good marksman to get an aim at one of the inmates of the carriage between the prancing horses. After the inaugural ceremony, the President and the ex-President were escorted in the same order to the White House. Arrived there, Mr. Buchanan walked to the door with Mr. Lincoln, and there bade him welcome to the House and good-morning. The infantry escort formed in line from the gate (of the White House to the house of Mr. Ould, whither Mr. Buchanan drove, and the cavalry escorted his carriage. The infantry line presented arms to the ex-President as he passed, and the cavalry escort saluted as he left the arriage and entered the house. Mr. Buchanan turned on the steps, and grace- fully acknowledged the salute. The District of Columbia volunteers had given to President Lincoln his first military salute and to Mr. Buchanan his last. WITH SLEMMER IN PENSACOLA HARBOR. BY J. H. GILMAN, BREVET LIEUTENA3NT-COLOWEL, UI. P. A. 4 E NTERING Pensacola Harbor from the Gulf of Mexico, one sees as he crosses the bar, immediately to his left, Fort MeRee on the mainland, or west shore of the bay, and to his right Fort (Pickens on the western extremity of Santa Rosa Island, which is about forty miles in length, nearly parallel to the shore of the mainland, and separated from it by Pensacola Bay. On the mainland, directly opposite' Fort Pickens, about a mile and a half from it and two miles north-east of Fort Mefee, stands Fort Barrancas, and, now forming a part of it, the little old Spanish fort, San Carlos de Barrancas. About a mile and a half east of this is the village of Warrington, adjoining the Navy Yard, and seven miles farther up the 2 bay is the town of Pensacola. Near Fort Barrancas, and between it and the Navy Yard, is the post of Barrancas Barracks, and there, in January, 1861, was stationed Company G, 1st United States Artillery, the sole force of the United States army in the har- bor to guard and hold, as best it might, the property of the United States. The captain of this company, John H. Winder (afterward brigadier-general in the Confederate army, and widely known in connection with the military prisons in the South), and the senior first lieutenant, A. R. Eddy, were absent 4 Lieut. Slenmer's report says of Lieut. Oilman: "Duringthe whole affair we have stood side by side, and if any credit is due for the course pursued, he is entitled [to it] equally with myself.aEDBTOay. 26 WITH SLEMMER IN PENSACOLA HARBOR. on leave, and the only officers with it were First Lieutenant Adam J. Slemmer and the writer of this sketch,- then the second lieutenant of the company, who, by virtue of that high rank, was also the post treasurer, post quarter- ,,,aster, post commissary, and post adjutant. With the new year, 1861, came to us at that quiet little post the startling news of the seizure of United States property at various points by State troops, and by January 7th rumors, to us still more startling, reached our ears, to the effect that the Navy Yard and forts in Pensacola Harbor were to be seized by troops already preparing, in Florida and Alabama, to march against us. As vet no orders had come to Lieutenant Slemmer for his guidance in this emer- Oleey, and, as may be imagined, we had frequent conversations as to what should or could properly be done. As it would be useless to attempt to hold Barrancas, the occupation of Fort Pickens was suggested and considered; but Lieutenant Slemmer, thinking that he would not be justified in changing his station without authority, decided to remain where he was. On January 8th the first step indicating to outsiders an intention on our S)art to resist was taken, by the removal of the powder from the Spanish fort to Fort Barrancas, where on the same night a guard was placed with loaded muskets. It was none too soon, for about midnight a party of twenty inen came to the fort, evidently with the intention of taking possession, expecting to find it unoccupied as usual. Being challenged and not answer- ing nor halting when ordered, the party was fired upon by the guard and ran in the direction of Warrington, their footsteps resounding on the plank walk as the long roll ceased and our company started for the fort at doublequick. This, I believe, was the first gun in the war fired on our side. Next day, January 9th, an order came from General Scott to Lieutenant Slemmer to do all in his power to prevent the seizure of the public property an(l to cooperate with Commodore James Armstrong at the yard. The latter received orders on the same day to cooperate with the army; but he was already so greatly under the influence of Captain Ebenezer Farrand and other seces- sionist officers of his command that he dared not take any very active part in aiding us, not even so far as to let us have the marines, as he had promised. The excitement at the yard and in the village of Warrington was intense and was increasing daily, and the commodore was nearly distracted. He was desirous of doing his duty, and apparently saw it clearly while we were with him; but as soon as we left, became demoralized, and was thwarted in his plans by his own officers and others about him, who advised and warned him not to inaugurate civil war and bloodshed by aiding us in what they called the mad scheme of resisting the State authorities. Fearing that, as soon as the determination to occupy Pickens became known, attempts would be made to prevent it, Lieutenant Slemmer decided to move at once, and the commodore promised to have the Wf'yandotte at Barrancas to take us across at 1 P. m. that day. She did not come, however, and we had to visit the commodore twice more that day to counteract the influence of those about him. The steamer was again promised at 5 P. I., but did not arrive until next morning. In a large flat-boat or scow, and 27 WITH SLEMMER IN PENSACOLA HARBOR. several small boats loaded with our men, provisions, brass field-pieces, ammu- nition, tools, and whatever public property was most needed and could be carried, including, I remember, an old mule and cart (which afterward proved of great service to us), we were towed over to Pickens and landed there about 10 A. m. January 10th, 1861, the day that Florida seceded from the Union. Lieutenant Slemmer's family and mine were sent on board the storeship Siipply, on which, a few days later, they sailed for New York. All our men Iz ) This netp b.h'w. the I..n -d btt t,,ri- a. e ..I ted M T , 1 .1. T t h re h-tthtexts were compelled to leav e behind more oi less personal property, those who were married leaving their houses and families as they were. Under such cir- cumstances, when so many inducements were held out for men to desert, and when so many men in higher places failed, it speaks well for their character, loyalty, and discipline that none of our men deserted. No company of men could work better or with more enthusiasm, and they were not at all disposed to give information to those outside. The day before we left, a civilian, visit- ing the post to see what news he could gather, asked one of them: " What is all this stir about You men are not going to fight, are youI" " Faith, you needn't ask me; I'm not the man that gives orders here!" " What are they moving these gun-carriages out for7" "Well, sir, I hear they are to be painted to-morrow." "How many men are there here nowI" "Sure, I'm not the baker, and don't know how many he bakes for." Next to the commodore, the most thoroughly excited and demoralizedma Isaw was our old Spanish friend, Francisco Gomez, who was well known in all that region, and had long lived in a little cottage just in front of the bar- racks. He was the friend of all army officers, but his hero was General Jack- son, and his great delight was to spin yarns to us about Jackson's capture of Pensacola from the British. Gomez was a true "original Jackson man," 28 WITH SLEMMER IN PENSACOLA HARBOR. having as a youth seen him at Pensacola. The morning we left, I met him walking to and fro in front of his cottage, and said: "Good-bye, Mr. Gomez; gol0u must take care of things here now!" He replied, with upturned eyes, ' My God! My God! it is awful; nothing can be saved; we shall all be killed - everything destroyed. I am afraid to say anything. How I wish General Jackson was here." And the old man straightened himself up as if the mere mention of the name gave him strength and courage. On the 12th we saw the flag at the Navy Yard lowered, and then knew that it had been quietly and tamely surrendered. Seeing our flag thus lowered to anl enemy caused intense excitement and emotion, a mingled feeling of shame, anger, and defiance. Not yet having a flag-staff up, we hung our flag over the north-west bastion of the fort, that all might see " that our flag was still there." The Stuplpy (Captain Henry Walke) immediately hoisted extra flags, awld soon after was towed out of the harbor by the Wyandotte (Captain 0. H. Berryman). With the capture of the Navy Yard everything on shore fell into the enemy's hands, including the large fine dry dock-the workshops, material, and supplies of all sorts. Fortunately, the Sutpply and WRyandotte, the only United States vessels in the harbor, were commanded by loyal men, and wer-e saved. We now felt sure that an attack on the fort would not long be delayed. The enemy was in possession of everything on the mainland, and Fort Pickens alone was left, and it was in a very dilapidated condition, not having been occupied since the Mexican war. We numbered, all told, including the 30 ordinary seamen, only 81 men. Our first attention was given to the flank casemate guns, loading with grape and canister such as could be worked, and at other points closing the embrasures. Just before sundown that evening, four gentlemen landed, and demanded of the corporal on guard, outside the gate, admittance to the fort as " citizens of Florida and Alabama." Lieutenant Slemmer and myself went to the gate and found Mr. Abert, civil engineer of the yard, whom we knew very well, and three officers, strangers to us, whom nhe introduced as Captain Randolph, Major Marks, and Lieutenant Rutledge. Captain Randolph said. "We have been sent by the governors of Florida and Alabama to demand a peaceable surrender of this fort." Lieutenant Slemmer replied: "I am here by authority of the President of the United States, and I do not recognize the authority of any governor to demand the surrender of United States property,- a governor is nobody here." One of them exclaimed sharply: " Do you say the governor of Florida is nobody, the governor of Alabama nobody " Lieu- tenant Slejimer replied: " I know neither of them, and I mean to say that they are nothing to me." They soon left, the conference being very short. The next night (the 13th) a small party of armed men was discovered near the fort by our patrol, and a few shots were fired. We had little fear of an attack by day, but had every reason to expect a night attack, an attempt to surprise us and carry the place by storm. All the men had to work by day mounting guns, preparing fire-balls, hand-grenades, etc., and by night do Picket or patrol duty or stand by the guns. They were nearly tired out 29 WITH SLEMMER IN PENSACOLA HARBOR. VIB R RiEDKRATE WATER BATERY NEAR WARRINGTON., PENSACOLA HAUOR. M A WAR-TIML PUIITO(x;RPH CAPTURED AT MOBILE IN 1" NY ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. with hard work and want of sleep, not having had a night's rest since the night of January 7th. On the 15th Colonel W. H. Chase, commanding the enemy's forces at the yard and Barrancas, came over in a small boat with Captain Farrand (late of the United States navy, and next in rank at the yard to Commodore Armstrong) and landed at the Pickens wharf, where Lieutenant Slemmer and myself met them, and the following conversation took place: Colonel Chase: " I have come on business which may occupy some time, and, if you have no objection, we had better go inside to your quarters." Lieutenant Slemmer: " I have objections, and it could hardly be expected that I would take you into the fort." Colonel Chase: "As I built the fort and know all its weak and strong points, I would learn nothing new by going in, and had no such object in proposing it." Lieutenant Slemmer: "I understand that perfectly, but it would be improper for me to take you in; and, however well you may have known the fort before, you do not know what it now contains, nor what I have done inside." Colonel Chase: " That is true, and I will state my business here. It is a most distressing duty to me. I have come to ask of you young officers, officers of the same army in which I have spent the best and happiest years of my life, the surrender of this fort. I would not ask it if I did not believe it right and necessary to save bloodshed; and fearing that I might not be able to say it as I ought, and in order, also, that you may have it in proper form, I have put it in writing and will read it." 30 WITH SLEMMER IN PENSACOLA HARBOR. He then took the manuscript from his pocket and began to read, but, after i eading a few lines, his voice shook, and his eyes filled with tears. He stamped his foot, as if ashamed of exhibiting such weakness, and said, " I can't read it. llere, Farrand, you read it." Captain FarTand took it, and, remarking that he hadn't his glasses and his eyes were poor (they looked watery), passed the ailper to me, saying, " Here, Gilman, you have good eyes; please read it." I trick the paper and read aloud the demand for the surrender. As soon as I fiiiislhed, I handed the paper to Lieuten- atit Slemmer, when he and I went a few paces away; and, after talking the mat- ter over, it was decided, in order to gain timne and give our men a night's rest, to ask until next day to consider the matter. We returned to Colonel Chase, and the following conversation took place: - Lieutenant Slemmer: " Colonel, how 3 niany men have you" Colonel Chase: " To-night I shall have 800 or 900." Lieutenant Slemmer: " WDo you imagine A von could take this fort with that num- a Colonel Chase: "I certainly do. I could carry it by storm. I know every inch of this fort and its condition." e-hTTaNlfN ADAM J. mLyMMifl. 1S A. Lieutenant Slemmer: " With your and A PHOToGRarpH knowledge of the fort and of your troops, what proportion of them, do you imagine, would be killed in such an attackI" Colonel Chase (shrugging his shoulders): " If you have made the best pos- sile preparations, as I suppose you have, and should defend it, as I presume you would, I might lose one-half of my men." Lieutenant Slemmer: " At least, and I don't believe you are prepared to -sacrifice that many men for such a purpose." Colonel Chase: " You must know very well that, with your small force, you are not expected to, and cannot, hold this fort. Florida cannot permit it, and the troops here are determined to have it; and if not surrendered peace- ably, an attack and the inauguration of civil war cannot be prevented. If it is a question of numbers, and eight hundred is not enough, I can easily bring thousands more." Lieutenant Slemmer: "I will give this letter due consideration, and as I wish to consult with the captains of the Supply and Wyandotte before reply- ing, I will give you my answer to-morrow morning." The next day the reply, refusing to surrender, was sent, Captain Berry- -tan of the Wyandotte taking it to the yard. Immediately after, the JVryan- "(die steamed out of the harbor, and, the same day, I think, the Supply sailed f-l New York. 3 1 WITH SLEMMER IN PENSACOLA HARBOR. On the 18th another, and the last, demand for surrender was received from Colonel Chase, and next day Lieutenant Slemmer sent the following reply: "In reply to your communication of yesterday, I have the honor to state that, as yet, I know of no reason why my answer of the 16th inst. should be changed, and I therefore very respectfully refer you to that reply for an answer to this." With his small command, Lieutenant Slemmer continued to hold Fort Pickens until he was reenforced about the middle of April. He remained there until about the middle of May, when our company, on the recommenda- tion of the surgeon, the men being much broken down by the severe labor, incessant watching, exposure, and want of proper food of the past four months, was ordered to Fort Hamilton, New York Harbor, to recruit. The order was a humane one, and came none too soon, as scurvy had already appeared among the men. On the way North one of them died, and few of them ever entirely recovered from the effects of the severe physical and mental strain they had endured with Slemmer in Pensacola Harbor. During the remainder of the war Fort Pickens continued to be held by the United States troops, assisted by various vessels of the blockading squad- ron. Lieutenant Slemmer was reinforced on the 6th of February by one company under Captain Israel Vogdes in the Brooklyn, and on the 17th of April by five companies in the Atlantic, nnderCol- onel Harvey Brown, who had been appointed to the command of the Department of Florida, with head- quarters at Fort Pickens, and continued in com- mand until February 22d, 1862, when he was succeeded by General Lewis G. Arnold. The Con- federates continued to bold the opposite shore until the 9th of May, 1 862, when it was evacuated by them, the Union forces taking possession the next day. On the 11th of March, 1 S61, General Brax- ton Bragg assumed command of the Confederate forces. He was succeeded in command of the Army of Pensacola on the 27th of January, 1 862, by General Samuel Jones, who, on the sth of March, was succeeded in command of the post by Colonel Thomas M. Jones, under whom the evacuation took place, whereupon the position was occupied by the United States troops, and the headquarters of the West Gulf Squadron, which had been at Ship Isl- and, were transferred to Pensacola. The harbor was considered the best on the Gulf. The chief events durinlg the Confederate occu- patiort were: September 2d, 1 S 61. Destruction of the dry-dock at Pensacola by orler of Colonel Harvey Brown. September 14th. Destruction of the Confeder- ate war schooner .Judalh by a night expedition. The .JMdah. was moored to the wharf at the Navy Yard under the protection of a battery and a colum- biad, and was armed with a pivot and four broad- side guns. The expedition, which was matured by Captain Theodorus Bailey of the Colorado, con- sisted of 100 men in 4 boats, under the com- mand of Lieutenant John H. Russell, U. S. Navy. Lieutenant Sproston and Gunner Borton, from one of the boats, succeeded in spiking the columbiad. The others of the force, after receiving in their boats a volley from the Judah, boarded her fore and aft and engaged in a hand-to-hand conflict with her crew, consisting of 75 men, who made a brave resistance, but were driven off to the wharf, where they rallied and, joined by the guard, kept up a continuous fire upon the vessel, which had been set on fire in several places by Lieutenant Russell's men. The alarm roll was sounded, and rockets were sent up by the Confederates. The enemy's forces being aroused, the Colorado's boats pulled away, rallying at a short distance from the shore to fire six charges of canister from their howitzers, under cover of which they returned to the fort. The Judah burned to the water's edge, anti, having been set free from her moorings by the fire, drifted down opposite Fort Barrancas, where she sank. The Union loss was 3 men killed and 13 wounded. For his gallantry in the exeeu- tion of the plan Lieutenmant Russell was promoted. October 9th. Night attack by a Confederate force of one thousand men, under General R. H. Ander- son, upon the camp of Colonel William Wilson's 6th New York (Zonave) regiment on Santa Rosa Island. The Confederates landed on the island at 2 A. M., burned a part of the camp four miles from Fort Pickens, and retired to their boats after encounter- ingUnion reeloforeemen.ts from the fort. The losses in killed, wounded, and missing were: Union, 67; Confederate, 97. November 22d and 23d. Bombardment of the Confederate lines by the United States vessels Niagara (Flag-Officer MecKeai) and Richmond (Captain Ellison), anti by Fort Pickemis and the neighboring Union batteries. Although Fort Me- Ree was so badly injured that General Bragg en- tertained the idea of abandoning it. the plan of the Union commanders to "take and destroy" it was not executed. January 1st, 18962. Bombardment of Forts Mc- Ree and Barrancas by Union batteries. May 9th. Burning and evaeuation of Pensacola. EDITORS. 32 RECOLLECTIONS OF THE TWIGGS SURRENDER. BY MIS. CAROlLNE BALDWIN DARROW. . H EARLY in December, 1860, a rumor reached San kg.Antio, Texas, that Captain John R. Baylor, well knX 4sow throughout the State, was organizing a company of one thousand men for a buffalo-hunt. As Captain Baylor's secession sentiments were well known, this was believed to be a mere pretense, and his real design to be to surprise and seize the arsenal in San Antonio, in time to prevent any resistance on the part of the United States, should Texas go out of the Union. The Union citizens, 2 2 alarmed lest the few soldiers stationed there should it Jlw. if prove insufficient, appealed to General David E. Twiggs, then commanding the Department of Texas, to increase the force. He accordingly fur- nished several hundred men, consisting of Knights of the Golden Circle (a secret secession organization), the Alamo Rifles, two other citizen com- panies, and an Irish and a German company. This quieted apprehension for a time, but in January these troops were quietly withdrawn. At this time General Twiggs's loyalty to the United States Government began to be questioned, as he was known to be often in consultation with prominent secessionists, some of them ladies. Toward the end of January the Union men again appealed to General Twiggs, but nothing was accomplished, whereupon they armed themselves, waiting with undefined dread for the next move. Meanwhile no one trusted his neighbor, since spies and informers abounded, and to add to the terror, there were fears of insurrection among the negroes, some of whom were arrested; while all of them were forbidden to walk or talk together on the streets, or to assemble as they had been accustomed to do. Late in January was held the election for delegates to a State convention which should consider the question of secession. San Antonio was crowded. Women vied with each other in distributing the little yellow ballots, on which were printed in large type, "For Secession," or "Against Secession." Many an ignorant Mexican received instructions that the ballot " with the longest words " was the right one. The carteros from New Mexico, who were in town with their wagon-trains, were bought by the secessionists, and some were known to have voted three times. It was well known that the Federal civil officers were loyal; the French and German citizens were emphatically so; and frAugust 2d, 1861. John R. Baylor, then Lieu- government being at Mesilla, and the authority tenant-Colonel, commanding the Confederate army of governor being assumed by him. This action in New Mexico, organized that part of the Terri- was approved by General Henry H. Sibley, then tory lying south of the thirty-fourth parallel, as in command of the Confederate department.- the Confederate Territory of Arizona, the.seat of EDITORs. VOL. I.-3 3 RECOLLECTIONS OF THE TWIGGS SURRENDER. yet against the will of the people, " by superior political diplomacy," secession triumphed in San Antonio by a small majority. Many Germans gave up their business and left the town, taking refuge in New Braunfels, 31 miles away. Many of these men were political refugees of rare culture and scholarly attainments. On the 1st of February, the ordinance of secession was adopted by the Texas Convention,, and on the 4th commissioners were appointed " to confer with General Twiggs, with regard to the public arms, stores, munitions of war, etc., under his control, and belonging to the United States, with power to demand [them] in the name of the people of the State of Texas." To meet this commission, which consisted of Thomas J. Devine, P. N. Luckett,J and Samuel A. Maverick,4 on the 9th of February General Twiggs appointed a commission consisting of Major David H. Vinton, Major Sackfield Maclin (secessionist), and Captain R. H. K. Whiteley. By this time the news of General Twiggs's disaffection had reached the Government, and Colonel C. A. Waite was sent to supersede him. One day, accidentally overhearing parts of a conversation between General Twiggs and a prominent Southern lady, I felt no longer any doubt that he was about to betray his trust, and reported the matter to Major Vinton. He sought an interview with General Twiggs, and told me that he could find no suspicion of disloyalty, and that I was entirely mistaken. Getting information a few days later, which led me to believe that the day for the surrender was fixed, I again informed Major Vinton. He then decided to remove at once from his safe all papers that would give valuable information to the State authorities, and the moneys belonging to the Government, and he intrusted them to his confidential clerk, Charles Darrow. They were sent at midnight to his wife, who was waiting to receive them, and who buried part of them in a deserted garden; the rest, secreted in the ashes of an unused stove and in the tester of a bed, were guarded by her till the information was no longer valuable. General Twiggs had succeeded in completely blinding his brother-officers as to his plans; but he now had no time to lose before Colonel Waite's arrival. On the 15th news came that some of the passengers on the mail-coach had alighted at the crossing of the Salado and joined a large company of Texas Rangers who, under the command of Ben McCulloch, had been encamped there for several days. Captain Baylor's buffalo-hunt had at last assumed a tangible shape. To be prepared for any emergency, for many nights we had kept our fire- arms beside us. On the night of the 15th, worn out with anxious watch- ing, we fell asleep, to be suddenly roused about 4 o'clock by the screams of the negroes, who were coming home from market, " We're all going to be ) The secession of Texas was not legally com- James H. Rogers, also appointed, was a com- pleted until the ratification of this ordinance by missioner, but it appears from the Official Records the people, February 23d, but the secession party that he did not serve.- EDITORS. considered the authority of the convention suffi- 4 From whom stray cattle were styled "Maver- cient for the prior seizure of United States prop- icks." erty.- EDITORS. I The writer. 34 RECOLLECTIONS OF THE TWIGGS SURRENDER. killed!" I grasped my revolver, and, springing to my feet, looked out upon the plaza. In the dim light I saw the revolutionists appearing, two by two, )n Inuleback and horseback, mounted and on foot,-a motley though quite orderly crowd, carrying the Lone Star flag before them, and surrounded and 5supported by armed men. The nights had been cold, and a week on the Salado without comforts had not added to their valorous appearance. Some had coats, but others were in their shirt-sleeves, and not a few were wrapped in old shawls and sad- 41le-b)lankets. Their arms were of every description. By daylight more had appeared, perhaps a thousand in all, and so great was the enthusiasm of two women who had aided General Twiggs in his arrangements that they mounted their horses, in male attire, and with pistols in their belts rode out to meet their friends. Coffee and refreshments had been provided, and blankets ald clothing were lavishly dis- tributed. All the stores were closed; men, women, and children armed themselves, and the excitement was intense. Companies of Union citizens, well drilled and well armed, were marching and countermarching, presenting an imposing contrast to the other party, and a conflict seemed inevitable. The arsenal building had been opened and was swarming with Rangers. Early in the morning General Twiggs drove down to the main plaza, where he was instantly surrounded by secessionists demanding the Government property, whereupon he went through the form of refusing their request. He then held a conference with Major W. A. Nichols, his assistant adjutant-general, and Ben McCulloch, and was given six hours in which to reconsider. By noon he had surrendered all the United States posts and stores in Texas. When the result was known there was great indignation against him among the citizens. Two or three hours later he left for New Orleans, where he was received with public honors. Orders were sent to all the outposts to turn over the military property to the State. The officers and men were widely scattered, and many of them were taken completely by surprise. The Federal troops in town gave their parole "not to take up arms" against the Confederacy, and were ordered to leave the post in the afternoon. By this time the German company had refused to act against the United States, and the citizen companies had dis- banded. The Irish company had twice torn down the Stars and Stripes from thle Alamo, and had raised the Lone Star flag in its place. An attempt was trade to disarm the troops, but they declared that they would kill any man -ho interfered, and marched away under Major Larkin Smith and Captain 35 RECOLLECTIONS OF THE TWIGGS SURRENDER. John H. King, with the stained and bullet-riddled old flag of the 8th Regi- ment flying over them, while the band played national airs. Strong men wept; the peoiple eheered them along the streets, and many followed them to the head of the San Pedro, where they encamped. By 6 o'clock the Rangers had returne(l to their camp on the Salado, and the lay ended without further excitefllellt. Albot 2 o'loek that afternoon, Colonel Robert E. Lee arrived in his ambu- lance from Fort Mason, Texas, on his way to Washington, whither he had been ordered by General Scott. As he approached the Read House I went out to greet him. At the same time some of the Rangers gathered around his wagons, anld, attracted, no doubt, by their insignia of rank, the red flannel strips sewed on their shoulders, he asked, "Who are those men" "They are MeCtilloch's," I answered. " General Twiggs surrendered everything to the State this morning, and we are all prisoners of war." I shall never forget his look of astonishment, as with his lips trembling and his eyes full of tears, he exclaimed, "Has it come so soon as this " In a short time I saw him erossing the plaza on his way to headquarters, and noticed particularly that he was in citizens dress. He returned at night and shut himself in his room, which was over mine, and I heard his footsteps through the night, and sometimes the murmur of his voice, as if he were praying. He remained at the hotel a week, and in conversations declared that the position he held was a neutral one. When he left it was my firm belief that no one could per- suade or compel him to change his decision.\ During the next two days the Rangers were drinking and shouting about the streets, recklessly shooting any one who happened to displease them. From this time OD, Union men were in danger, and Northerners sent their families away. Some who were outspoken were imprisoned and barely escaped with their lives; among them, Charles Anderson, brother of Robert Anderson. On the 26th of February a dozen men of the State troops were stationed on guard over the offices of the disbursing officers, and the occupants were ordered to leave, but forbidden to take away papers or effects, though allowed to keep the keys to their safes. Colonel Waite had now arrived and assumed command, and the secessionist commissioners made a second demand for \On this point Captain R. M. Potter,C. S.A., says: "I saw General Lee (then Colonel Lee) when he took leave of his friends to depart for Washington some days after the surrender of Twiggs. I have seldom seen a more distressed man. He said, 'When I get to Virginia I think the world will have one sol- dier less. I shall resign and go to planting corn."' Colonel Charles Anderson, U. S. V., who is referred to above, and who talked with General Lee on the same day, thus gives the substance of his parting words (see " Texas Before and on the Eve of the Rebellion." Cincinnati, 1884): "I still think . . . that myloyalty to Virginia ought to take precedence over that which is due to the Federal Government, and I shall so report myself at Washington. If Vir- ginia stands by the old Union, so will I. But if she secedes (though I do not believe in secession as a constitutional right, nor that there is a sufficient cause for revolution), then I will still follow my na- tive State with my sword, and, if need be, with my life. I know you think and feel very differently, but I can't help it. These are my principles, and I must follow them." Colonel Anderson, in the course of a high tribute to General Lee's character, gives General Scott as his authority for the statement that the command of the United States forces (un- der Scott) was offered to Lee, and was declined by him on the same ground,- that he must be guided wholly in his action by that of Virginia. Colonel Albert G. Brackett, U. S. A., says: "When the civil war broke out, Lee was filled with sorrow at the condition of affairs, and, in a letter to me deploring the war in which we were about to en- gage, he made use of these words: 'I fearthe liber- ties of our country will be buried in the tomb of a great nation."-EDITORs. oh RECOLLECTIONS OF THE TWIGGS SURRENDER. , statement of the amount of indebtedness and funds on hand and required t promise from each officer that he would pay outstanding debts with funds 1141 turn the balance over to the State": it being very desirable to the enemy to possess the Government records, which exhibited the number of troops and tlw condition of the whole department. Imprisonment and death were to is' the penalty in case of refusal; but Major Vinton of the quartermasters department declared that he did not fear either, would do nothing dishonorable and would not comply. Major Daniel Me- Clure of the pay department iand Cap- tain Whiteley of the ordnance department also refused, but several officers did com- ply and were returned to their offices. The larger responsibilities of the quarter- master's department detained Major Vin- ton after the above-named officers had left, and thus he fought his battle almost alone. His office was transferred to his lTh g ; I own house, where with the aid of Mr. Dar- row he transacted his business. He soon became so ill that it was impossible for him to leave his bed. Both were after- COLONELA M VIINTON, V. ' A ward arrested and given ten days in which to surrender the papers and funds or be shot. These threats were not executed, for on the morning of the tenth day we were gladdened by the news that United States troops from the different outposts were within a few miles of the town, having been three weeks on the way. They were met at the San Pedro and paroled not to take arms against the Confederacy or serve in any capacity during the war. These troops, representing the army in Texas, were loyal almost to a man, while all but forty of the officers went over to the Confederacy. The commissioners had promised to furnish facilities for the transportation of these troops to the coast, but so great had been the confusion and so many supplies had been carried off, that the soldiers were left almost destitute. I visited their camp and found them cursing the man who had placed them in this position. Major Vinton and family, with my husband and myself, were the last to leave. On the morning of our departure, the 11th of May, as the ambulances an(l baggage wagons stood at the door, to add to the gloom, a storm broke over the city, enveloping us in midnight darkness. The thunder and light- 'ling was so loud and incessant as to seem like the noise of battle. For two weeks we journeyed over the park-like prairies, fragrant and brilliant with Captain Potter says: " The officers detained brother officers, when no public funds were acces- i' Hall Antonio were much indebted to Major sible. He, of course, had no office in which to XcClure for his successful efforts to raise money, transact business, and paid the officers covertly 'n his own responsibility, for the pay of his in holes and corners." 37 38 RECOLLECTIONS OF THE TWIGGS SURRENDER. flowers. We forded streams and rivers, crossed the Brazos by a rope ferry, and, taking the railroad train from Harrisburg to Galveston, caught the last steamer before the blockade of New Orleans. We went up the Mississippi in the steamer Jlijaat ha, which was crowded with refugees, who made no sign until, in answer to a shot from shore at Cairo, the steamer rounded to and we found ourselves once more under the protection of our own flag. Oji the 1 3th of December, 1 8t6i, (Getneral l)avid E. Twigg., of the ULnited States Army, who had served with distinction in the war with Mexico, and who was at that date in eommaind of the De- partment of Texas, wrote the followiiig letter to General Scott from San Anutonio: `I thiiik there eall be no doubt that many of the 8outhern Stnte. will secede from the Union. The State of Texas will be among the number, and, from all ap- pearanee ..t present, it wilt be at tin early day; certainly before the 4th of March next. What is to be done with publb- piroperty iln eharge if the army t The arsettal at this plae, has some tirdanee and other munitions of war. I dtm not expect ani order for the present for the disposition of them, but I wonld lie pleased to re-elve your views aid uggestiotis. My course, as respects myself, will be to remaihi at my post and protect "hta frontier as long as I -al. alid then when turned adrift make my way home, it I hav-e one. I wrouli be pleased to hear from yiu at yiinr carlitat convenience. At this time it took from tell to fifteen days for a letter to pass between San Antonio and army head- quarters. December 28th, General Scott replied: - In eases of political disturbance Involving loc-al conflict with the aiuthority of the general government, the general-in-ehlef considers that the military ques- tions, sucb a. you suggest, etntain a political element, with due regard to whieh, and in due deferenec to the chief executive authority, no extraordinary instructions concerning the.t must be issued without the consent of sueh authority. He has labored bhord to suggesting and urging proper measures to vindicate the laws and protect the property of the United States without waging war or aeting offensavely against any State or community. All such suggestions, though long since made in good time to have been peaceably atid eficiently earried out. have failed to seeltre the favorable attention of the (loveroment. The Prestdent has li-tened to him with due frlidlin-s anid respet, but the War Depart- menit has been little eonun.-i-atinve. [Mr. Floyd was theu Secretary of War.] Up to thi timne he has not teemi shown the written instrmutions of Major Anderon. nutr bet-n itfornled tif the pirport of those nmore recently conveyed t, Fort Mtnultri verially by Major Buell. Probmbly the poliey of the tGoveninr-ent lit regnrd ti the forts and deliot. within the lintits of .i-.e..log Statto wil lilvc I--eli clearly indih-atell beftre events ta have .ased it pra-ticall .....- to bw- made pl In Texas. The general iloes not see, at this nion-ont, that he can tender yot any psietal ltdv Ie, but leaves. the administration of your cotilnuad in your own hands, with the laws and '4 ai taiti i'lltt-r (be-fore tii tei) ln a written mcmoralllt to thse iiitirs, says: "It was on time evening befolre Mi-tihloch entered usai A ntoniit. . is-ealis two eveutlfgs lattice. tMMat I met (t .- oral Twiggs at a weil ling party. lle sal. to mne: 'It is runiori- i tiatt - tcItlioM li lisa been 1 it town: ave viol seen hii ii I reitileit. t1ii. After a few nmore w eis tin the state itf affairs,. e si : I Titere is ni arch at sen. lil- g him to careen ate. If as i ii wi ntaml withl a tirt asm atick ahonllt onae with ull satilority from the State of Texas to tientas the public property. I would give it tin hl oler: Ctaptain Pot- ter fartler ays: From the diate of Tigga's retunrn from N.. Orleans [about the 27tih of Eovember] there was no regulations to guile, in the .full eonfidenee that your diseretion, fi-riujess, and patriotism ill effect all of good that the sad state of the times may permit." December 27th, and January 2d, 7th, and 23d, General Twiggs wrote similar letters to army head- quarters, making urgent requests for instructions. January 15th, after the receipt of the above letter from General Scott, General Twiggs wrote to him again, this time expressing sympathy with the secession movement, and asking to be re- lieved from command of the department on or before the 4th of March. The order relieving him, and appointing Colonel Waite as his suc- cessor, is dated January 28th, and was received by General Twiggs on the 15th of February. Meanwhile the secession party in Texas had made decided progress toward carrying the State out of the Union. Late in January an election had been held for delegates to a State convention to consider the question of secession. This con- vention had met onl the 28th of January, at Aus- tin, and on the 1st of Febrnary had passed an ordinance of secession which was to take effect on the 2d of March, if it should be ratified by the people on the 23d of February. General Twiggs did not wait till the ordinance was in operation, or even till its ratification, to surrender the military posts and public property under his charge. Feb- ruary 9th he appointed a military commission to treat with a commission from the eonvention,- as his order of that date announced, "to transact such business as relates to the disposition of the public property upot, the demand of the State of Texas." February 1Wth, three days before the arrival of Colonel Waite, the aetual surrender took place, nominally to superior forces under Colonel Bell Mc ulloch, then in command of 1000 to 1500 men, and acting under the authority, not of the governor (General Sam Houston, a Union man), but of the commissioners appointed by the convention.' Ott the 17 th the State Commissioners wrote to General Twiggs: ';In our ommunnication of the 16th instantwe required a delivery up hy you of the positions held and public property held by or under your control a. commander dIOlibt of his intentioI lt to witfiit-od any ft.srreCtiot.ory moVemenlt On tile pHact il tue atate. ItH constantly sail t hat tlhe br-ak.,p was ooin.dg, aiit lut tlucre Wth w. l-ne living whil, -nid reait Ilie acssion nivelnent s..ccessfulliy. OD the same point, (C.itel Ch-arles Aniteron says It mus.t he remembered distincitl. on tub,, my testoel.y. anit tihat of very nianl other. that from thr time ot hi.s eturn. with inceasin.g frequency an.d -ehenraee of ills spee0les, aenersi Twigga hal not only lecaced tlat h. I wonld ncrer fire on American itizens tinder any circemstances, hbt that te wonld surrelder tue United States property in lhi dePart- nient to the StatW of Te-as irhe-irer it wdomauded."- t Teu, aefore and on the Eve of the Rebeilion. ) RECOLLECTIONS OF THE TWIGGS SURRENDER. Althis department- As no reply Nave your verbal ,-er1.rtiou (which decltration was that you gave up , -rythling') hlal been given to our note, . we again ,tsrtad the surrender . . . A To this General Twiggs replied the Name day: - I Intve to Say that you are already aware of my views ill regarl to the delivery of the publie property of this ,Iqarttreut, and I now repeat that I wilt direct the Ils.itimttN held by the Federal troops to be turned over to the .,athorized agents of the State of Texas, provided thit' tr ps, retain their arms and clothing, camp and gi.rrison equiltage, quparterniaster's NtoreN, snbltenee, medUicl, hospital stores, and such means of transporta- twinle t every kind as may be necessary for an efficient ali orderly movement of the troops from Texas, pre- pared for attack or defense against aggression from any soure." The cotonnissioners then wrote, making two fur- ther conditions: that the troops should leave Texas by way of the coast, and that they shonld there sur- retider all means of transportation as well as the artillery. General Twiggs responded, consenitingto the first condition, but objecting to the second so far as it related to the guns of the light batteries, and it was to that extent waived by the cominis- sioners. Thus the formal surrender was consum- mated ott the 1Sth of February, five days before the ratification of the ordinance of secession by the people of Texas. In a letter to Mr. Davis, dated New Orleans, February 2.5tb, 1861, Gen- eral Braxton Bragg says: "General Twiggs was ordered to turn over the command to Colonel Waite, a Northern man, but preferred surrender- ing to Texas." March 1st, General Twiggs was dismissed from the United States army. He was aplpointed major-general in the Confederate serv- ice, and was placed in command at New Orleans. He died September 1.5th, 1862, at Augusta, Georgia, his own State. On the 28th of January, General Twiggs's suc- cessor, Colonel Waite, was in command at Camp Verde, 65 miles from San Antonio. In a letter of that date to General Twiggs's assistant adju- tant-general at San Antonio, Colonel Waite said: " For the purpose of making some defensive arrauge- mne,,ts, I have deemed it proper to order the remainder If Captain irackett' coulpany to this place without waiting for further instructions from your office. - . . I re.eetfuIly request that 1 or 2 pieces of artillery . . . may be sent here as early as practicable. to ninking this application I assume that there is a prob- ability, or at least a possibility, that al mob of reckless m l, mtoy attempt to s-ize the punltm property bere. the, most valtiatle of which e naists of cnamels, . .- w-terth oure 20,000. I hill I it to be the dmtty of every commanding officer to be at til times, anti under all eiremastances, prepared as far as possible ftor any tuti every emergeney. To this end he utust anticipate his wtants and take timely measures to meet them." February 12th, he wrote again: - Belng desirous of concentrating my regiment (the tit Infautry) sit as to bring the companies tuore under ty eontrol, I r-speetfully request permission to itove ,lIt ttf the department with the five companies now serv- Itg htere and .oin the remainder of the regiment which is it the Departmuent of the West." February 26th, in his report of the situation after he had assumed command, he says: "To concentrate a su-fficient number [of troopsl to make a successful resibtagie- after the Texans had taken the fitld was not practicable. it-sides. wve had no large depot of provisitas to move upon, and the means of trinsportation at the posts were so limited that the troops etiuld bave taken with them a supply for only a few days. An attentpt tot bring then together under these eicuntistalnces witlti have no doubt resulted in their ise-ng cut up in dt-tail before they eould get out of the country. Under these eireumstaneN, I felt it ity dutyto comply with the agreement entered Into by Gen- eral Twiggn. and remove the troops from the country as early as possible:" For this purpose Colonel Waite continued at San Antonio. The troops (except those mentioned below) marched to the coast, where vessels char- tered by the United States awaited them. Concerning the advantages which General Twiggs's surrender conferred upoti the cause of secession, Colonel Charles Anderson says: A of its successes, the first was that it carried the so- canlet election five days afterward, Without this brill- iant eoup de stain (the first victory of rebellion) the malority wouId have strely lieen In Texas for the Union cause. As it was. only 2,000 votes (less than half the total vote of the State) was polled, of which 13,000 votes were given by the now confounded and dismayed Unionahsi. [The exact vote was: for ratification, 34,194; against. 11.23w. - Eniroas.] And Jttst here (a semend and great stuceast was the beginbing of that series of fioekings pari poes., with every disaster to the Unitn canse, of our Douglas Democrats, and our Bell and Everett men to the winning side-the Breckiaridge Democrats . . . A third gaini to the rebellion was the immense money and tilitary values of the public arms and other war properties on the very verge of the coming war, which It hastened, if it did not determine. Fonrthly, our national prestige lost was a vast and Instant impulse to secession and rebellion in every slave State." The number of posts surrendered was 19. The number of troops "' to be removed, in compli- ance with General Twiggs's agreement," was re- ported by Colonel Waite, February 26th, at 2328. This agreement was not respected by the Con- federate authorities, who, on the 11th of April, on the ground "that hostility exists between the United States and Confederate States," gave in- structions to Colonel Earl Van Dorm '4 to intercept and prevent the movement of the United States troops from the State of Texas." Under these orders 815 officers atid men were captured, in- cluding Colonel Waite and his staff, who accepted parole under protest. Many of the private soldiers were kept in confinement for nearly two years. The San Auttonio "Herald," of February 23d, 1861, estimated the total value of the property surrendered at 1,209,500, " exclusive of public buildings to which the Federal Government has a title." This property included mtiles, wagons, horses, harness, tools, corn, clothing, commissary and ordnance stores. In the lnaimt the authority for the foregoing state- ments is Volume I. of the "Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies," issued by the War Department, under the editorship of Liet- tenant-Colonel Robert N. Scott, U. S. A. This work will be referred to hereafter in these pages as "Official Records."-EDITOR. 39 FROM MOULTRIE TO SUMTER. BY ABNER DOUBLEDAY, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL. U. S. A., RETIRED. A S senior captain of the 1st Regiment of United States Artillery, I had been stationed at Fort Moultrie, Charleston Harbor, two or three years previ- ous to the outbreak of 1861. There were two other forts in the harbor. Of these, Fort Sumter was unoccupied, being in an unfinished state, while Castle Pinckney was in charge of a single ordnance sergeant. The garrison of Fort Moultrie consisted of 2 companies that had been reduced to 65 men, who with the band raised the number in the post to 73. Fort Moultrie had no strength; it was merely a sea battery. No one ever imagined it would be attacked by our own people; and if assailed by foreigners, it was supposed that an army of citizen-soldiery would be there to defend it. It was very low, the walls having about the height of an ordinary room. It was little more, in fact, than the old fort of Revolutionary time of which the father of Major Robert Anderson had been a defender. The sand had drifted from the sea against the wall, so that cows would actually scale the ramparts. In 1860 we applied to have the fort put in order, but the quartermaster-general, afterward the famous Joseph E. Johnston, said the matter did not pertain to his department. We were then apprehending trouble, for the signs of the times indicated that the South was drifting toward secession, though the Northern people could not be made to believe this, and regarded our repre- sentation to this effect as nonsense. I remember that at that time our engi- neer officer, Captain J. G. Foster, was alone, of the officers, in thinking there would be no trouble. We were commanded by a Northern man of advanced age, Colonel John L. Gardner, who had been wounded in the war of 1812 and had served with credit in Florida and Mexico. November 15th, 1860, Mr. 40 FROM MOULTRIE TO SUMTER. Floyd, the Secretary of War, relieved him and put in command Major Robert Anderson of Kentucky, who was a regular officer and the owner of a slave plantation in Georgia. Floyd thought the new commander could lie relied upon to carry out the Southern programme, but we never believed that Anderson took com.- mnand with a knowledge of that programme or a desire that it should succeed. He simply obeyed orders; he had to obey or leave the ar-my. Anderson was a Union man and, in the incipiency, was perfectly willing to chastise South Carolina in case she should attWemcpt any revolutionary a 4a measures. His feeling as to coercion changed when he found that all the South- ern States had joined South Carolina, for he looked up- on the conquest of the South as hopeless. H8oon after his arrival, which took place on the 21st of November, Anderson wanted the sand removed from the walls of Moultrie, and urged that it be done. Suddenly the Secretary of War seemed to adopt this view. He pretended there was danger of war with Eng- ' land, with reference to Mex- ico, which was absurd; and underthispretextwasseized with asudden zeal to put the MAO OMTA ERO.rRXAP"WRP1 hiaibor of Charleston in con- (litioii,--. to be turned over to the Confederate forces. He appropi iated 150,- 000 for Moultrie and 80,000 to finish Sumter. There was not much to be mnade out of Fort Moultrie, with all our efforts, because it was hardly defen- sible; but Major Anderson strove to strengthen it. He put up heavy gates to prevent Charleston secessionists from entering, and made a little man-hole through which visitors had to crawl in and out. We could get no additional ammunition, but Colonel Gardner had man- aged to procure a six months' supply of food from the North before the trouble 41 FROM MOULTRIE TO SUMTER. 't-.." t-fita, a aI tWt. .t t it -ft , v a..g.t. t.alesA t lt W wnit . tt - taWiltrxttls,, I.W itm- l.etlt s T.11.4 tl I-- Ft -rt S m-lt ,1,t (S lvril ,- JA J-v(tiss tto ild to jOrt sYhiji-r eame. The Secretary of War would not let us have a man in the way of reen- forcement, the plea being that reenforcements would irritate the people. The secessionists could hardly be restrained from attacking us, but the leaders kept them back, knowing that our workmen were laboring in their interests, at the expense of the United States. When Captain Truman Seymour was sent with a party to the United States arsenal in Charleston to get some friction primers and a little ammunition, a crowd interfered and drove his men back. It became evident, as I told Anderson, that we could not defend the fort, because the houses around us on Sullivan's Island looked down into Moultrie, and could be occupied by our enemies. At last it was rumored that two thousand riflemen had been detailed to shoot us down from the tops of those houses. I proposed to anticipate the enemy and burn the dwellings, but Anderson would not take so decided a step at a time when the North did not believe there was going to be war. It was plain that the only thing to be done was to slip over the water to Fort Sumter, but Anderson said he had been assigned to Fort Moultrie, and that he must stay there. We were then in a very peculiar position. It was commonly believed that we would not be supported even by the North, as the Democrats had been bitterly opposed to the election of Lincoln; that at the first sign of war twenty thousand men in sympathy with the South would rise in New York. Moreover, the one to whom we 42 FROM MOULTRIE TO SUMTER. soldiers always looked up as to a father,-the Secretary of War, seemed to be (levising arrangements to have us made away with. We believed that in the event of an outbreak from Charleston few of us would survive; but it did not greatly concern us, since that risk was merely a part of our business, and we intended to make the best fight we could. The officers, upon talk- ilig the matter over, thought they might control any demonstration at Charleston by throwing shells into the city from Castle Pinckney. But, with only sixty-four soldiers and a brass band, we could not de- tach any force in that direction. Finally, Captain Foster, who had misapprehended the whole situation, and who had orders to S r put both Moultrie and Sumter in perfect order, brought sever- t g al hundred workmen from Bal- tinore. Unfortunately, these were nearly all in sympathy with the Charlestonians, manypse io even wearing secession badges. fi Bands of secessionists were THE SEX BATTerY or FirT MtomakRe. now patrolling near us by dlay FRMAPIIUTO(MAU' TAKENB'FRETE antd night. We were so worn out with guard-duty-hwatching them-that on oMe occasion my wife and Captain Seymour's relieved us on guard, al that was needed being some one to give the alarm in case there was an attempt to break in. Foster thought that out of his several hundred workmen he could get a few Union men to drill at the guns as a garrison in Castle Pincek- ney, but they rebelled the moment they found they were expected to act as artillerists, and said that they were not there as warriors. It was said that when the enemy took possession of the castle, some of these workmen were hauled from under beds and from other hiding-places. The day before Christmas I asked Major Anderson for wire to make an entanglement in front of my part of the fort, so that any one who should charge would tumble over the wires and could be shot at our leisure. I had already caused a sloping picket fence to be projected over the parapet on my side of the works so that scaling-ladders could not be raised against us. The dis- c-ussion in Charleston over our proceedings was of an amusing character. This wooden fraise puzzled the Charleston militia and editors; one of the latter said, "Make ready your sharpened stakes, but you will not intimidate freemen." When I asked Anderson for the wire, he said I should have a mile of it, with 'I Peculiar smile that puzzled me for the moment. He then sent for Hall, the Post quartermaster, bound him to secrecy, and told him to take three schooners and some barges which had been chartered for the purpose of taking the women and children and six months' supply of provisions to Fort Johnson, Opposite Charleston. He was instructed when the secession patrols should 43 44 FROM MOULTRIE TO SUMTER. i ANT, N CHARLEST e I.' . i.. H.ARB OR '.W ,;C4 AND VICINITY, V V A N A) V ' 1NtT7.- .' CIIATLESTN Y ANDVRANTY, X S W.a ;'' ask what this meant, to tell them we were sending off the families of the officers and men to the North because they were in the way. The excuse was plausible, and no one interfered. We were so closely watched that we could make no movement without demands being made as to the reason of it. On the day we left-the day after Christmas-Anderson gave up his own mess, and came to live with me as my guest. In the evening of that day I went to notify the major that tea was ready. Upon going to the parapet for that purpose, I found all the officers there, and noticed something strange in their manner. The problem was solved when Ander- son walked up to me and said: " Captain, in twenty minutes you will leave this fort with your company for Fort Sumter." The order was startling and unexpected, and I thought of the immediate hostilities of which the movement FROM MOULTRIE TO SUMTER. should be the occasion. I rushed over to my company quarters and informed lly men, so that they might put on their knapsacks and have everything in l eadiness. This took about ten minutes. Then I went to my house, told my wvife that there might be fighting, and that she must get out of the fort as soon ,is she could and take refuge behind the sand-hills. I put her trunks out of the sally-port, and she followed them. Then I started with my company to join (Captain Seymour and his men. We had to go a quarter of a mile through the little town of Moultrieville to reach the point of embarkation. It was about sunset, the hour of the siesta, and fortunately the Charleston militia were taking their afternoon nap. We saw nobody, and soon reached a low line of sea-wall under which were hidden the boats in charge of the three engineers, for Lieutenants Snyder and Meade had been sent by Floyd to help Captain Foster do the work on the forts. The boats had been used in going back and forward in the work of construction, manned by ordinary work- men, who now vacated them for our use. Lieutenant Snyder said to me in a low tone: "Captain, those boats are for your men." So saying, he started with his own party up the coast. When my thirty men were embarked I went straight for Fort Sumter. It was getting dusk. I made slow work in crossing over, for my men were not expert oarsmen. Soon I saw the lights of the secession guard-boat coming down on us. I told the men to take off their coats and cover up their muskets, and I threw my own coat open to conceal my buttons. I wished to give the impression that it was an officer in charge of laborers. The guard-ship stopped its paddles and inspected us in the gathering darkness, but concluded we were all right and passed on. My party was the first to reach Fort Sumter. We went up the steps of the wharf in the face of an excited band of seces- sion workmen, some of whom were armed with pistols. One or two Union men among them cheered, but some of the others said angrily: " What are these soldiers doing here what is the meaning of this " Ordering my men to charge bayonets, we drove the workmen into the center of the fort. I took possession of the guard-room commanding the main entrance and placed sentinels. Twenty minutes after, Seymour arrived with the rest of the men. Meantime Anderson had crossed in one of the engineer boats. As soon as the troops were all in we fired a cannon, to give notice of our arrival to the quartermaster, who had anchored at Fort Johnson with the schooners carrying the women and children. He immediately sailed up to the wharf and landed his passengers and stores. Then the workmen of secession sym- pathies were sent aboard the schooners to be taken ashore. Lieutenant Jefferson C. Davis of my company had been left with a rear- guard at Moultrie. These, with Captain Foster and Assistant-Surgeon Craw- ford, stood at loaded columbiads during our passage, with orders to fire upon the guard-boats and sink them if they tried to run us down. On withdraw- ing, the rear-guard spiked the guns of the fort, burned the gun-carriages on the front looking toward Sumter, and cut down the flag-staff. Mrs. Doubleday first took refuge at the house of the post sutler, and afterward with the family of Chaplain Harris, with whom she sought shelter behind the sand-hills. 45 FROM MOULTRIE TO SUMTER. When all was quiet they paced the beach, anxiously watching Fort Sumter. Finding that the South Carolinians were ignorant of what had happened, we sent the boats back to procure additional supplies.) The next morning Charleston was furious. Messengers were sent out to ring every door-bell and convey the news to every family. The governor sent two or three of his aides to demand that we return to Moultrie. Anderson replied in my hearing that he was a Southern man, but that he had been assigned to the defense of Charleston Harbor, and intended to defend it. Chaplain Harris was a spirited old man. He had lived at Charleston most of his life and knew the South Carolinians well. He visited Fort Sumter on our first day there and made a prayer at the raising of the flag, after which he returned to his home at Moultrieville. One day he went to the com- mander of Fort Moultrie and said to him: " Will any impediment be put in the way of my going over to Fort Sumter" The reply was: " Oh, no, par- son; I reckon we'll give you a pass." The chaplain answered: "I didn't ask you for a pass, sir. I am a United States officer, and will go to any United States fort without your permission. I asked you a different question: whether you would prevent my going by force." He was not allowed to cross, after that. We had no light and were obliged to procure some if possible, for the win- ter nights were long. There was much money due the workmen who had been discharged, and the secessionists sent them over to demand their pay. Mrs. Doubleday came in the same boat with them, and managed to ship us a box of candles at the same time; she also brought a bandbox full of matches. At the same time Mrs. Seymour reached us stealthily in a boat rowed by two little boys. Mrs. Foster was already there. Anderson thought there was going to be trouble, so he requested the ladies to return to Moultrie- ville that night. The next day they went to a Charleston hotel, where they were obliged to keep very quiet and have their meals served privately in their rooms. After a day or two they left for the North, on account c2 the feeling in the city. From December 26th until April 12th we busied ourselves in preparing for the expected attack, and our enemies did the same on all sides of us. Ander- son apparently did not want reenforcements, and he shrank from civil war. He endured all kinds of hostile proceedings on the part of the secessionists, in the hope that Congress would make some compromise that would save. slavery and the Union together. Soon after daylight on the 9th of January, with my glass I saw a large steamer pass the bar and enter the Morris Island Channel. It was the Star of the West, with reenforcements and supplies for us. When she came near the upper part of the island the secessionists fired a shot at her. I hastened )I will give anl incident here to show how successful transit to Fort Sumter, went back to completely even our own people were deceived by Moultrie in small boats to procure additional sup- the celerity and secrecy of Major Anderson's plies, Davis walked over to the mess. He was movement. Lieutenant Davis and some other receivedveryindignantlybythewoman, forcoming officers bad a mess, which was in charge of the to supper when everything was cold. Nothing could wife of one of the soldiers. She had prepared the exceed herastonishment when she learned thatthe evening meal as usual and was amazed that no entire garrisonwas in Fort Sumter. Daviscarried one came to eat it. When the officers, alter their her and her pots and kettles back with him. 46 FROM MOULTRIE TO SUMTER. to Major Anderson's room, and was ordered by him to have the long roll Ieaten and to post the men at the barbette guns. By the time we reached the parapet the transport coming to our relief had approached so near that Moultrie opened fire. Major Anderson would not allow us to return the fire, so the transport turned about and steamed seaward. Ander- Sou asked for an explanation of the firing from Governor Pickens, and atnounced that he would allow no vessel to pass within range of the guns of Sumter if the answer was unsatisfactory. Governor Pickens replied that he would renew the firing under like circumstances. I think Major Anderson had received an intimation that the Star of the WTest was coming, but did not believe it. He thought General Scott would send a man-of-war instead of a merchant vessel. Great secrecy was observed in loading her, but the purpose of the expedition got into the newspapers, and, of course, was telegraphed to Charleston. Bishop Stevens of the Methodist Church stated in a speech made by him on Memorial Day in the Academy of Music, New York, that he aimed the first gun against the Star of the West. I aimed the first gun on our side in reply to the attack on Fort Sumter. Sure that we would all be tasked to the utmost in the coming conflict, and be kept on the alert by day and night, I desired to get all the sleep I could beforehand, and lay down on a cot bedstead in the magazine nearest to Morris Island,- one of the few places that would be shell-proof when the fire opened. About 4 A. M. on the 12th, Major Anderson came to me as his exeeutive officer, and informed me that the enemy would fire upon us as soon as it was light enough to see the fort. He said he would not return it until it was broad daylight, the idea being that he did not desire to waste his ammunition. We have not been in the habit of regarding the signal shell fired from Fort Johnson as the first gun of the conflict, although it was undoubtedly aimed at Fort Sumter. Edmund Ruffin of Virginia is usually credited with opening the attack by firing the first gun from the iron-clad battery on Morris Island. The ball from that gun struck the wall of the magazine where I was lying, penetrated the masonry, and burst very near my head. As the smoke from this explosion came in through the ventilators of the magazine, and as the floor was strewn with powder where the flannel cartridges had been filled, I thought for a moment the place was on fire. When it was fully light we took breakfast leisurely before going to the guns, our food consisting of pork and water. The first night after the bombardment we expected that the naval vessels outside would take advantage of the darkness to send a fleet of boats with reenforcements of men and supplies of provisions, and as it was altogether 1robable that the enemy would also improvise a fleet of small boats to meet those of the navy, it became an interesting question, in case parties came to Us in this way, to decide whether we were admitting friends or enemies. however, the night passed quietly away without any demonstration. Captain Chester, in his paper which follows, has omitted a fact that I will mention. As the fire against us came from all directions, a shot from 47 FROM MOULTRIE TO SUMTER. TIM HOT-SHOr FURNACE, FORT MiOULTRIE- FROM A PHOTOGRAPH. Sullivan's Island struck near the lock of the magazine, and bent the copper door, so that all access to the few cartridges we had there was cut off. Just previous to this the officers had been engaged, amid a shower of shells, in vigorous efforts to cut away wood-work which was dangerously near the magazine. After the surrender we were allowed to salute our flag with a hundred guns before marching out, but it was very dangerous and difficult to do so; for, owing to the recent conflagration, there were fire and sparks all around the cannon, and it was not easy to find a safe place of deposit for the car- tridges. It happened that some flakes of fire had entered the muzzle of one of the guns after it was sponged. Of course, when the gunner attempted to ram the cartridge down it exploded prematurely, killing Private Daniel Hough instantly, and setting fire to a pile of cartridges underneath, which also exploded, seriously wounding five men. Fifty guns were fired in the salute. With banners flying, and with drums. beating "Yankee Doodle," we marched on board the transport that was to take us to the steamship Baltic, which drew too much water to pass the bar and was anchored outside. We were soon on our way to New York. With the first shot against Sumter the whole North became united. Mobs went about New York and made every doubtful newspaper and private house display the Stars and Stripes. When we reached that city we had a royal reception. The streets were alive with banners. Our men and officers were seized and forced to ride on the shoulders of crowds wild with enthusiasm. When we purchased anything, merchants generally refused all compensation. 48 FROM MOULTRIE TO SUMTER. Fort Hamilton, where we were stationed, was besieged with visitors, many of vhom were among the most highly distinguished in all walks of life. The (lamber of Commerce of New York voted a bronze medal to each officer and s )l(ier of the garrison. We were soon called upon to take an active part in the war, and the two Sulmiter companies were sent under my command to reienforce General Patter- sos's column, whichwas to serve in the ShenandoahValley. Our march through Pennsylvania was a continuous ovation. Flowers, fruits, and delicacies of all kinds were showered upon us, and the hearts of the people seemed overflow- ing with gratitude for the very little we had been able to accomplish. Major Anderson was made a brigadier-general in the regular army, and assigned to command in his native State, Kentucky; but his system had been undermined by his great responsibilities; he was threatened with softening of the brain, and was obliged to retire from active service. The other officers were engaged in battles and skirmishes in many parts of the field of war. Anderson, Foster, Seymour, Crawford, Davis, and myself became major- generals of volunteers. Norman J. Hall, who rendered brilliant service at Gettysburg, became a colonel, and would doubtless have risen higher had he not been compelled by ill health to retire. Talbot became an assistant adjutant-general with the rank of captain, but died before the war had fairly begun. He was not with us during the bombardment, as he had been sent as a special messenger to Washington with dispatches. Lieutenant Snyder of the engineers, a most promising young officer, also died at the very com- mencement of hostilities. Only one of our number left us and joined the Confederacy,-Lieutenant R. K. Meade of the engineers, a Virginian. His death occurred soon after. MAJOR ANDiERSON'S MTEN CROftN IN BOATS To AORT SUMTHR. ROMA WAR-TIME SLRTCI . VOL. 1. 4. 49 INSIDE SUMTER IN '6i. BY JAMES CHESTER, CAPTAIN THIRD ARTILLEBY, U. M. A. TOWARD the close of 1860, the national defenses of Charleston Harbor, consisting of Castle Pinckney, Fort Moultrie, and Fort Sumter, were garrisoned by an army of 65 men instead of the 1030 men that were required. Fort Moultrie alone, where the 65 soldiers were stationed, required 300 men for its defense, and Fort Sumter, to which they were ultimately transferred, was designed for a garrison of 630. Fort Moultiie, at the time of which we write, was considered a rather pleas- ant station, Sullivan's Island being a favorite summer resort. Many of the wealthy citizens of Charleston had their summer residences there, and indeed some of them lived there all the year round. There was a large summer hotel on the beach half-way up the island, and a horse railway connected the steam- boat wharf and the hotel. The military reservation stretched across the island from the front to the back beach, like a waistbelt of moderate width, and the fort looked like a big buekle at the front end. It was a brick structure, or rather an earthen structure revetted with brick. It was bastioned on the land side, and had a scarp wall perhaps fifteen feet high; but the sand had drifted against it at some points so as almost to bury its masonry. With its full complement of men it could hardly have been held against a numerous and enterprising enemy, and with 63 men it was plainly untenable. This garrison consisted of two skeleton companies and the regimental band of the 1st Artillery. They had occupied the fort since 1857, and were fairly well acquainted in the neighborhood. Indeed, several of the men had been enlisted at the post, and were native Carolinians. As the political pot began to boil toward the close of 1860 and secession was openly discussed, the social position of the garrison became anomalous. Army officers had always been favorites in the South; and as they were discreet and agreeable, it is not sur- prising, perhaps, that their society continued to be sought after, even by the most outspoken secessionists, up to the actual commencement of hostilities. But enlisted men, even in the South, were social outcasts. It was rather sur- prising, therefore, to find them receiving attentions from civilians. But the fact is that the soldiers of the army were never before treated with such consideration in the South as on the eve of the rebellion. A The secession- An amusing incident which illustrates this always peculiar. It could hardly be said that occurred during the election excitement in Novem- there were two parties, but there generally were ber, 1860. Elections ill South Carolina were two candidates tor every office in the State. FIl 50 INSIDE SUMTER IN '6i. ists were determined to have the fort, and they wanted to get it without iioodshed. They had failed with the commissioned officers, and they had Ia better success with the soldiers: every enlisted man remained faithful to the Union. The old commander of Fort Moultrie, Colonel John L. Gardner, was remtioved; the new oiie, Major Robert Anderson of Kentucky, arrived oIn ANe ,menber 21st. As a Southern man, lhe was expected to be reasonable. If he hila scruples apoil the question of qualified allegiance, he might surrender o ll demand, onl purely professional grounds. No one doubted Major Ander- sill's professional ability, and of course lie could see the hopelessness of his situation at Moultrie. Moreover, lie was a humane mail, anid would le unwillino to shed blood needlessly. But his actions clearly indicated that lie Wo\uld iiot surrender oin demand. He continued defensive preparations with ais miiuch energy and zeal as his predecessor, and manifestly meant to fight. This was very discouraging to the preachers of bloodless secession, and when lie transferred his command to Sumter their occupation was completely gone. Nothing but war would now get him out. Hence the efforts to get him ordered back again by President Buchanan-efforts which almost succeeded. The transfer of Major Anderson's command from M-oultrie to Sumter was neatly executed early in the evening of December 26th, 1860. It was a few minutes after sunset when the troops left Moultrie; the short twilight was about over when they reached the beats; fifteen or twenty minutes more car- ried them to Sumter. The workmen had just settled down to an evening's (enjoyment when armed men at the door startled them. There was no par- leying, no explaining; nothing but stern commands, silent astonishment, and ironpt obedience. The workmen were on the wharf, outside the fort, before they- were certain whether their captors were secessionists or Yankees. Meantime the newly arrived troops were busy enough. Guards were posted, embrasures secured, and, as far as practicable, the palace was put in a defensible condition against any storming-party which chagrin might drive the guard-boat people to send against it. Such an attempt was perfectly feasible. The night was very dark; the soldiers were oln unknown ground such cases the candidates would each give a barbe- ciillor feast of some kind to the voters, at which stump speeches were delivered in a somewhat tloriid style. The whole body of voters attended both entertainments, and it is to be feared decided rather upon the merits of the feast than the fitness of the candidate. At one of these entertainments on Sullivan's Island, the regimental band attended,- Hill id as an attraction -and such soldiers as were pii puss gathered around the outskirts of the crowd wh1lichl surrounded the open-air supper table. The -loper was over, and the speaking had begun. B vicything eatable had been devoured except a 17 iinant of ham which rested on a platter in front '! the chairman -who perhaps was also the can- ,ihiilute-.t one end of the long table. The chairman s is speaking, and the audience was enthusiastic. A -trm of applause had just broken out at some- ll the speaker had said, when a soldier, who hail had his eyes on the fragment of ham for some time, deliberately mounted the table at the louer eud, and carefully picking his steps among the dishes, walked to the chairman's end, picked up the coveted fragment, and started on the return trip. The audacity of the man stunned the audi- ence for a moment, but indignation soon got the better of astonishment, and the soldier was in some danger ofrough treatment. But the chairman had his revolver out in a second, and holding it aloft proelaimed: "I'll shoot the first man who interferes with that soldier." And the soldier earried off the fragment. Of course he was drunk; but he could not have done the same thing without a drubbing in 1859. This aneedote- and others might be related-indicates the policy and perhaps the expectations of the secession- ists in connection with the soldiers of Fort Moul- trie.- J. C. 5 1 INSIDE SUMTER IN '61. and could not find their way about readily; many of the embrasures could not be closed; and there were at least a hundred willing guides and helpers already on the wharf and in a fine frame of mind for such work. But nothing was attempted, and when the soldiers felt themselves in a position to repel any attempt against them that night, two guns were fired as a signal to friends that the occupation had been successfully accomplished, and that they might proceed with their part of the programme. This was the first intima- tion the guard-boat people had of the transfer; and, indeed, it told them nothing, except that some soldiers must have got into Sumter. But they blew their alarm-whistle all the same, and burned blue-lights; signal-rockets were sent up from various points, and there was great excitement everywhere in the harbor until morning. When the signal-guns were fired, the officer in charge of the two schooners which had carried provisions and ammunition to Fort Johnson (under the pretense that they were subsistence for the women and children, whom he had also carried there as a cloak) cast loose his lines and made all speed for Sumter, and the old sergeant who had been left in Moultrie for the purpose set fire to the combustibles which had been heaped around the gun-carriages, while another man spiked the guns. The garrison from the ramparts of its new nest grimly approved of the destruction of the old one. At dawn of December 27th the men were up and ready for any emergency; indeed, most of them had been up all night. Captain Foster had been spe- cially busy with his former employees. Among them he found several loyal men, and also some doubtful ones who were willing to share the fortunes of the garrison. These constituted an acceptable addition to our work- ing strength, although those classed as doubtful would have been an ele- ment of weakness in case of a fight. However, they did much good work before hostilities began, and the worst ones were weeded out before we were closely invested. Those who remained to the end were excellent men. They endured the hardships of the siege and the dangers of the bombardment without a murmur, and left Sumter with the garrison -one of them, John Swearer, severely wounded -with little besides the clothes they stood in. They were the first volunteers for the Union, but were barred from the benefits secured by legislation for the national soldiers, having never been " mustered in." Fort Sumter was unfinished, and the interior was filled with building materials, guns, carriages, shot, shell, derricks, timbers, blocks and tackle, and coils of rope in great confusion. Few guns were mounted, and these few were chiefly on the lowest tier. The work was intended for three tiers of guns, but the embrasures of the second tier were incomplete, and guns could be mounted on the first and third tiers only. The complete armament of the work had not yet arrived, but there were more guns on hand than we could mount or man. The first thing to be con- sidered was immediate defense. The possibility of a sudden dash by the enemy, under cover of darkness and guided by the discharged workmen then in Charleston, demanded instant attention. It was impossible to spread 65 men over ground intended for 650, so some of the embrasures had to be 52 INSIDE SUMTER IN '6i. bricked up. Selecting those, therefore, essential to artillery defense, and mounting guns in them, Anderson closed the rest. This was the work of ]any days; but we were in no immediate danger of an artillery attack. The annanlent of Moultrie was destroyed; its guns were spiked, and their car- r iages burned; and it would take a longer time to put them in condition than it would to mount the guns of Sumter. Oin the parade were quantities of flag-stones standing on end in masses and columns everywhere. We dared not leave them where they were, even if they had not been in the way, because mortar shells bursting among them would have made the very bomb-proofs untenable. A happy idea occuired to some one in an-k teority, and the flag-stones were arranged two tiers high in front of the case- mates, and just under the arches, thus partly closing the casemates and making excellent splinter-proofs. and SALLY-PORTage ORT labor aR This arrangement, no doubt, had A PHOt TAKES in tin warei saved the garrison from many wounds similar to that inflicted on John Swearer, for it was in passing an opening unprotected by the screen that he was struck by a fragment of shell. Moving such immense quantities of material, mounting guns, distributing shot, and bricking up embrasures kept us busy for many weeks. But order was coming out of chaos every day, and the soldiers began to feel that they were a mateh for their adversaries. Still, they could not shut their eye's to the fact that formidable works were growing up around them. The seces- sionists were busy too, and they had the advantage of unlimited labor and material. Fort Moultrie had its armament again in position, and was receiv- ing the framework of logs which formed the foundation for its sandbag bomb- Proofs. The Stevens' Point floating battery was being made impregnable by an overcoat of railroad iron; and batteries on Morris, James, and Sullivan' islands were approaching completion. But our preparations were more advanced than theirs; and if we had been permitted to open on them at this time, the bombardment of Sumter would have had a very different ter- mination. But our hands were tied by policy and instructions. The heaviest guns in Sumter were three ten-inch columbiads-considered very big guns in those days. They weighed fifteen thousand pounds each, and( were intended for the gorge and salient angles of the work. We found them skidded on the parade ground. Besides these there was a large number 'If eight-inch columbiads-more than we could mount or man-and a full `UPPlY Of 42, 32, and 24-pounders, and some eight-inch sea-coast howitzers. 53 INSIDE SUMTER IN '6i. There was an ample supply of shot and shell, and plenmy of powder in the magazines, but friction primers were not abundant and cartridge-bags were scarce. The scarcity of cartridge-bags drove us to some strange makeshifts. During the bombardment several tailors were kept busy making cartridge- bags out of soldiers' flannel shirts, and we fired away several dozen pairs of woolen socks belonging to Major Anderson. In the matter of friction primers striCt economy had to be observed, as we had no means of improvising a substitute. Our first efforts in preparation were di- reeted toward mounting the necessary guns on the lowest tier. These consisted of 42 and :32-pounders, and as the necessary trucks, gins, and tackle were on hand, the work went on rapidly. The men were in fine con- dition and as yet well fed; besides, they GH0:1'DAN-0F FORT SEATER. had the assistance of the engineer workmen, ,ACi OS ' DAl' DUALAING. who soon became experts at this kind of work. Meantimie a party of mechanics were making the main gate secure. This was situated at the middle of the gorge or base of the pentagon (the trace of the work was pen- tagonal), which was also the south-west side. It was closed by two heavy iron-studded gates, the outer a folding pai, and the inner arranged on pulleys, so that it could be raised or lowered at will. It was clear that the enemy, if he meant to bombard us, would erect batteries on Morris Island, and thus would be able to deliver an oblique fire on the gate sufficient to demolish it in a very few minutes. The gate once demolished, a night assault would become practicable. To meet this possible emergency the main entrance was closed by a sub- stantial brick wall, with a man-hole in the middle two feet wide and opposite to the man-hole in the gate. This wall was about six feet high, and to increase the security and sweep the wharf, an eight-inch sea-coast howitzer was mounted on its upper carriage without any chassis, so as to fire through the man-hole. The howitzer was kept loaded with double canister. To induce the belief that the folding gates were our sole dependence at this point, their outer surface was covered with iron. The lower tier of guns being mounted, the more difficult operation of send- ing guns up to the third tier began. The terre-plein of the work was about fifty feet above parade level,- a considerable hoist,- but a pair of shears being already in position, and our tackle equal to the weight of eight-inch colum- biads, the work went on amidst much good humor until all the guns of that caliber were in position. We had now reached a problem more difficult to solve, namely, sending up our ten-inch columbiads. We were extremely desirous to have them-or at least two of them-on the upper tier. They were more powerful guns than any the enemy had at that time, and the only ones in our possession capable 54 INSIDE SUMTER IN '6i. 55 of smashing the iron-clad defenses which might be constructed against us. Wye had rumors that an iron-clad floating battery was being built in Charles- ton, which the enemy proposed to anchor in some convenient position so as to breach Sumter at his leisure. We had no faith in the penetrating power of the eight-inch guns, and if we wished to demolish this floating adversary, it was necessary that the ten-inch guns should be mounted. Besides, an iron- clad battery was well on the road to completion at Cumming's Point (twelve huidred yards from the weakest side of Sumter), which, from what we could see of it, would be impervious to any less powerful gun. There was in the fort a large coil of very heavy rope, new, and strong enough to sustain fifteen thousand pounds, but some of the doubtful work- men had cut several strands of it at various points oii the outside of the coil; at least we could account in no other way for the damage. Besides, we had 11o blocks large enough to receive the rope even if it had been uninjured. The rope was uncoiled and examined. The portion on the inner side of the coil was found uninjured, and a few splices gave rope enough for a triple tackle sixty feet long. The improvisation of blocks of sufficient size and strength now became the sole remaining difficulty, and it was overcome in this way: the gun-carriages of those days were made of well-seasoned oak, and one of them was cut up and the material used for the construction of lblocks. When the blocks were finished the iron-elad battery was shorn of half its terrors. The tackle thus improvised was rigged on the shears, the first gun was rolled into position for hoisting, the sling was attached, and the windlass was manned. After carefully inspecting every knot and lashing, the officer in charge gave the word, " Heave away," and the men bent to their work steadily and earnestly, feeling, no doubt, that the battle with the iron-clad had really begun. Every eye watched the ropes as they began to take the strain, and when the gun had fairly left the skids, and there was no accident, the song which anxiety had suspended was resumed, all hands joining in the chorus, " On the plains of Mexico," with a sonorous heartiness that might well have been heard at Fort Moultrie. The gun made the vertical passage of fifty feet successfully, and was safely landed on the terre-plein. The chassis and carriage were then sent up, transported to the proper emplacement, and put in position, and the gun was mounted. The ten-inch columbiad threw a shot weighing one hundred and twenty-eight pounds, and it was now necessary that a supply of such shot should be raised. Of course, they could have been sent up at the derrick, but that would have been a slow process, and, moreover, it would have required the derrick and the men, when they were needed for other work. So after retreat roll-call, when the day's work was over, the men were bantered by some designing sergeant as to their ability to carry a ten-inch shot up the stairway. Some of the soldiers, full of confidence and energy, shouldered a shot each and started. They accom- plished the feat, and the less confident, unwilling to be outdone by comrades no bigger than themselves, shouldered a shot each and made the passage. In a few minutes sixty shot were deposited near the gun; and it became the custom to INSIDE SUMTER IN '6t. carry up a ten-inch shot after retreat-just for fun-as long as there were ally to carry. These trivial incidents serve to show the spirit and humor of the men better than any description. There never was a happier or more contented set of meu irl any garrison than the Sumter soldiers. There was no sulkiness among them, and no grumbling until they had to try their teeth on spun yarn as a substitute for tobacco. This occurred long before the ration was reduced, and it produced some of the loudest grumbling ever listened to. The second ten-inch columbiad was less fortunate than its fellow. It reached the level of the terre-plein without accident, but almost at the first haul on the watch tackle to swing it in, it broke away and fell with a dull thud. There was 1o1 mirth in the faces of the men at the watch tackle as they looked over the edge of the parade wall to see how many of the men at the windlass were left. The gun had descended, breech first, like a bolt from a catapult, and had buried itself in the sand up to the trunnions; but beyond breaking the transoms of the derrick, no damage was done. The cause of the accident was easily discovered. The amateur block-maker, unwilling to weaken the blocks by too much trimming, had left their upper edges too sharp, and the strap of the upper block had been cut in consequence. In four days the derrick was repaired, and the gun safely landed on the terre-plein. The third ten-inch columbiad was not sent up. It was mounted as a mortar on the parade, for the purpose of shelling Charleston should that become advisable. A mortar platform already existed there. A ten-inch top carriage was placed on it and the gun mounted pointing toward the city. A laughable incident occurred in connection with this gun soon after it was mounted. Some of the officers were anxious to try how it would work, and perhaps to see how true its alignment was, and to advertise to the enemy the fact that we had at least one formidable mortar in Fort Sumter. At any rate they obtained permission from Major Anderson to try the gun with a " very small charge." So, one afternoon the gun was loaded with a blind shell, and what was considered a " very small charge" of powder. The regu- lation charge for the gun, as a gun, was eighteen pounds. On this occasion two pounds only were used. It was not expected that the shell would be thrown over a thousand yards, and as the bay was clear no danger was anticipated. Every- thing being in readiness, the gun was fired, and the eyes of the garrison followed the shell as it described its graceful curve in the direction of the city. By the time it reached the summit of its trajectory, the fact that the charge used was not a " very small" one for the gun fired as a mortar became painfully apparent to every observer, and fears were entertained by sonle that the shell would reach the city, or at least the shipping near the wharves. But fortunately it fell short, and did no damage beyond searing the seces- sionist guard-boat then leaving the wharf for her nightly post of observation. The guard-boat put back and Sumter was visited by a flag of truce, perhaps to find out the meaning of our performance. No doubt the explanations given were satisfactory. No more experiments for range were tried with that gun, but we knew that Charleston was within range. 56 INSIDE SUMTER IN '6i. Although the full armament of Sumter was not on hand, there were many mnore guns than places to put them. This resulted from the fact that no guns were mounted on the second tier, and because many embrasures on the first tier were bricked up. There were four unplaced eight-inch colum- Ibiads after the fort had been satisfactorily garnished with glns. But we were entirely without mortars. Perhaps this serious defect in our armament, an(l perhaps our success with the ten-inch gun mounted as a mortar, induced Major Anderson to mount his extra eight-inch guns in that way. Morris Island, twelve hun- dred yards away, was the nearest terra I firma to Fort Sumter, and there the enemy would plant his most important batteries. The more searching and severe the fire that could be brought to bear upon that island, therefore, the better. So the four extra columbiads were mounted as mortars to fire in that direction. We had no carriages for 1DTRUR1OR OF EXTER Ad" tn: SURRENDER, 91OWUNO TUIC FainC an ] 1 XtCLUMBIADS PLANTESD 8MORTARS AND THrE C.ONFEDERATE FL.AG the guns and no plat- PLYING FROM TUE DRRATSCK BY VWHICI THE (UN WEIRE RAISEXD TO forms. So a trench TII UPlEU TILER FROM A PlJOTWRAPH. was dug in the parade at right angles to the proposed line of fire. A heavy timber was then embedded in the sand at the bottom of the trench, and another on the Morris Island side of it, in such a way that a gun resting on the one and leaning on the other would be supported at an angle of forty- five degrees. The guns were then placed in notches at equal intervals along the trench. We had no opportunity to try this novel mortar battery, but everybody was satisfied that it could have done good service. It was expected that the walls of Fort Sumter would be able to withstand the guns which we knew the enemy possessed, but we did not anticipate importations from abroad. During the bombardment a Whitworth gun of small caliber, just received from England, was mounted in one of the Morris Island batteries, and in a few rounds demonstrated its ability to breach the work. Fortunately its supply of ammunition was limited, and the fire stopped short of an actual breach. But a few hours more of that Whitworth 12- pounder would have knocked a hole in our defenses. A breach was not dreaded by the garrison, for, weak as it was, it could have given a good account of itself defending a breach. The greatest danger was a simultaneous attack on all sides. Sixty-four men could not be made very 57 INSIDE SUMTER IN '6i. effective at a dozen different points. The possibility of the enemy, under cover of darkness, getting a foothold in force on the narrow bit of riprapping between tide-water and the foundation of the swarp was ever present in our minds. The most likely place to land was the wharf, a stone structure in front of the main entrance. There an assaulting column might be formed and the main gate stormed, while the bulk of the garrison was defending the embra- sures. To checkmate any such attempt, means of blowing the wharf out of existence were devised. Two five-gallon demijohns filled with powder were planted as mines, well under the wharf pavement, in such a way as to insure the total demolition of the structure by their explosion. These mines were arranged so that both should explode at the same instant. The means of filing were twofold: first, a powder-hose leading from the mines through a wooden trough buried under the pavement, and terminating in a dry well just inside the gate; second, a long lanyard connected with friction primers inserted in the corks of the powder demijohns, and extending through the trough into the well, whence it branched like a bell wire to convenient points inside the fort. Another place offering special advantages to a storming party was the esplanade. This was a broad promenade extending the whole length of the gorge wall on the outside, and paved with immense blocks of dressed granite. As Fort Sumter was not designed to resist attack by storm, the esplanade was unswept by any fire. To remedy this defect the stone fougasse was resorted to. To the uninitiated the " fougasse " looked like a harmless pile of stones resting against the scarp wall. The only thing that would be likely to attract his attention was the bin-like inclosure of solid masonry open at the outer side, which looked like an immense dust-pan, and which he might think was a rather elaborate arrangement to hold merely a pile of stones together. There was nothing to indicate that beneath the stones, in the angle close to the scarp wall, a magazine of gunpowder lay concealed, and that behind were arrangements for firing it from the inside of the works. These harmless-looking piles of stones were mines of the deadliest kind. In addi- tion, two eight-inch sea-coast howitzers were mounted on their upper carriages only, and placed in front of the main entrance, pointing to the right and left so as to sweep the esplanade. The possibility of a hostile landing on the narrow strip of riprapping between the scarp wall and tide-water still remained to be provided for. Before secondary defenses were constructed, this was a continuous dead space on which a thousand men could have found a safe lodgment perfectly sereened from fire and observation. The danger from such a lodgment was, that from it all our embrasures could have been assaulted at the same time. It was all-important, therefore, that the entrance by an embrasure should be made as difficult as possible. The ledge of riprapping was little more than four feet below the sills of the embrasures, and there would have been no difficulty in stepping in, if the two or three guards inside were disposed of. This fact was well known to the enemy, and we felt certain that, if he decided to attempt an assault in this way, he would consider sealing-ladders unnecessary. In order 58 INSIDE SUMTER IN '6i. INTEWO OF o VtlR AFTER THE: DAMHAMUMEN, SiHOWING THE GATE ANM) TIHE GOROU WALL: ALSO N-E OF' TlE f8-Ihe t1IOLUMIlADS SET AS MORTA4RS RE.ARING ON MORM8 INLAND.I FROM A Pt1TOGilRAPH. to disappoint him, therefore, we removed the riprapping in front of each embrasure to the depth of four or five feet, rolling the large stones into the water. This gave a height of eight or nine feet to the embrasure sills. Macbicoulis galleries were also erected on all the flanks and faces of the work. The machicoulis when completed looked like an immense dry-goods box, set upon the parapet so as to project over the wall some three or four feet. The beams upon which it rested extended inward to the terre-plein and were securely anchored down. But the dry-goods boxwas deceptive. Inisideitwaslinedwithheavyironplates to make it bullet-proof. That portion of the bottom which projected beyond the wall was loop-holed for musketry, and a marksman in the machicoulis could shoot a man, however close he might be to the scarp wall. But musketry from the machicoulis could hardly be expected to beat off a determined assault upon the flanks and faces of the work. To meet this difficulty, hand-grenades were improvised. Shells of all sizes, from 12-pounders to 10-inch, were loaded, and the fuse-holes stopped with wooden plugs. The plugs were then bored through with a gimlet, and friction primers inserted. Behind the parapet at short intervals, and wherever it was thought they might be useful, numbers of these shell-grenades were stored under safe cover in readiness for any emergency. The method of throwing them was simple. Lanyards of sufficient length to reach to within about four feet of the riprapping were prepared, and fastened securely at the handle end near the piles of shell-grenades. To throw a grenade, the soldier lifted it on the parapet, hooked the lanyard into the eye of the friction primer, and threw the shell over the parapet. When the lanyard reached its length, the shell exploded. Thus a very few men would be more than a match for all that could assemble on the riprapping. 59 INSIDE SUMTER IN '6i. Another contrivance, the " flying fougasse," or bursting barrel, a device of Captain Truman Seymour, consisted of an ordinary cask or barrel filled with broken stones, and having in its center a canister of powder, sufficient to burst the barrel and scatter its contents with considerable force. A fuse con- ne(ted the powder in the canister with a friction primer in the bung, and the barrel was exploded by attaching a lanyard to the eye of the primer, and letting the barrel roll over the parapet, as in the case of the shell-grenade. If one experiment can justify an opinion, the flying fougasse would have been a success. When it became known in the fort that one of the barrels was about to be fired as an experiment, the novelty of the thing attracted most of the men to the place, and the little crowd attracted the attention of the enemy. No doubt glasses were focused on the party from every battery within sight. When everything was ready the barrel was allowed to roll over the parapet, and an instant afterward a terrific explosion took place. The stones were thrown in every direction, and the surface of the water was lashed into foam for a considerable distance. The effect as seen by the secessionists must have appeared greater than it did to us, although we thought it quite satis- factory. The Charleston newspapers described the effect of the "infernal machine" as simply terrific. Only three of them were constructed, yet for moral effect an empty barrel set upon the parapet would have been just as good. In war, plan as we may, much depends upon accident, and the moral effect of very insignificant incidents is often considerable. For this reason " Witty- man's Masterpiece" deserves to be mentioned. Wittyman was a German carpenter, not very familiar with English, and wholly ignorant of military engineering. His captain had conceived the idea that a cheval-de-frise across the riprapping at the salient angles of the fort would confine the enemy on whatever face he landed until he had been treated liberally with shell- grenades. So Wittyman was ordered to build a cheval-de-frise at the angle of the gorge nearest Morris Island. It was easy to see that Wittyman was not familiar with chevaux-de-frise, so the captain explained and roughly illustrated the construction. At last Wittyman seemed to grasp the idea and went to work upon it forthwith. Perhaps the work was not examined during con- struction, nor seen by any one but Wittyman until it was placed. But from that day forward it was the fountain of amusement for the men. No matter how sick or sad a man might be, let him look at the masterpiece and his ailments were forgotten. Not a steamer passed,-and they were passing almost every hour,-but every glass on board was leveled at the masterpiece. But it baffled every one of them. Not one could guess what it was, or what it was intended to be; and after the bombardment was over we learned, quite accidentally, that it had been set down by the enemy as a means of exploding the mines. Any description of the siege of Sumter would be incomplete without some sort of reference to the Star of the West fiasco. At reveille on the 9th of January, it became generally known among the men that a large steamer flying the United States flag was off the bar, seemingly at anchor. There had been some talk among the men, based upon rumors from Charleston, that the garrison would either be withdrawn from the harbor or returned to 60 INSIDE SUMTER IN '6t. Fort Moultrie; and there were some who believed the rumors. These believers were now confident that withdrawal had been determined on, and that the steamer off the bar was the transport come to take them away. There was no denying that appearances favored the theory, yet there was no enthusiasm. The men were beginning to feel that they were a match for their adversaries, and they were loath to leave without proving it. And, indeed, at that time Sumter was master of the situation. Moultrie had very few guns mounted,-only one, according to report,-and that fact ought to have been known to the people on the Star of the Whest. It was known officially in Washington that fourteen lidays previously Major Anderson had spiked the guns and burned the carriages ; 0 01 M m , at Moultrie, and gun-carriages when they have to be fabricat- ed. Hence Moultrie could not have been formidable, and as soon as it should have passed the battery on Morris Island, it would have been comparatively safe. When the Star of the West was seen standing in, the nov- MEHIR0 ORTSMTR-THIH NC, RHIIAK)IK DBAI city of a steamer carrying the O HARK KrON. FROMh A. PKHOTOGRAPH. national flag had more attrac- tions for the men than the breakfast table. They soon made her out to be a merchant steamer, as the walking-beam, plainly visible as she rounded into the channel, was unknown on a man-of-war. She had taken the Morris Island channel, and was approaching at a fair rate of speed. Perhaps every man in Sumter was on the ramparts, but there was no excitement. But when the blue puff of smoke from a hidden battery on Morris Island advertised the fact that she was being fired on, there was great scurrying and scampering among the men. The long roll was beaten, and the batteries were manned almost before the guns of the hidden battery had fired their second shot. As she approached, a single gun at Fort Moultrie opened at extreme long range, its shot falling over half a mile short. There seemed to be much perplexity among our officers, and Major Anderson had a conference with some of them in a room used as a laundry which opened on the terre-plein of the sea-flank. The conference was an impromptu one, as Captain Doubleday and Lieutenant Davis were not of it. But Captain Foster was there, and by his actions demonstrated his disappointment at the result. He left the laun- dry, bounding up the two or three steps that led to the terre-plein, smashing his hat, and muttering something about the flag, of which the words " trample on it" reached the ears of the men at the guns, and let them know that there was INSIDE SUMTER IN '6i. to be no fighting, on their part at least. Meantime the steamer had worn ship, and was standing out again, receiving the fire of the hidden battery in passing. This is about all the men saw or knew about the strange vessel at the time, although she came near enough for them to look down upon her decks and see that there were no troops visible on her. With the exception of the mounting of the guns, the preparations described were chiefly intended to ward off assault. The actions of the enemy now indicated that he proposed to bombard the work at an early day. If we would meet Moultrie, and the numerous batteries which were being con- structed against us, on anything like even terms, we must be prepared to shoot accurately. Few artillerymen, without actual experience, have any idea of the diffi- culty of aiming a gun during a bombardment. They may be able to hit a target in ordinary practice with absolute certainty, and yet be unable to deliver a single satisfactory shot in a bombardment. The error from smoke is difficult to deal with, because it is a variable, depending upon the density of the smoke clouds which envelop your own and your adversary's batteries. (Within the writer's experience, a thin veil of fog protected a mass of army wagons-900, it was said-from the fire of some 8 or 10 guns, during a whole forenoon, although the guns were within easy range, and the wagons could be distinctly seen. Refraction saved them, every shot going over.) Then danger and its consequent excitement are also disturbing elements, especially where delicate instruments have to be used. It is easier to lead a forlorn hope than to set a vernier under a heavy artillery fire. Fortunately, we had officers of experience in Sumter, and fortunately, too, we had very few instruments; one gunner's level and two old quadrants being the extent of the outfit, with perhaps some breech-sights and tangent-scales. The paucity of aiming-instruments, and perhaps the experience of some of the officers, led to the devising of instruments and methods which neither smoke nor excite- ment could disturb; and as some of them, in a much more perfect form, have since been adopted, the rude originals may as well be described here. Aiming cannon consists of two distinct operations: namely, alignment and elevation. In the former, according to instructions and practice, the gunner depends upon his eye and the cannon-sights. But for night firing or when the enemy is enveloped in smoke,-as he is sure to be in any artillery duel,- the eye cannot be depended on. Visual aiming in a bombardment is a delusion and a snare. To overcome this difficulty, on clear days, when all the conditions were favorable to accuracy, and we could work at our leisure, every gun in the armament was carefully aimed at all the prominent objects within its field of fire, and its position marked on the traverse circle, the index being a pointer securely fastened to the traverse fork. After this had been done, alignment became as easy as setting a watch, and could be done by night or day, by the least intelligent soldier in the garrison. The elevation was more difficult to deal with. The ordinary method by the use of a breech-sight could not be depended on, even if there had been a The troops on the Star of the WeTt consisted of 200 men, under Lieut. Charles B. Woods.-EDITORS. 62 INSIDE SUMTER IN '6t. sufficient supply of such instruments, because darkness or smoke would render it inapplicable or inaccurate; and the two quadrants in the outfit could not be distributed all over the fort. Before the correct elevation to carry a shot to a given object can be deter- mined, it is necessary to know the exact distance of the object. This was obtained from the coast-survey chart of the harbor. The neces- sary elevation was then calcu- lated, or taken from the tables, and the gun elevated accord- inigly by means of the quad- rant. The question thenbecam1 How can the gunner bring the gun to this elevation in the heat X of action, and without the use of a quadrant I There was an abundance of brass rods, per haps a quarter-inch in diame- ter, in the fort. Pieees of such rods, eighteen inches long, were prepared by shaping one end to EFFEC V THE BHI)MRARDWfT 01" TH BA V.PNI TH SE FRO)NT OF1 SUMTE R. "]to A.PflHO'"IKPH. fit into a socket on the cheek of the carriage, and the other into a chisel edge. They were called by the men pointing rods. A vertical line was then drawn on the right breech of the gun, and painted white. The non-commissioned officer who attended to this prep- aration, having carefully elevated the gun with the quadrant for a particular object, set the pointing rod in the socket, and brought its chisel end down on the vertical line. The point thus cut was marked and the initials of the object to be struck with that elevation written opposite. These arrangements, which originated with Captain Doubleday, were of great value during the bombardment. The preparation of Sumter for defense afforded a fine field for ingenuity, because nothing connected with its equipment was complete. As another illustration of this ingenuity, the following is in point. It might become desirable to continue a bombardment into the night, and the casemates, owing to the partial closing up of the arches with flagstones, were as dark as dungeons, even on very clear nights. Lights of some kind were absolutely necessary, but there were no candles and no lamps. There was a light-house oil the fort, however, and the light-keeper had several barrels of oil on hand. Small tubes of tin, to receive wicks, were made, and fitted into disks of cork Mufficiently large to float them on the surface of the oil. Coffee-cups were then filled with oil and the floats laid on the surface. Among the many incidents of the siege may be mentioned the mishap of an ice-laden Yankee schooner that strayed within range of the secession batteries; the accidental solid shot fired at Fort Sumter by an impatient secessionist in the Cumming's Point battery, and the daring generosity of McInerny, a INSIDE SUMTER IN '6t. r7 ' TIE S4 MTI'R GARUItI.N WATCHV,G THEFUbIN ONJU ' THE "IAR OF THE W"T. Fort M.ouitrt t. siiowi. on the loft, aud the smuoke of tlu M.lrrts I-lndn batt,,ry on the e'.tremet right. warm-hearted and loyal Irishman, who did not "cross the broad Atlantic to become the citizen of only one Shtate," and who cheerfully risked his life and ruined his Sunday shirt by tearing a white flag from it, that he might be able to deliver in person his donation of tobacco to the besieged soldiers. There is one other incident which should find a place in these reminiscences. Major Anderson was fully impressed with the solemn responsibilities which rested upon him when he transferred his command to Sumter. When he reached Sumter there were no halliards to the flag-staff, and as there was more pressing work on hand for several days, some time elapsed before it becamne possible to display the national flag.. At length, however, halliards were rigged, and everything was ready for the flag. The usual method of proceeding in such a case would have been to order the sergeant of the guard to send up the flag, but it was otherwise arranged on this occasion. A dress-parade was ordered, and the little garrison formed around the flag-staff, the officers in the center. Presently Major Anderson, with Chap- lain Harris of Fort Moultrie, who perhaps had been summoned for the purpose, approached the flag-staff, and the command was brought to "1Attention." The flag, already bent to the halliards, was held by one officer, and another held the hoisting end of the halliards. The chaplain then, in a few words, invited those present to join with him in prayer, and Major Ander- son, receiving the halliards from the officer who till that time had held them, knelt beside the chaplain, most of the officers and some of the men in the ranks following his example. Prayers being ended, all rose, and the flag of 64 INSIDE SUMTER IN '61. iFort Sumter was raised by Major Anderson, and the halliards secured. He then turned toward the officers and directed that the companies be dismissed. if any of those who doubted the loyalty to the Union of Major Anderson .ould have had but one glimpse of that impressive scene, they would have dloubted no longer. The weary waiting for war or deliverance which filled up the few weeks that intervened between the preparations and the actual bombardment developed no discontent among the men, although food and fuel were getting scarce. The latter was replenished from time to time by tearing down sheds and temporary workshops, but the former was a constantly dimin- ishing quantity, and the men could count on their fingers the number of days between them and starvation. It was a favorite belief among the secessionists that the pinchings of hunger would arouse a spirit of mutiny among the soldiers, and compel Major Anderson to propose terms of evacuation. But no such spirit manifested itself. On the contrary, the men exhibited a devotion to their Government and the officers appointed over them which surprised their enemies, but attracted little attention from their friends. ) The opening of the bombardment was a somewhat dramatic event. A reliev- ing fleet was approaching, all unknown to the Sumter garrison, and General Beauregard, perhaps with the hope of tying Major Anderson's hands in the expected fight with that fleet, had opened negotiations with him on the 11th of April looking toward the evacuation of the fort. But Major Anderson declined to evacuate his post till compelled by hunger. The last ounce of breadstuffs had been consumed, and matters were manifestly approaching a crisis. It was evident from the activity of the enemy that something important was in the wind. That night we retired as usual. Toward half- past three on the morning of the 12th we were startled by a gun fired in the immediate vicinity of the fort, and many rose to see what was the matter. It was soon learned that a steamer from the enemy desired to communicate with Major Anderson, and a small boat under a flag of truce was received aw1(l delivered the message. Although no formal announcement of the fact was made, it became generally known among the men that in one hour (general Beauregard would open his batteries on Sumter. The men waited about for some time in expectation of orders, but received none, except an informal order to go to bed, and the information that reveille would be sounded at the usual hour. This was daylight, fully two hours off, so some of the men did retire. The majority perhaps remained up, anxious to see the opening, for which purpose they had all gone on the ram- parts. Except that the flag was hoisted, and a glimmer of light was visible at the guard-house, the fort looked so dark and silent as to seem deserted. The morning was dark and raw. Some of the watchers surmised that Beauregard was " bluffing," and that there would be no bombardment. But ISo faithful and true have the soldiers of the which were abandoned by all the commissioned aray always been that even very striking exhibi- officers, at which not one of the enlisted men time of these qualities are not considered worthy proved untrue. The loyalty of the latter has Of notice. There were military posts in 1861 never been properly appreciated. -J. C. VOL. 1. 5. INSIDE SUMTER IN '6,. C:ONFEltATE FLOATING BATTRET IN A(CTIO AT THE W9EST END OF SULLIVAEW'S Ii-LED. (llonO Joseph A. Yate,4 who was a liretenaut in on bner shi.eld with railtroa iron laid on it-- two 1,150's the alttak i' Forte Snulurr, says il a letter asrnl-- ofrails tnrnid infadl mnd ont -ard so as to fort i ant ying the pil- on the loxt lpug- I M'Iid X rough pretty sooeth roftaee. The hbgs of Vudl repreenteul lkeotrh of the tt-ting battery whirh I ,hInaollld;t it is on thle dek were to counterwigh the gnu., whih rovugh, lnt from sti reco lletiu it is very like her The were 31 tod 42-laintlidr. Flae wa- strnik wIlaLy times, battery wats Ibstantially tuilt, lat. heavily tiltored se-,erl shot going entirely through tin, shield." promptly at 4:30 A. m. a flash as of distant lightning in the direction of Mount Pleasant, followed by the dull roar of a mortar, told us that the bombardment had begun. The eyes of the watchers easily detected and followed the burning fuse which marked the course of the shell as it mounted among the stars, and then descended with ever-increasing velocity, until it landed inside the fort and burst. It was a capital shot. Then the batteries opened on all sides, and shot and shell went screaming over Sumter as if an army of devils were swooping around it. As a rule the guns were aimed too high, but all the mortar practice was good. Iu a few minutes the novelty disappeared in a realizing sense of danger, and the watchers retired to the bomb-proofs, where they discussed probabilities until reveille. Habits of discipline are strong among old soldiers. If it had not been for orders to the contrary, the men would have formed for roll-call on the open parade, as it was their custom to do, although mortar-shells were bursting there at the lively rate of about one a minute. But they were formed under the bomb-proofs, and the roll was called as if nothing unusual was going on. They were then directed to get breakfast, and be ready to fall in when "assembly" was beaten. The breakfast part of the order was considered a grim joke, as the fare was reduced to the solitary item of fat pork, very rusty indeed. But most of the men worried down a little of it, and were " ready" when the drum called them to their work. 66 INSIDE SUMTER IN '6i. By this time it was daylight, and the effects of the bombardment became visible. No serious damage was being done to the fort. The enemy had -onieentrated their fire on the barbette batteries, but, like most inexperienced gunners, they were firing too high. After daylight their shooting improved, until at 7:30 A. M., when " assembly" was beaten in Sumter, it had become fairly good. At "assembly" the men were again paraded, and the orders of the day announced. The garrison was divided into two reliefs, and the tour of duty at the guns was to be four hours. Captain Doubleday being the senior captain, his battery took the first tour. There were three points to be fired upon,-the Morris Island batteries, the James Island batteries, and the Sullivan's Island batteries. With these last was included the famous iron-clad floating battery, which had taken up a position off the western end of Sullivan's Island to command the left flank of Sumter. Captain Doubleday divided his men into three parties: the first, under his own immediate command, was marched to the casemate guns bear- ing on Morris Island; the second, under Lieutenant Jefferson C. Davis, manned the casemate guns bearing on the James Island batteries; and the third-without a commissioned officer until Dr. Crawford joined it-was marched by a sergeant: to the guns bearing on Sullivan's Island. The guns in the lower tier, which were the only ones used during the bombard- ment,-except surreptitiously without orders,-were 32 and 42-pounders, and some curiosity was felt as to the effect of such shot on the iron-clad battery. The gunners made excellent practice, but the shot were seen to bounce off its sides like pease. After battering it for about an hour and a half, no visible effect had been produced, although it had perceptibly slackened its fire, perhaps to save ammunition. But it was evident that throwing 32-pounder shot at it, at a mile range, was a waste of iron, and the attention of the gunners was transferred to Fort Moultrie. Moultrie was, perhaps, a less satisfactory target than the iron-clad. It was literally buried under sand-bags, the very throats of the embrasures being closed with cotton-bales. The use of cot- ton-bales was very effective as against X shot, but would have been less so against shell. The fact that the embrasures were thus closed was not known in Sumter till after the bombardment. It explained what was otherwise inexplicable. Shot TIE IRON-CLAD FLOATING BATTE!Y. would be seen to strike an embrasure, FRO A PLAN BY C:LWEL JOSEEPH A. YAT and the gunner would feel that he had settled one gun for certain, but even while he was receiving the congratulations of his comrades the supposed t, The non-commissioned officers in Fort Sumter William A. Harn. and James Chester, Corporals Were Ordnance-Sergeant James Kearney, U. S. A., Owen Expire, Francis J. Oakes, Charles Bring- Quartermaster-Sergeant William H. Hammer, 1st hurst, and Henry Ellerbrook; Company H, 1st U. S. Artillery; Regimental Band, Ist Artillery: Artillery: First Sergeant John Renehan, Sergeants !geant James E. Galway, Corporal Andrew James M'Mahon, John Carmody, and John Otto, Smith; Company E, lot Artillery: First Sergeant Corporal Christopher Costolan. -EDITORS. Eulgene Bcheibner, Sergeants Thomas Kirnan, 67 INSIDE SUMTER IN '6t. disabled gun would reply. That the cotton-bales could not be seen from Sumter is not surprising. The sand-bag casemates which covered the guns were at least eighteen feet thick, and the cotton-bale shutter was no doubt arranged to slide up and down like a portcullis inside the pile of sand-bags. The gunners of Sumter, not knowing of the existence of these shutters, directed their shot either on the embrasures for the purpose of disabling the enemy's guns, or so as to graze the sand-bag parapet for the purpose of reaching the interior of the work. The practice was very good, but the effect, for reasons already stated, was inconsiderable. At the end of the first four hours, Doubleday's men were relieved from the guns and had an opportunity to look about them. Not a man was visible near any of the batteries, but a large party, apparently of non-combatants, had collected on the beach of Sullivan's Island, well out of the line of fire, to witness the duel between Sumter and Moultrie. Doubleday's men were not in the best of temper. They were irritated at the thought that they had been unable to inflict any serious damage on their adversary, and although they had suffered no damage in return they were dissatisfied. The crowd of unsympathetic spectators was more than they could bear, and two veteran sergeants determined to stir them up a little. For this purpose they directed two 42-pounders on the crowd, and, when no officer was near, fired. The first shot struck about fifty yards short, and, bounding over the heads of the astonished spectators, went crashing through the Moultrie House. The second followed an almost identical course, doing no damage except to the Moultrie House, and the spectators scampered off in a rather undignified manner. The Moultrie House was flying a yellow flag at the time, and the Charleston newspapers discoursed upon the barbarity of firing upon a hospital flag, forgetting, perhaps, that we also had a hospital in Sumter, which they treated to red-hot shot during the bombardment. Of course, none of the officers of Sumter knew anything about the two 42-pounder shot. The smoke which enveloped the Confederate batteries during the first day, while not so thick as entirely to obscure them, was sufficiently so to make visual aiming extremely unreliable; and during the second day, when Sumter was on fire, nothing could be seen beyond the muzzles of our own guns. But the aiming arrangements, due to the foresight and ingenuity of Captain Doubleday, enabled us to fire with as much accuracy when we could not see the object as when we could. Early on the first day several vessels of the fleet were observed off the bar, and orders were given to dip the flag to them. This was done, and the salute was returned, but while our flag was being hoisted after the third dip, a shell burst near the flag-staff and cut the halliards. This accident put the flag beyond our control. It ran down until the kinky halliards jammed in the pulley at the mast-head, and the flag remained at about half-staff. This has been interpreted as a signal of distress, but it was only an accident. There was no special distress in Sumter, and no signal to that effect was intended. Major Anderson had given orders that only the casemate batteries should be manned. While this was undoubtedly prompted by a desire to save his 68 INSIDE SUMTER IN '6i. 69 men, it operated also, in some degree, to save the Confederates. Our most pow- erful batteries and all our shell guns were on the barbette tier, and, being for- Ihidden their use, we were compelled to oppose a destructive shell fire with solid shot alone. This, especially as we had no mortars, was a great disadvantage. ' SURORkANT 4011. CARMODY FUIN1G THE 11 "IIIIE GV S. Had we been permitted to use our shell guns we could have set fire to the l)arracks and quarters in Moultrie; for, as it was, we wrecked them badly with solid shot, although we could not see them. Then the cotton-bale shutters would have been destroyed, and we could have made it much livelier generally for our adversaries. This was so apparent to the men, that one of them - a man utared Carmody - stole up on the ramparts and deliberately fired every bar- bette gun in position on the Moultrie side of the work. The guns were already loaded and roughly aimed, and Carmody simply discharged them in succession; hetice, the effect was less than it, would have been if the aim had been care- fully rectified. But Carmody's effort aroused the enemy to a sense of his dan- ger. He supposed, no doubt, that Major Anderson had determined to open his barbette batteries, so he directed every gun to bear on the barbette tier of Fort Sumter, and probably believed that the vigor of his fire induced MIajor Anderson to change his mind. But the contest was merely Carmody against the Confederate States; and Carmody had to back down, not because lie was beaten, but because he was unable, single-handed, to reload his guns. Another amusing incident in this line occurred on the Morris Island side of th1 fort. There, in the gorge angle, a ten-inch columbiad was mounted, et 1)etrbette, and as the 42-pounders of the casemate battery were makting no INSIDE SUMTER IN '6t. impression on the Cumming's Point iron battery, the two veteran sergeants who had surreptitiously fired upon the spectators, as already related, deter- mined to try a shot at the iron battery from the big gun. As this was a direct violation of orders, caution was necessary. Making sure that the major was out of the way, and that no officers were near, the two sergeants stole upstairs to the ten-ineh gun. It was loaded and aimed already, they very well knew, so all they would have to do was to fire it. This was the work of a few seconds only. The gun was fired, and those in the secret down below watched the flight of the shot in great expectations of decided results. Unfortunately the shot missed; not a bad shot-almost grazing the crest of the battery- but a miss. A little less elevation, a very little, and the battery would have been smashed: so thought the sergeants, for they had great faith in the power of their gun; and they determined to try a second shot. The gun was reloaded, a feat of some difficulty for two men, but to run it "in battery" was beyond their powers. It required the united efforts of six men to throw the carriage "in gear," and the two sergeants could not budge it. Things were getting desperate around them. The secessionists had noticed the first shot, and had now turned every gun that would bear on that ten-inch gun. They were just getting the range, and it was beginning to be uncomfortable for the sergeants, who in a fit of desperation determined to fire the gun " as she was." The elevating screw was given half a turn less elevation, and the primer was inserted in the vent. Then one of the sergeants ran down the spiral stairs to see if the coast were clear, leaving his comrade in a very uncomfortable posi- tion at the end of the lanyard, and lying flat on the floor. It was getting hotter up there every second, and a perfect hurricane of shot was sweeping over the prostrate soldier. Human nature could stand it no longer. The lanyard was pulled and the gun was fired. The other sergeant was hastening up the stairway, and had almost reached the top, when he met the gun com- ing down, or at least trying to. Having been fired "from battery," it had recoiled over the counter-hurters, and, turning a back somersault, had landed across the head of the stairway. Realizing in a moment what had happened, and what would be to pay if they were found out, the second sergeant crept to the head of the stairway and called his comrade, who, scared almost to death,- not at the danger he was in, but at the accident,-was still hugging the floor with the lanyard in his hand. Both got safely down, swearing eternal secrecy to each other; and it is doubtful if Major Anderson ever knew how that ten-inch gun came to be dismounted. It is proper to add that the shot was a capital one, striking just under the middle embrasure of the iron battery and half covering it with sand. If it had been a trifle higher it would have entered the embrasure. The first night of the bombardment was one of great anxiety. The fleet might send reenforcements; the enemy might attempt an assault. Both would come in boats; both would answer in English. It would be horrible to fire upon friends; it would be fatal not to fire upon enemies. The night was dark and chilly. Shells were dropping into the fort at regular intervals, and the men were tired, hungry, and out of temper. Any party that 70 INSIDE SUMTER IN '6i. approached that night would have been rated as enemies upon general prin- -iples. Fortunately nobody appeared; reveille sounded, and the men oiled their appetites with the fat pork at the usual hourby way of breakfast. The second day's bombardment began at the same hour as did the first; that is, on the Sumter side. The enemy's mortars had kept up a very slow fire all iiight, which gradually warmed up after daylight as their batteries seemed to awaken, until its vigor was about equal to their fire of the day before. The fleet was still off the bar-perhaps wait- ing to see the end. Fire broke out once or twice in the officers' quarters, and was extinguished. It broke out again in several places at once, and we real- ized the truth and let the quarters burn. They were firing red-hot shot. This was about 9 o'clock. As soon as Sumter was noticed to be on fire the secession- ists increased the fire of their batteries to a maximum. In the perfect storm of a d rah s o shot and shell that beat upon us from full ofsmokes,an the flag-tffws shot rpdlycoinwnupni.ntwsvdn but the old flag was rescued and nailed b to a new staff. This, with much diffi- culty, was carried to the ramparts and A lashed to some chassis piled up there KKQ ' for a traverse. We were not sorry to see the quarters ACAEXATV OU DUIN TH CONLARATON burn. They were a nuisance. Built for fire-proof buildings, they were not fire-proof. Neither would they burn up in a cheerful way. The principal cisterns were large iron tanks immediately under the roof. These had been riddled, and the quarters below had been deluged with water. Everything was wet and burned badly, yielding an amount of pungent piney smoke which almost suffocated the garrison. The scene inside the fort as the fire gained headway and threatened the magazine was an exciting one. It had already reached some of our stores of loaded shells and shell-grenades. These must be saved at all hazard. Soldiers lbrought their blankets and covered the precious projectiles, and thus the most of them were saved. But the magazine itself was in danger. Already it was full of smoke, and the flames were rapidly closing in upon it. It was evident that it must be closed, and it would be many hours before it could be opened again. During these hours the fire must be maintained with such powder as we could secure outside the magazine. A number of barrels were rolled out for this purpose, and the magazine door-already almost too hot to handle -was closed. It was the intention to store the powder taken from the magazine in several safe corners, covering it with damp soldiers' blankets. But safe corners were 7 1 INSIDE SUMTER IN '6i. hard to find, and most of the blankets were already in use covering loaded shells. The fire was raging more fiercely than ever, and safety demanded that the uncovered powder be thrown overboard. This was instantly done, and if the tide had been high we should have been well rid of it. But the tide was low, and the pile of powder-barrels rested on the riprapping in front of the embrasure. This was observed by the enemy, and some shell guns were turned upon the pile, producing an explosion which blew the gun at that embrasure clear out of battery, but did no further damage. The fire had now enveloped the magazine, and the danger of an explosion was imminent. Powder had been carried out all the previous day, and it was more than likely that enough had sifted . through the cartridge- bags to carry the fire into the powder- chamber. Major An- dereon, his head erect asifon parade, cualled a the men around him; t t d be killed with is own shot nd He BaRRuETTE in Tho- msCT OF directed that a shot be fired every five mnc- putes; and mentioned that there was some danger of the nmaga- zine exploding. Some of the men, as soon as RVKS(F TIIP CAEMTE NEA THE -4AL1 IPORT ADO T'ILE they learned what the FLG-TAF FROM1 IIH! IOGRAP.1 real danger was, rushed to the door of the magazine and hurriedly dug a trench in front of it, which they kept filled with water until the danger was considered over. It was during this excitement that ex-Senator Wigfall of Texas visited the fort. It came the turn of one of the guns on the left face of the work to fire,- we were now firing once in five minutes,- and as the cannoneer approached for the purpose of loading, he discovered a man looking in at the embrasure. The man must have raised himself to the level of the embrasure by grasping the sill with his hands. A short but lively altercation ensued between the man and the cannoneer, the man pleading to be taken in lest he should be killed with his own shot and shell. He was hauled in, Thompson, the cannoneer, first receiving his sword, to the point of which a white hand- kerchief was attached, not by way of surrender, but for convenience. Once 72 INSIDE SUMTER IN '61. inside, the bearer asked to see Major Anderson. The major was soon on the spot and opened the conversation by asking, "To what am I indebted for this visit" The visitor replied, " I am Colonel Wigfall, of General Beaure- gard's staff. For God's sake, Major, let this thing stop. There has been enough bloodshed already." To which the major replied, " There has been none on my side, and besides, your batteries are still firing on me." At which Wigfall exclaimed, "I'll soon stop that," and turning to Thompson, who still held the sword under his arm, he said, pointing to the handkerchief, " Wave that out there." Thompson then handed the sword to Wigfall, saying, in sub- stance, " Wave it yourself" Wigfall received back his sword and took a few steps toward the embrasure, when the major called him back, saying, " If you desire that to be seen you had better send it to the parapet." There was a good deal more said on the subject of the white flag both by Wigfall and the major which the writer cannot recall, but the end of it all was that a white flag was ordered to be displayed from the parapet at the request of Colonel Wigfall, and pending negotiations with him, which was instantly done, a hospital sheet being used for the purpose. Then the firing gradually ceased, and the major and his officers and Colonel Wigfall retired into the hospital bomb-proof, the only habitable room left. This was about 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Wiglfall's conference was not of long duration. He left the fort in the small boat which brought him from Morris Island, and which was manned by negroes. Shortly after his departure another small boat from Sullivan's Island, containing officers in full uniform (Wigfall wore citizen's dress with the sword), approached the fort. The officers in this boat were very much astonished and annoyed at being warned off by the sentinel, and compelled to show a white flag before they were permitted to approach. They were received by the officer of the day, who apologized for not meeting them afloat, saying that all our boats had been destroyed by shot or burned up. They were indignant at their reception, and demanded to know whether or not the fort had surrendered. What was said in reply was not distinctly heard by the writer, but it was believed to be a negative. The officer then asked what the white flag meant, and Wigfall's name was mentioned in reply, About this time Major Anderson made his appearance, and the visitors, still talking in an indignant tone, addressed themselves to him. What was said seemed to be a repetition of what had just been said to the officer of the day. The major's replies were inaudible where the writer of this stood, except when he raised his hand in a sweeping sort of gesture in the direction of Fort Moultrie, and said, " Very well, gentlemen, you can return to your batteries" They did not return, however, immediately, but were conducted into the hospital where Wigfall had been, and remained there some time. When they left we learned that there would be no more firing until General Beauregard had time to hear from his Government at Montgomery. About 7 o'clock in the evening another white flag brought the announce- mnent that the terms agreed upon between General Beauregard and Major Anderson had been confirmed, and that we would leave Fort Sumter the following day; which we did, after saluting our flag with fifty guns. 73 THE FIRST STEP IN THE WAR. BY STEPHEN )D. LEE, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL, C. S. A. IN the month of December, 1860, the South itself had no more realizing sense than the North of the magnitude of events about to be entered into so lightly. Even the Southern leaders did not realize that there could be any obstacle to " peaceable secession." Many at the North were willing to " let the wayward sisters depart in peace." Only a few on either side expected that blood would be shed. When, in the first Confederate Congress at Mont- gomery, one prudent dlebater exclaimed, "What if we really have a war " the general response was, " There will be no war." " But," he persisted, "if there is a war, what are our resources I " and when one man in reply expressed his conviction that if the worst came, the South could put fifty thousand men into the field, he was looked upon as an enthusiast. The expectation of "peaceable secession" was the delusion that precipitated matters in the South; and it was on this expectation, when the crisis came, that South Carolina seceded. Her first step was to organize troops and assert the sov- ereignty in which she believed, by the occupation of her territory. After the evacuation of Fort Moultrie, although Major Anderson was not permitted by the South Carolina authorities to receive any large supply of provisions, yet he received a daily mail, and fresh beef and vegetables from the city of Charleston, and was unmolested at Fort Sumter. He con- tinued industriously to strengthen the fort. The military authorities of South Carolina, and afterward of the Confederate States, took possession of Fort Moultrie, Castle Pinckney, the arsenal, and other United States property in the vicinity. They also remounted the guns at Fort Moultrie, and con- structed batteries on Sullivan's, Morris, and James islands, and at other places, looking to the reduction of Fort Sumter if it should become necessary; meantime leaving no stone unturned to secure from the authorities at Wash- ington a quiet evacuation of the fort. Several arrangements to accomplish this purpose were almost reached, but failed. Two attempts were made to reenforee and supply the garrison: one by the steamer Star of the West, which tried to reach the fort, January 9th, 1861, and was driven back by a battery on Morris Island, manned by South Carolina troops; the other just 74 THE FIRST STEP IN THE WAR. before the bombardment of Sumter, April 12th. The feeling of the Con- federate authorities was that a peaceful issue would finally be arrived at; but they had a fixed determination to use force, if necessary, to occupy the fort. They did not desire or intend to take the initiative, if it could be avoided. So soon, however, as it was clearly understood that the authorities at Washington had abandoned peaceful views, and would assert the power of the United States to supply Fort Sumter, General Beauregard, the commander of the Confederate forces at Charleston, in obedience to the command of his Government at Montgomery, proceeded to reduce the fort. His arrangements were about complete, and on April 11th he demanded of Major Anderson the evacuation of Fort Sumter. He offered to transport Major Anderson and his command to any port in the United States; and to allow him to move out of the fort with company arms and property, and all private property, and to salute his flag in lowering it. This demand was deliv- ered to Major Anderson at 3:45 P. m., by two aides of General Beauregard, James Chesnut, Jr., and myself. At 4:30 P. mi. he handed us his reply, refusing to accede to the demand; but added, "Gentlemen, if you do not batter the fort to pieces about us, we shall be starved out in a few days." The reply of Major Anderson was put in General Beauregard's hands at 5:15 P. M., and he was also told of this informal remark. Anderson's reply and remark were communicated to the Confederate authorities at Montgom- ery. The Secretary of War, L. P. Walker, replied to Beauregard as follows: " Do not desire needlessly to bombard Fort Sumter. If Major Anderson will state the time at which, as indicated by him, he will evacuate, and agree that in the meantime he will not use his guns against us, unless ours should be employed against Fort Sumter, you are authorized thus to avoid the effusion of blood. If this, or its equivalent, be refused, reduce the fort as your judgment decides to be most practicable." The same aides bore a second commu- nication to Major Anderson, based on the above instructions, which was placed in his hands at 12:45 A. m., April 12th. His reply indicated that he would evacuate the fort on the 15th, provided he did not in the meantime receive contradictory in- structions from his Government, or addi- tional supplies, but he declined to agree not to open his guns upon the Confederate ti oops, in the event of any hostile demon- stration on their part against his flag. Major Anderson made every possible effort to retain the aides till daylight, making one excuse and then another for not replying. 4 Finially, at 3: 15 A.mi., he delivered his reply. In accordance with their instructions, the aides read it and, finding it unsatisfactory, CAUOFNA, 1w1. FROMA. 1VR. X R I0'l. gave Major Anderson this notification: 75 THE FIRST STEP IN THE WAR. ' FORT SuwTrR, S. C., April 12, 1861, 3:20 A. M.-SIR: By authority of Brigadier-General Beauregard, commanding the Provisional Forces of the Confederate States, we have the honor to notify you that he will open the fire of his batteries on Fort Sumter in one hour from this time. We have the honor to be very respectfully, Your obedient servants, JAMES CHESNUT, JR., Aide-de-camp. STEPHEN D. LEE, Captain C. S. Army, Aide-de-camp.' The above note was written in one of the casemates of the fort, and in the presence of Major Anderson and several of his officers. On receiving it, he was much affected. He seemed to realize the full import of the consequen- 22. ces, and the great respon- z24A t\V sibilityof his position. Eseorting us to the boat X2 A at the wharf, he cordially Gf pressed our hands in fare. well, remarking, "If we never meet in this world again, God grant that we ) iVw'''.. may meet in the next." Captain Jamesat one arused is and ranThe boat containing the two aides and also Roger A. Pryor, of Virginia, and the first ft-R1T1E1 gun of1 thNe, ovMaArEy BY A. R. Chisolm, of South Capai NaNT C. R. 11would all4o n o o1 ls bu Carolina, who wmeere also members of General Beauregard's staff, went immediately to Fort Johnson on James Island, and the order to fire the signal gun was given to Captain George S. James, commanding the battery at that point. It was then 4 A. f . Captain James at once aroused Jis command, and arranined to carry out the order. He was a great adiniger of Roger A. Pryor, and said to him, "mYou are the otl man to whom I would give up thee honor of firifg the first gni of the war"; anl lhe offered to allow thin to fire it. Pryor, on receiving the offer, was very much agitated. Wvitlh a husky voice he said, "1I could not fire the first gun of the war." His manner was almost similar to that of Major Aiiderson as we left himn a few moments before on the wharf at Fort Sumter. Captain James would allow no one else but himself to fire the gun. The boat with the aides of Geineral Beauregard left Fort Johnson before arrangements were complete for the firing of the gun, and laid on its oars, about one-third the distance between the fort and Sumter, there to witness the firing of "the first gun of the war " between the States. It was fired from a ten-inch mortar at 4: 30 A. m., April 12th, 1861. Captain James was a skill- ful officer, and the firing of the shell was a success. It burst immediately over the fort, apparently about oiie hundred feet above. The firing of the When the Star ,f fhve West arrived, on the from a 4-pounder had been fired from Vicksbur 91th Of January, the first shot, aimed across her by Horace Miller at a passing United States ves- bow, was fired by G1. E. Haynsworth, and the sel, supposed to be carrying a supply of arms second, aimed directly at her, by Cadet Horlbeck. and ammunition to New Orleans. (see also pp. It is claimed that before this date a hostile shot 07 and 47.)-EDITORS. 76 THE FIRST STEP IN THE WAR. mortar woke the echoes from every nook and corner of the harbor, and in this the dead hour of night, before dawn, that shot was a sound of alarm that brought every soldier in the harbor to his feet, and every man, woman, andl child in the city of Charleston from their beds. A thrill went through the whole city. It was felt that the Rubi- con was passed. No one thought of go- ing home; unused as their ears were to the appalling sounds, or the vivid flashes from the bat- teries, they stood for hours fascinated with horror. After the second shell the different batteries opened their fire on Fort Sumter, and by 4:45 A. M.the fir- ing was general and regular. It was a hazy, foggy morn- ing. About day- light, the boat with the aides reached Charlestoni,andthey reported to General Beauregard. Fort Sumter did eot respond with her guns till 7: 30 .k. . The firing from7 this fort, during the entire bombard- ment, was slow and deliberate, and _ marked with little accuracy. The firing continued without intermission during the 12th, and more slowly during the night of the 12th and 13th. No material change was noticed till 8 A. M. on the 13th, when the barracks in Fort Sumter were set on fire by hot shot from the guns of Fort Moultrie. As soon as 77 THE FIRST STEP IN THE WAR. this was discovered, the Conf ederate A5 ,batteries redoubled their efforts, to prevent the fire being extinguished. Fort Sumter fired at little longer in- tervals, to enable the garrison to fight the flames. This brave action, under such a trying ordeal, aroused great sympathy and admiration on the part of the Confederates for Major Ander- son and his gallant garrison; this feeling was shown by eheers when- ever a gun was fired from Sumter. :I EA t ever a gIt was shown also by loud reflec- y X 2 W athetions on the "men-of-war" outside the harbor4, About 12:30 the flag-staff of Fort Sumter was shot down, but it was soon replaced. As soon as General Beauregard heard that the flag was -no longer flying, he sent three of his aides, William Porcher Miles, Roger SECDIoNG HALL CETQ E OFTHE PASSAGE A. Pryor, and myself, to offer, and OFROM A B ROCK RAH of SWalso to see if Major Anderson would receive or needed, assistance, in sub- duing the flames inside the fort. Before we reached it, we saw the United States flag again floating over it, and began to return to the city. Before going far, however, we saw the Stars and Stripes replaced by a white flag. We turned about at once and rowed rapidly to the fort. We were directed, from an embrasure, not to go to the wharf, as it was mitted, and the fire was near it. We were assisted through an embrasure and conducted to Major Anderson. Our mission being made known to him, he replied, "Present my compliments to General Beauregard, and say to him I thank him for his kindness, but need no assistance." He further remarked that he hoped the worst was over, that the fire had settled over the magazine, and, as it had not exploded, he thought the real danger was about over. Continuing, he said, "Gentlemen, do I understand you come direct from General Beauregard " The reply was in the affirmative. He then said, " Why! Colonel Wigfall has just been here as an aide too, and by authority of General Beauregard, and t. These vessels, part of the second expedition for the relief of Fort Sumter, were the Baltic (no guns), the Pawnee (8 9-inch guns), and the Harriet Laen (1 S-inch gun and 4 32-pounders). The Poenahontas did not arrive till the afternoon of the 13th. The expedition was in charge of Captain Gnstavus V. Fox (afterward Assistant Secretary of the Navy), who had visited the fort on the 21st of March. It had been understood between Secre- tary Welles and Captain Fox that the movement should be supported by the Poirhatan (1 11-inch and 10 9-inch guns); but, unknown to Mr. Welles, and perhaps without full understanding of this plan, President Lincoln had consented to the dispatch of the ship to the relief of Fort Pickens, for which destination it had sailed from New York, April 6th, under command of Lieutenant David D. Porter. This conflict of plans deprived Captain Fox of the ship which he calls the " fighting portion" of his fleet; and to this circumstance he attributed the failure of the expedition. EDITORs. 78 THE FIRST STEP IN THE WAR. proposed the same terms of evacuation offered on the I1th instant." We informed the major that we were not authorized to offer terms; that we were direct from General Beauregard, and that Colonel Wigfall, although an aide- le-camp to the general, had been detached, and had not seen the general for several days. Major Anderson at once stated, " There is a misunderstanding on my part, and I will at once run up my flag and open fire again." After con- sultation, we requested him not to do so, until the matter was explained to General Beauregard, and requested Major Anderson to reduce to writing his understanding with Colonel Wigfall, which he did. However, before we left the fort, a boat arrived from Charleston, bearing Major D. R. Jones, assistant adjutant-general oln General Beauregard's staff, who offered sub- stantially the same terms to Major Anderson as those offered on the 11th, and also by Colonel Wigfall, and which were now accepted. Thus fell Fort Sumter, April 13th, 1861. At this time fire was still raging in the barracks, and settling steadily over the magazine. All egress was cut off except through the lower embrasures. Many shells from the Confederate bat- teries, which had fallen in the fort and had not exploded, as well as the hand- grenades used for defense, were exploding as they were reached by the fire. The wind was driving the heat and smoke down into the fort and into the case- mates, almost causing suffocation. Major Anderson, his officers, and men were blackened by smoke and cinders, and showed signs of fatigue and exhaustion, from the trying ordeal through which they had passed. It was soon discovered, by conversation, that it was a bloodless battle; not a man had been killed or seriously wounded on either side during the entire bom- bardment of nearly forty hours. Congratulations were exchanged on so happy a result. Major Anderson stated that he had instructed his officers only to fire on the batteries and forts, and not to fire on private property. The terms of evacuation offered by General Beauregard were generous, and were appreciated by Major Anderson. The garrison was to embark on the 14th, after running up and saluting the United States flag, and to be carried t_7SN\_zU_I a z _ _ _ _ z _e lbos __xu___s_ ft ___ a- -- --- -------_-----_-_-. w am "zT SUMTER AFTER THE BOMBARVMENT, FROM A SKETCH MADE IN' APIL, 1861, 79 JR"T3SOw VAVMs wReMNor mee Ox rATE "TOW ANERIUA PROM AL koTovo 9D THE FIRST STEP IN THE WAR. 81 to the United States fleet. A soldier killed during the salute was buried inside the fort, the new Confederate garrison uncovering during the impres- sive ceremonies. Major Anderson and his command left the harbor, bearing with them the respect and admiration of the Confederate soldiers.+ It was conceded that he had done his duty as a soldier holding a most delicate trust. This first bombardment of Sumter was but its " baptism of fire." During subsequent attacks by land and water, it was battered by the heaviest Union artillery. Its walls were completely crushed, but the tons of iron projectiles imbedded in its ruins added strength to the inaccessible mass that surrounded it and made it impregnable. It was never taken, but the operations of Gen- eral Sherman, after his march to the sea, compelled its evacuation, and the Stars and Stripes were again raised over it, April 14th, 1865. k 4 The officers, under General Beauregard, of the batteries surrounding Fort Sumter were: SULLIVAN's ISLAND, Brigadier-General R. G. M. Dunovant commanding, Lieutenant-Colonel Ros- well S. Ripley, commanding the artillery: Fire-gun Battery (east of Fort Moultrie), Captain S. Y. Tapper; laffit Channel Battery (2 guns) and Mor- tar Battery Nlo. 2 (2 10-inch mortars), Captain William Butler, Lieutenant J. A. Huguenin; Fort Moultrie (30 guns), Captain W. I. Calhoun: con- sisting of Channel Battery, Lieutenants Thomas M. Wagner, Preston, and Sitgreaves, Sumter Battery, Lieutenants Alfred Rhett and John Mitchell, and Oblique Battery, Lieutenant C. W. Parker; Mortar BatterjV No. 1 (2 10-inch mortars) and Enfilade Battery (4 guns), Captain James H. Hallonquist, Lieutenants Flemming, Jacob Valen- tine, and B. S. Burnet; the Point Battery (1 9-inch L)ablgren) and the Floating Iron-clad Battery (2 42-pounders and 2 32-pounders), Captain John B. Hamilton and Lieutenant Joseph A. Yates; the Motint Pleasant Battery (2 1O-inchmortars),Captain Robert Martin, Lieutenant George N. Reynolds. MORRIS ISLAND, Brigadier-General James Simons commanding, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilmot G. De Saussure, commanding the artillery: Major P. F. Stevens, commanding Cumming's Point Battery (Blakely gun, which arrived from Liverpool April 9th, Captain J. P. Thomas; 2 42-pounders, Lieu- tenant T. Sumter Brownfield; and 3 10-inch mortars, Lieutenants C. R. Holmes and N. Arm- strong) and the Sterens Irons-lad Battery (3 8-inch columbiads), Captain George B. Cuthbert, Lieu- tenant G. L. Buist; 1rapier Battery (3 10-inch mortars), Captain J. Gadsden King, Lieutenants W. D. H. Kirkwood, J. P. Strohecker, A. M. Huger, and E. L. Parker. JAMEs ISLAND, Major N. G. Evans commanding; Fort Johnson (battery of 24-pounders), Captain George S. James; Mortar Battery, Lieutenants W. H. Gibbes, H. S. Farley, J. E. McP. Washington, and T. B. Hayne; Upper Battery (2 1 0-ineh mor- tars), Lower Battery (2 10-inch mortars), Captain S. C. Thayer.-EDITORS. P Under an order from Secretary Stanton, the same flag that was lowered, April 14th, 1861, we raised again over Sumter, by Major (then General) Anderson, on April 14th, 1865, the day President Lincoln was shot. Of Major Anderson's former officers, Generals Abner Doubleday and Norman J. Hall and Chaplain Matthias Harris were present. The Rev. Henry Ward Beecher delivered an oration, and other prominent anti- slavery men attended the ceremony.-EDITOPS. Invent9 viw or '0scaWr sOINT. EXA A 'a MADE A-grlft T oE 0098ARDxENt. VOE- I. 6 , , -41e- , "', I -k NOTES ON THE SURRENDER OF FORT SUMTER. BY A. R. CHtSOLM, COLONEL, C. S. A. VERY soon after Major Robert Anderson moved with his command into Fort Sumter from Fort Moultrie, Governor Francis W. Pickens sent James Fraser, of the Charleston Light Dragoons, to me at my plantation, fifty miles south of Charleston, with the request that I would assist with my negroes in constructing batteries on Morris Island. Taking my own negro men and others from the plantation of my uncle, Robert Chisolm, and that of Nathaniel Heyward, I was engaged in this work when General Beauregard arrived to take command. I then informed the governor that it would be necessary for General Beauregard to have an aide-de-camp who was familiar with the harbor and with boating; that I was the owner of a large six-oared boat and six superior oarsmen, that were at his service free of cost. I was thereupon commissioned lieutenant-colonel, and ordered to report to General Beauregard. Having visited Fort Sumter five times under a flag of truce, and once after the surrender, I became well acquainted with most of its officers. During a visit in company with Captain Samuel W. Ferguson, the officers jokingly complained of being short of cigars and like luxuries. With General Beau- regard's approval, the next time duty called us to the fort we presented them with several cases of claret and boxes of cigars. April 12th, 1861, I visited the fort in company with James Chesnut, Jr., and Captain Stephen D. Lee with the demand for its surrender, and heard Major Anderson say in conversation with us, " I shall await the first shot, and if you do not batter us to pieces we shall be starved out in a few days." These words being communicated to General Beauregard, we were again sent to the fort, arriving there about 1:30 A. ., April 12th. After waiting nearly two hours for a reply, we sent word to Major Anderson that our orders did not admit of our waiting any longer. He came to where we were in the guard-room, and informed us " that we had twice fired on his flag, and that if we did so again he would open his fire on our batteries" Under our instructions this reply admitted of no other answer than the one dated April 12th, 1861, 3:20 A. M. [see page 76), which was dictated by Chesnut, written by Lee, and copied by me. Roger A. Pryor was with us on the second visit, but did not enter the fort, giving me as a reason that his State, Virginia, had not yet seceded. For the same reason he declined to fire the signal shot. Moreover, I believe he was then a member of Congress, and may have been unwilling to compro- mise himself. The facts of the surrender of Fort Sumter to ex-Senator Wigfall are these: General Beauregard, seeing the fort on fire, sent me with a note to General James Simons, commanding on Morris Island, in which he directed him, if he could do so without risk to his command, to offer assistance in extinguishing the fire. I passed down between Fort Sumter and our batteries; delivering my dispatches, I volunteered to go to Fort Sumter, which offer was accepted. 82 NOTES ON THE SURRENDER OF FORT SUMTER R Colonel Wigfall, of Texas, volunteered to accompany me. While bringing my boat from its moorings in a creek, Wigfall, who was very much excited, jumped into a small skiff. The flag of the fort, which had been shot away, reappeared, and Wigfall was ordered to return, but he was out of hearing. I was ordered to return, and obeyed. Colonel Wigfall climbed through an embrasure, and, assuming authority from General Beauregard, called upon Mtajor Anderson to surrender. Major Anderson did not realize the unauthor- ized nature of Wigfall's mission until the arrival of Captain Stephen D. Lee, William Porcher Miles, and Roger A. Pryor with an offer direct from Gen- eral Beauregard, similar to the one General Simons was authorized to make. Major Anderson was about to renew the action, when Major David R. Jones arrived with the offer of terms for the surrender of the fort, which were virtually almost anything that Anderson might ask, in order that we might get possession before the fleet could reinforce and provision the garrison. I have always been of the opinion that Major Anderson should not have surrendered when he did. The fire only consumed the officers' and men's quarters; the two magazines were uninjured, only one man had been wounded, the walls were secure, and he still had provisions which would have sustained his small command until the fleet could both have provisioned and reinforced him. I was present with Captain Hartstene during the evacuation, and was astonished to see barrels of pork\ being rolled out and shipped on board the Isabel, the steamer furnished by General Beauregard to transport Anderson's men to the fleet. My duty often required that I should pass Fort Sumter and our guard-boats at night to visit Hartstene, who commanded the poor boats we used. I was rarely seen and had such a contempt for our guards that on one occasion, having a strong tide in my favor, we did not halt when shots were fired at us. In fact, we were seldom seen until close to the guards of the boat we sought. Captain Hartstene was well aware how easy it was to pass to Fort Sumter and expressed to me his uneasiness on this point; in fact, one bold officer in command of a navy barge, armed with a boat howitzer, could have easily cleared the way for a hundred barges with men and sup- plies to pass to the fort. The night but one previous to the surrender was verv dark. I was ordered to Hartstene between the fort and the fleet in the main ship-channel, and my boat touched his guards before it was seen. Later in the war, when Beauregard defended the fort, one of the bravest officers in his command pronounced the work untenable. Beauregard then informed me that if necessary he would go there and hold the fort with his staff; that on no condition would he consent to give it up to General Gillmore. It was after this that General (then Major) Stephen Elliott made his gallant defense of the ruins; when, with the exception of some guns buried under the ruins of the casemate facing Fort Moultrie, but one small gun remained mounted, and that was pointed toward the city, being used merely to fire the salutes. \ Captain J. G. Foster in his report says that the the fort, but with plenty of cartridges [referring to 811pply of bread in Sumter failed April 10th, and the lack of material for cartridge-bags] the men that the last of the damaged rice was served at would have cheerfully fought five or six days, and, breakfast on the 13th. " The want of provisions," if necessary, much longer, on pork alone, of which bh- adds, " would soon have caused the surrenderof we had a sufficient supply."-EOJToRs. 83 WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH. BY JACOB D. COX, MAJOR-GENERAL. V. S. V., EX-GOVERNOR OF OHIO, EX-SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. THE wonderful outburst of national feeling in the North in the spring of 1861 has always been a thrilling and almost supernatural thing to those who participated in it. The classic myth that the resistless terror which some- times unaccountably seized upon an army was the work of the god Pan might seem to have its counterpart in the work of a national divinity rousing a whole people, not to terror, but to a sublime enthusiasm of self-devotion. To picture it as a whole is impossible. A new generation can only approxi- mate a knowledge of the-feelings of that time by studying in detail some sep- arate scenes of the drama that had a continent for its stage. The writer can only tell what happened under his eye. The like was happening everywhere from Maine to Kansas. What is told is simply a type of the rest.J On Friday, the twelfth day of April, 1861, the Senate of Ohio was in session, trying to go on in the ordinary routine of business, but with a sense of anxiety and strain which was caused by the troubled condition of national jin those opening days of the war, the National Government seemed for the moment to be subor- dinated to the governments of the States. A rev- olution in the seceding South had half destroyed the national legislature, and the national executive was left without a treasury, without an army, and without laws adequate to create these at once. At no time since the thirteen colonies declared their independence have the State governors and the State legislators found so important a field of duty as then. A little hesitation, a little lukewarmness, would have ended all. Then it was that the in- tense zeal and high spirit of Governor Andrew of Massachusetts led all Neo England, and was ready to lead the nation, as the men of Concord and Lex- ington had led in 1775. Then it was that Gov- ernor Morton of Indiana came to the front with a masculine energy and burly weight of character and of will which was typical of the force which the Great West could throw into the struggle. Ohio was so situated with regard to West Vir- ginia and Kentucky that the keystone of the Union might be said to be now west of the mountains. Governor Dennison mediated, like the statesman he was, between East and West; and Tod and Brough, following him by the will of the people in votes that ran up to majorities of near a hun- dred thousand, gave that vigorous support to Mr. Lincoln which showed the earnest nationality of the "war Democrats " of that day. -J. D. C. 84 WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH. affairs. The passage of "ordinances of secession " by one after another of the Southern States, and even the assembling of a provisional Confederate govern- ment at Montgomery, had not wholly destroyed the hope that some peaceful way out of our troubles would be found; yet the gathering of an army on the sands opposite Fort Sumter was really war, and if a hostile gun were fired, we knew it would mean the end of all effort at arrangement. Hoping almost against hope that blood would not be shed, and that the pageant of military array and of a secession government would pass by, we tried to give our thoughts to business; but there was no heart in it, and the "morning hour" lagged, for we could not work in earnest, and we were unwilling to a(ljourn. Suddenly a senator came in from the lobby in an excited way, and, catch- ing the chairman's eye, exclaimed, "Mr. President, the telegraph announces that the secessionists are bombarding Fort Sumter!" There was a solemn and painful hush, but it was broken in a moment by a woman's shrill voice from the spectators' seats, crying, " Glory to God!" It startled every one, almost as if the enemy were in the midst. But it was the voice of a radical friend of the slave, Abby Kelly Foster, who, after a lifetime of public agitation, believed that only through blood could his freedom be won, and who had shouted the fierce cry of joy that the question had been submitted to the decision of the sword. With most of us, the gloomy thought that civil war had begun in our own land overshadowed everything else; this seemed too great a price to pay for any good,- a scourge to be borne only in preference to yielding what was to us the very groundwork of our republicanism, the right to enforce a fair interpretation of the Constitution through the election of President and Congress. The next day we learned that Major Anderson had surrendered, and the telegraphic news from all the Northern States showed plain evidence of a popular outburst of loyalty to the Union, following a brief moment of dis- may. That was the period when the flag-The Flag-flew out to the wind from every housetop in our great cities, and when, in New York, wildly excited crowds marched the streets demanding that the suspected or the lukewarm should show the symbol of nationality as a committal to the country's cause. He that is not for us is against us, was the deep, instinctive feeling. Judge Thomas M. Key of Cineinnati4,t chairman of the Judiciary Com- mittee, was the recognized leader of the Democratic party in the Senate, and at an early hour moved an adjournment to the following Tuesday, in order, as he said, that the senators might have the opportunity to go home and eonsult their constituents in the perilous crisis of public affairs. No objec- tion was made to the adjournment, and the representatives took a similar recess. All were in a state of most anxious suspense,-the Republicans to know what initiative the Administration at Washington would take, and the Democrats to determine what course they should follow if the President should call for troops to put down the insurrection. I, Afterward aide-de-camp and acting judge-advocate on General McClellan's staff. 85 WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH. Before we met again, Mr. Lincoln's proclamation and call for 75,000 men for three months' service had been issued, and the great mass of the people of the North, forgetting all party distinctions, answered with an enthusiasm that swept politicians off their feet. When we met again on Tuesday morning, Judge Key, taking my arm and pacing the floor outside the railing, broke out impetuously, " Mr. Cox, the people have gone stark mad! "-" I knew they would if a blow were struck against the flag," said I, reminding him of some previous conversations we had had on the subject. He, with most of the poli- ticians of the day, partly by sympathy with the overwhelming current of public opinion, and partly by the reaction of their own hearts against the theories which had encouraged the secessionists, determined to support the war measures of the Government and to make no factious opposition to such State legislation as might be necessary to sustain the Federal Administration. The attitude of Mr. Key is only a type of many others, and marks one of the most striking features of the time. On the 8th of January the usual Democratic convention and celebration of the battle of New Orleans had taken place, and a series of resolutions had been passed, in which, professing to speak in the name of " 200,000 Democrats of Ohio," the convention had very significantly intimated that this vast organization of men would be found in the way of any attempt to put down secession until the demands of the South in respect to slavery were complied with. A few days afterward I was returning to Columbus from my home in Trumbull county, and meeting upon the railway train with David Tod, then an active Democratic politician, but afterward one of our loyal " war governors," the conversation turned on the action of the convention which had just adjourned. Mr. Tod and I were per- sonal friends and neighbors, and I freely expressed my surprise that the con- vention should have committed itself to what must be interpreted as a threat of insurrection in the North, if the Administration should, in opposing seces- sion by force, follow the example of Andrew Jackson, in whose honor they had assembled. He rather vehemently reasserted the substance of the resolution, saying that we Republicans would find the 200,000 Ohio Democrats in front of us, if we attempted to cross the Ohio River. My answer was, " We will give up the contest if we cannot carry your 200,000 over the heads of you leaders The result proved how hollow the party assertions had been, or, perhaps, I should say, how superficial was the hold of such doctrines upon the mass of men in a great political organization. At the first shot from Beauregard's guns in Charleston Harbor these men crowded to the recruiting stations to enlist for the defense of the national flag and the national union. It was a popular torrent which no leaders could resist; but many of these should be credited with the same patriotic impulse, and it made them nobly oblivious of party consistency. A few days after the surrender of Sumter, Stephen A. Douglas passed through Columbus on his way to Washington, and, in response to the calls of a spontaneous gathering of people, spoke to them from the win- dow of his bedroom in the hotel. There had been no thought for any of the common surroundings of a public meeting. There were no torches, no music. 86 WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH. A dark mass of men filled full the dimly lit street, and called for Douglas with an earnestness of tone wholly different from the enthusiasm of common political gatherings. He came half-dressed to his window, and, without any light near him, spoke solemnly to the people upon the terrible crisis which had come upon the nation. Men of all parties were there: his own followers to get some light as to their duty; the Breckinridge Democrats ready, most of them, repentantly to follow a Northern leader now that their Southern asso- eiates were in armed opposition to the Government; the Republicans eager to know whether so potent an influence was to be unreservedly on the side of the nation. I remember well the serious solicitude with which I listened to his open- iiig sentences as I leaned against the railing of the State House park, trying in vain to see more than a dim outline of the man as he stood at the unlighted window. His deep, sonorous tones rolled down through the darkness from above us, an earnest, measured voice, the more solemn, the more impressive, because we could not see the speaker, and it came to us literally as " a voice in the night,"-the night of our country's unspeakable triaL There was no uncertainty in his tone; theUnion must be preserved and the insurrection must be crushed; he pledged his hearty support to Mr. Lincoln's administration in doing this; other questions must stand aside till the national authority should lie everywhere recognized. I do not, think we greatly cheered him,- it was, A rather, a deep Amen that went up from the crowd. We went home o breathing more freely in the assur- ance we now felt that, for a time at the m I least, no organized opposition to the sae wt Federal Government and its policy of I d coercion could be formidable in the North. Yet the situation hung upon uslike a nightmare. Garfield and I were lodg- ing together at the time, our wives being kept at home by family cares, and when we reached our sitting- room, after an evening session of the Senate, we often found ourselves in- voluntarily groaning, " Civil war in oifr land!" The shame, the folly, theA.DULA TKNB outrage, seemed too great to believe, L1FL rI,'0_WAK'K or MOTPiIN BEOREd THE LCOLN-I and we half hoped to wake from it as I.UGhD EBTIROFW from a dream. Among the painful remembrances of those days is the ever- present weight at the heart which never left me till I found rehief in the active duties of camp life at the close of the month. I went about my duties (and I am sure most of those with whom I assoc iated did the same) with the half-choking sense of a grief I dared not think of :like one who is 87 WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH. STErPHEN A. DOUGLAS. FROM A D)AGUERREOTYPE TAKEN UN 1i52. dragging himself to the ordinary labors of life from some terrible and recent bereavement. We talked of our personal duty, and though both Garfield and myself had young families, we were agreed that our activity in the organization and sup- port of the Republican party made the duty of supporting the Government by military service come peculiarly home to us. He was, for the moment, somewhat trammeled by his half-clerical position, but he very soon cut the knot. My own path seemed unmistakably plain. He, more careful for his friend than for himself, urged upon me his doubts whether my physical strength was equal to the strain that would be put upon it. "I," said he, "am big and strong, and if my relations to the church and the college can be loosened, I shall have no excuse for not enlisting; but you are slender and 88 WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH. will break down." It is true I then looked slender for a man six feet high; Yet I had confidence in the elasticity of my constitution, and the result justi- tied me, while it also showed how liable one is to mistake in such things. G;arfield found that he had a tendency to weakness of the alimentary system, which broke him down on every campaign in which he served, and led to his retiring from the army at the close of 1863. My own health, on the other hand, was strengthened by outdoor life and exposure, and I served to the end with growing physical vigor. When Mr. Lincoln issued his first call for troops, the existing laws made it ieeessary that these should be fully organized and officered by the several States. Then, the treasury was in no condition to hear the burden of war expenditures, and, till Congress could assemble, the President was forced to rely on the States for means to equip and transport their own men. This threw upon the governors and legislatures of the loyal States responsibilities of a kind wholly unprecedented. A long period of profound peace had made every military organization seem almost farcical. A few inde- pendent companies formed the merest shadow of an army, and the State militia proper was only a nominal thing. It happened, however, that I held a commission as brigadier in this State militia, and my intimacy with Governor Dennison led him to call upon me for such assistance as I could render in the first enrollment and organization of the Ohio quota. Arrang- ing to. be called to the Senate chamber when my vote might be needed, I gave my time chiefly to such military matters as the governor appointed. Although, as I have said, my military commission had been a nominal thing, and in fact I had never worn a uniform, I had not wholly neglected theoretic preparation for such work. For some years, the possibility of a war of seces- sion had been one of the things which were forced upon the thoughts of reflecting people, and I had given some careful study to such books of tactics and of strategy as were within easy reach. I had especially been led to read military history with critical care, and had carried away many valuable ideas from that most useful means of military education. I had, therefore, some notion of the work before us, and could approach its problems with less loss of time, at least, than if I had been wholly ignorant. My commission as brigadier-general in the Ohio quota in national service was dated the 23d of April. Just about the same time Captain George B. McClellan was requested by Governor Dennison to come to Columbus for consultation, and, by the governor's request, I met him at the railway station and took him to the State House. I think Mr. Lars Anderson (brother of Major Robert Anderson) and Mr. L'Hommedieu of Cincinnati were with h1im. The intimation had been given me that he would probably be made major-general of the Ohio contingent, and this, naturally, made me scan Iiim closely. He was rather under the medium height, but muscularly formed, with broad shoulders and a well-poised head, active and graceful in Motion. His whole appearance was quiet and modest, but when drawn out lie showed no lack of confidence in himself. He was dressed in a plain traveling dress and wore a narrow-rimmed soft felt hat. In short, he seemed 89 WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH. what he was, a railway superintendent in his business clothes. At the time, his name was a good deal associated with Beauregard's, and they were spoken of as young men of similar standing in the engineer corps of the army, and great things were expected of them both because of their scientific knowledge of their profession, though McClellan had been in civil life for some years. McClellan's report on the Crimean war was one of the few important memoirs our old army had produced, and was valuable enough to give a just reputation for comprehensive understanding of military organization, and the promise of ability to conduct the operations of an army. I was present at the interview which the governor had with him. The des- titution of the State of everything like military material and equipment was very plainly put, and the magnitude of the task of building up a small army out of nothing was not blinked. The governor spoke of the embarrassment he felt at every step from the lack of practical military experience in his staff, and of his desire to have some one on whom he could properly throw the details of military work. McClellan showed that he fully understood the difficulties there would be before him, and said no man could wholly master them at once, although he had confidence that if a few weeks' time for prepara- tion were given, he would be able to put the Ohio division into reasonable form for taking the field. The command was then formally tendered and accepted. All of us who were present felt that the selection was one full of promise and hope, and that the governor had done the wisest thing practicable at the time. The next morning McClellan requested me to accompany him to the State arsenal, to see what arms and material might be there. We found a few boxes of smooth-bore muskets which had once been issued to militia companies and had been returned rusted and damaged. No belts, cartridge-boxes, or other accouterments were with them. There were two or three smooth-bore brass field-pieces, 6-pounders, which had been honey-combed by firing salutes, and of which the vents had been worn out, bushed, and worn out again. In a heap in one corner lay a confused pile of mildewed harness which had been once used for artillery horses, but was now not worth carrying away. There had for many years been no money appropriated to buy military material or even to protect the little the State had. The Federal Government had occasionally distributed some arms which were in the hands of the independent uniformed militia, and the arsenal was simply an empty store-house. It did not take long to complete our inspection. At the door, as we were leaving the build- ing, McClellan turned, and, looking back into its emptiness, remarked, half humorously and half sadly, "A fine stock of munitions on which to begin a great war!" We went back to the State House where a room was assigned us, and we sat dowvn to work. The first task was to make out detailed schedules and estimates of what would be needed to equip ten thousand men for the field. This was a unit which could be used by the governor and Legislature in esti- mating the appropriations needed then or subsequently. Intervals in this labor were used in discussing the general situation and plans of campaign. Before the close of the week McClellan drew up a paper embodying his own 90 WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH. views, and forwarded it to Lieutenant-Genertl Scott. He read it to me, and my recollection of it is that he suggested two principal lines of movement in the West: one to move eastward by the Kanawha Valley with a heavy column to cooperate with an army in front of Washington; the other to march directly southward and to open the Valley of the Mississippi. Scott's answer was appreciative and flattering, without distinctly approving his plan, and I have never doubted that the paper prepared the way for his appoint- ment in the regular army, which followed at an early day.+ But in trying to give a connected idea of the first military organization of the State, I have outrun some incidents of those days which are worth recol- lection. From the hour the call for troops was published, enlistments began, and recruits were parading the streets continually. At the capitol the rest- less impulse to be doing something military seized even upon the members of the Legislature, and a good many of them assembled every evening upon the east terrace of the State House to be drilled in marching and facing by one or two of their own number who had some knowledge of company tac- tics. Most of the uniformed independent companies in the cities of the State immediately tendered their services and began to recruit their numbers to the hundred men required for acceptance. There was no time to procure uni- forms, nor was it desirable; for these companies had chosen their own, and would have to change it for that of the United States as soon as this could be furnished. For some days companies could be seen marching and drilling, of which part would be uniformed in some gaudy style such as is apt to pre- vail in holiday parades in time of peace, while another part would be dressed in the ordinary working garb of citizens of all degrees. The uniformed files would also be armed and accoutered, the others would be without arms or equipments, and as awkward a squad as could well be imagined. The mate- rial, however, was magnificent and soon began to take shape. The fancy uniforms were left at home, and some approximation to a simple and useful costume was made. The recent popular outburst in Italy furnished a useful idea, and the " Garibaldi uniform " of a red flannel shirt with broad falling collar, with blue trousers held by a leathern waist-belt, and a soft felt hat for the head, was extensively copied and served an excellent purpose. It could be made by the wives and sisters at home, and was all the more acceptable for that. The spring was opening and a heavy coat would not be much needed, so that with some sort of overcoat and a good blanket in an impro- vised knapsack, the new company was not badly provided. The warm scar- let color reflected from their enthusiastic faces as they stood in line made a picture that never failed to impress the mustering officers with the splendid character of the men. The officering of these new troops was a difficult and delicate task, and, so far as company officers were concerned, there seemed no better way at the beginning than to let the enlisted men elect their own, as was in fact done. In most cases where entirely new companies were raised, it had been by the 1 Scott's answer was dated May 3d, and is given by General E. D. Townsend (then on Scott's staff), in his " Anecdotes of the Civil War." 91 WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH. MAJtOR-GENERA:L GLEORGE B. MI1L LLLAN. FROM A WAR-TIME li'MOTlRAPIl. enthusiastic efforts of some energetic volunteers who were naturally made the commissioned officers. But not always. There were numerous examples of self-denial by men who remained in the ranks after expending much labor and money in recruiting, modestly refusing the honors, and giving way to some one supposed to have military knowledge or experience. The war in Mexico in 1846-7 had been our latest conflict with a civilized people, and to have served in it was a sure passport to confidence. It had often been a service more in name than in fact; but the young volunteers felt so deeply their own igno- rance that they were ready to yield to any pretense of superior knowledge, and generously to trust themselves to any one who would offer to lead them. Hosts of charlatans and incompetents were thus put into responsible places at WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH. the beginning, but the sifting work went on fast after the troops were once in the field. The election of field-officers, however, ought not to have been allowed. Companies were necessarily regimented together of which each could have little personal knowledge of the officers of the others; intrigue and demagogy soon came into play, and almost fatal mistakes were made in selection. The evil worked its cure, but the ill effects of it were long visible. The immediate need of troops to protect Washington caused most of the uniformed companies to be united into the first two regiments, which were quickly dispatched to the East. These off, companies began to stream in from all parts of the State. On their first arrival they were quartered wherever shelter could be had, as there were no tents or sheds to make a camp for them. Going to my evening work at the State House, as I crossed the rotunda I saw a company marching in by the south door, and another disposing itself for the night upon the marble pavement near the east entrance; as I passed on to the north hall, I saw another that had come a little earlier holding a prayer- meeting, the stone arches echoing with the excited supplications of some one who was borne out of himself by the terrible pressure of events around him, while, mingling with his pathetic, beseeching tones as he prayed for his country, came the shrill notes of the fife and the thundering din of the ubiquitous bass-drum from the company marching in on the other side. In the Senate chamber a company was quartered, and the senators were supplying them with paper and pens with which " the boys" were writing their farewells to mothers and sweethearts, whom they hardly dared hope they should see again. A similar scene was going on in the Representatives' hall, another in the Supreme Court-room. In the executive office gat the governor, the unwonted noises, when the door was opened, breaking in on the quiet, business- like air of the room,-he meanwhile dictating dispatches, indicating answers to others, receiving committees of citizens, giving directions to officers of com- panies and regiments, accommodating himself to the willful democracy of our institutions which insists upon seeing the man in chief command, and will not take its answer from a subordinate, until in the small hours of the night the noises were hushed, and after a brief hour of effective, undisturbed work upon the matters of chief importance, he could leave the glare of his gas-lighted office and seek a few hours' rest, only to renew his wearing labors on the morrow. On the streets the excitement was of a rougher if not more intense charac- ter. A minority of unthinking partisans could not understand the strength and sweep of the great popular movement, and would sometimes venture to speak out their sympathy with the rebellion, or their sneers at some party friend who had enlisted. In the boiling temper of the time the quick answer was a blow; and it was one of the common incidents of the day for those who came into the State House to tell of a knock-down that had occurred here or there, when this popular punishment had been administered to some indis- creet " rebel-sympathizer." Various duties brought young army officers of the regular service to the State capital, and others sought a brief leave of absence to come and offer 93 WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH. their services to the governor of their native State. General Scott had planted himself firmly on the theory that the regular army must be the prin- cipal reliance for severe work, and that the volunteers could only be auxilia- ries around this solid nucleus which would show them the way to perform their duty, and take the brunt of every encounter. The young regulars who asked leave to accept commissions in State regiments were therefore refused, and were ordered to their own subaltern positions and posts. There can be no doubt that the true policy would have been to encourage the whole of this younger class to enter at once the volunteer service. They would have been field-officers in the new regiments, and would have impressed discipline and system upon the organization from the beginning. The Confederates really profited by having no regular army. They gave to the officers who left our service, it is true, commissions in their so-called "provisional" army, to encourage them to expect permanent military positions if the war should end in the independence of the South; but this was only a nominal organization, and their real army was made up (as ours turned out practically to be) from the regiments of State volunteers. Less than a year afterward we changed our pol- icy, but it was then too late to induce many of the regular officers to take regi- mental positions in the volunteer troops. I hesitate to declare that this was not, after all, for the best; for, although the organization of our army would have been more rapidly perfected, there are other considerations which have much weight. The army would not have been the popular thing it was, its close identification with the people's movement would have been weakened, and it, perhaps, would not so readily have melted again into the mass of the nation at the close of the war. On the 29th of April I was ordered by McClellan to proceed next morning to Camp Dennison, near Cincinnati, where he had fixed the site for a per- manent camp of instruction. I took with me one full regiment and half of another. The day was a fair one, and when about noon our railway train reached the camping ground, it seemed an excellent place for our work. The drawback was that the land was planted in wheat and corn, instead of being meadow or pasture land. Captain Rosecrans (later the well-known general) met us as McClellan's engineer officer, coming from Cincinnati with a train- load of lumber. With his compass and chain, and by the help of a small detail of men, he soon laid off the two regimental camps, and the general lines of the whole encampment for a dozen regiments. The men of the regiments shouldered the pine boards, and carried them up to the lines of the company streets which were close to the hills skirting the valley, and which opened into the parade and drill ground along the railway. Vigorous work housed all the men before night, and it was well that it did so, for the weather changed in the evening, a cold rain came on, and the next morning was a chill and dreary one. My own headquarters were in a little brick school-house of one story, and with a single aide (my only staff-officer) we bestowed ourselves for the night in the little spaces between the pupils' desks and the teacher's pulpit. The windy, cheerless night was a long one, but gave place at last to a fickle, changeable day of drifting showers and occasional sunshine, and we were 94 WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH. roused by our first reveille in camp. A brealdast was made from some cooked provisions brought with us, and we resumed the duty of organizing and instructing the camp. With the vigorous outdoor life and the full physical and mental employment, the depression which had weighed upon me since the news of the guns at Sumter passed away, never to return. New battalions arrived from day to day, the cantonments were built by themselves, like the first, and the business of instruction and drill was systema- tized. The men were not yet armed, so there was no temptation to begin too soon with the manual of the musket, and they were kept industriously employed in marching in single line, by file, in changing direction, in forming column of fours from double line, etc., before their guns were put into their hands. Each regiment was treated as a separate camp with its own chain of sentinels, and the officers of the guard were constantly busy inspecting the sentinels on post and teaching guard and picket duty theoretically to the reliefs off duty. Schools were established in each regiment for field and staff as well as for company officers, and Hardee's "Tactics" was in the hands of everybody who could pro- cure a copy. One of the proofs of the unprecedented scale of our war prepara- tion is found in the fact that the supply of the authorized " Tactics " was soon exhausted, making it difficult to get the means of instruction in the company schools. The arriving regiments sometimes had their first taste of camp life under circumstances well calculated to dampen their ardor. The 4th Ohio, under Colonel Lorin Andrews, president of Kenyon College, came just before a thunder- storm one evening, and the bivouac that night was as rough a one as his men were likelyto experience for many a day. They made shelter by placing boards from the fence-tops to the ground, but the fields were level and soon became a mire under the pouring rain, so that they were a queer-looking lot when they crawled out in the morning. The sun was then shining bright, however, and they had better cover for their heads by the next night. The 7th Ohio, which was recruited in Cleveland and on the "Western Reserve," sent a party in advance to build some of their huts, and though they too came in a rain-storm, they were less uncomfortable than some of the others. In the course of a fortnight all the regiments of the Ohio contingent were in the camp, except the two that had been hurried to Washington. They were organized into three brigades. The brigadiers, besides myself, were Generals J. H. Bates and Newton Schleich. General Bates, who was the senior, and as such assumed command of the camp in McClellan's absence, was a graduate of West Point who had served some years in the regular army, but had resigned and adopted the profession of law. General Schleich was a Democratic senator, who had been in the State militia, and had been one of the drill-masters of the Legislative Squad, which had drilled upon the Capitol terrace. McClellan had intended to make his own headquarters in the camp; but the convenience of attending to official business in Cincinnati kept him in the city. His purpose was to make the brigade organizations permanent, and to take them as a division to the field when they were a little prepared for the work. Like many other good plans, it failed to be carried out. I was the only one of the brigadiers who remained in the service after 95 WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH. the first enlistment for ninety days, and it was my fate to take the field with new regiments, only one of which had been in my brigade in camp. After General Bates's arrival my own hut was built on the slope of the hillside behind my brigade, close under the wooded ridge, and here for the next six weeks was my home. The morning brought its hour of business correspond- ence relating to the command; then came the drill, when the parade ground was full of marching companies and squads. Officers' drill followed, with sword exercise and pistol practice, and the evening was allotted to schools of theoretic taetics, outpost duty, and the like. The first fortnight in camp was the hardest for the troops. The plowed fields became deep with mud which nothing could remove till steady good weather should allow them to be packed hard under the continued tramp of thousands of men. The organization of camp-kitchens had to be learned by the hardest experience also, and the men who had some aptitude for cook- ing had to be found by a slow process of natural selection, during which many an unpalatable meal had to be eaten. A disagreeable bit of informa- tion soon came to us in the proof that more than half the men had never had the contagious diseases of infancy. The measles broke out, and we had to organize a camp-hospital at once. A large barn near by was taken for this purpose, and the surgeons had their hands full of cases, which, however triv- ial they might seem at home, were here aggravated into dangerous illness by the unwonted surroundings, and the impossibility of securing the needed pro- tection from exposure. The good women of Cincinnati took promptly in hand the task of providing nurses for the sick and proper diet and delicacies for hospital use. The Sisters of Charity, under the lead of Sister Anthony, a noble woman, came out in force, and their black and white robes harmonized picturesquely with the military surroundings, as they flitted about under the rough timber framing of the old barn, carrying comfort and hope from one rude couch to another. As to supplies, hardly a man in a regiment knew how to make out a requi- sition for rations or for clothing, and, easy as it is to rail at " red-tape," the necessity of keeping a check upon embezzlement and wastefulness justified the staff-bureaus at Washington in insisting upon regular vouchers to support the quartermasters' and commissaries' accounts. But here, too, men were gradually found who had special talent for the work. Where everybody had to learn a new business, it would have been miraculous if grave errors had not frequently occurred. Looking back at it, the wonder is that the blunders and mishaps had not been tenfold more numerous than they were. By the middle of May the confusion had given way to reasonable system, but we now were obliged to meet the embarrassments of reorganization for three years, under the President's second call for troops (May Sd). In every company some discontented spirits wanted to go home, and, to avoid the odium of going alone, they became mischief-makers, seeking to prevent the whole com- pany from reenlisting. The growing discipline was relaxed or lost in the solici- tations, the electioneering, the speech-making, and the other common arts of persuasion. In spite of all these discouragements, however, the daily drills 96 WAR PREPARATIONS IN THE NORTH. and instruction went on with some approach to regularity, and our raw volunteers began to look more like soldiers. Captain Gordon Granger, of the regular army, came to muster the reeinlisted regiments into the three-years service, and as he stood at the right of the 4th Ohio, looking down the line of a thousand stalwart men, all in their Garibaldi shirts (for we had not yet got our uniforms), he turned to me and exclaimed, "My God I that such men should be food for powder 1" It certainly was a display of manliness and intelli- gence such as had hardly ever been seen in the ranks of an army. There were in camp at that time, three if not four com- panies in different regiments that were wholly made up of under-graduates of colleges, who had enlisted together, their officers being their tutors and professors. And where there was not so striking evi- dence as this of the enlistment of the best of our youth, every company could still show that it was largely recruited from YA)RNFA 60)the best nurtured and most promising young men of the community. Granger had been in the South-west when the secession movement began, and had seen the formation of military compa- I JORGENEAL GWNGRGE nies every-where, and the incessant drill- FRI! AL PUIITO(I(UIIIR ing which had been going on all winter; while we, in a strange condition of political paralysis, had been doing nothing. His information was eagerly sought by us all, and he lost no opportunity of impressing upon us the fact that the South was nearly six months ahead of us in organization and preparation. He did not conceal his belief that we were likely to find the war a much longer and more serious piece of business than was commonly expected, and that, unless we pushed hard our drilling and instruction, we should find ourselves at a disadvantage in our earlier encouna- ters. What he said had a good effect in making officers and men take more willingly to the laborious routine of the parade ground and the regimental school; for such opinions as his soon ran through a camp, and they were com- mented upon by the enlisted men quite as earnestly as among the officers. Still, hope kept the upper hand, and I believe that three-fourths of us still cherished the belief that a single campaign would end the war. Though most of our men were native Ohioans, we had in camp two regiments made up of other materiaL The 9th Ohio was recruited from the Germans of Cincinnati, and was commanded by Colonel Robert MeCook In camp, the drilling of the regiment fell almost completely into tihe hands of the adjutant, Lieutenant August Willich (afterward a general of division), and McCook, who humorously exaggerated his own lack of military knowledge, used to say that he was only " clerk for a thousand Dutchmen," so Vol.. I. 7 97 WAR PREPAKRATIONS IN THE NORTH. completely did the care of equipping and providing for his regiment engross his time and labor. The 10th Ohio was an Irish regiment, also from Cincin- nati, and its men were proud to call themselves the "Bloody Tinth." The brilliant Lytle was its commander, and his control over them, even in the beginning of their serviee and near the city of their home, showed that they had fallen into competent hands. It happened, of course, that the guard- house pretty frequently contained representatives of the 10th, who, on the short furloughs that were allowed them, took a parting glass too many with their friends in the city, and came to camp boisterously drunk. But the men of the regiment got it into their heads that the 13th, which lay just opposite them across the railroad, took a malicious pleasure in filling the guard-house with the Irishmen. Some threats had been made that they would go over and " clean out" the 13th, and one fine evening these came to a head. I sud- denly got orders from General Bates to form my brigade and march them at once between the 10th and 13th to prevent a collision that seemed imminent. The long-roll was beaten as if the drummers realized the full importance of the first opportunity to sound that warlike signal. We marched by the moon- light into the space between the belligerent regiments; but Lytle already had got his own men under control, and the less mercurial 13th were not disposed to be aggressive, so that we were soon dismissed, with a compliment for our promptness. The six weeks of our stay in Camp Dennison seem like months in the retro- spect, so full were they crowded with new experiences. The change came in an unexpected way. The initiative taken by the Confederates in West Vir- ginia had to be met by prompt action, and McClellan was forced to drop his own plans and meet the exigency. The organization and equipment of the regiments for the three-years service was still incomplete, and the brigades were broken up, to take across the Ohio the regiments best prepared to go. This was discouraging to a brigade commander, for, even with veteran troops, acquaintanceship between the officer and his command is a necessary condition of confidence and a most important element of strength. My own assign- ment to the Great Kanawha district was one I had every reason to be content with, except that for several months I felt the disadvantage I suffered from having command of troops which I had never seen till we met in the field. CAMP DIEMx NEAR CINCINNATL 98 THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY. BY R. BARNWELL RIEW (EDITOR OF TIHE CHIARLETON "-MERCURY," 1860i-2). TWENTY-SIX years have passed since the delegates of six States of the South that had seceded from the Union met in a convention or Pro- visional Congress, at the Capitol, at Montgomery, Alabama. Twenty-one years have elapsed since the close of the war between the States of the North and the eleven States of the South that entered the Confederate Govern- ment then and there organized. Most of the men who participated in the deliberations of that convention are dead, and the few now left will before long be laid away. Of the debates of that body there is no record, and the proceedings in secret session have never been published. In Washington the proceedings of the Congress of the United States were open, and at the Nortb there was an intelligent, well-informed, powerful public opinion throughout the war. Not so at the South. Secret sessions were commenced at Montgomery, and at Richmond almost all important business was trans- acted away from the knowledge and thus beyond the criticism of the people. Latterly, accounts of the battles fought have been written from every stand- point; but of the course and policy of the Confederate Government, which held in its hands all the resources of the Southern people, and directed their affairs, diplomatic, financial, naval, and military, little has been said. During the war scarcely anything was known except results, and when the war ter- Ininated, the people of the South, though greatly dissatisfied, were generally as ignorant of the management of Confederate affairs as the people of the North. The arrest and long imprisonment of the President of the Confed- eracy made of him a representative martyr, and silenced the voice of criticism at the South. And up to this time little has been done to point out the eauses of the events which occurred, or to develop the truth of history in this direction. It very well suits men at the South who opposed secession to com- Plilnent their own sagacity by assuming that the end was inevitable. Nor do( men identified with the Confederacy by office, or feeling obligation for its appreciation of their personal merits, find it hard to persuade themselves that all was done that could be done in " the lost cause." And, in general, - . _=Ir; _-1 - - - - loo THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY. it may be an agreeable sop to Southern pride to take for granted that supe- rior numbers alone effected the result. Yet, in the great wars of the world, nothing is so little proved as that the more numerous always and necessarily prevail. On the contrary, the facts of history show that brains have ever been more potent than brawn. The career of the Confederate States exhibits no exception to this rule. Eliminate the good sense and unselfish earnestness of =: . 0 0 isMr. Lincoln, and the great ability and practical energy of Sewardl and Adams, and of Stanton and 4 ALFXAN"R Ch TEVNS Ikase fromthecontrol of the affairs of the United States; con- ceive a management of third-rate and incompetent men in their ordain, and iihebdcadaplaces-will any one doubt that on t dao aiteeoormatters would have ended differ- eight, weethCntently I To many it may be unpal- Acts aptocoto iatable to hear that at the South all was not done that might have been done and that cardinal blunders were made. But what is pleasing is -not always true, and there can be no good excuse now for suppress- ing important facts or perverting ARNIMAH STEMNhVi ve I'sF-iR.IDL. OF1 THE history. The time has come when ticipate FROM A woksasonh. Othpublic attention may with pro- priety be directed to the realities of that momentous period at the South. On the 20th of December, 1860, South Carolina passed unanimously the first ordinance of secession, in these words: " We, the people of the State of South Carolina in convention assembled, do declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared and ordained, that the ordinance adopted by us in convention on the twenty-third day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty- eight, whereby the Constitution of the United States of America was ratified, and also, anl Acts and parts of Acts of the General Assembly of this State, ratifying amendments of the said Constitution, are hereby repealed; and that the Union now subsisting between South Carolina and other States, under the name of ' the United States of America,' is hereby dissolved." On her invitation, six other Southern States sent delegates to a conven- tion in Montgomery, Alabama, for the purpose of organizing a Confederacy. On the 4th of February, 1861, this convention assembled. The material which constituted it was of a mixed character. There were members who were constitutionally timid and unfit by character and temperament to par- ticipate in such work as was -on hand. Others had little knowledge of public affairs on a large scale, and had studied neither the resources of the South nor the conduct of the movement. A number of them, however, were men of THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY. ripe experience and statesmanlike grasp of the situation - men of large knowledge, with calm, strong, clear views of the policies to be pursued. Alexander H. Stephens characterized this convention as "the ablest body with which he ever served, and singularly free from revolutionary spirit." It the organization of the convention, Howell Cobb was chosen to preside, and J. J. Hooper, of Montgomery, to act as secretary. It was decided to organize a provisional government under a provisional constitution, which was adopted on the 8th of February. On the 9th a provisional President and Vice-President were elected, who were installed in office on the 18th to carry the government into effect. In regard to this election, it was agreed that when four delegations out of the six should settle upon men, the elec- tion should take place. Jef- ferson Davis was put forward by the Mississippi delega- tion and Howell Cobb by that of Georgia. The Florida delegationproposedtovotefor whomsoever South Carolina should support. The South Carolina delegation offered no candidate and held no meet- ing to confer upon the matter. The chairman, Mr. R. Barn- well Rbett, I did not call them together. Mr. Barnwell, how- ever, was an active supporter ; of Mr. Davis, and it was af- 4) terward said that while in Washington in December, as A a commissioner to treat for the evacuation of Fort Sum- \W ter, he had committed himself to Mr. Davis. At any rate, he was zealous. Colonel Keitt iILIU TO L ANCEY, MENVR OF TUN CONFROXHATZ f E.AT1 afterward stated to the writer cQmrliSovaXTS coImII IItNI To I HI IN 1861f FROlA PnOTOea m. and others in Charleston that ) The deputies elected to meet at the Mont- Jabez L. M. Curry; GEORGIA, Robert Toombs, 9omery convention were: SOUTH CAROLINA, R. Martin J. Crawford, Benjamin H. Hill, Augustus Barnwell Rhett, Lawrence M. Keitt, C. G. Mew- R. Wright, Augustus H. Kenan, Francis S. Bar- huinger, Thomas J. Withers, Robert W. Barnwell, tow, Eugenius A. Nisbet, Howell Cobb, Thomas R. Jam.es Chesnut, Jr., W. Poreher Miles, and Will- R. Cobb, and Alexander H. Stephens; LOUISIANA, iamn W. Boyce; FLORIDA, Jaekson Morton, James John Perkins, Jr., Charles M. Conrad. Edward B. Owens, iand J. Patton Anderson; MISS18SIPPI, Sparrow, Alexander De Clouet, Duncan F. Ken- N"'iley P. Harris, W. S. Wilson, Walker Brooke, ner, and Henry Marshall. The Texas delegates Alexander M. Clayton, James T. Harrison, William were not appointed until February 14th. ` Barry, and J. A. P. Campbell; ALABAMA, These delegates had been appointed by the con- Ilichard W. Walker, Colin J. McRae, William P. ventions of their respective States on the ground (hilton, David P. Lewis, Robert H. Smith, John that the people had intrusted the State conven- "ill Shorter, Stephen F. Hale, Thomas Fearn, and tions with unlimited powers. They constituted t, Father of the writer.-EOITOR. 101 102 THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY. a majority of the delegation were opposed to Mr. Davis, but that, not having compared opinions, they did not understand one another, and that Mr. Davis received the vote of South Carolina, and was elected, by the casting vote of Mr. Rhett. Personally Mr. Rhett knew little of Mr. Davis. He regarded him as an accomplished man, but egotisti- 1cal, arrogant, and vindictive, without depth or statesmanship. Besides this, ;9 he judged him not sufficiently iii ae- cord with the movement to lead it. His speech on the 4th of July, 1858, between New York and Boston, was reported as denunciatory of secession- ists, and as comparing them to " mos- quitoes around. the horns of an ox, who S could annoy, but could do no harm." The strong Union sentiments uttered Z l J in his Now England electioneering tour, which secured to him the voteofB.F. Buter ndothers at the Democratic convention at Charleston, in 1860, were I confirmatory of the newspaper report. tAs late as November 10th, 1860, after the South Carolina convention was called, Mr. Davis had written a letter, within the cognizance of Mr. Rhett, and published by himself since the war, inwhich he unmistakably indicated \ 4uthe opinion that, if South Carolina ROBERT TOOMBS. FIT SECRERY OF STATE OF T ceded, neither Georgia, nor Alabama, CONFEDERACY, ME'MBER OF THECONFEDERATE nor Mississippi, nor Louisiana, nor FROM A PHOTOGRAH a any other State would secede unless both the convention that organized the Confederacy and its Provisional Congress. On the 8th of Feb- ruary the Provisional Constitution was adopted, to be in force one year. On the 9th was passed the first enactment, providing "That all the laws of the United States of America in force and in use in the Confederate States of America on the first day of November last, and not incon- sistent with the Constitution of the Confederate States, be and the same are hereby continued in force until altered or repealed by the Congress." The next act, adopted February 14th, continued in office until April 1 t all officers connected with the collection of customs, and the assistant treas- urers, with the same powers and functions as under the Government of the United States. An act of the 25th of February declared the peaceful navigation of the Mississippi River free to the citizens of any of the States upon its borders, or upon the borders of its navigable tributaries. On the 25th of February a commission to the Govern- ment of the United States, for the purpose of negotiating friendly relations and for the settle- ment of all questions of disagreement between the two governments, was appointed and confirmed. The commissioners were A. B. Roman, of Louisi- ana, Martin J. Crawford, of Georgia, and John Forsyth, of Alabama. An act of February 26th provided for the repeal of all laws which forbade the employment in the coasting trade of vessels not enrolled or licensed, and all laws imposing diseriminating duties on foreign vessels or goods imported in them. This Provisional Congress of one House held four sessions, as follows: L. Feb- ruary 4th-March lftb, 1861; IL April 29th- May 22d, 1861; III. July 20th-August 22d, 1861; IV. November 18tb, 1861-February 17tb, 1862; the first and second of these at Montgom- ery, the third and fourth at Richmond, whither the Executive Department was removed late in May, 1861,-because of "the hostile demonstrations of the United States Government against Virginia," as Mr. Davis says in his "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government."-EDITORS. THE CONFEDERA TE GOVERNMENT A T MONTGOMER Y. the United States Government should attempt to coerce South Carolina back into the Union, or to blockade her ports. His expectation, at that late period, ap- parently was that South Carolina would be left out of the 'Union alone, and that the United States Government would simply collect duties off the bars of her seaports; and he expressed himself "in favor of seeking to bring those [the :000 : planting States] into cooperation before asking for a popular decision upon a new kj policy and relation to the nations of the earth." These views did not strengthen him with Mr. Rhett for the executive head of the Southern Confederacy; nor did the published report of his shedding LERO: POPE WALKER, FIUR CO tears on retiring from the United States SERET 'Y ui' WAR Senate after the secession of Mississippi. FROM I. P110TI)GIAPH. But Mr. Rhett's cotemporary and second cousin, Mr. Barnwell, called three times to solicit his vote for Mr. Davis. The impression was produced upon his mind that he, Mr. Rhett, was the only man in the delegation opposed to Mr. Davis. In reply to objections sug- gested by Mr. Rhett, Mr. Barnwell said that Mr. Rhett's standard of the statesmanship requisite was higher than he might be able to get. He added that he knew Mr. Davis, and although he considered him not a man of great ability, yet he believed him just and honorable, and that he would utilize the best ability of the country, as Monroe and Polk and others had done, and would administer the powers intrusted to O F him as President, with an eye single to the interests of the Confederacy. t t. Upon this presentment Mr. Rhett concluded to forego his own mistrust, and to give his vote for Mr. Davis, along with the rest, as he supposed. HORUB1T HARWE'l RO I CHATII' )MIIr On taking the vote in the conven- CONGRES. FRO APOIGAH tion (February 9th) Georgia gave hers to Mr. Cobb, and the other States theirs to Mr. Davis. Georgia then changed her vote, which elected Mr. Davis unanimously. Mi. Alexander H. l03 104 THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY. Stephens was chosen Vice-President. I Mr. Rhett was made chairman of the committee to notify the President-elect, and to present him to the convention for inauguration. This office he performed in complimentary style, reflecting the estimate of Mr. Barnwell rather than his own fears. Within six weeks the Provisional Congress found out that they had made a mistake, and that there was danger of a division into an administration and an anti-administration party, which might paralyze the Government. To avoid this, and to confer all power on the President, they resorted to secret sessions. Mr. Davis offered the office of Secretary of State to Mr. Barnwell, but he declined it, and recommended Mr. C. G. Memminger, also of South Carolina, for the Treasury portfolio, which was promptly accorded to him. Both of these gentlemen had been cooperationists, and up to the last had opposed secession. Mr. Barnwell would not have been sent to the State convention from Beaufort but for the efforts of Edmund Rhett, an influential State sen- ator. Of Mr. Memminger it was said that when a bill was on its passage through the Legislature of South Carolina in 1859, appropriating a sum of money for the purchase of arms, he had slipped in an amendment which had operated to prevent Governor Gist from drawing the money and procur- ing the arms. In Charleston he was known as an active friend of the free- school system and orphan house, a moral and charitable Episcopalian, and a lawyer, industrious, shrewd, and thrifty. As chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means in the House of Representatives, he was familiar with the cut-and-dried plan of raising the small revenue necessary to carry on the government of South Carolina. Such was his record and experience when appointed to the cabinet of Mr. Davis. Mr. Memminger received no recom- mendation for this office from the South Carolina delegation; nor did the delegation from any State, so far as known, attempt to influence the Presi- dent in the choice of his cabinet. Mr. Robert Toombs, of Georgia, was appointed Secretary of State. This was in deference to the importance of his State and the publie appreciation of his great mental powers and thorough earnestness, not for the active part he had taken in the State convention in behalf of secession. In public too fond of sensational oratory, in counsel he was a man of large and wise views. Mr. Leroy Pope Walker, of Alabama, was appointed Secretary of War on the recommendation of Mr. William L. Yancey. Ambitious, without any special fitness for this post, and overloaded, he accepted the office with the understanding that Mr. Davis would direct and control its business, which he did. After differing with the President as to the number of arms to be imported, and the number of men to be placed in camp in the winter of 1861-2 (being in favor of very many more than the President), he wisely resigned. Mr. Stephen R. Mallory, of Florida, was appointed Secretary of the Navy. He was a gentleman of unpretending manners and ordinary good sense, who had served in the Senate with Mr. Davis, and had been chairman of the Committee 4 The choice was provisional only, but was made permanent on the 6th of November, 186 1, when Mr. Davis and Mr. Stephens were unanimously elected for six years. The Confederate Constitution made them ineligible to reelection. -EDITOR. THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY. on Naval Affairs. With some acquaintance with officers of the United States Navy, and some knowledge of nautical matters, he had small comprehen- sion of the responsibilities of the office. His efforts were feeble and dilatory, and he utterly failed to provide for keeping open the seaports of the Confed- eracy. But he was one of the few who remained in the cabinet to the end. Mr. Judah P. Benjamin, of Louisiana, was appointed Attorney-General, and held that office until the resignation of Mr. Walker, when he was transferred to the post of Secre- tary of War. Upon the fall of New Or- leans, public indig- nation compelled a change, and he was made Secretary of State. A man of great fertility of mind and resource and of facile charac- ter, he was the facto- turn of the President, performed his bid- ding in various ways, and gave him the benefit of his brains in furtherance of the Although a pro- visional government was more free to meet emergencies andeorrect mistakes, -' it was determined to proceed to the forma- tion of a permanent government. It was RoWLLCOB, REME T Oru IS P FA)R'ECN-E apprehended that in MAJO-GEXRA - C.IHA RMA OTOGRAPIL the lapse of time and I Mr. Daviss reasons for the selection of the mem- any, other consideration than the public welfare, h aving hers of the first Cabinet are given in his "Rie and no friends to reward or enemoes to punish. it resulted Fall of the ftCobnfede ara e government (N sew York that not one of those who formed my first Cabinet bad Fall of the Confederate Government I ( New York: borne to ue the relation of close personal friendship, l. Appleton Co., 1881), Vol. I., pp. 241-3, in or had political claims upon me; indeed, with two of these words: thenm I had no previous acquaintance. It was my wish that the Hon. Robert W. Barnwefl. of After being inaugurated, I proceeded to the forma- South Carolina, Should e Secretary of State. I had tion of my Cabinet, that is, the heada of the executive Flown him intimately during a trying period of our departments authorized by the laws of the Provisional joint servie inthe United States Senate, and he had won Congre-s. The unanitmiy existing among our people alike my esteem and regard. Before making known to ml.ade this a much easier and more agreeable task than him my wish in this conneetion, the delegation of where the rivalries in the party of an exeentive have to South Carolina, of Which he was a member, had he consulted and accommodated, often at the expense resoived to recommend one of their number to he of the higheat capacity and fitness Unencumbered by Secretary of the Treasury, and Mr. Barnwell, with 101, lob THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY. change of circumstances and of men, the cardinal points for which the South had contended, and on which the separation of sections had occurred. might be lost sight of; so it was decided to impress at once upon the new government the constitutional amendments regarded as essential The committee, of which Mr. Rhett was chairman, agreed at its fIrst meeting that the Constitution of the United States should be adopt- ed, with only such alterations as experience had proved desirable, A and to avoid latitudinarian con- structions. Most of the important amendments were adopted on mo- tion of the chairman. But the limits of this paper do not permit a specific statement of their char- acter and scope. \ The permanent constitution was adopted on the 11th of March, 1861, and went into operation, with . the permanent government, at Richmond, on the 18th of Febru- ary, 1862, when the Provisional Congress expired. A' Those men who had studied the situation felt great anxiety about ,the keeping open of the ports of STEPHNti It L 014LOY SEUKAR OF TNAVYr TS the Confederacy. Much was said VONFEIFRAC FRO AV11GAPuILt and published about the immediate charaeteristic delieaey, declined to aceept my offer to him. ` I had intended to offer the Treasury Department to Mr. Toomnb, of (Georgia, wbose knowledge on subjeets ot tinanee had particularly attracted my notice when we served together In the United States Senate. Mr. Barn- well having declined the State Department, and a col- lenni of his, said to be pecuhlarly qualiieid for the Treasury Delartoient, bhaving beeu recommended for it. Mr. T-otuhb was offered the State Department, for which others believed him to be well qualified. Mr. Mallory, of Florida, had been chairman of the Contnittee on Naav.l Affairs In the United State Senate. was extesWively .equalnted with the ffieers of the navy, and for a lahodanan had mueh knowledge of nauticall ffatir; therefore he wa. seleeted for Seeretary of the Navy. "1 Mr. Benjamin, of Louisiana, had a very high reputa- tion as a Mlwyer, and my acquaintance wlth him In the Senate bad Impreed me with the lucidity of his intel- lect. his systematic habits anud eapaeity for labor. He was therefore Invited to the post of Attorney-GeneraL 11 Mr. Reagan, of Texa., I had known for a sturdy, hon- est Representative in thq Inhted States Congress, and his acquaintance with the territory included in the COn- federate States was both extensive and acurate. These. together with his industry and ability to labor, indicated him as peculiarly tit for the offce of Postmaster-Gen- eral. "1 Mr. Memminger, of South Carolina, had a high repu- tation for knowledge of tlnane. He bore an unimpeach- able character for integrity and close attention to duties, and, on the r-eommendation of the delegation from South Carolina, he was appointed Secretary of the Treaes- ury, and proved himseuf entirely worthy of the trust "M Mr. Walker, of Alabama, was a distinguished mem- ber of the bar of north Alabama, and was eminnut auong the pohticians of that section. He was earnestly reeommended by gentlemen intimately and favorably known to me, and was therefore selected for the War Department. His was the only name presented from Alabama." EDITORS. \ One of them, offered by Mr. Rhett, and unani- mously adopted, relates to eivil-service reform, and is in the following words: The principal offieer io each otthe exeentive depart- ments, and alt persons eonneeted with the diplomatic alrvtce. may be removed from offe at the pleasure of the President. All other ivil offcer of the executive department may be removed at any time by the Prest- dent or other appointing power, when their serviecs are nunecesary, or for dishonesty, incapacity, inefficlency, miseonduct, or neglect of duty; and when so removed, the removal shall be reported to the Senate, together with the reasons therefor." R. B. R. THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY. necessity of providing gun-boats and shipping suitable for that purpose. In the winter of 1861 Mr. C. K. Prioleau, of the firm of John Fraser Co., of Liverpool, found a fleet of ten first-class East Indiamen, available to a buyer at less than half their cost. They belonged to the East India Company, and had been built in Great Britain for armament if required, or for moving troops and carrying valuable cargoes and treasure. Four of them were vessels of great size and power and of the very first class; and there were six others, which, although smaller, were scarcely inferior for the required purpose. On surrendering their powers to the British throne, the company had these steamships for sale. Mr. Prioleau secured the refusal of this fleet. The total cost of buying, arming, and fitting out the ten ships and putting them on the Southern coast ready for action was estimated at 10,000,000, or, say, 40,000 bales of cotton. The harbor of Port Royal, selected before the war as a coaling station for the United States Navy, with 26 feet of water at mean low tide, was admirably adapted for a rendezvous and point of supply. Brunswick, Georgia, was another good harbor, fit for such a fleet. The proposal was submitted to the Government through a partner of Mr. Prioleau in Charleston, Mr. George A. Trenholm, who forwarded the proposition by his son, William L. Trenholn. Its importance was not at all comprehended, and it was rejected by the executive. Captain J. D. Bulloch, the secret naval agent in Europe, who had the Alabamna built, states that "1the Confederate Gov- ernment wanted ships to cruise and to destroy the enemy's mercantile marine." It was of infinitely more importance to keep Southern ports open, but this does not seem to s have been understood until too late. The opportunity of obtaining these ships was thrown away. They were engaged by the British Govern- ment. To show the narrow spirit of those in office, an incident concerning Captain Maffit, who figured after- ward in command of the Florida, may be mentioned. In May, after the reduction of Fort Sumter, Maf- JUD1AHt 1:. UENJAMIN, C'ONF'EDERATE ATTORNF.Y-tMERALt, V NTIIM I PT. ITUT, i " ILTXU1 O ' fit came from Washington to offer THIRD SE'.CRETAvRY OF STATE. FM AL PH1TOPLg his services, and when he met the writer was in a state of indignation and disgust. He said that after having been caressed and offered a command in the Pacific, he had sneaked away from Washington to join the Confederacy, and that he had been received by the Secretary of the Navy as if he (Maffit) had designs upon him. 107 108 THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY. The Secretary of War has stated that before the Government moved from Montgomery 366,000 men, the flower of the South, had tendered their services in the army. Only a small fraction of the number were received. The Secretary was worn out with personal applications of ardent officers, and himself stated that in May, 1861, he was constantly waylaid, in walking the back way from his office to the Exchange Hotel, by men offering their lives in the Confederate cause. Another instance of narrowness may be named in the ease of William Cut- ting Heyward. He was a wealthy rice- planter and an eminently practical and efficient man, a graduate at West Point in the class with Mr. Davis. He went to Montgomery to tender a regiment. He sent in his card to the President anS waited for days in the lobby with- out obtaining an interview, and then returned home. He finally died from dp exposure, performing the duties of a c private in the Home Guard at Charles- w ton. The reason alleged for inot ac- Depting anore men was the want of arms, and Mr. Davis's book is an apol- CHARLES 0. Mr, INEU FIS IECIKTA.t OF Sae for not procuring them. d. It3 was d Teeme EGorant INin vsonay Congress of the Cofdrt Stte to send comsioesabodt that a great war was probable, and in- augurated on the 18th of February,- there was no declaration of war befomre the middle of April and no efficient blockade of the ports for many months,- yet it was in May that he started Major Huse over to England with instruc- tions to purchase 10,000 Enfield rifles! By these facts may be gauged his estimate of the emergency or of the purchasing ability of the Confederate States. The provisional constitution provided that " Congress shall appro-. priate no money from the Treasury unless it be asked and estimated for by the President or some one of the heads of departments, except for the purpose of paying its own expenses and contingencies." The Congress could, therefore, do nothing about the purchase of arms without a call from the executive. But for the Treaty of Paris in 1778, made by Benjamin Franklin, Silas Dean, and Arthur Lee, with France, the independence of the thirteen original States would not have been established. It was deemed important in the Pro- visional Congress of the Confederate States to send commissioners abroad to negotiate for a recognition of their independence, and, in case of war with the States of the North, perhaps for assistance. The chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Rhett, reported such a resolution, which was unani- mously adopted. As the treaty-making power of the Government belonged to the President, Congress could not dictate to him the limit of authority that should be conferred upon the commissioners, in the negotiations desired. But THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY. all those who had reflected upon the subject expected the President to give extensive authority for making treaties. The views held by the chairman were that the commissioners should be authorized to propose to Great Britain, France, and other European nations, upon the conditions of recognition and alliance, that the Confederate States for twenty years would agree to lay no higher duties on productions imported than fifteen or twenty per cent. ad val- orern; that for this period, no tonnage duties would be laid on their shipping, entering or leaving Confederate ports, but such as should be imposed to keep in order the harbors and rivers; that the navigation between the ports of the Confederate States for the same time should be free to the nations entering into alliance with the Confederate States, while upon the productions and ton- nage of all nations refusing to recognize their independence and enter into treaty with them, a discriminating duty of ten per cent. would be imposed. He believed, moreover, that they should be authorized to make an offen- sive and defensive league, with special guarantees, as was done in 1778. Here was a direct and powerful appeal to the interests of foreign nations, especially England. Would any British Minister have dared to reject a treaty offering such vast advantages to his country And if so, when the fact became known to Parliament, could he have retained his place I Up to September, 1862, the United States Government was committed, both by diplomatic dispatches and by the action of Congress, to the declara- tion that the war was made solely to preserve the Union and with the pur- pose of maintaining the institutions of the seceded States, unimpaired and unaltered. Hence, at this period, the issue of slavery had not been injected into diplomacy, and was no obstacle to X. 7' negotiating treaties. the When Mr. Yancey received teap- pointment at the head of the commis- sion, Mr. Rhett conferred with him at length, and found that the commis- sioner fully concurred in the views just mentioned. But he surprised Mr. Rhett by the statement that the Presi- 40oN It. RVAO.AN 4('.FF1)jRATE P()STMAWTE dent had given no powers whatever OI.RL ) TR NRV-.G to make commercial treaties, or to give any special interest in Confederate trade or navigation to any foreign nations, but relied upon the idea that " Cotton is King." " Then, rejoined Mr. Rhett, "if you will take my advice, as your friend, do not accept the appointment. For you will have nothing to propose and nothing to treat about, and must necessarily fail. Demand of the President the powers essential to the success of your mission, or stay at home." log io THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY. On the reassembling of the Provisional Congress in April, ascertaining that these powers had not been conferred upon the commission, Mr. Rhett pre- pared a resolution requesting the President to empower the commissioners to propose to European nations, as the basis of a commercial treaty, a tariff of duties for 20 years no higher than 20 per cent. ad vaharem on their imports into the Confederate States. This he submitted to Mr. Toombs, the Secretary of State, who promptly approved it and appeared before the Committee on Foreign Affairs to urge it. It was reported, with the indorsement of the com- mittee, to the Congress, and was not opposed in debate; but Mr. Perkins moved, as an amendment, six years instead of twenty. As this was carried, Mr. Rhett moved to lay the resolution on the table, which was done; and this was the only effort made to appeal to the interests of foreign nations, to secure recognition of the independence of the Confederate States, or to obtain assist- ance. Upon his return from abroad, Mr. Yancey met Mr. Rhett and said: "You were right, sir. I went on a fool's errand." In December, 1863, at Richmond, James L. Orr, chairmanof the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Senate, said to the writer, " The Confederate States have had no diplomacy." In March, 1863, proposals were made for a loan of 15,000,000 on 7 per cent. bonds, secured by an engagement of the Confederate Government to deliver cotton at 12 cents per pound within 6 months after peace. The loan stood in the London market at 5 per cent. premium; and the applications for it exceeded 75,000,000. In the Provisional Congress at Montgomery, Mr. Stephens proposed that the Confederate Government should purchase cot- ton at 8 cents per pound, paying in 8 per cent. bonds, running 20 or 30 years. He believed that 2,000,000 bales of the crop of 1860 could be obtained in that way from the planters, and that, of the crop of 1861, 2,000,000 more bales might be obtained afterward. By using this cotton as security, or shipping it abroad, he maintained the finances of the Confederate States could at once be placed on a solid basis. His plan met with much favor, but was opposed by the administration and was not carried through. Money for the long war was to be raised by loans from Confederate citizens on bonds sup- plemented by the issue of Treasury notes and by a duty on exported cotton. In April, 1865, after the collapse of the Confederacy, Mr. Barnwell, who had steadfastly supported Mr. Davis in the Confederate Senate, met the writer at Greenville, S. C., where Governor Magrath had summoned the Legislature of the State to assemble. There, in conversation, Mr. Barnwell explicitly expressed his judgment in the following words: " Mr. Davis never had any policy; he drifted, from the beginning to the end of the war." For practical regret at the issue of the secession movement, the time has long passed by. The people of the South have reconciled themselves to the restoration of the Union and to the abolishment of slavery. They have bravely and strenuously endeavored to go through the transition period of an enormous change without wreck. In complete harmony with the destinies of the Union, they are working out the future of the United States faithfully. This is set down to prevent the suppression of important facts in history, and in justice to eminent men, now dead, who have been much misunderstood. JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN i86i. BY JOflf D. IMBODEN, BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. S. A. THE movement to capture Harper's Ferry, Virginia, and the fire-arms manufactured and stored there was organized at the Exchange Hotel in Richmond on the night of April 16th, 1861. Ex-Governor Henry A. Wise was at the head of this purely impromptu affair. The Virginia Secession Convention, then sitting, was by a large majority " Union" in its sentiment till Sumter was fired on and captured, and Mr. Lincoln called for seventy-five thou- sand men to enforce the laws in certain Southern States. Virginia was then, as it were, forced to " take sides," and she did not hesitate. I had been one of the candidates for a seat in that convention from Augusta county, but had been overwhelmingly defeated by the " Union" candidates, because I favored secession as the only "peace measure" Virginia could then adopt, our aim being to put the State in an independent position to negotiate between the United States and the seceded Gulf and Cotton States for a new Union, to be formed on a compromise of the slavery question by a convention to be held for that purpose. Late on April 15th I received a telegram from "Nat" Tyler, the editor of the "Richmond Enquirer," summoning me to Richmond, where I arrived the next day. Before reaching the Exchange Hotel I met ex-Governor Wise on the street. He asked me to find as many officers of the armed and equipped volunteers of the inland towns and counties as I could, and request them to be at the hotel by 7 in the evening to confer about a military movement which he deemed important. Not many such officers were in town, but I found Captains Turner Ashby and Richard Ashby of Fauquier county, Oliver R. Funsten of Clarke county, all commanders of volunteer companies of cavalry; also Captain John A. Harman of Staunton-my home-and Alfred M. Barbour, the latter ex-civil superintendent of the Government works at Harper's Ferry. These persons, with myself, promptly joined ex-Governor Wise, and a plan See page 125 for a letter of Mr. Barbour, regarding the security of the armory.-EDITORS. 111 JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN ,86,. for the capture of Harper's Ferry was at once discussed and settled upon. The movement, it was agreed, should commence the next day, the 17th, as soon as the convention voted to secede,-provided we could get railway transportation and the concurrence of Governor Letcher. Colonel Edmund Fontaine, president of the Virginia Central railroad, and John S. Barbour, president of the Orange and Alexandria and Manassas Gap railroads, were sent for, and joined us at the hotel near midnight. They agreed to put the necessary trains in readiness next day to obey any request of Governor Letcher for the u the movement of troops. TIIJ: O1OilatQ UCldl: RAIIiNX N EI ,Y. A commeittee, of which I was chairman, waited on Governor 4 4Letcher after midnight, and, then informed him what co s w arousing him from his bed, laid mom s on have nthe scheme before him. He John S. Barboustated that he would take no 4 step till officially informed that decided to telegraphthe ordinance of secession was to b d d r spassed by the convention. He the St n Artillery, which I commanded, towas then asked if contingent upon the event hetwould next THE PALM REGIMErNT PARAININ CHAESTON, S C., day order the movement by be ROUTE " O leak IW XROM A SKET telegraph. He consented. We then informed hin what companies would be under arms ready to move at a moment's notice. All the persons I have named above are now dead, except John S Barbour, "Natr" Tyler, and myself. On returning to the hotel and reporting Governor Letcher's promise, it was decided to telegraph the captains of companies along the railroads mentioned to be ready next day for orders from the governor. In that way I ordered the Staunton Artillery, which I commanded, to assemble at their artiory by 4 P. m. on the 17th to receive orders from the governor to aid in the capture of the Portsmouth Navy Yaird This destination had been indicated in all our dispatches, to deceive the Government at Washington in case there should be a "1leak " in the telegraph offices. Early in the evening a message had been received by ex-Governor Wise from his son-in-law Doctor Garnett of Wash- ington, to the effect that a Massachusetts regiment, one thousand strong, had been ordered to Harper's Ferry. Without this reenforcement we knew the guard there consisted of only forty-five men, who could be captured or driven away, perhaps without firing a shot, if we could reach the place secretly. The Ashbys, Funsten, Harman, and I remained up the entire night. The superintendent and commandant of the Virginia Armory at Richmond, Cap- tain Charles Dimmock, a Northern man by birth and a West Point graduate, was in full sympathy with us, and that night filled our requisitions for ammunition and moved it to the railway station before sunrise. He also granted one hundred stand of arms for the Martinsburg Light Infantry, a 1 12 JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN i86i. 113 "' 4'i0 j,'3 r.. i/ NI ,qe ' ' N i',',. 003,' \:,''"g,;9 ,, L N N N I A I '2 4:4 ''2' C , k k i as afatel ot a message to President Lincoln andpaid a ner, do var Ths pQCf erap prvete trop beingW i3sent. to heds of My; teega to thtutnArtllery prdue widectmnadsra raedl through jutfre.Altheseuny an broughtpthosads ofo andsawplaed toSanonth duraingthetday.oAugustaoved been of stron Uniot, county, andaoubt wasea ungaised byemark whethe cr, I was acigvnertheaorder of Govterno traveler, h immediately wrtea esaeoPrsieninolndpada do to ak ittotheteegrphoffce Ths ct asdisovredbyoneofourpaty who induced a friend to follow the negro and take the dispatch from him. naiew cyompayjs fored.AltheseIwa acin reeipthed fordandsa plce Gvron Ltcher trai. Jus beoew8oe u ftedeoAfe abu aea JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN 186,. To satisfy them, my brother, George W. Imboden, sent a message to me at Gordonsville, inquiring underwhose authorityl had acted. Onthe arrival of the train at Gordonsville, Captain Harman received the message and replied to it in myname, that I was acting by order of the governor. Harman had been of the committee, the night before, that waited on Governor Letcher, and he assumed that by that hour-noon-the convention must have voted the State out of the Union, and that the governor had kept his promise to send orders by wire. Before we reached Staunton, Harman handed me the dispatch and told me what he had done. I was annoyed by his action till the train drew up at Staunton, where thousands of people were assembled, and my artillery eom- pany and the West Augusta Guards (the finest infantry company in the valley) were in line. Major-General Kenton Harper, a native of Pennsylvania, "a born soldier," and Brigadier-General William H. Harman, both holding commissions in the Virginia militia,-and both of whom had won their spurs in the regiment the State had sent to the Mexican war,-met me as I alighted, with a telegram from Governor Letcher ordering them into service, and referring them to me for information as to our destination and troops. Until I imparted to them confidentially what had occurred the night before, they thought, as did all the people assembled, that we were bound for the Ports- mouth Navy Yard. For prudential reasons, we said nothing to dispel this illusion. The governor in his dispatch informed General Harper that he was to take chief command, and that full written instructions would reach him en route. He waited till after dark, .3 and then set out for Winchester behind a good team. Brigadier- General Harman was ordered to take command of the trains and of all troops that might report en route. (See map, page 113.) About sunsetwe took train; our departure was an exciting and af- fecting scene. At THE COCRT-ROu IE, CHARLESTOWN VA.. WHERE JOHN BROWN AND UTLS AmStCIATtS Charlottesville, in WERE TRlrD AND SENTENCED, FROM A PHOTOPH. the night, the Monticello Guards, Captain W. B. Mallory, and the Albemarle Rifles, under Captain R. T. W. Duke, came aboard. At Culpeper a rifle com- pany joined us, and just as the sun rose on the 18th we reached Manassas. The Ashbys and Funsten had gone on the day before to collect their 114 JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN i86i. cavalry companies, and also the famous "Black Horse Cavalry," a superb body of men and horses, under Captains John Scott and Welby Carter of Fauquier. By marching across the Blue Ridge, they were to rendezvous near Harper's Ferry. Asnby had sent men on the night of the 17th to cut the wires be- tween Manassas Junction and Al- exandria, and to keep them cut for several days. Our advent at the Junction astounded the l quiet people of the village. Glen- eral Harman at once " impress- ed"theManassas MAw OF HARsesby FERRuY. iap train to take the lead, and switched two or three other trains to that line in order to proceed to Strasburg. I was put in command of the foremost train. We had not gone five miles when I discovered that the engineer could not be trusted. He let his fire go down, and came to a dead standstill on a slight ascending grade. A cocked pistol induced him to fire up and go ahead. From there to Strasburg I rode in the engine-cab, and we made full forty mriles an hour with the aid of good dry wood and a navy revolver. At Strasburg we left the cars, and before 10 o'clock the infantry com- panies took up the line of march for Winchester. I now had to procure horses for my guns. The farmers were in their corn-fields, and some of them agreed to hire us horses as far as Winchester, eighteen miles, while others refused. The situation being urgent, we took the horses by force, under threats of l)eing indicted by the next grand jury of the county. By noon we had a suffi- eient number of teams. We followed the infantry down the Valley Turnpike, reaching Winchester just at nightfall. The people generally received us very eoldly. The war spirit that bore them up through four years of trial and privation had not yet been aroused. General Harper was at Winchester, and had sent forward his infantry by rail to Charlestown, eight miles from Harper's Ferry. In a short time a train returned for my battery. The farmers got their horses and went home rejoic- ing, and we set out for our destination. The infantry moved out of Charles- town about midnight. We kept to our train as far as Hailtown, only four miles from the ferry. There we set down our guns to be run forward by hand to Bolivar Heights, west of the town, from which we could shell the place if necessary. at1 5 JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN i86i. The well-known raid of John Brown upon Har- per's Ferry, Virginia, for the purpose of freeing slaves by force of arms, occurred on the evening of Sunday, the 17th of October, 1839. His party, including himself and five negroes (three of whom were fugitive slaves), consisted of 22 men, three of whom remained at the rendezvous on the Maryland side of the Potomac. The others crossed by the bridge and seized the United States armory and arsenal, and during the next eighteen hours were busy in arousing slaves, cutting telegraph wires, providing defenses against attack, and imprisoning citizens. They were at last besieged in the engine- house by a large number of citizens and militia, to ii6 JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN i861. A little before dawn of the next day, April 18th, a brilliant light arose from near the point of confluence of the Shenandoah and Potomac rivers. General Harper, who up to that moment had expected a conflict with the Massachusetts regiment supposed to be at Harper's Ferry, was making his dispositions for an attack at daybreak, when this light convinced him that the enemy had fired the arsenal and fled. He marched in and took posses- sion, but too late to extinguish the flames. Nearly twenty thousand rifles and pistols were destroyed. The workshops had not been fired. The people of the town told us the catastrophe, for such it was to us, was owing to declarations made the day before by the ex-superintendent, Alfred Barbour. He reached Harper's Ferry, via Washington, on the 17th about noon, and, collecting the mechanics in groups, informed them that the place would be capt- ured within twenty-four hours by Virginia troops. He urged them to protect the property, and join the Southern cause, promising, if war ensued, that the place would be held by the South, and that they would be continued at work on high wages. Hisinuec with the men was great, and most of them decided to accept his advice. But Lieutenant Roger Jones, who com- manded the little guard of forty- five men, hearing what was going, on, at once took measures to destroy the place if necessary. Trains of gunpowder d whoma were added, on the morning of Tuesday, a were captured, and, after trial and conviction, force of United States marines, sent fromwash- were hanged at Charlestown, ViAginia,-Jobn ington under Colonel Robert E. Lee and Lieuten- Brown on the 2d of December, 1859; John E. ants Green and J. E. B. Stuart. The marines Cook, Edwin Coppoc, John A. Copeland (a mulat- battered down the door of the engine-house and to), and Shields Green (a negro) on the 16th of captured the insurgents, after a brave resistance. December; and Aaron D. Stevens and Albert Haz- In the conftict John Brown was wounded; his sons lett on the 16th of the following March. Three Watson and Oliver were mortally wounded, and citizens and a number of negroes were killed by eight others of the party were killed. Five, in- the insurgents, and others were wounded. eluding another son, Owen Brown, escaped. Seven EDITORS. 117 JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN t86i. were laid through the buildings to be fired. In the shops the men of Southern sympathies managed to wet the powder in many places 1X a aoduring the night, render- mig it harmless. Jones's sir 4xlv,rntir hettehetrhow ever, held StRt lh l kneOtVe the arsenal buildings jor-general of militia, whohadand stores, and when tion. Ts e aso es their commander was for we ab aihr a o e advisedof Harpers rapid approach the gunpowder was fired, and he crossed into Maryland with his wihu h , to shandful of men. So we secured only the ma- chinery and the gun and pistol barrels and locks, "2which, however, were sent to Richmond and Columbia, South Caro- lina, and were worked over into -excellent arms. [See note, page 125.] Within a week about thirteen hundred Vir- ginia volunteers had as- sembled there. As these CO"LOR tIROBE"ET FZE topniserEnfc FRMA PiOTOGIIRAPH TAKEN BEFORE THE copniserRinfct. Aprl 23d 1tt1 It itbert1 E. Lee with thei rolk of matjor-gieerl, u watt part of the State Militia, Vme. liltelt 10 Virgnaad al-tuel rhr o the zoitatry they were legally under dteel.. of the State. June 80th 1 In ac leordia. wle ith the prol I iluatioi commnand of the three of Gllw l-r LetI her, he truntefrmel Il t lfhlllPo iald to tle Confederate Stal-e hot Ino remained the rolkilg officer oI tile Virg'ioni itilitar tor brigadiers and one ma- jor-general of militia, who had authority over this, that, or the other organiza- tion. These generals surrounded themselves with a numerous staff, material for w hich was abundant in the rank and file of the volunteers; for instance, in my battery there were at least a dozen college graduates of and below the grade of cotrporal. Every fair afternoon the official display in Harper's Ferry of fuss and feathers" would have done no discredit to the Champs tlysites. One afternoon, six or eight days after our occupation, General Harper sent for me, as the senior artillery officer (we then had three batteries, but all without horses), to say he had been told that a number of trains on the Balti- more and Ohio railroad would try to pass us in the night, transporting troops from the West to Washington, and that he had decided to prevent tt8 JACKSON AT.HARPER'S FERRY IN 186,. them at the risk of bringing on a battle. He ordered the posting of guns so as to command the road for half a mile or more, all to be accurately trained on the track by the light of day, and ready to be discharged at any moment. Infantry companies were stationed to fire into the trains, if the artillery failed to stop them. Pickets were posted out two or three miles, with orders to fire signal-guns as soon as the first troop-laden train should pass. About 1 o'clock at night we heard the rumbling of an approach- ing train. The long roll was beat; the men assembled at their assigned positions and in silence awaited the sound of the sig- nal-guns. A nerv- ous cavalryman was the vedette. As the train passed him (it was the regular mail) he thought he saw soldiers in it, and fired. Pop ! pop! pop! came down the road from sue- cessive sentries. Primers were in- H 'It' I lElItY, LOOKIO G)WNV THlE PIOTOMAC. iFl) I HllVOTiRAPi TAhli do1 f 1F1O T HILl AVllO THll TIOWN' serted and lan- yards held taut, to be pulled when the engine should turn a certain point four hundred yards distant from the battery. By great good luck Colonel William S. H. Baylor, commanding the 5th Virginia regiment, was with some of his men stationed a little beyond the point, and, seeing no troops aboard the train, signaled it to stop. It did so, not one hundred yards beyond where the artillery would have opened on it. When the first excitement was over, he demanded of the conductor what troops, if any, were on board, and was told there was "one old fellow in uniform asleep on the mail-bags in the first car." Entering that car with a Mfie of soldiers, he secured the third prisoner of war taken in Virginia. It proved to be Brigadier-General W. S. Harney, of the United States army, on his way from the West to Washington, to resign his commission and go to Europe rather than engage in a fratricidal war. He surrendered with a pleasant remark, and was taken to General Harper's headquarters, where he spent the night. On his assur- ance that he knew of no troops coming from the West, Harper ordered us all to quarters. Next morning General Harney was paroled to report in Richmond, and was escorted to a train about to leave for Winchester. He was a fine-looking old soldier, and as he walked down the street to the depot he saw all our forces except the cavalry. He was accompanied socially by two or three of our generals and a swarm of staff-officers. He cast his glance over the few hundred men in sight, and turning to General Harper, I heard him inquire, with a merry twinkle in his eye, " Where is your army 119 JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN 1861. encamped, general I" Harper's face crimsoned as he replied, "Excuse me from giving information." Harney smiled, and said politely, "Pardon me for asking an improper question, but I had forgotten I was a prisoner." He went on to Richmond, was treated with marked courtesy, and in a day or two proceeded to Washington. In a few days our forces began to increase by the arrival of fresh volunteer companies. Being only a captain, I was kept very busy in trying to get my battery into the best condition. We had no caissons and but insufficient har- ness. For the latter I sent to Baltimore, purchasing on my private credit. In the same way I ordered from Richmond red flannel shirts and other clothing for all my men, our uniforms being too fine for camp life. The governor subse- quently ordered these bills to be paid by the State treasurer. We found at the armory a large number of very strong horse-carts. In my battery were thirty or more excellent young mechanics. By using the wheels and axles of the carts they soon constructed good caissons, which served us till after the first battle of Bull Run. We had no telegraph line to Richmond except via Washington, and the time of communication by mail was two days. General Harper found it so difficult to obtain needed munitions and supplies, that about the last of April he decided to send me to the governor, who was my intimate friend, with a requisition for all we needed, and verbal instructions to make to him a full statement of our necessitous and defenseless condition, in case General Robert Patterson,whowasre- ported with a Federal - \ 0 fforceat Chambers- burg, should move against us. When I v ;:, arrived in Richmond, 2 S N l Blla L ok General Robert E. Lee had been placed in command of all the Virginia forces by the =r.:9 Sgovernor, and by an ordinance every mi- litia officer in the State above the rank of captain had been IARIESl LPRRY, FE o TOEL NDARYAD 8IDE. decapitated, and the The railwawybridge was destroyed by the Coillfederatll on the l3th of June, 1861. governor and his mil- Two days later, on the applo, oh of t nIon foree.. olider G(hnelral RIobert Patter- .11, neWillia lll.Irt, agd werrlourl 1ew Walls'ee at Ronney (weee foot- itarycouncil had been .oate page Any, Oeaerlal Joiseph E. John.tWI Kvwho hafl ute.-edeead Cflol-el Jaekt tm1 the 2t of MIay), ebo-idering the potation :ntenablel authorized to fill va- drew the ConfedeIOIIe arImy to WInchester. cancies thus created. This was a disastrous blow to " the pomp and circumstance of glorious war" at Harper's Ferry. Militia generals and the brilliant " staff " were stricken down, and their functions devolved, according to Governor Letcher's order of April 27th, upon Thomas J. Jackson, colonel commandant, and James W. 120 JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN i86,. Massie, major and assistant adjutant-general, who arrived during the first week of May. This was " Stonewall" Jackson's first appearance on the theater of the war. I spent one day and night in Richmond, and then returned to camp, arriv- ing about 2 P. M. What a revolution three or four days had wrought I I could scarcely realize the change. The militia generals were all gone, and the staff had vanished. The commanding colonel and his adjutant had arrived, and were occupying a small room in the little wayside hotel near the railroad bridge. Knowing them both, I immediately sought an interview, and deliv- ered a letter and some papers I had brought from General Lee. Jackson and his adjutant were at a little pine table figuring upon the rolls of the troops present. They were dressed in well-worn, dingy uniforms of professors in the Virginia Military Insti- tute, where both had recently occupied chairs. Colonel Jackson had issued and sent to the camps a short, simple order assuming the t command, but had had no intercourse with the troops. The deposed officers had nearly all left for home or for Richmond in a high state of indignation. After an interview of perhaps a half hour I proceeded to my camp on the hill, and found the men of the 5th Vir- ginia regiment, from my own county, in assembly, and greatly excited. They were deeply attached to their field-officers, and re- garded the ordinance of the convention as an outrage on freemen and volunteers, and were discussing the propriety of passing denunci- GEEA" Ll TOAS J. (.T0'LL atory resolutions. On seeing me they called for a speech. As I did not belong to the regiment, I declined to say any- thing, but ordered the men of the Staunton Artillery to fall into line. Then I briefly told them that we were required to muster into service either for twelve months or during the war, at our option, and urged them to go in for the full period of the war, as such action would be most creditable to them, and a good example to others. They unanimously shouted, " For the war ! For the war!" Before they were dismissed the ceremony of mustering in was completed, and I proudly took the roll down to Colonel Jackson with the remark, " There, colonel, is the roll of your first company mustered in for the war." He looked it over, and, rising, shook my hand, saying, "Thank you, captain-thank you; and please thank your men for me." He had heard that there was dissatisfac- tion in the camps, and asked me to act as mustering officer for two other artil- lery companies present. Before sunset the rolls were returned. This prompt action of the batteries was emulated the next day by the other troops, and all were mustered in. Within a week Governor Letcher wisely appointed Major-General Harper colonel of the 5th Virginia, Brigadier-General Har- 1 2 1 JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN i86i. man lieutenant-colonel, and Colonel Baylor major, and I venture to say no regiment in either army was better officered, as the fame it won in the " Stonewall" brigade will prove. The presence of a master mind was visible in the changed condition of the camp. Perfect order reigned everywhere. Instruction in the details of military duties occupied Jackson's whole time. lie urged the officers to call upon him for information about even the minutest details of duty, often remarking that it was no discredit to a civilian to be ignorant of military matters. He was a rigid disciplinarian, and yet as gen- tle and kind as a woman. He was the easiest man in our army to get along with pleasantly so long as one did his duty, but as inexorable as fate in exacting the performance of it; yet he would overlook serious faults if he saw they were the result of ignorance, and would instruct the offender in a kindly way. He was as courteous to the humblest private who sought an inter- view for any purpose as to the highest officer in his command. He despised superciliousness and self-assertion, and nothing angered him so quickly as to see an officer wound the feelings of those under him by irony or sarcasm. When Jackson found we were without artillery horses, he went into no red-tape correspondence with the circumlocution offices in Richmond, but ordered his quartermaster, Major John A. Harman, to proceed with men to the Quaker settlements in the rich county of Loudoun, famous for its good horses, and buy or impress as many as we needed. Harman executed his orders with such energy and dispatch that he won Jackson's confidence, and remained his chief quartermaster till the day of Jackson's death. By Jackson's orders I took possession of the bridge across the Potomac at Point of Rocks, twelve miles below Harper's Ferry, and fortified the Vir- ginia end of the bridge, as we expected a visit any night from General B. F. Butler, who was at the Relay House on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. It was my habit to keep awake all night to be ready for emergencies, and to sleep in the day-time, making daily reports, night and morning, to Jackson. One Sunday afternoon, a little over a week after we occupied this post, I was aroused from my nap by one of my men, who said there were two men in blue uniforms (we had not yet adopted the gray) riding about our camp, and looking so closely at everything that he believed they were spies. I went out to see who they were, and found Jackson and one of his staff. As I approached them, he put his finger on his lips and shook his head as a signal for silence. In a low tone he said he preferred it should not be known he had come there. He approved of all I had done, and soon galloped away. I after- ward suspected that the visit was simply to familiarize himself with the line of the canal and railroad from Point of Rocks to Harper's Ferry preparatory to a sharp bit of strategy which he practiced a few days later. From the very beginning of the war the Confederacy was greatly in need of rolling-stock for the railroads. We were particularly short of locomo- tives, and were without the shops to build them. Jackson, appreciating this, hit upon a plan to obtain a good supply from the Baltimore and Ohio road. Its line was double-tracked, at least from Point of Rocks to Martins- burg, a distance of 25 or 30 miles. We had not interfered with the running 12 JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN 186,. of trains, except on the occasion of the arrest of General Harney. The coal traffic from 0Pm Cumberland was immense, as the Washing- ton government was accumulating supplies of coal on the seaboard. These coal trains passed Harper's Ferry at all hours of the day and night, and thus furnished Jackson with a pretext for arranging a brilliant "scoop." When he sent me to Point of Rocks, he ordered Colonel Harper with the 5th Vir- ginia Infantry to Martinsburg. He then complained to President Garrett, of the Baltimore and Ohio, that the night trains, eastward bound, disturbed the repose of his camp, and requested a change of sched- ule that would pass all east-bound trains by Harper's Ferry between 11 and 1 o'clock in the day-time. Mr. Garrett complied, and thereafter for several days we heard the con- P O GENERAL JC , DRAWNstant roar of passing trains for an hour ELN iF., WEAR UAL L:.' BLUFF, before and an hour after noon. But since MI'oAUIA IN 1861. s the "empties" were sent up the road at night, Jackson again complained that the nuisance was as great as ever, and, as the road had two tracks, said he must insist that the west-bound trains should pass during the same two hours as those going east. Mr. Garrett promptly complied, and we then had, for two hours every day, the liveliest railroad in America. One night, as soon as the schedule was working at its best, Jackson sent me an order to take a force of men across to the Maryland side of the river the next day at 11 o'clock, and, letting all west-bound trains pass till 12 o'clock, to permit none to go east, and at 12 o'clock to obstruct the road so that it would require several days to repair it. He ordered the reverse to be done at Martinsburg. Thus he caught all the trains that were going east or west between those points, and these he ran up to Winchester, thirty-two miles on the branch road, where they were safe, and whence they were removed by horse-power to the railway at Strasburg. I do not remem- ber the number of trains captured, but the loss crippled the Baltimore and Ohio road seriously for some time, and the gain to our scantily stocked Virginia roads of the same gauge was invaluable. While we held the Point of Rocks bridge, J. E. B. Stuart (afterward so famous as a cavalry leader) was commissioned lieutenant-colonel, and reported to Colonel Jackson for assignment to duty. Jackson ordered the consolidation of all the cavalry companies into a battalion to be commanded by Stuart, who then appeared more like a well-grown, manly youth than the mature man he really was. This order was very offensive to Captain Turner Ashby, at that time the idol of all the troopers in the field, as well he might be, for a more brave and chivalrous officer never rode at the head of well-mounted 123 JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN ,86,. troopers. Ashby was older than Stuart, and he thought, and we all believed, that he was entitled to first promotion. When not absent scouting, Ashby spent his nights with me at the bridge. He told me of Jackson's order, and that he would reply to it with his resignation. I expostulated with him, although he had all my sympathies. I urged him to call upon Colonel Jackson that night. It was only twelve miles by the tow-path of the canal, and on his black Arabian he could make it in less than an hour. I believed Jackson would respect his feelings and leave his company out of Stuart's battalion. I ventured to write a private letter to Jackson, appealing in the strong- est terms for the saving of Ashby v to the service. The result of his _ And i night ride was that Jackson not only relieved him from the obnox- fi4 0\ i; ! apse :;S:\\S\ ions order, but agreed to divide the companies between him and Stuart, and to ask for his immediate pro- motion, forming thus the nuclei of two regiments of cavalry, to be filled as rapidly as new companies came to the front. One of these regiments was commanded at first by Colonel Angus McDonald, with Ashby as lieutenant-colonel, and in a few months Ashby was promoted to its full command. Ashby got back to Point of Rocks ofChOmeL spn.XU that he a boTrr and, about 2 in the morning, as happy a man as I ever saw, and completely enraptured with Jackson From that night on, the affection and confidence of the two men were remarkable. A trip Ashby had made a few days before to Chambersburg and the encampment of General Robert Patterson was the real reason for Jacksons favor. Ashby had rigged himself in a farmer's suit of homespun that he had borrowed, and, hiring a plow-horse, had personated a rustic horse-doctor. With his saddlebags full of some remedy for spavin or ringbone, he had gone to Chambersburg, and had returned in the night with an immense amount of information. The career of Ashby was a romance from that time on till he fell, shot through the heart, two days before the battle of Cross Keys. May 23d, 1861, Colonel Jackson was superseded in command at Harper's Ferry by Brigadier-General Joseph E. Johnston. When General Johnston arrived several thousand men had been assembled there, representing nearly all the seceded States east of the Mississippi River. Johnston at once began the work of organization on a larger scale than Jackson had attempted. He brigaded the troops, and assigned Colonel Jackson to the command of the ex- clusively Virginia brigade. The latter was almost immediately commissioned 124 JACKSON AT HARPER'S FERRY IN ,86i. 12t brigadier-general, and when on the 15th of June Johnston withdrew from Har- per's Ferry to Winchester, he kept Jackson at the front along the Baltimore and Ohio road to observe General Patterson's preparations. Nothing of much importance occurred for several weeks, beyond a little affair near Martinsburg in which Jackson captured about forty men of a reconnoitering party sent out by Patterson. His vigilance was ceaseless, and General Johnston felt sure, at Winchester, of ample warning of any aggressive movement of the enemy. On the 2d of January, 1861, Alfred M. Barbour (mentioned in the foregoing paper), Superinten- dent of the United States Armory at Harper's Ferry, wrote to Captain William Maynadier of the Ordnance Bureau, Washington, in part as follows: I have reason to apprehend that some assault will be made upon the United States Armory at Harper's Ferry. My reasons I do not fetl at liberty to disclose. They may or they may not be well founded. I deem it my duty to inform you that there is no regularly organ- ized defense for the post. The armorers have been formed into volunteer companies, and arms and ammuni- tion furnished them. . . . But the armory might be taken and destroyed; the arms might be abstracted and removed or destroyed; vast amount of damage might be done to the Government property before the companies could be notified or rallied. . . . I cannot he held re- sponsible for consequences at present, unless the Gov- ernment itself sees to the protection of its property by placing reliable regularly drilled forces to sustain me. I donut look to personal consequences at alL I look to the duty of protecting the property of the Federal Govern- meut now under my charge." The next day Major (now General) Henry J. Hunt was assigned to command at Harper's Ferry, and Lieutenant Roger Jones was ordered to report to him with a small force from Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Major Hunt, in response to his re- quest for instructions, accompanied by a statement of the weakness of his position, was directed by the Secretary of War (Holt) to avoid all needless irri- tation of the public mind. Aprll 2d Major Hunt was ordered to other service, and the command devolved upon Lieutenant Jones (now Colonel and Inspector-General, U. S. A.), who, in a letter to the Editors, gives the following account of the destruction of the armory: "1 From aearlyday after I reported with mydetachment of sixty men from Carlisle, it became evident that a de- fense of the valuable Government interests at Harper's Ferry would be impracticable unless large reftforce- ments were sent there; and as there was every reason for believing that this would not be done, I early became convinced that there was but one course to pursue,- viz., to destroy what could not be defended. The chances for the capture or destruction of my small force -re- duced on April loth to 4t men - were overwhelming, but I counted on the unorganized and undisciplined state of the troops to be sent against me, on their surprise and bitter disappointment, as circumstances favoring our escape. " On the Sunday preceding the seizure of the armory, a wealthy miller of the village came to me and offered to he the bearer of any message I might care to send to the Secretary of War [Mr. Simon Cameron], saying he knew him intimately and that he believed Mr. Cameron would heed and give due consideration to any representation coming from him. Having full confidence in the gentle- man, I intrusted him with a message to Mr. Cameron. to the effect that if he would save for the Government the arm, etc., etc., at the armory, troops must be sent there at once and by the thousand. I further charged this gentleman to go to Washington that night, and nut delay until the next morning, as he had intended-all of which he promised to do and none of which he did. But of his failure and change of purpose I was ignorant until his return to the Ferry Wednesday evening, when I learned that fear of the consequences of his mission, voluntarily assumed, had made him abandon it. Mon. day was passed in anxious expectation; the silence of Tuesday added to my anxiety, which culminated on the following morning, when Ex-Superinteude-t Barbour, fresh from the convention at Richmond, appeared upon the scene, told what had been done, and announced that within twenty-four hours the forces of the State of Vir- nia would be in possession of the armory. " As I was acting entiely on my own Judgment and responsibility, it was apparent I must not act prema- turely, before the danger was self-evident and imminent. As the evening advanced, nearer and nearer came the troops from Halltown, and finally, shortly after o'clock, when they had advanced to within less than a mile of the armory,-in time less than fIve milutes,-the torch was applied, and before I could withdraw my amen from the village, the two arsenal buildings, containing about twenty thousand stand of rifles and rifle muskets, were ablaes. But very few of these arms were saved, for the constantly recurring explosions of powder which had been distributed through the buildings kept the crowd aloof. The fire in the shop. was extinguished, but the arms, which were then of Incalculable value, were de- stroyed. The spirit, devotion, and loyalty of my men, ec- except two deserters, were admirable; four of them were captured at their posts, but they all eventually escaped,- one by swimming the river,- and reported to me at Carlisle. I have heard that within a few minutes after my command had crossed the Potomac to the Mary- land side of the river, a train was heard 8atrting off for Baltimore, and that it was assumed by the Virginia troops and their offlers that my command had been taken off by that train, and that, consequently, pursuit was useless." Lieutenant Jones's action was warmly approved by the President in a congratulatory letter from Secretary Cameron. Governor Letcher estimated the value of the property secured to the State by the seizure of the Gosport Navy Yard and the Harper's Ferry Arsenal at 25,000,000 to 30,000,000. EDITORS MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. BY JACOB D. COX, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V. HE reasons which made it important to occupy West Virginia with T national troops were twofold-political and strategic. The people were strongly attached to the Union, and had opposed the secession of Virginia, of which State they were then a part. But few slaves were owned by them, and all their interests bound them more to Ohio and Pennsylvania than to eastern Virginia. Under the influence of Lincoln's administration, strongly backed, and, indeed, chiefly represented, by Governor Dennison of Ohio, a movement was on foot to organize a loyal Virginia government, repudiating that of Governor Letcher and the State convention as self-destroyed by the act of secession. Governor Dennison had been urging McClellan to cross the Ohio to protect and encourage the loyal men when, on the 26th of May, news came that the Confederates had taken the initiative, and that some bridges had been burned on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad a little west of Grafton, the crossing of the Monongahela River, where the two western branches of the railroad unite, viz., the line from Wheeling and that from Parkersburg. [See map, p. 129.] The great line of communication between Washington and the west had thus been cut, and action on our part was made necessary. Governor Dennison had anticipated the need of more troops than the thirteen regiments which had been organized as Ohio's quota under the President's first call. He had organized nine other regiments, numbering them consecutively with those mustered into the national service, and had put them in camps near the Ohio River, where they could occupy Wheeling, Parkersburg, and the mouth of the Great Kanawha at a moment's notice. Two Union regiments were also organizing in West Virginia itself, at Wheeling and Parkersburg, of which the first was commanded by Colonel (afterward General) B. F. Kelley. West Virginia was in McClellan's department, and the formal authority to act had come from Washington on the 24th, in the shape of an inquiry from General Scott whether the enemy's force at Grafton could be counteracted. 126 MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. The dispatch directed McClellan to "act promptly." On the 27th Colonel Kelley was sent by rail from Wheeling to drive off the enemy and protect the railroad. The hostile parties withdrew at Kelley's approach, and the bridges were quickly rebuilt. At the same time several of the Ohio regi- ments were ordered across the river, and a brigade of Indiana volunteers under Brigadier-General Thomas A. Morris was sent forward by rail from Indianapolis. Morris reached Grafton on the 1st of June, and was intrusted with the command of all the troops in West Virginia. He found that Colonel Kelley had already planned an expedition against the enemy, who had retired southward to Philippi, about thirty miles from Grafton. Morris approved the plan, but enlarged it by sending another column under Colonel Ebenezer Dumont of the 7th Indiana to cooperate with Kelley. Both columns were directed to make a night march, starting from points on the railroad about twelve miles apart, and converging on Philippi, which they were to attack at daybreak of June 3d. Each column consisted of about 1500 men, and Dumont's had with it 2 field-pieces of artillery, smooth 6-pounders. The Confederate force was commanded by Colonel G. A. Porterfield, of the Virginia volunteers, and was something less than a thousand strong, about one-fourth cavalry. J The night was dark and stormy, and Porterfield's raw troops had not learned picket duty. The concerted movement against them was more suc- cessful than such marches commonly are, and Porterfield's first notice of danger was the opening of the artillery upon his sleeping troops. It had been ex- K pected that the two columns would inclose the enemy's camp and capture the whole; but, though in disorderly rout, Porterfield succeeded, by personal coolness and cour- age, in getting them off with but few casu- alties and the loss of a few arms. The camp equipage and supplies were, of course, captured. Colonel Kelley was wounded S by a pistol-shot in the breast, which was the only injury reported on the National side; no prisoners were taken, nor did any dead or wounded fall into our hands. Por- terfield retreated to Beverly, some thirty miles farther to the south-east, and the National forces occupied Philippi. The telegraphic reports had put the Confed- FROX A WAw:-TIrE IoTocinAm. erate force at 2000 and their loss at 15 A Confederate Court of Inquiry reported that way to the front. They belonged to General Mor- he had "600 effective infantry (or thereabouts) ris's First Indiana Brigade (which also included the and 173 cavalry (or thereabouts)."-OFFICIAL 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Indiana regiments), RECORDS, II., p. 72. but were placed on detached service at Cumber- 4 The 11th Indiana Zouaves, Colonel Lew Wal- land, on the Potomac. Under instructions from lace, passed through Cincinnati June 7th on their General Robert Patterson, Colonel Wallace led an 127 MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. killed. This implied a considerable list of wounded and prisoners also, and the newspapers gave it the air of a considerable victory. The campaign thus opened with apparent 6clat for McClellan, and the " Philippi races," as they were locally called, greatly encouraged the Union men of West Virginia and correspondingly depressed the secessionists. McClellan, however, was still of the opinion that his most promising line of operations would be by the Great Kanawha Valley, and he retained in their camp of instruction the Ohio regiments which were mustered into the service of the United States, sending into Virginia only those known as the State forces. Another reason for this was that the older regiments were now nearly at the end of their three-months' enlistment, and weie trying to reorganize under the President's second call, which required enlistment for " three years or the war." + Nearly a month elapsed, when, having received reports that forces of the enemy were gathering at Beverly, McClellan determined to pro- ceed in person to that region with his best-prepared troops, postponing his Kanawha plan till north-western Virginia should be cleared of hostile forces. Referenee to the map will show that as the Potomac route was usually in the bands of the Northern forces, a Confederate occupation of West Virginia must be made either by the Staunton and Beverly road, or by the Kanawha route, of which the key-point west of the mountains was Gauley Bridge. General Lee determined to send columns upon both these lines -General Henry A. Wise upon the Kanawha route, and General Robert S. Garnett to Beverly. Upon Porterfield's retreat to Beverly after the "Philippi races," Garnett, who had been an officer in the United States army, was ordered to Beverly to assume command and to stimulate the recruiting and organization of regiments from the secession element of the population. Some Virginia regiments, raised on the eastern slope of the mountains, were sent with him, expedition against a force of about five hundred Confederates at Romney, which influenced General J. E. Johnston in his decision to evacuate Harper's Ferry (see note, page 120). In his report of the Romney engagement Colonel Wallace says: 1I left Cunmberland at 10 o'clock on the night of the 12th June with a companies, in all about ice men, and by railway went to New Creek station, 21 miles distant. A little after 4 o'clock I started my men across the mon.tanW., 23 miles off, intending to reach the town by 6 o'clock in the morning. The road was very fatiguing and rough. . . . With the utmost industry I did not get near Romney until about 8 o'clock. . . . I after- ward learned that they had notiem of my coming full an hour before my arrival. In approaching the place, it was necesary for mne to cross a bridge over the South Branch of the Potomac. A reconnaisance satifed me that the pasage of the bridgewould bethe eblefobstacle In my way, although I could distinctly see the enemy drawn up on the bluff. which is the town site, support- tng a battery of two guns, planted so as to sweep the road completely. I directed my advance guard to croms the bridge on the run. leap down an embankment at the farther entrance, and observe the wIndows of a large briek house not farther offthan seventy-five yards. Their appearance was the signal for an assault. A warm fire opened from the house, which the guard returned, with- no other los than the wounding of a sergeant. The fring continued several minutes. I led a second company across the bridge, and by following up a ravine got them Into a position that soon drove the enemy from the bouse and into a mountain to its rear. My attention was then turned to the battery on the hill. . . . I pushed five companies in skirmishing order, and at double-quick time, up a hill to the right, intending to get around the left flank of the enemy, and cut off their retreat. Between their position and that of my men was a deep. precipitous gorge, the crossing of which occupied about ten minutes. When the opposite ridge was gained we diseovered the rebels Indiscriminately blent, with a mam of women and children, flying as for life from the town. Having no borse, parsuit of the cannoneers was impossible. . . . After searching the town for arms, camp equipage, etc., I returned to Cumberland by the same road, reaching camp at 11 o'clock at night." EDITORS. s It is necessary to remember that at this time the Virginia State Government at Richmond was trying to keep up an appearance of independence, and that Robert E. Lee had been made major- general of Virginia troops, conducting a campaign ostensibly under the direction of Governor Letcher, and not of the Confederate authorities. A simil- acrum of neutrality was still preserved, and a shadow of doubt regarding Virginia's ultimate attitude had some effect in delaying active opera- tions along the Ohio as well as upon the Potomac. -J. D. C. 128 MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. and to these was soon added the 1st Georgia. On the 1st of July he reported his force as 4500 men, but declared that his efforts to recruit had proven a complete failure, only 23 having joined. The West Virginians, he says, " are thoroughly imbued with an ignorant and bigoted Union sentiment." Other reenforcements were promised Garnett, but none reached him except the 44th Virginia regiment, which arrived at Beverly the very day of the action, hut which did not take part in the fighting. Tygart's Valley, in S N I'm X N' 1 A which Beverly lies, is between Cheat Mountain i CAMPAIG S XINXS fjt thewst. Thea 9B-'_ vter, o f eth sane name as the val- ley, flows north- ward about fifteen miles, then turns westward, breaking through the ridge, passes by Philippi, and afterward crosses the railroad at Grafton. The Staunton and Parkersburg Turnpike divides at Beverly, the Parkersburg route passing over a saddle in Rich Mountain, and the Wheeling route following the river to Philippi. The ridge north of the river at the gap is known as Laurel Mountain, and the road passes over a spur of it. Garnett regarded the two positions at Rich Mountain and Laurel Mountain as the gates to all the region beyond, and to the West. A rough mountain road, barely passable, connected the Laurel Mountain position with Cheat River on the east, and it was possible to go by this way northward through St. George to the Northwestern Turnpike, turning the mountain ranges. [See map, p. 131.] Garnett thought the pass over Rich Mountain much the stronger and more easily held, and he therefore intrenched there about 1300 of his men and VOL. 1. 9 129 MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. 4 cannon, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pegram. The position chosen was on a spur of the mountain near its western base, and it was rudely fortified with breastworks of logs covered with an abattis of slashed timber along its front. The remainder of his force he placed in a similar fortified position on the road at Laurel Mountain, where he also had four guns, of which one was rifled. Here he commanded in person. His depot of supplies was at, Beverly, which was 16 miles from the Laurel Mountain position and 5 from that at Rich Mountain. He was pretty accurately informed of McClellan's forces and movements, and his preparations had barely been completed by the 9th of c July, when the Union general ap- peared in his front. McClellan entered West Yirginia in om person on the 22d of June, and on the w 23d issued from Grafton a proclama- i tion to the inhabitants. He had grad- C ually collected his forces along the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, which, at the time of the affair at Rich Moum- ng theimmeditecom and oA McOeIll tamn, consisted of 16 Ohio regiments, 9 from Indiana and 2 from West Virginia; in all, 27 regiments with 4 batteries of artillery of 6 guns each, 2 troops of cavalry, and an independent company of riflemen. Of his batteries, one was of the regular army, and another, a company of regulars (Company I, 4th U. S. Artillery), was with him awaiting mountain howitzers, which arrived a little later. o The regiments varied somewhat in strength, but all were recently organized, and must have aver- aged at least 700 men each, making the whole force about 20,000. Of these, about 50W0 were guarding the railroad and its bridges for some 200 miles, under the command of Brigadier-General C. W. Hill, of the Ohio Militia; a strong brigade under Brigadier-General Morris, of Indiana, was at Philippi, and the rest were in three brigades forming the immediate command of McClellan, the brigadiers being General W. S. Rosecrans, U. S. A., General Newton Schleich, of Ohio, and Colonel Robert L. McCook, of Ohio. On the date of his proclamation McClellan intended, as he informed General Scott, to move his principal column to Buckhannon on June 25th, and thence at once upon Beverly; but delays occurred, and it was not till July 2d that he reached Buckhannon, which is 24 miles west of Beverly, on the Parkersburg branch I As part of the troops were State troops not and 22d Ohio; 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, l0th, lith, mustered into the United States service, no report 13th, 14th, 15th Indiana, and 1st and 2d Vir of them is found in the War Department; but tho ginia; also Howe's United States battery, Bar- following are the numbers of the regiments found nett's Ohio battery, Loomnis's 'Michigan battery, named as present in the correspondence and re. and Daum's Virginia battery; the cavalry were Ports - viz., 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10Oth, Burdsal's Ohio Dragoons and Barker's Illinois 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, Cavalry. -J. D. C. 130 MWCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. of the turnpike. Before leaving Grafton the rumors he heard had made him estimate Garnett's force at 6000 or 7000 men, of which the larger part were at Laurel Mountain in front of General Morris. On the 6th of July he moved McCook with two regiments to Middle Fork Bridge, about half-way to Beverly, and on the same day ordered Morris to march with his brigade from Philippi to a position one and a half miles in front of Garnett's princi- pal camp, which was promptly done. Three days later, McClellan eoncen- trated the three brigades of his own column at Roaring Creek, about two miles from Colonel Pegram's position at the base of Rich Mountain. The advance on both lines had been made with only a skirmishing resistance, the Confederates being aware of McClellan's great superiority in numbers, and choosing to await his attack in their fortified positions. The National com- mander was now convinced that his opponent was 10,000 strong, of which about 2000 were before him at Rich Mountain. A reconnaissance made on the 10th showed that Pegram's position would be difficult to assail in front, but preparations were made to attack the next day, while Morris was directed to hold firmly his position before Garnett, watching for the effect of the attack at Rich Mountain. In the evening Rosecrans took to McClellan a young man named Hart, whose father lived on the top of the mountain two miles in rear of Pegram, and who thought he could guide a column of infantry to his father's farm by a circuit around Pegram's left flank south of the turnpike. The paths were so difficult that cannon could not go by them, but Rosecrans offered to lead a column of infantry and seioe the road at the Hart X farm. After some discussion McClelln- adopted the suggestion, and it was arranged that Rosecrans should march at daybreak of the 11th with about two thousand men, including a troop of horse, and that upon the sound of his engagement in the rear of Pegram, McClellan would attack in force in front. By a blunder in one of the regimental camps, the reveille and assembly were sounded at midnight, and Pegram was put on the qui vive. He, however, believed that the attempt to turn his position would be by a path or country road passing round his right, between him and Garnett (of v ery which the latter had warned him), and his attention was diverted from Rose- crans's actual route, which he thought impracticable. The alert which had C 5 O AT AT occurred at midnight made Rosecrans EAb,7 R5CH MOUNTAIN think it best to make a longer circuit _ _ _ _ 131 MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. than he at first intended, and it took ten hours of severe marching and mountain climbing to reach the Hart farm. The turning movement was made, but he found an enemy opposing him. Pegram had detached about 350 men from the 1300 which he had, and had ordered them to guard the road at the mountain summit. He sent with them a single cannon from the four which constituted his only battery, and they threw together a breastwork of logs. The turnpike at Hart's runs in a depression of the summit, and as Rose- crans, early in the afternoon, came out upon the road, he was warmly received by both musketry and cannon. The ground was rough, the men were for the first time under fire, and the skirmishing combat varied through two or three hours, when a charge by part of Rosecrans's line, aided by a few heavy volleys from another portion of his forces which had secured a good position, broke the enemy's line. Reenforcements from Pegram were nearly at hand, with another cannon, but they did not come into action, and the runaway team of the caisson on the hill-top, dashing into the gun that BlU;ADIEWReN RAL JIOII'N PFXRAt C. A. was coming up, capsized it down the moun- BURG, iERAinit 6, I qo'XFM A tain-side where the descending road was PHOTOGRAPH. scarped diagonally along it. Both guns fell into Rosecrans's hands, and he was in possession of the field. The march and the assault had been made in rain and storm. Nothing was heard from McClellan, and the enemy, rally- ing on their reenforcements, made such show of resistance on the crest a little farther on, that Rosecrans directed his men to rest upon their arms till next morning. When day broke on the 12th, the enemy had disappeared from the mountain-top, and Rosecrans, feeling his way down to the rear of Pegram's position, found it also abandoned, the two remaining cannon being spiked, and a few sick and wounded being left in charge of a surgeon. Still nothing was seen of McClellan, and Rosecrans sent word to him, in his camp beyond Roaring Creek, that he was in possession of the enemy's position. Rosecrans's loss had been 12 killed and 49 wounded. The Confederates left 20 wounded on the field, and 63 were surrendered at the lower camp, including the sick. No trustworthy report of their dead was made. The noise of the engagement had been heard in McClellan's camp, and he formed his troops for attack, but the long continuance of the cannonade and some signs of exultation in Pegram's camp seem to have made him think Rosecrans had been repulsed. The failure to attack in accordance with the plan has never been explained. Rosecrans's messengers had failed to reach McClellan during the 11th, but the sound of the battle was sufficient notice that he had gained the summit and was engaged; and he was, in fact, left to 132 MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. win his own battle or to get out of his embarrassment as he could. Toward evening McClellan began to cut a road for artillery to a neighboring height, from which he hoped his twelve guns would make Pegram's position unten- able; but his lines were withdrawn again beyond Roaring Creek at nightfall, and all further action postponed to the next day. About half of Pegram's men had succeeded in passing around Rosecrans's right flank during the night and had gained Beverly. These, with the newly arrived Confederate regiment, fled southward on the Staunton road. Garnett had learned in the evening by messenger from Beverly that Rich Mountain summit was carried, and evacuated his camp in front of Morris about mid- night. He first marched toward Beverly, and was within five miles of that place when he received information (false at the time) that the National forces already occupied it. He then retraced his steps nearly to his camp, and, leaving the turnpike at Leadsville, he turned off upon a country road over Cheat Mountain into Cheat River Valley, following the stream northward toward St. George and West Union, in the forlorn hope of turning the moun- tains at the north end of the ridges and regaining his communications by a very long detour. He might have continued southward through Beverly almost at leisure, for McClellan did not enter the town till past noon on the 12th. Morris learned of Garnett's retreat at dawn, and started in pursuit as soon as rations could be issued. He marched first to Leadsville, where he halted to communicate with McClellan at Beverly and get further orders. These reached him in the night, and at daybreak of the 13th he resumed the pur- suit. His advance-guard of three regiments, accompanied by Captain H. W. Benham of the Engineers, overtook the rear of the Confederate column about noon and continued a skirmishing pursuit for some two hours. Garnett him- self handled his rear-guard with skill, and at Carrick's Ford a lively encounter was had. A mile or two farther, at another ford and when the skirmishing was very slight, he was killed while withdrawing his skirmishers from behind a pile of driftwood which he had used as a barricade. One of his cannon had become stalled in the ford, and, with about forty wagons, fell into Morris's hands. The direct pursuit was here discontinued, but McClellan had sent a dispatch to General Hill at Grafton, to collect the gar- risons along the railway and block the way of the Confederates where they must pass around the northern spurs of the mountains. His military telegraph terminated at the Roaring Creek camp, and the dis- patch written in the evening of the 12th was not forwarded to Hill till near noon of the 13th. This officer immediately ordered the collection of the greater part of his detachments at Oakland and called upon the railway officials for special trains to hurry them to the rendezvous. About one thousand men under Colonel James Irvine of the 16th Ohio were at West Union where the St. George road reaches the Northwestern Turnpike, and Hill's information was that a detachment of these held Red House, a crossing several miles in advance by which the retreating enemy might go. Irvine was directed to hold his positions at all hazards till he could be reen- forced. Hill himself hastened with the first train from Grafton to Oakland with 133 MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. about 500 men and 3 cannon, reached his destination at nightfall, and hurried his detachment forward by a night march to Irvine, 10 or 12 miles over rough roads. It turned out that Irvine did not occupy Red House, and the preva- lent belief that the enemy was about eight thousand in number, with the uncertainty of the road he would take, made it proper to keep the little force concentrated till reenforcements should come. The first of these reached Irvine about 6 o'clock on the morning of the 14th, raising his command to 1500, but a few moments after their arrival he learned that the enemy had passed Red House soon after daylight. He gave chase, but did not overtake them. ,, Meanwhile, General Hill had spent the night in trying to hasten forward the railway trains, but none were able to reach Oakland till morn- ing, and Garnett's forces had now more than twenty miles the start, and were on fairly good roads, moving southward on the eastern side of Bt;AllEr11L ROBERT ELJr-N the mountains. McClellan still telegraphed that A1831) FO A 1111 13, Hill had the one opportunity of a lifetime to cap- ture the fleeing army, and that officer hastened in pursuit, though unprovided with wagons or extra rations. When, however, the Union commander learned that the enemy had fairly turned the mountains, he ordered the pursuit stopped. Hill had used both intelligence and energy in his attempt to con- eentrate his troops, but it proved simply impossible for the railroad to carry them to Oakland before the enemy had passed the turning-point, twenty miles to the southward. During the 12th Pegram's situation and movements were unknown. He had intended, when he evacuated his camp, to follow the line of retreat taken by the detachment already near the mountain-top, but, in the darkness of the night and in the tangled woods and thickets of the mountain-side, his column got divided, and, with the rear portion of it, he wandered all day on the 12th, seeking to make his way to Garnett. He halted at evening at the Tygart Valley River, six miles north of Beverly, and learned from some country people of Garnett's retreat. It was still possible to reach the mountains east of the valley, but beyond was a hundred miles of wilderness and half a dozen mountain ridges on which little, if any, food could be found for his men. He called a council of war, and, by advice of his officers, sent to McClellan, at Beverly, an offer of surrender. This was received on the 13th, and Pegram brought in 30 officers and 523 men. McClellan then moved southward him- self, following the Staunton road, by which the remnant of Pegram's little force had escaped, and on the 14th occupied Huttonsville. Two regiments of Confederate troops were hastening from Staunton to reenforce Garnett. These were halted at Monterey, east of the principal ridge of the Alleghanies, and upon them the retreating forces raflied. Brigadier-General H. R. Jackson was assigned to command in Garnett's place, and both Governor Letcher and General Lee made strenuous efforts to increase this army to a force sufficient 134 MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA to resume aggressive operations. On McClellan's partl nothing further was attempted, till, on the 22d, he was summoned to Washington to assume eom- mand of the army, which had retreated to the capital after the panic of the first Bull Run battle. The affair at Rich Mountain and the subsequent movements were among the minor events of a great war, and would not warrant a detailed descrip- tion, were it not for the momentous effect they had upon the conduct of the war, by being the occasion of McClellan's promotion to the command of the Potomac army. The narrative which has been given contains the "unvar- nished tale," as nearly as official records of both sides can give it, and it is a curious task to compare it with the picture of the campaign and its results which was then given to the world in the series of proclamations and dis- patches of the young general, beginning with his first occupation of the country and ending with his congratulations to his troops, in which he announced that they had " annihilated two armies, commanded by educated and experienced soldiers, intrenched in mountain fastnesses fortified at their leisure." The country was eager for good news, and took it as literally true. McClellan was the hero of the moment, and when, but a week later, his sue- cess was followed by the disaster to McDowell at Bull Run, he seemed pointed out by Providence as the ideal chieftain, who could repair the misfortune and lead our armies to certain victory. His personal intercourse with those about him was so kindly, and his bearing so modest, that his dispatches, proclama- tions, and correspondence are a psychological study, more puzzling to those who knew him well than to strangers. Their turgid rhetoric and exaggerated pretense did not seem natural to him. In them he seemed to be composing for stage effect, something to be spoken in character by a quite different person from the sensible and genial man we knew in daily life and conversation. The career of the great Napoleon had been the study and the absorbing admira- tion of young American soldiers, and it was, perhaps, not strange that when real war came they should copy his bulletins and even his personal bearing. It was, for the moment, the bent of the people to be pleased with McClellan's rendering of the r6le; they dubbed him the young Napoleon, and the photographers got him to stand with folded arms, in the historic pose. For two or three weeks his dispatches and letters were all on fire with enthusiastic energy. He appeared to be in a morbid condition of mental exaltation. When he came out of it, he was as genial as ever, as can be seen by the con- trast between his official communications and that private letter to General Burnside, written just after the evacuation of Yorktown, which, oddly enough, has found its way into the official records of the war.\ The assumed dash \, Letter of May 21st, 1862. "My Dear Burn: arms, and rely far more on his goodness than I do Your dispatch and kind letter received. I have on my own poor intellect. I sometimes think noW instructed Seth (Williams] to reply to the official that I can almost realize that Mahomet was sin- letter, and now acknowledge the kind private cere. When I see the hand of God guarding one note. It always does me good, in the midst of so weak as myself, I can almost think myself a my cares and perplexities, to see your wretched chosen instrument to carry out his schemes. old scrawling. I have terrible troubles to contend Would that a better man had been selected. with, but have met them with a good heart, like . . . Good-bye, and God bless you, Burn. your good old self, and have thus far struggled With the sincere hope that we may soon shake through successfully. . . . The crisis cannot hands, I am as ever, long be deferred. I pray for God's blessing on our Your sincere friend, McClellan."-J. D. C. l 3:; MAJOR-GENERAL W. S. ROSECRANS. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH. 136 MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. and energy of his first campaign made the disappointment and the reaction more painful, when the excessive caution of his conduct in command of the Army of the Potomac was seen. But the Rich Mountain affair, when analyzed, shows the same characteristics which became well known later. There was the same overestimate of the enemy, the same tendency to inter- pret unfavorably the sights and sounds in front, the same hesitancy to throw in his whole force, when he knew that his subordinate was engaged. If Garnett had been as strong as McClellan believed him, he had abundant time and means to overwhelm Morris, who lay four days in easy striking distance, while the National commander delayed attacking Pegram; and had Morris been beaten, Garnett would have been as near Clarksburg as his opponent, and there would have been a race for the railroad. But, happily, Garnett was less strong and less enterprising than he was credited with being. Pegram was dislodged, and the Confederates made a precipitate retreat. THE KANAWHA VALLEY. WHEN McClellan reached Buckhannon, on the 2d of July, the rumors he heard of Garnett's strength, and the news of the presence of General Wise with a considerable force in the Great Kanawha Valley, made him conclude to order a brigade to that region for the purpose of holding the lower part of the valley defensively till he might try to cut off Wise's army after Gar- nett should be disposed of. This duty was assigned to me. The brigade which I had organized had all been taken for his own campaign, except the 11th Ohio (only five companies present), but the 12th Ohio, which was still at Camp Dennison, was ordered to report to me, and these two regiments were to be sent by rail to Gallipolis as soon as the railways could furnish transportation. At Gallipolis we should find the 21st Ohio militia, and the 1st and 2d Kentucky volunteers were also to join me there, coming by steam- boat from Cincinnati. The two Kentucky regiments had been organized in Cincinnati, and were made up chiefly of steamboat crews and "longshore- men" thrown out of employment by the stoppage of commerce on the river. There were in them some companies of other material, but these gave the distinctive character to the regiments as a whole. The colonels and part of the field-officers were Kentuckians, but the organizations were Ohio regi- ments in nearly everything but the name. The men were mostly of a rough and reckless class, and gave a good deal of trouble by insubordination; but they did not lack courage, and, after they had been under discipline for a while, became good fighting regiments. The troops moved the moment transportation could be furnished, and those going by rail were at Gallipolis and Point Pleasant (the mouth of the Great Kanawha) on the 10th. My only artillery was a section of 2 bronze rifles, altered from smooth 6-pounders, and my only cavalry some 30 raw recruits, useful only as messengers. Meanwhile, my orders had been changed, and in accordance with them I directed the 2d Kentucky to land at Guyandotte, on the Ohio, about 70 miles below the Kanawha, the 137 MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. 1st Kentucky to proceed to Ripley, landing at Ravenswood, about 50 miles above, while with two and a half regiments I myself should move up the Kanawha Valley. The two detachments would join me after a time by lateral roads. My total force, when assembled, would be a little over three thousand men, the regiments having the same average strength as those with McClellan. The opposing force under General Wise was four thousand by the time the campaign was fully opened, though somewhat less at the begin- ning. 4 The Kanawha River was navigable for small steamboats about 70 miles, to a point 10 or 12 miles above Charleston, the only important town of the region and lying at the confluence of the Kan- awha and Elk rivers. Steamboats were plenty, owing to the interruption Of trade, and wagons were wholly lacking, so that -my column was accompanied . and partly carried by a fleet of stern- wheel steamers. On the 11th of July the movement A.. from Point Pleasant began. An advance- or VIROINIA. guard was sent out on each side of the Fft-I A PHTJOGRAII. river, marching upon the roads which were near its banks. The few horse- men were divided and sent with them as messengers, and the boats followed, steaming slowly along in rear of the marching men. Most of two regiments were carried on the steamers, to save fatigue to the men, who were as yet unused to their work, and many of whom were footsore from their first long march of 25 miles to Gallipolis, from the station where they left the railway. The arrangement was also a good one in a military point of view, for if an enemy were met on either bank of the stream, the boats could land in a moment and the troops disembark without delay. Our first day's sail was thirteen miles up the river, and it was the very romance of campaigning. I took my station on top of the pilot-house of the leading boat, so that I might see over the banks of the stream and across the bottom-lands which bounded the valley. The afternoon was a lovely one. Summer clouds lazily drifted across the sky, the boats were dressed in their colors, and swarmed with men as a hive with bees. The bands played national tunes, and as we passed the houses of Union citizens, the inmates would wave their handkerchiefs to us and were answered by cheers from the troops. The scenery was picturesque, the gently winding river making beautiful reaches that opened new scenes upon us at every turn. On either Wise reported his force on 17th July as on the 18th. When he abandoned the valley 3500 "effective" men and 10 cannon, and says ten days later he reported his force 4000 in he received "perhaps 300" in reenforcements round numbers.-J. D. C. t38 MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. side the advance-guard could be seen in the distance, the main body in the road, with skirmishers exploring the way in front and flankers on the sides. Now and then a horseman would bring some message to the shore from the front, and a small boat would be sent to receive it, giving us the rumors with which the country was rife, and which gave just enough of excitement and of the spice of possible danger to make this our first day in the enemy's country key everybody to a pitch that doubled the vividness of every sensation. The landscape seemed more beautiful, the sunshine more bright, and the exhilara- tion of outdoor life more joyous than any we had ever before known. Our first night's camp was in a picturesque spot in keeping with the beauties of the day's progress, and was enlivened by a report that the enemy was advancing to attack us in force. It was only a rumor, based upon the actual approach of a reconnoitering party of cavalry, and the camp was not allowed to be disturbed except to send a small reconnoissance forward on our own part. Two more days' advance, in the face of a slight skirmishing resistance, brought us to the Pocotalico, a stream entering the Kanawha from the north. Wise had placed his principal camp at Tyler Mountain, a bold spur which reaches the river on the northern side (on which is also the turnpike road) about 12 miles above my position, while he occupied the south side with a detachment above Scary Creek some 3 miles from us. The hills closing in nearer to the river make it easy to stop steamboat navigation with a small force, and it became necessary to halt a little and await the arrival of the wagons which had not yet been sent me, and of the 2d Kentucky regiment, which was marching to me from Barboursville, where one wing of it, com- manded by Lieutenant-Colonel Neff, had a brilliant little affair with a body of Confederate recruits occupying the place. On the afternoon of the 17th, the Kentuckians having arrived, and a reconnaissance having been made of the Scary Creek position, which was found to be held by about 500 of the enemy with 1 or 2 cannon, Colonel John W. Lowe of the 12th Ohio was ferried over the river with his own regiment and 2 companies of the 21st Ohio with our 2 cannon, and directed to occupy the attention of the enemy in front at the creek, which was unfordable at its mouth, while he tried to turn the position with part of his command. The enemy at first retreated, leaving one cannon disabled, but, being reenforced, they rallied, and, no good crossing of the creek being found, Lowe was foiled in his effort to dislodge them after a sharp engagement across the stream. The wagons reached us a few at a time, but by the 24th I was able to move from our strong position behind Pocotalico, and, taking circuitous country roads among the hills, to come upon the rear of Wise's camp at Tyler Mountain. The march was a long and difficult one, but was successful. As soon as his outposts were driven in, the enemy decamped in a panic, leaving his camp- kettles and supper over the fires. We had also cut off a steamboat with troops which was just below us as we came to the bluff, and which, under the fire of our cannon, was run ashore and burned, while the detachments on the other side of the river hastened by country roads to rejoin Wise at Charleston. It was now nightfall, and we bivouacked upon the mountain-side. Wise 1 39 MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. abandoned Charleston in the night and re- treated toward Gauley Bridge. On the 25th I occupied Charleston without resistance, and moved on, ordering the 1st Kentucky up from Ripley to garrison the place and establish my depot there. At every mile above Charleston the scenery 4 grows wilder, the mountains crowding in l upon the river, often with high, beetling cliffs l overhanging it, and offering numerous posi- X i 1 tions where a small detachment might hold an army in check. Wise, however, made no resistance worth naming, except to fell timber into the road, and he passed the Gauley, burn- ing the important bridge there and continu- ing his hasty retreat to the White Sulphur Springs, hurried, no doubt, by the fear that McClellan might intercept him by way of B. rLaeheCe,A., Huntersville and Lewisburg. McClellan had nto A aD paicfrm whc recognized the fact that he -was asking me to HITCrANN ordre meGto face the enemy with no odds in my favor, and as soon as he heard that Wise was disposed to make a stand, he had directed me not to risk attacking him in front, but rather to await the result of his own moveient toward the Upper Kanawha. Rosecrans did the same whatn he assumed com- mand; but I knew the hope had been that I could reach Gauley Bridge, and I felt warranted, as soon as wagons reached me, in attempting the turning movement which seems to have thrown Wise into a panic from which he did not recover till he got out of the valley. Rosecrans ordered me to remain on the defensive at Charleston, but his dispatehes did not reach me fortunately, till I was close to Gauley Bridge, some forty miles above Charles- ton, and was quite sure of my ability to take possession of that defile, as I did on the 29th of July. Another reason for haste was that the time of enlist- ment of the 21st Ohio had expired, and I was ordered by the governor to send it back to Ohio for reorganization, which would make a reduction of one- fourth of my numbers. At my first night's encampment above Charleston, in a lovely nook between spurs of the hills, I was treated to a little surprise on the part of three of my subordinates which was an unexpected enlargement of my mu itary experience, and which is worth preserving to show some of the con ditions attending the beginning of a war with undisciplined troops. The camp was nicely organized for the night and supper was over, when I was waited upon at my tent by these gentlemen. Their spokesmani informed me that after consultation they had concluded that it was foolhardy to follow the Confederates into the gorge we were traveling, and, unless I could show them satisfactory reasons for changing their opinion, they would not lead their commands farther into it. I dryly asked if he was quite sure he under- 140 MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. stood the nature of his communication. There was probably something in the tone of my question which was not altogether expected, and his compan- ions began to look a little uneasy. He then protested that they meant no disrespect, but, as their military experience was about as extensive as my own, they thought I ought to make no movement but on consultation with them and by their consent. The others seemed better pleased with this way of put- ting it. My answer was that whether they meant it or not, their action was mutinous, and only their ignorance of military law could palliate it. The responsibility for the movement of the army was with me, and, while glad to confer freely with them, I should call no council of war and submit nothing to vote till I felt incompetent to decide for myself. If they apologized for their conduct and showed earnestness in military obedience, what they had now said would be overlooked, but on any recurrence of insubordination I should enforce my power by arresting the offender at once. I dismissed them with this, and immediately sent out orders through my adjutant-general to march early next morning. Before they slept, one of the three had come to me with an earnest apology for his part in the matter, and a short time made them all as subordinate as I could wish. The incident could not have occurred in the brigade which had been under my com- mand at Camp Den- nison, and was the natural result of the sudden assembling of inexperienced men under a bri- gade commander of whom they knew nothing except that at the beginning of the war he had been a civilian like them- selves. The same march . enabled me to make '' the acquaintance of another army " insti- tution,"-the news- paper correspond- ent. At Charleston I was joined by two POS HOSPITAL AND W'AI,,N-St.P AT KAN'WHS Fii ms NEX t men representing GAtLE' RlUK4E. FRoM APllOGztI. influential newspapers, who wished to know on what terms they might accom- pany the column. The answer was that the quartermaster would furnish them with a tent and with transportation, and that their letters should be submitted to one of the staff to protect us from the publication of facts which 141 MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. might aid the enemy. This seemed Hi Do 1 unsatisfactory, and they intimated that +- g ethey expected to be taken into my mess, and to be announced as volun- teer aides with military rank. They were told that military position or rank could only be given by authority much higher than mine, and that they could be more honestly independent if free from personal obligation and from temptation to repay favors with t 0 oflattery. My only purpose was to put X 0 0 \ 9 Xhi; the matter upon the foundation of public right and of mutual self-re- spect. The day before we reached Gauley Bridge they opened the matter GAL-B E = Y again to my adjutant-general, but were informed that I had decided it upon a principle by which I meant to abide. Their reply was, " Very well; General Cox thinks he can get along without us. We will show him. We will write him down !" They left the camp the same evening and wrote letters to their papers, describing the army as a rabble of ruffians, burning houses, ravishing women, robbing and destroying property, and the commander as totally incom- petent. As to the troops, more baseless slander was never uttered. Their march had been orderly, no willful injury had been done to private property, and no case of personal violence to any non-combatant, man or woman, had been even charged. Yet the publication of such communications in widely read journals was likely to be as damaging as if it were true. My nomination as brigadier-general was then before the Senate for confirmation, and "the pen" would probably have proved "'mightier than the sword" but for McClel- lan's knowledge of the nature of the task we had accomplished, as he was then in the flood-tide of power at Washington, and had expressed his satisfac- tion at the performance of our part of the campaign which he had planned. BOSEClIANS IN COMMAND. GENERAL RosECRANs had succeeded McClellan as ranking officer in West Virginia, but it was not until the beginning of November, 1861, that the region was made a department and he was regularly assigned to command. Meanwhile the three-months' enlistments were expiring, many regiments were sent home, new ones were received, and a complete reorganization of his forces took place. Besides holding the railroad, he fortified the Cheat Mountain Pass looking toward Staunton, and the pass at Elkwater on the mountain summit between Huttonsville and Huntersville. In similar manner I was directed to fortify the camp at Gauley Bridge, and to cover the front in every direc- tion with active detachments, constantly moving from the central position. 142 MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. By the middle of August, Rosecrans had established a chain of posts, with a regiment or two at each, on a line upon which he afterward marched from Weston, by way of Bulltown, Sutton, and Summersville, to Gauley Bridge. The Confederates had also been straining every nerve to collect a force that might give us an effective return blow, and Robert E. Lee was expected to lead their forces in person. After ten days' quiet occupation of Gauley Bridge, in which I had reconnoitered the country nearly forty miles in front and on each flank, we learned that General John B. Floyd had joined Wise with a brigade, and that both were moving toward the Kanawha. At the same time the militia of Raleigh, Mercer, and Fayette counties were called out, making a force of two thousand men unrler General Chapman. The total force confronting us was thus about eight thousand. ) To resist these I kept 2 regiments at Gauley Bridge, an advance-guard of 8 companies vigorously skirmishing toward Sewell Mountain, a regiment distributed on the Kanawha to cover the steamboat communications, and some West Virginia recruits organizing at the mouth of the river. By extreme activity these were able to baffle the enemy and impose upon him the belief that our numbers were more than double our actual force. Rosecrans had informed me of his purpose to march a strong column to join me as soon as Lee's plans were fully developed, and I accumulated sup- plies and munitions at Gauley Bridge, determined to stand a siege if neces- sary. On the 13th of August the 7th Ohio, Colonel E. B. Tyler, was ordered by Rosecrans to Cross Lanes, covering Carmifex Ferry on the Gauley River about twenty miles above us, where a road from Lewis- burg meets that going up the Gauley to Summersville. I was author- ized to call Tyler to me if seriously attacked. On the 20th Wise made a GAtULY RKBII', tL"KlING DOWN STaE. strong demonstration in front, but was 'BOX A i1U4T13BAPll. met at Pig Creek, three miles up the New River, and easily repulsed. On the 26th Floyd, having raised a flat-boat which Tyler had sunk, crossed the Gauley at Carnifex Ferry with 2000 or 3000 men, and surprised him, routing the regiment with a loss to us of 15 killed and about 100 captured, of which 50 were wounded. The greater part of the regiment was rallied by Major Casement, and led over the O0n the 14th of August Wise reported to force: 100. AtthattimehegivesFloyd'sforceat General Lee that he had 2000 ready to move, 1200, with 2 strong regiments coming up, besides and could have 2500 ready in 5 days; that 5.50 2000 militia under General Chapman, as stated of his cavalry were with Floyd, besides an artil- above. Theaggregateforceoperatingonthe Kan.- lery detachment of 50. This makes his total wha line he gives as 7800, Sept. 9th.-J. D. C. 143 MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. mountains to Elk River, and thence to Charleston. Floyd intrenched his position, and built a foot-bridge to connect it with the eastern side of the wild gorge. Wises failure to cooperate was Floyd's reason for abandoning his announced purpose of marching upon my rear; but he was on my northern line of comniu- nication with Rosecrans, and the latter hastened his preparations to come to my relief. On the 3d of September, Wise and Chapman attempted a concerted attack upon Gauley Bridge, the first pushing in upon the turnpike, wbile Chapman advanced from NVA Fayette by Cotton Hill and a road to the river a little below Kanawha Falls. Wise was again met at Pig Creek and driven bark; Chapman reached the bluffs overlooking the river in rear of us, driving in our outposts, but did us little mischief, except to throw a few shells into our lower cainp, and on Wise's repulse he also withdrew. Our detachments followed them up on both lines with NEW NIVTlV Stow, NE-AR GAULEc . DittDGL daily warm skirmishes, and the advance-guard ambushed and pun- ished the enemy's cavalry in a very demoralizing way. Efforts to reach the river and stop our steamboats, kept the posts and detachments below us 144 MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. on the alert, and an expedition of half the 1st Kentucky, under Lieutenant- Colonel D. A. Enyart, sent to break up a Confederate militia encampment at Boone Court House, 40 miles southward, routed the enemy, who left 25 dead upon the field. The march and attack had been swift and vigorous, and the telTor of the blow kept that region quiet for some time afterward. I was puzzled at Floyd's inaction at Carnifex Ferry, but the mystery is partly solved by the publication of the Confederate records. There was no cooperation between the commanders, and Wise refused the assistance Floyd demanded, nor could even the authority of Lee reduce the ex-governor of Virginia to real subordination. The letters of Wise show a capacity for keeping a command in hot water which was unique. If he had been half as troublesome to me as he was to Floyd, I should, indeed, have had a hot time of it. But he did me royal service by preventing anything approaching unity of action between the two principal Confederate columns. Rosecrans now began his march from Clarksburg with three brigades, having left the Upper Potomac line in command of General Kelley, and the Cheat Mountain region in command of General J. J. Reynolds. His route (already indicated) was a rough one, and the portion of it between Sutton and Summersville, over Birch Mountain, was very wild and difficult. He left his bivouac on the morning of the 10th of September, before daybreak, and, marching through Summersville, reached Cross Lanes about 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Floyd's position was now about two miles distant, and waiting only for his column to close tSC;AtLEup, he again pressed forward. Gen- N W;- ,4;vrgt eral Benham's brigade was in front, X X and soon met the enemy's pickets. Getting the impression that Floyd was in retreat, Benham pressed for- t7Z= at So ant ward rather rashly, deploying to the left, and coming under a sharp fire from the right of the enemy's works. \ The woods were dense and tangled, it was too late for a proper recon- noissance, and Rosecrans could only hasten the advance and deployment of the other brigades under Colonels McCook and Scammon. Benham had snt a howitzer battery and two rifled cannon with his head of column at AFjft55 3FPAIR AT the left, and these soon got a position, A RNI FEX FERRY from which, in fact, they enfiladed 5lg4trw .5Ra-k5V35m53 3ss s sr part of Floyd's line, though it was t ..R.rCrr r..3 Himpossible to see much of the situa- C .S.:.tR rr; Ttsir r tion. Charges were made by portions Dsreir ts pfrsi'toP of Benham's and McCook's brigades as they came up, but they lacked VOL 1. 10 145 4MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. unity, and Rosecrans was dissatisfied that his head of column should be engaged before he had time to plan an attack. Colonel Lowe, of the 12th Ohio, had been killed at the head of his regiment, and Colonel W. H. Lytle, of the 10th, had been severely wounded; darkness was rapidly coming on, and Rosecrans ordered the troops withdrawn from fire, till positions could be rectified, and the attack renewed in the morning. Seventeen had been killed and 141 had been wounded in the sharp but irregular combat. Floyd, however, had learned that his position could be subjected to a destructive cannonade; he was himself slightly wounded, and his officers and men were discouraged. He therefore retreated across the Gauley in the night, having great difficulty in carrying his artillery down the cliffs by a wretched road in the darkness. He had built a slight foot-bridge for infantry, in the bit of smooth water known as the Ferry, though both above and below the stream is an impassable mountain torrent. Once over, the bridge was broken up and the ferry-boat was destroyed. He reported but twenty casualties, and threw much of the responsibility upon Wise, who had not obeyed orders to reenforce him. His hospital, containing the wounded prisoners taken from Tyler, fell into Rosecrans's hands. On the 12th of September we first heard, at Gauley Bridge, of the engagement at Carnifex Ferry, and I at once moved with two regiments to attack Wise, who retired as we advanced, till I occupied the junction of the turnpike with the Sunday road. The whole hostile force had retreated to Sewell Mountain, and Rosecrans halted me until he could create means of crossing the Gauley. McCook's brigade joined me on the 16th of September, and my own command was increased by bringing up another of my regiments from below. With FLOYD' CONXM"P 11k ECIO'SI' TIlE GALLEY ilVER AFTERM THE FIGHT OF USEMBYIKF 1UT, AT UARNEIi FLEERT, AFTEE A IETCH MADE AT THE TIMEi 146 ... ",", . .... ."'', 1111 ift- - I --"' =iEl I --:1- MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. the two brigades I advanced to Spy Rock, a strong posi- tion overlooking a valley several miles broad, beyond which was Big Sewell Mountain, the crest of which we occu- pied with an ad- vance-guard on the 20th and in force on the 24th. Before the a 1st of October Rose- crans had concentra- ted his force at the mountain, the four brigades being so reduced by sickness and by detachments that he reported the whole as making only 5200 effective men. Immediately in front, across a deep gorge, lay the united forces of Floyd and WVise, 4IT4 114F I ItUM"ARII COLIMMAND' 1 PKHA1NG TO MIL.G'CA commanded by Lee HOERI'.' CAMP' AT1 1AE BIDGEl'. FRO A 'I,. T" I .1 NUD4A THlt TIM in person. The autumn rains set in upon the very day of Rosecrans's arrival, and continued without intermission. The roads became so difficult that the animals of the wagon trains were being destroyed in the effort to supply the command. The camp was 35 miles from Gauley Bridge, and our stores were landed from steamboats 25 miles below that post, making 60 miles of wagoning. The enemy was as badly off, and no aggressive operations were possible on either side. This became so evident that on the 5th of October Rosecrans withdrew his forces to camps within 3 or 4 miles of Gauley Bridge. Lee had directed an effort to be made by General Loring, his subordinate on the Staunton line, to test the strength of the posts under Reynolds at Cheat Mountain and Elkwater, and lively combats had resulted on the 12th and 14th of September. Reynolds held firm, and Rosecrans had not been diverted from his own plans. On October 2d Reynolds delivered a return blow upon the Confederate position at Grecnbrier River, but found it too strong to be carried. Both parties now remained in observation till the end of October. Floyd reported to his Government that the eleven days of cold storms at Sewell Mountain had "cost more men, sick and dead, than the 147 MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. battle of Manassas Plains." More enterprising in plans than resolute or skillful in carrying them out, he determined upon another effort, with Lee's consent. Taking advantage of Rosecrans's neglect to occupy Fayette Court House and Cotton Hill, a mountainous mass in the angle of the Kanawha and New rivers, he moved with a column of about five thousand men across New River and down its left bank, and startled the Union commander by opening with cannon upon the post at Gauley Bridge on the 1st of Novem- ber. The demonstration was more noisy than dangerous, for Floyd had no means of crossing the river. The ordnance stores at the post were moved into a gorge out of the range of fire, and a battery was established high up on Gauley Mount to reply to the enemy. Rosecrans had hopes of capturing Floyd, by turning his position from below by Benham's and Robert C. Schenck's (formerly Scammon's) brigades. Delays occurted which Rosecrans attributed to failure to obey orders on the part of Benham. On the 10th detachments from my brigade at Gauley Bridge crossed the river and scaled the heights, attacking Floyd in front and securing a position on the top of the mountain. Floyd withdrew his artillery, and on the 12th, learning that Schenck and Benham were moving toward his rear, decamped, and did not cease his retreat till he reached the Holston Valley railroad. Lee returned to Richmond, and portions of the troops on both sides were sent to other fields, where military operations in winter were thought to be more practicable. The remnant went into winter quarters, and though some com- bats occurred, the most noteworthy of which was Milroy's attack upon the Confederates in front of Cheat Mountain Pass in December, these engage- ments did not change the situation. West Virginia had organized as a free State within the Union, and this substantial result of the campaign crowned it with success. The line of the Alleghanies became the northern frontier of the Confederacy in Virginia, and was never again seriously broken. VIEW OF ROMNEY, VA. FROM A SKETCH. On (etoher 26thm 1861, Birigaler-GeIneral B. F. Kelley, gagemeut, the .(7federates were driveni froit their In- With a swall force of infantry and cavalry, advanceld trenclaeonts and the town was captured. The Union upon Romlney front New Creek Ptatohn, 26 wiles listant, forces lost I killed and al0 Wotunded. In the sketch tire tn the P'otomac (see wap, page 121). After a sharp en- shown the camps of General Kelley's troups. 148 GOING TO THE FRONT. RECOLLECTIONS OF A PRIVATE - . BY WARREN LEE G088. BEFORE I reached the point of enlisting, I had read and been " enthused" B by General Dix's famous "shoot him on the spot" dispatch; I had attended flag-raisings, and had heard orators declaim of " undying devotion to the Union." One speaker to whom I listened declared that " human life must be cheapened "; but I never learned that he helped on the work experiment- ally. When men by the hundred walked soberly to the front and signed the enlistment papers, he was not one of them. As I came out of the hall, with conflicting emotions, feeling as though I should have to go finally or forfeit my birthright as an American citizen, one of the orators who stood at the door, glowing with enthusiasm and patriotism, and shaking hands effusively with those who enlisted, said to me: "Did you enlist I " " No," I said. " Did you " "No; they won't take me. I have got a game leg and a widowed mother to take care of. I remember another enthusiast who was eager to enlist others. He declared that the family of no man who went to the front should suffer. After January 18th, 1861, three days after he had Dix wrote the following reply: "Treasury De- entered on his duties as Secretary of the Treasury partment, January 29, 1881. Tell Lieutenant to President Buchanan, General Dix sent W. Caldwell to arrest Captain Breshwood, assume Hemphill Jones, chief clerk of one of the Treasury command of the cutter, and obey the order I gave bureaus, to the South, for the purpose of saving through you. If Captain Breshwood, after arrest, the revenue-cutters at New Orleans, Mobile, and undertakes to interfere with the command of the Galveston. January 29th, Mr. Jones telegraphed cutter, tell Lieutenant Caldwell to consider him as from New Orleans that the captain of the revenue- a mutineer, and treat him accordingly. If any one cutter McClelland refused to obey the Secretary's attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot orders. It was seven in the evening when the him on the spot. JOHN A. Dix, Secretary of the dispatch was received. Immediately, Secretary Treasury." -EDpros. 149 150 GOING TO THE FRONT. ARRIVAL OF THE SEVEINTH EKW TORK AT ANNAPOLIS, APRIL 20, ai61, ON THE WAY TO AWASINGTOX. FROM 4 SKETCH MADE AT THE TrME. the war he was prominent among those who at town-meeting voted to refund the money to such as had expended it to procure substitutes. He has, moreover, been fierce and uncompromising toward the ex-Confederates since the war. From the first I did not believe the trouble would blow over in " sixty days"; J nor did I consider eleven dollars a month, t, and the promised glory, large pay for the services of an able-bodied young man. It was the news that the 6th Massachusetts regiment had been mobbed by roughs on their passage through Baltimore which gave me the war fever. 4 )Mr. Seward, speaking in New York two days after the secession of South Carolina, said: " Sixty days' more suns will give you a much brighter and more cheerful atmosphere." The monthly pay of Union privates was: cavalry 12, artillery and infantry 11; from August 6th, 1861, 13 for all arms, and from May 1st, 1864, 16. Confederate privates re- ceived: in the cavalry and light batteries 12; in the artillery and infantry 11; increased June 9th, 1864, to 19 and 18 per month for a period of one year from that date. -EDITORS. J Concerning this encounter Colonel Edward F. Jones, of the 6th Massachusetts, says in his report: "After leaving Philadelphia I received intimation that our passage through the city of Baltimore would be resisted. I caused ammunition to be distributed and arms loaded, and went personally through the cars and issued the following order, viz., 'The regi- meni will march through Baltimore in column of see- tions. arms at will. You will undoubtedly be insulted, abused, and perhaps assaulted, to which you must pay no attention whatever, but march with your faces square to the front and pay no attention to the mob, even If they throw stoned, bricks, or other missiles; but it you are fired upon and any one of you Is bit, your officers will order you to fire. Do not fire utoe any pro- miseuous crowds, but select any man whom you may see aiming at you, and be sure you drop him.' Reach- log Baltimore, borses were attached the instant that the locomotive was detached, and the cars were driven at a rapid pace across the city. After the cars con- taining seven companies had reached the Washington depot the truck behind them was barricaded, and the eam containing . . . the following companies, via., Company C, of Lowell, Captain Follansbee; Company D, of Lowel, Captain Hart; Company 1, of LAwrence, Captain Pickering, and Company L, of Stoneham, Cap- tami Dike, were vacated, and they proceeded but a short distance before they were furiously atacked by a shower of missiles, which came faster as they advanced. They increased their steps to double-quick, which seemed to infuriate the mob. us it evidently impressed the mob with the idea that the soldiers dared not fire or had no ammunition, and pistol-shots were numerously fired into the ranks, and one soldier fell dead. The order IFire' was given, and It was executed, In conse- quence, several of the mob fell, and the soldiers again advanced hastily. The mayor of Baltimore placed him- self at the head of the column beside Captain Follans- bee, and proceeded with them a short distance." The Hon. George William Brown, then mayor of Baltimore, in his volume entitled " Baltimore and the 19th of April, 1861," thus desribes the march of the soldiers after he joined the column: " They were firing wildly, sometimes backward, over their shoulders. So rapid was the march that they could not Stop to take aim. The mob, which was not very large, as it seemed to me, was pursuing with shonta and stones, and, I think, an occasional pistol- shot. The uproar was furious. I ran at once to the head of the column, some persons in the crowd Shout- ing, ' Here comes the mayor.' I shook bands with the officer In command, Captain Follausbee, saying, as I did sO, ' t am the mayor of Baltimore.' The captain greeted me cordially. I at one. objected to the double-quick, which was immediately stopped. I placed myself by his side, and marched with him. He said, We have been attacked without provocation,' or words to that effect. I replied, ' You must defend yourselves.' I expected that he would face bis men to the rear, and, after giving warning, would fire if neesary. But I sid no more, for I Immediately felt that, as mayor of the city, it was GOING TO THE FRONT. 151 And yet when I read Governor John A. Andrew's instructions to have the hero martyrs "preserved in ice and tenderly sent forward," somehow, though I felt the pathos of it, I could not reconcile myself to the ice. Ice in connection with patriotism did not give me agreeable impressions of war, and when I came to think of it, the stoning of the heroic "Sixth" didn't suit me; it detracted from my desire to die a soldier's death. I lay awake all night thinking the matter over, with the "ice" and "brick-bats" before my mind. How- ever, the fever culminated that night, and I resolved to enlist. " Cold chills" ran up and down my back as I got out of bed after the sleepless night, and shaved, preparatory to other desperate deeds of valor. I was twenty years of age, and when anything unusual was to be done, like fighting or courting, I shaved. With a nervous tremor convulsing my system, and my heart thumping like muffled drum-beats, I stood before the door of the recruiting-office, and, before turn- q ing the knob to enter, read and re-read the advertisement for recruits posted thereon, until I knew all its pecu- liarities. The promised chances for "travel and promo- not my province to volunteer such advice. Once before in my life 1 had taken part in opposing a formidable riot, and had learned by experience that the safest and i,,ost humane manner of quelling a mob is to meet it at the beginning with armed resistance. The column con- tinued its march. There was neither concert of action nor organization among the rioters. They were armed only with such stones or missiles as they could pick up, and a few pistols. My presence for a short time had some effect, but very soon the attack was renewed with greater violence. The mob grew bolder. Stones flew thick and fast. Rioters rushed at the soldiers and at- tem.pted to snatch their muskets, and at least on two occasions succeeded. With one of these muskets a sol- dier was killed. Men fell on both sides. A young law- yer, then and now known as a quiet citizen, seized a flag of one of the companies and nearly tore it from its staff. He was shot through the thigh, and was carried home apparently a dying mau, but he survived to enter the army of the Confederacy,where he rose to the rank of captain, and he afterward returned to Baltimore, where he still lives. The soldiers fired at will. There was no firing by platoons, and I heard no order given to fire. I remember that at the corner of South street several citizens standing In a group fell, either killed or wounded. It was impossible for the troops to diacrimi- nate between the rioters and the bystanders, but the latter seemed to suffer most. . . . Marshal Kane, with about fifty policemen (as I then supposed, but I have since ascertained that, in fact, there were not so many), came at a run from the direction of the Camden street station, and throwing themselves in the rear of the troops, they formed a line in front of the mob, and with drawn revolvers kept It back. This was between Light and Charles streets. Marshal Kane's voice shouted, 'Keep back, men, or I shoot I I This movement. which I saw myself, was gallantly exeented, and was perfectly successful. The mob recoiled like water from a rock. One of the leading rioters, thea a young man, now a peaceful merchant, tried, as he has himself told me, to poas the Une, but the marshal seized him, and UNIF)X1M OF rTH elxrT FROM A PllROOGRAMP. vowed he would shoot It the attempt was made. This nearly ended the fight, and the column passed on under the protection of the police, without serious molestsa tion, to Camden station " Sumner H. Needham, of Lawrence, Addison 0. Whitney and Luther C. Ladd, of Lowell, and Charles A. Taylor were the killed, and thirty-six of their comrades were wounded. Twelve citi- zens were killed, and an unknown number were wounded. Col. Jones continues: ",As the men went into the cars 1 caused the blinds to the cars to be closed, and took every precaution to pre- vent any shadow of offense to the people of Baltimore; but still the stones flew thick and fast Into the train. and It was with the utmost difficulty that I could pre- vent the troops from leaving the cars and revenging the death of their comrades. . . . On reaching Washington we were quartered at the Capitol, in the Senate Chamber." This regiment, the 6th Massachusetts, were the first armed troops to reach Washington in re- sponse to the call of the President. The 27th Pennsylvania Regiment (unarmed) arrived at Baltimore by the same train as the Massachusetts troops. It was attacked by a mob and obliged to remain at the President street station, from which point it was sent back the same day in the direction of Philadelphia. The same night, by order of the Board of Police Com- missioners, with the concurrence of Governor Hicks and Mayor Brown, the railways from the north were obstructed, so that the 8th Massa- chusetts, with General B. F. Butler, and the 7th New York were compelled to go to Annapolis by water and march thence to Washington.-EDToRaS. GOING TO THE FRONT. tion" seemed good, and I thought I might have made a mistake in con- sidering war so serious after all. "Chances for travel!" I must confess now, after four years of soldiering, that the "chances for travel" were no myth; but "promotion" was a little un- certain and slow. I was in no hurry to open the door. Though determined to enlist, I was half inclined to put it off awhile; I had a fluc- tuation of desires; I was faint-hearted and brave; I wanted to enlist, and yet - Here I turned the knob, and was relieved. I had been more prompt, with all my hesitation, than the officer in his duty; he wasn't in. Finally he came, and said: "What do you want, my boy" "I want to enlist," I responded, blushing deeply with upwelling patriotism and bashfulness. Then the surgeon came to strip and examine me. In justice to my- self, it must be stated that I signed the rolls without a tremor. It is common to the most of humanity, I believe, that, when confronted with actual danger, men have less fear than in its contemplation. I will, however, make one exception in favor of the first sliell I heard uttering its blood-curdling hisses, as though a steam locomotive were traveling the air. With this exception I have found the actual dangers of war always less terrible face to face than on the night before the battle. And THe ofCO hR NL DIDI My first uniform was a bad fit: my trousers were too long by thiee or four inches; the flannel shirt was coarse and unpleasant, too large at. the neck and too short elsewhere. The forage cap was an un- gainly bag with pasteboard top and leather visor; the blouse was the only part whieh seemed decent; while the overcoat made me feel like a little nubbin of corn in a large preponderance of husk. Nothing except " Virginia mud"I ever took down my ideas of military pomp quite so low. After enlisting I did not seem of so much consequence as I had expected. There was not so much excitement on account of my military appearance as I deemed justly my due. I was taught my facings, and at the time I thought the drill-master needlessly fussy about shouldering, ordering, and presenting arms. At this time men were often drilled in company and regimental evolutions long before they learned the manual of arms, because of the diffi- culty of obtaining muskets. These we obtained at an early day, but we 152 GOING TO THE FRONT. would willingly have resigned them after carrying them for a few hours. The musket, after an hour's drill, seemed heavier and less ornamental than it had looked to be. The first day I went out to drill, getting tired of doing the same things over and over, I said to the drill-sergeant: " Let's stop this fooling and go over to the grocery." His only reply was addressed to a corporal: " Corporal, take this man out and drill him like h-l "; and the cor- poral did! I found that suggestions were not so well appreciated in the army as in private life, and that no wisdom was equal to a drill-master's " Right face," "Left wheel," and "Right, oblique, march." It takes a raw recruit some time to learn that he is not to think or suggest, but obey. Some never do learn. I acquired it at last, in humility and mud, but it was tough. Yet I doubt if my patriotism, during my first three weeks' drill, was quite knee-high. Drilling looks easy to a spectator, but it isn't. Old soldiers who read this will remember their green recruithood and smile assent. After a time I had cut down my uniform so that I could see out of it, and had con- quered the drill sufficiently to see through it. Then the word came: On to Washington! Our company was quartered at a large hotel near the railway station in the town in which it had been recruited. Bunks had been fitted up within a part of the hotel but little used. We took our meals at the public table, and found fault with the style. Six months later we would have considered ourselves aristo- cratic to have slept in the hotel stables with the meal-bin for a dining-table. One 0 morning there was great excitement at the report that we were going to be sent to the front. Most of us obtained a limited pass and went to see our friends for the last time, returning the same night. Many of our schoolmates came in tears to say good-bye. We took leave of them all with heavy hearts, for, lightly as I may here seem to treat the sub- ject, it was no light thing for a boy of twenty to start out for three years into the unknown dangers of a civil war. Our mothers -GCod bless them !- had. brought us something good to eat,-pies, cakes, doughnuts, and jellies. It was one way in which a mother's heart found utterance. The young ladies AMTE' ATN IT (sisters, of course) brought an invention, usually made of leather or cloth, containing needles, pins, thread, buttons, and scissors, so that nearly every recruit had an embryo tailor's shop, with the goose outside. One old lady, in the innocence of her heart, brought her son an umbrella. We did not see 153 GOING TO THE FRONT. anything particularly laughable about it at the time, but our old drill-sergeant did. Finally we were ready to move; our tears were wiped away, our buttons were polished, and our muskets were as bright as emery paper could make them. "Wad" Rider, a member of our company, had come from a neighboring State to enlist with us. He was about eighteen years of age, red-headed, freckled-faeed, good-natured and rough, with a wonderful aptitude for crying or laughing from sympathy. Another comrade, whom I will call Jack, was honored with a call from his mother, a little woman, hardly reaching up to his shoulder, with a sweet, motherly, care-worn face. At the last moment, though she had tried hard to preserve her composure, as is the habit of New England people, she threw her arms around her boy's neck, and with an outburst of sobbing and crying, said: " My dear boy, my dear boy, what will your poor old mother do without youI You are going to fight for your country. I:. 4 _ Don't forget your mother, Jack; God bless you, God bless you!" We felt as if the mother's tears and blessing were a l benediction over us all. There was a touch of nature in her homely sorrow and solici- l if tude over her big boy, which drew tears of sympathy from my eyes as I thought of my own sorrowing mother at home. The sympathetic Wad Rider burst into tears and sobs. His eyes refused, as he expressed it, to "dry up," until, as we were moving off, Jack's mother, rushing toward S him with a bundle tied like a wheat-sheaf, called out in a most pathetic voice, " Jack! Jack! you've forgotten to take your pennyroyal." We all laughed, and g so did Jack, and I think the laugh helped hin more than the cry did. Everybody had said his last word, and the cars were off. Handkerchiefs were waved at us from all the houses we passed; we cheered till we were hoarse, and then set- tied back and swung our handkerchiefs. Just here let me name over the con- tents of my knapsack, as a fair sample of what all the volunteers started with. There were in it a pair of trousers, two pairs of ':': drawers, a pair of thick boots, four pairs ff of stockings, four flannel shirts, a blouse, a looking-glass, a can of peaches, a bottle A OUTIJA uNtx OF d1.-AiER TIE NE of cough-mixture, a button-stick, chalk, YORK SEVENTH MNEMOIAL OTATUt IS THEg ICETreAL PARK. razor and strop, the " tailor's shop" 154 GOING TO THE FRONT. THlE NEW YOR' K rosv II MARCUGtlt. lWOX BROADWAY, APRIL 19, 161, spoken of above, a Bible, a small volume of Shakspere, and writing utensils. To its top was strapped a-double woolen blanket and a rubber one. Many other things were left behind because of lack of room in or about the knapsack. I On our arrival in Boston we were marched through the streets - the first march of any consequence we had taken with our knapsacks and equipments. Our dress consisted of a belt about the body, which held a cartridge-box and bayonet, a cross-belt, also a haversack and tin drinking-cup, a canteen, and, last but not least, the knapsack strapped to the back. The straps ran over, around, and about one, in confusion most perplexing to our unsophisti- cated shoulders, the knapsack constantly giving the wearer the feeling that he was being pulled over backward. My canteen banged against my bayonet, both tin cup and bayonet badly interfered with the butt of my musket, while my cartridge-box and haversack were constantly flopping up and down-the whole jangling like loose harness and chains on a runaway horse. As we marched into Boston Common, I involuntarily cast my eye about for a bench. But for a former experience in offering advice, I should have proposed to the captain to "c hip in " and hire a team to carry our equipments. Such was my first experience in war harness. Afterward, with hardened muscles, rendered athletic by long marches and invigorated by hardships, I could look back upon those days and smile, while carrying a knapsack as lightly as my heart. That morning my heart was as heavy as my knapsack. At last the welcome I It is said by one of the " Monticello Guards," that most of its members started for Bull Run with a trunk and an abundant supply of fine linen shirts.-EDITORS 155 GOING TO THE FRONT. FELDlAL HILL, BlALTIMORE. FROM A SKETCH MALE ON THE DAY OF THE OCCUPATION BY GEN:ERAL BUTLER. OrL the 27th of April, 1ll, oeneral D. F. Butler wi-i aevupied aud fortitled Fed'e.al Hill, .u-erlookhig the asMigued to the atouuiL of the paturtmlunt of Aule- htirbor sud ecuommandhin the city. (L the 1wth he was plU, M hieh did not inelude BaltiLimore. (On the 5th of followetd in coltiuard of the Departmlent by Geueral May, with two regitoeuts aund aL hattery ot artilhry, be Gteorge Cadwalaler, Hobh was mLeceeded ou the lth of lovted ftrut WXashington to the Belay Itou-e, ou the Juve hoby General N. 11. Banks, who Adilinistered the Baltituore and Ohio Rail Yay, 7 riles fmrot Baltimore, at Deptrto..eut until sueee(ed by GLener;l Johu A. Dix, the Junction of the Waohiugtou brauch. lIe fortified July ld, 15(1. On the 1B12d of May tGenerml Butler this potition, anL oGB the lath entered Baltimuore atold atutoed coutaianud at Fort Momre, Va. orders came: "Prepare to open ranks! Rear, open order, march! Right dress! Front ! Order arms! Fix bayonets! Stack arms! Unsling knapsacks! In plaee, rest!" The tendency of raw soldiers at first is to overload themselves. On the first long march the reaction sets in, and the recruit goes to the opposite extreme, not carrying enough, and thereby becoming dependent upon his comrades. Old soldiers preserve a happy medium. I have seen a new regiment start out with a lot of indescribable material, including sheet-iron stoves, and come back after a long march covered with more mud than baggage, stripped of every- thing except blankets, haversacks, canteens, muskets, and eartridge-boxes. During that afternoon in Boston, after marching and countermarching, or, as one of our farmer-boy recruits expressed it, after "hawing and geeing" about the streets, we were sent to Fort Independence for the night for safe- keeping. A company of regulars held the fort, and the guards walked their post with an uprightness that was astonishing. Our first impression of them was that there was a needless amount of " wheel about and turn about, and walk just so," and of saluting, and presenting arms. We were all marched to GOING TO THE FRONT. our quarters within the fort, where we unslung our knapsacks. After the first day's struggle with a knapsack, the general verdict was, " got too much of it." At supper-time we were marched to the dining-barracks, where our bill of fare was beefsteak, coffee, wheat bread, and potatoes, but not a sign of milk or butter. It struck me as queer when I heard that the army was never provided with butter and milk. The next day we started for Washington, by rail. We marched through New York's crowded streets without awakening the enthusiasm we thought our due; for we had read of the exciting scenes attending the departure of the New York 7th for Washington, on the day the 6th Massachusetts was mobbed in Baltimore, and also of the march of the 12th Massachusetts down Broadway on the 24th of July, when the regiment sang the then new and always thrilling lyric, "John Brown's Body." The following morning we took breakfast in Philadelphia, where we were attended by matrons and maidens, who waited upon us with thoughtful tenderness, as if they had been our own mothers and sweethearts instead of strangers. They feasted us and then filled our haversacks. God bless them! If we did not quite appreciate them then, we did afterward. After embarking on the cars at Philadelphia, the waving of handkerchiefs was less and less noticeable along the route. We arrived in Baltimore late at night; Union troops now controlled the city, and we marched through its deserted streets unmolested. On our arrival at Washington the next morning, we were marched to barracks, dignified by the name of "Soldiers' Retreat," where each man received a half loaf of " soft- tack," as we had already begun to call wheat bread, with a piece of " salt junk," about as big and tough as the heel of my government shoe, and a quart of coffee,-which constituted our breakfast. Our first day in Wash- ington was spent in shaving, washing, polishing our brasses and buttons, and cleaning-up for inspection. A day or two later we moved to quarters not far from the armory, looking out on the broad Potomac, within sight of Long Bridge and the city of Alexandria. Here and there the sound of a gun broke the serenity, but otherwise the quiet seemed inconsistent with the war preparations going on around us. In the distance, across the wide river, we could see the steeples and towers of the city of Alexandria, while up stream, on the right, was the Long Bridge. Here and there was to be seen the moving panorama of armed men, as a regiment crossed the bridge; a flash of sunlight on the polished muskets revealed them to the eye; while the white-topped army baggage-wagons filed over in con- stant procession, looking like sections of whitewashed fence in motion. The overgrown country village of that period, called Washington, can be described in a few words. There were wide streets stretching out from a common center like a spider's web. The Capitol, with its unfinished dome; the Patent Office, the Treasury, and the other public buildings, were in marked and classic con- trast with the dilapidated, tumble-down, shabby look of the average homes, stores, groceries, and groggeries, which increased in shabbiness and dirty dilapi- dation as they approached the suburbs. The climate of Washington was genial, but in the winter months the mud was fearful. I have drilled in it, 157 GOING TO THE FRONT. .I1\.S'YLVI iV AVENUJE. WA-iGTO4T FROM A SKET tII MADE IN 1t1. marched in it, and run from the provost-guard in it, and I think I appreciate it from actual and familiar knowledge. In the lower quarter of the city there was not a piece of sidewalk. Even Pennsylvania Avenue, with its side- walks, was extremely dirty; and the cavalcade of teams, artillery caissons, and baggage-wagons, with their heavy wheels, stirred the mud into a stiff batter for the pedestrian. Officers in tinsel and gold lace were so thick on Pennsylvania Avenue that it was a severe trial for a private to walk there. The salute exacted by officers, of bringing the hand to the visor of the cap, extending the arm to its full length, and then letting it drop by the side, was tiresome when followed up with the industry required by this horde. Perhaps I exaggerate, but in a half-hour's walk on the avenue I think I have saluted two hundred officers. Brigadier-generals were more numerous there than I ever knew them to be at the front. These officers, many of whom won their positions by political wire-pulling at Washington, we privates thought the great bane of the war; they ought to have been sent to the front rank of battle, to serve as privates until they had learned the duties of a soldier. Mingled with these gaudy, useless officers were citizens in search of fat contracts, privates, "non-com's" and officers whose uniforms were well worn and faded, showing that they were from encampments and active service. Occasionally a regiment passed through the streets, on the way to camp; all surged up and down wide Pennsylvania Avenue. The soldiers of this period were eager to collect mementoes of the war. One of my acquaintances in another regiment made sketches of the different camps he had visited around Washington, including " Brightwood " and Camp 158 GOING TO THE FRONT. Cameron; the latter he termed "a nursery for brigadier-generals." Another friend hoarded specimens of official signatures and passes issued in Wash- ington, conspicuous among which was a pass with the well-known John- Hancock-like signature of Drake De Kay. (See page 173.) Before enlisting, and while on a visit to a neighboring town, I was one even- ing at the village store, when the talk turned upon the duration of the war. Jim Tinkham, the clerk of the grocery store, announced his belief in a sixty days' war. I modestly asked him for more time. The older ones agreed with Jim and argued, as was common at that time, that the Government would soon blockade all the rebel ports and starve them out. Tinkham proposed to wager a supper for those present, if the rebels did not surrender before snow came that year. I accepted. Neither of us put up any money, and in the excitement of the weeks which followed I had forgotten the wager. During my first week in Washington, whom should I meet but Jim Tinkham, the apostle of the sixty-day theory. He was brown with sunburn, and clad in a rusty uniform which showed service in the field. He was a veteran, for he had been at the battle of Bull Run. He confidentially declared that after getting the order to retreat at that battle, he should not have stopped short of Boston if he had not been halted by a soldier with a musket, after crossing Long Bridge. TIIE SUVENTg NEW YORE AT CAMP CAMERON, WA,-lltNTON, I "9 VIRGINIA SCENES IN '6i. BY CONSTANCE CARY HARRISON. HE only association I have with my old home in TX XXirginia that is not one of unmixed happiness relates to the time immediately succeeding the exe- cution of John Brown at Harpers Ferry. Our homestead was in Fairfax, at a considerable dis- tance from the theater of that tragic episode; and, belonging as we did to a family among the first in the State to manumit slaves,-our grandfather hav- ing set free those that came to him by inheritance, and the people who served us being hired from their owners and remaining in our employ through years of kindliest relations,- there seemed to be no especial reason for us to share in the apprehension of an uprising of the blacks. But there was the fear -unspoken, or pooh-poohed at by the men who were mouth-pieces for our community-dark, boding, oppressive, and altogether hateful. I can remember taking it to bed with me at night, and awaking suddenly oftentimes to confront it through a vigil of nervous terror, of which it never occurred to.me to speak to any one. The notes of whip-poor-wills in the sweet-gum swamp near the stable, the mut- terings of a distant thunder-storm, even the rustle of the night wind in the oaks that shaded my window, filled me with nameless dread. In the day- time it seemed impossible to associate suspicion with those familiar tawny or sable faces that surrounded us. We had seen them for so many years smil- ing or saddening with the family joys or sorrows; they were so guileless, so patient, so satisfied. What subtle influence was at work that should trans- form them into tigers thirsting for our blood The idea was preposterous. But when evening came again, and with it the hour when the colored people (who in summer and autumn weather kept astir half the night) assembled themselves together for dance or prayer-meeting, the ghost that refused to be laid was again at one's elbow. Rusty bolts were drawn and rusty fire-arms loaded. A watch was set where never before had eye or ear been lent to such a service. In short, peace had flown from the borders of Virginia. Although the newspapers were full of secession talk and the matter was eagerly discussed at our tables, I cannot remember that, as late as Christmas- time of the year 1860, coming events had cast any definite shadow on our homes. The people in our neighborhood, of one opinion with their dear and honored friend, Colonel Robert E. Lee, of Arlington, were slow to accept the startling suggestion of disruption of the Union. At any rate, we enjoyed the usual holiday gathering of kinsfolk in the usual fashion. The old Vaucluse house, known for many years past as a center of cheerful hospitality in the county, threw wide open its doors to receive all the members who could be gathered there of a large family circle. The woods about were despoiled of 160 VIRGINIA SCENES IN '6,. holly and spruce, pine and cedar, to deck the walls and wreathe the picture- frames. On Christmas Eve we had a grand rally of youths and boys belonging to the " clan," as they loved to call it, to roll in a yule log, which was deposited upon a glowing bed of coals in the big " red-parlor" fire-place, and sit about it afterward, welcoming the Christmas in with goblets of egg-nog and apple-toddy. " Where shall we be a year hence 7" some one asked at a pause in the merry chat; and, in the brief silence that followed, arose a sudden spectral thought of war. All felt its presence; no one cared to speak first of its grim possibilities. On Christmas Eve of the following year the old house lay in ruins, a sacri- fice by Union troops to military necessity; the forest giants that kept watch around her walls had been cut down and made to serve as breastworks for a fort erected on the Vaueluse property as part of the defenses of Washington. Of the young men and boys who took part in that holiday festivity, all were in the active service of the South,- one of them, alas! soon to fall under a rain of shot and shell beside his gun at Fredericksburg; the youngest of the number had left his mother's knee to fight at Manassas, and found himself, before the year was out, a midshipman aboard the Confederate steamer Nashville, on her cruise in distant seas! My first vivid impression of war-days was during a ramble in the neigh- boring woods one Sunday afternoon in spring, when the young people in a happy band set out in search of wild flowers. Pink honeysuckles, blue lupine, beds of fairy flax, anemones, and ferns in abundance sprung under VOL.1 . 11 161 6VIRGINIA SCENES IN '6i. the canopy of young leaves on the forest boughs, and the air was full of the song of birds and the music of running waters. We knew every mossy path far and near in those woods; every tree had been watched and cherished by those who went before us, and dearer than any other spot on earth was our tranquil, sweet Vaucluse. Suddenly the shrill whistle of a locomotive struck the ear, an unwonted sound on Sunday. "Do you know what that means" said one of the older cousins who accompanied the party. " It is the special train carrying Alexandria volunteers to Manassas, and to-morrow I shall follow with my company." Silence fell upon our little band. A cloud seemed to come between us and the sun. It was the begininng of the end too soon to come. The story of one broken circle is the story of another at the outset of such a war. Before the week was over, the scattering of our household, which no one then believed to be more than temporary, had begun.' Living as we did upon ground likely to be in the track of armies gathering to confront each other, it was deemed advisable to send the children and young girls into a place more remote from chances of danger. Some weeks later the heads of the household, two widowed sisters whose sons were at Manassas, drove away from their home in their carriage at early morning, having spent the previous night in company with a half-grown lad digging in the cellar hasty graves for the interment of two boxes of old English silver-ware, heirlooms in the family, for which there was no time to provide otherwise. Although the enemy were long encamped immediately above it after the house was burnt the following year, this silver was found there when the war had ended; it was lying loose in the earth, the boxes having rotted away. The point at which our family reunited within the Confederate lines was Bristoe, the station next beyond Manassas, a cheerless railway inn; a part of the premises was used as a country grocery store; and there quarters were secured for us with a view to being near the army. By this time all our kith and kin of fighting age had joined the volunteers. One cannot pic- ture accommodations more forlorn than these eagerly taken for us and for other families attracted to Bristoe by the same powerful magnet. The sum- mer sun poured its burning rays upon whitewashed walls unshaded by a tree. Our bedrooms were almost uninhabitable by day or night, our fare the plain- est. From the windows we beheld only a flat, uncultivated country, crossed by red-clay roads, then ankle-deep in dust. We learned to look for all excite- ment to the glittering lines of railway track, along which continually thun- dered trains bound to and from the front. It was impossible to allow such a train to pass without running out upon the platform to salute it, for in this way we greeted many an old friend or relative buttoned up in the smart gray uniform, speeding with high hope to the scene of coming conflict. Such shouts as went up from sturdy throats while we stood waving hands, handkerchiefs, or the rough woolen garments we were at work upon! Then fairly awoke the spirit that made of Southern women the inspiration of Southern men through- out the war. Most of the young fellows we knew and were cheering onward wore the uniform of privates, and for the right to wear it had left homes of i62 VIRGINIA SCENES IN '6i. ON TIE WAY 1T0 XANAPX8. ease and luxury. To such we gave our best homage; and from that time forth the youth who was lukewarm in the cause or unambitious of military glory fared uncomfortably in the presence of the average Confederate maiden. Thanks to our own carriage, we were able during those rallying days of June to drive frequently to visit "the boys" in camp, timing the expeditions to include battalion drill and dress parade, and taking tea afterward in the different tents. Then were the gala days of war, and our proud hosts has- tened to produce home dainties dispatched from the far-away plantations- tears and blessings interspersed amid the packing, we were sure; though I have seen a pretty girl persist in declining other fare, to make her meal upon raw biscuit and huckleberry pie compounded by the bright-eyed amateur cook of a well-beloved mess. Feminine heroism could no farther go. And so the days wore on until the 17th of July, when a rumor from the front sent an electric shock through our circle. The enemy were moving for- ward! On the morning of the 18th those who had been able to sleep at all awoke early to listen for the first guns of the engagement of Blackburn's Ford. Abandoned as the women at Bristoe were by every male creature old enough to gather news, there was, for us, no way of knowing the progress of events during the long, long day of waiting, of watching, of weeping, of praying, of rushing out upon the railway track to walk as far as we dared in the direction whence came that intolerable booming of artillery. The cloud of dun smoke arising over Manassas became heavier in volume as the day pro- gressed. Still, not a word of tidings, till toward afternoon there came limping i63 VIRGINIA SCENES IN '6i. up a single, very dirty, soldier with his arm in a sling. What a heaven- send he was, if only as an escape-valve for our pent-up sympathies! We seized him, we washed him, we cried over him, we glorified him until the man was fairly bewildered. Our best endeavors could only develop a pin-scratch of a wound on his right hand; but when our hero had laid in a substantial meal of bread and meat, we plied him with trembling questions, each asking news of some staff or regiment or company. It has since oc- curred to me that he was a humorist in disguise. His invariable reply, as he looked from one to the other of his satellites, was: "The - Virginia, inarm I Why, of coase. They warnt no two ways o' thinkin' 'bout that ar reg'Iment. They just kivered tharselves with glory!" A little later two wagon- loads of slightly wounded claimed our care, and with them came authentic news of the day. Most of us re- LIITENING FOR THE FIRST GUN. ceived notes on paper torn from a soldier's pocket-book and grimed with gunpowder, containing assurance of the safety of our own. At nightfall a train carrying more wounded to the hospitals at Culpeper made a halt at Bristoe; and, preceded by men holding lanterns, we went in among the stretchers with milk, food, and water to the sufferers. One of the first discoveries I made, bending over in that fitful light, was a young officer whom I knew to be a special object of solicitude with one of my comrades in the search; but he was badly hurt, and neither he nor she knew the other was near until the train had moved on. The next day, and the next, were full of burning excitement over the impend- ing general engagement, which people then said would decide the fate of the young Confederacy. Fresh troops came by with every train, and we lived only to turn from one scene to another of welcome and farewell. On Saturday even- ing arrived a message from General Beauregard, saying that early on Sunday an engine and car would be put at our disposal, to take us to some point more remote from danger. We looked at one another, and, tacitly agreeing the gal- lant general had sent not an order but a suggestion, declined his kind proposal. Another unspeakably long day, full of the straining anguish of suspense. Dawning bright and fair, it closed under a sky darkened by cannon-smoke. The roar of guns seemed never to cease. First, a long sullen boom; then a sharper rattling fire, painfully distinct; then stragglers from the field, with varying rumors; at last, the news of victory; and, as before, the wounded, to force our numbed faculties into service. One of our group, the mother of i64 VIRGINIA SCENES IN '6i. all only son barely fifteen years of age, heard that her boy, after being in action all the early part of the day, had through sheer fatigue fallen asleep upon the ground, where he was found resting peacefully amidst the roar of the guns. A few days later we rode over the field. The trampled grass had begun to spring again, and wild flowers were blooming around carelessly made graves. From one of these imperfect mounds of clay I saw a hand extended; and when, years afterward, I visited the tomb of Rousseau beneath the Pantheon in Paris, where a sculptured hand bearing a torch protrudes from the sarcophagus, I thought of that mournful spectacle upon the field of Manassas. Fences were everywhere thrown down; the undergrowth of the woods was riddled with shot; here and there we came upon spiked guns, disabled gun-carriages, cannon-balls, blood-stained blankets, and dead horses. We were glad enough to turn away and gallop homeward. With August heats and lack of water, Bristoe was forsaken for quarters near Culpeper, where my mother went into the soldiers' barracks, sharing soldiers' accommodations, to nurse the wounded. In September quite a party of us, upon invitation, visited the different headquarters. We stopped over- night at Manassas, five ladies, sleeping upon a couch made of rolls of car- tridge-flannel, in a tent guarded by a faithful sentry. I remember the comical effect of the five bird-cages (of a kind without which no self-respecting young woman of that day would present herself in public) suspended upon a line running across the upper part of our tent, after we had reluctantly removed them in order to adjust ourselves for repose. Our progress during that mem- orable visit was royal; an ambulance with a picked troop of cavalrymen had been placed at our service, and the convoy was " personally conducted" by a pleasing variety of distinguished officers. It was at this time, after a supper at the headquarters of the " Maryland line" at Fairfax, that the afterward uni- versal war-song, " My Maryland!" was put afloat upon the tide of army favor. We were sitting outside a tent in the warm starlight of an early autumn night,- when music was proposed. At once we struck up Randall's verses to the tune of the old college song, " Lauriger Horatius,"-a young lady of the party, Jennie Cary, of Baltimore, having recently set them to this music before leaving home to share the fortunes of the Confederacy. All joined in the ring- ing chorus; and, when we finished, a burst of applause came from some soldiers listening in the darkness behind a belt of trees. Next day the melody was hummed far and near through the camps, and in due time it had gained the place of favorite song in the army. Other songs sung that evening, which afterward had a great vogue, were one beginning " By blue Patapsco's billowy dash," and " The years glide slowly by, Lorena." Another incident of note, during the autumn of '61, was that to my cousins, Hetty and Jennie Cary, and to me was intrusted the making of the first three battle-flags of the Confederacy. They were jaunty squares of scarlet crossed with dark blue edged with white, the cross bearing stars to indicate the number of the seceded States. We set our best stitches upon them, edged them with golden fringes, and, when they were finished, dispatched one to Johnston, another to Beauregard, and the third to Earl Van Dorn, then VIRGINIA SCENES IN '6t. commanding infantry at Manassas. The banners were received with al possible enthusiasm; were toasted, feted, and cheered abundantly. After two years, when Van Dorn had been killed in Tennessee, mine came back to me, tattered and storm-stained from long and honorable service in the field. But it was only a little while after it had been bestowed that there arrived one day at our lodgings in Culpeper a huge, bashful Mississippi scout,-one of the most daring in the armv,-with the frame of a Hercules and the face of a child. He had been bidden to come there by his general, he said, to ask, if I would not give him an order to fetch some cherished object from my dear old home-something that would prove to me "how much they thought of the maker of that flag!" A week later I was the astonished recipient of a lamented bit of finery left "within the lines," a wrap, brought to us by Dillon himself, with a beaming face. Mounted on a load of fire-wood, he had gone through the Union pickets, and while peddling poultry had presented himself at the house of my uncle, Dr. Fairfax, in Alexandria, whence he carried off his prize in triumph, with a letter in its folds telling us how relatives left behind longed to be sharing the joys and sorrows of those at large in the Confederacy. AO G O FIRSTSZ O FACJIMILIE OF IJTOGRIAPHIC COPY OF TUE FnBHT IITAZA OF " MY MARYLA!4D!" /6 0 9 /ffi am / i66 MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. BY JAMS B. FRY, BREVET MAJORGENERAL. U. S. A. (AT BULL RUN, CAPTAIN AND ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL ON MCDOWELL'S STAFF). AS President Buchanan's administration was drawing to a "'-LX close, he was forced by the action of the South to decide A . 3 3 33 whether the power of the general Government should be used to coerce into submission States that had attempted to secede from the Union. His opinion was that the con- tingency was not provided for, that while a State had no W 0 tinright to secede, the Constitution gave no authority to coerce, and that he had no right to do anything except hold the property and enforce the laws of the United States. Before he went out of office the capital of the nation seemed to be in danger of seizure. For its protection, and in order to consult about holding Southern forts and arsenals, General Scott was in December called to Wash- ingtoD, from which he had been absent since the inaugu- "T tin9 ration of Pierce, who had defeated him for the presidency. Jefferson Davis, Pierce's Secretary of War, and General Scott had quarreled, and the genius of acrimony controlled the correspondence which took place ) The battle of Bull Run was notable in a minor by their several States. The Confederate uniforms way for the variety of uniforms worn on both exhibited similar variety; some regiments were in sides -a variety greater than was shown in any citizens' dress, and several of the general officers later engagement. The Federal blue had not yet who had been in the old service -including, we been issued, and the troops wore either the uni- are informed, Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and forms of their militia organizations (including vari- Longstreet - still wore the dress of the United ous patterns of Zouave dress) or those furnished States Army.-EDITORS. 167 MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. between them. Notwithstanding the fact that on account of his age and infirmities he was soon overwhelmed by the rush of events, General Scott's laurels had not withered at the outbreak of the war, and he brought to the emergency ability, experience, and prestige. A high light in the whole mili- tary world, he towered above the rest of our army at that time profession- ally as lie did physically. As the effect of his unusual stature was increased by contrast with a short aide-de-canip (purposely chosen, it was suspected), so was his exalted character marked by one or two conspicuous but not very harmful foibles. With much learning, great military ability, a strict sense of justice, and a kind heart, lie was vain and somewhat petulant. He loved the Union and hated Jefferson Davis. By authority of President Buchanan, Ad l F Scott assembled a small force of regulars iii the capital, and for the first time in the history of the country the electoral count was made and a President was in- augurated under the protection of sol- diery. But before the inauguration of I Lincoln, March 4th, the secession niove- ment had spread through the "cotton- belt" and delegates from the secession States had met as a congress at Mont- gomery, Alabama, February 4th. On the I e 8th they had organized the " Provisional MARCHI 4.1861, UNTIL JAN. I5, 186Z Government of the Confederate States of l!OM A PHOTOGN'l. America," and on the 9th had elected Jefferson Davis President and Alex- ander H. Stephens Vice-President. When the news of the firing upon Sumter reached Washington, President Lincoln prepared a proclamation, and issued it April 15th, convening Con- gress and calling forth 75,000 three-months militia to suppress combinations against the Government. The Federal situation was alarming. Sumter fell on the 13th of April, and was evacuated on the 14th. Virginia seceded on the 17th, and seized Harper's Ferry on the 18th and the Norfolk Navy Yard on the 20th. On the 19th a mob in Baltimore assaulted the 6th Massachusetts volunteers as it passed through to Washington, and at once bridges were burned and railway communication was cut off between Washington and the North. Lincoln had had no experience as a party leader or executive officer, and was without knowledge of military affairs or acquaintance with military men. Davis at the head of the Confederacy was an experienced and acknowledged Southern leader; he was a graduate of the Military Academy; had commanded a regiment in the Mexican war; had been Secretary of War under Presi- dent Pierce, and had been chairman of the Military Committee in the United States Senate up to the time he left Congress to take part with the South. o08 MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. He was not only well versed in everything relating to war, but was thoroughly informed concerning the character and capacity of prominent and promising officers of the army. There was nothing experimental in his choice of high military commanders. With but few exceptions, those appointed at the beginning retained command until they lost their lives or the war closed. The Southern States, all claiming to be independent republics after seces- sion, with all their governmental machinery, including militia and volunteer organizations, in complete working order, transferred themselves as States from the Union to the Confederacy. The organization of a general govern- ment from such elements, with war as its immediate purpose, was a simple matter. Davis had only to accept and arrange, according to his ample infor- mation and well-matured judgment, the abundant and ambitious material at hand in the way that he thought would best secure his purposes. Lincoln had to adapt the machinery of a conservative old government, some of it unsuitable, some unsound, to sudden demands for which it was not designed. The talents of Simon Cameron, his first Secretary of War, were political, not military. He was a kind, gentle, placid man, gifted with powers to persuade, not to command. Shrewd and skilled in the management of business and personal matters, he had no knowledge of military affairs, and could not give the President much assistance in as- sembling and organizing for war the earnest and impa- tient, but unmilitary people of the North. Officers from all departments of the Federal civil service hurried to the Confederacy and placed themselves at the A disposal of Davis, and officers from all the corps of the regular army, most of them full of vigor, with the same education and experience as those who remained, went South and awaited assignment to the duties for which Davis might regard them as best qualified. All Confed- erate offices were vacant, and the Confederate President X had large if not absolute power in filling them. On the other hand, the civil offices under Lincoln were occupied or controlled by party, and in the small regular army of the Union the law required that vacancies should as a A rule be filled by seniority. There was no retired list for T 1 the disabled, and the army was weighed down by lon- AT IBVtN'F gevity; by venerated traditions; by prerogatives of service A PlltTtNMAT'll, rendered in former wars; by the firmly tied red-tape of military bureauism, and by the deep-seated and well-founded fear of the auditors and comp- trollers of the treasury. Nothing but time and experience-possibly nothing but disaster-could remove from the path of the Union President difficulties from which the Confederate President was, by the situation, quite free. In the beginning of the war, the military advantage was on the side of the Con- federates, notwithstanding the greater resources of the North, which produced their effect only as the contest was prolonged. I 69 7DOWELL'S ADVXNCE TO BULL RUN. czfz _ After the firing of the first gun upon Sumter, the two sides were equally active in marshaling their forces on a line along the border States from the Atlantic coast of Virginia in the east to Kansas in the west. Many of the earlier collisions along this line were due rather to special causes or local feeling than to general military considerations. The prompt advance of the Union forces under McClellan to West Virginia was to protect that new-born free State. Patterson's movement to Hagerstown and thence to Harper's Ferry was to prevent Maryland from joining or aiding the rebellion, to re-open the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and prevent invasion from the Shenandoah Valley. The Southerners having left the Union and set up the Confederacy upon the principle of State rights, in violation of that principle 170 MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE T0 BULL RUN. invaded the State of Kentucky in opposition to her apparent purpose of armed neutrality. That made Kentucky a field of early hostilities and helped to anchor her to the Union. Missouri was rescued from secession through the energy of General F. P. Blair and her other Union men, and by the indomi- table will of Captain Lyon of the regular army, whose great work was accom- plished under many disadvantages. In illustration of the difficulty with which the new condition of affairs penetrated the case-hardened bureauism of long peace, it may be mentioned that the venerable adjutant-general of the army, when a crisis was at hand in Missouri, came from a consultation with the President and Secretary Cameron, and with a sorry expres- sion of countenance and an ominous shake of the head exclaimed, "It's bad, very bad; we're giving that young man Lyon a great deal too much power in Missouri." Early in the contest another young Union officer came to the front. Major Irvin McDowell was appointed briga- dier-general May 14th. He was forty-three years of age, of unexceptionable habits and great physical powers. His education, begun in France, was continued at the United States Military Academy, from which he was graduated in 1838. Always a close student, he was well informed out- side as well as inside his profession. Distinguished in the Mexican war, intensely Union in his sentiments, full of energy and patriotism, outspoken in his opinions, highly esteemed by General Scott, on whose staff he had served, he at once secured the confidence of the President and the X XliTltiDi Secretary of War, under whose observation he was serv- AT lVLT71 Bl:SND ing in Washington. Without political antecedents or 'Rom X P`l`SRA` acquaintances, he was chosen for advancement on account of his record, his ability, and his vigor. Northern forces had hastened to Washington upon the call of President Lincoln, but prior to May 24th they had been held rigidly on the north side of the Potomac. On the night of May 23d-24th, the Confederate pickets being then in sight of the Capitol, three columns were thrown across the river by General J. K. F. Mansfield, then commanding the Department of Washing- ton, and a line from Alexandria below to chain-bridge above Washington was intrenched under guidance of able engineers. On the 27th Brigadier- General Irvin McDowell was placed in command south of the Potomac. z By the 1st of June the Southern Government had been transferred from Montgomery to Richmond, and the capitals of the Union and of the Confed- eracy stood defiantly confronting each other. General Scott was in chief com- mand of the Union forces, with McDowell south of the Potomac, confronted by his old classmate, Beauregard, hot from the capture of Fort Sumter. Z The aspect of affairs was so threatening after and without waiting for the meeting of Congress, President Lincoln's call of April 15th for 75,000 the President entered upon the creation of an three-months militia, and General Scott was so additional volunteer army to be composed of averse to undertaking any active operations with 42,034 three-years men, together with an increase such short-term troops, that, as early as May 3d, of 22,714 regulars and 18,000 seamen.-J. B. F. 171 MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. General Patterson, of Pennsylvania, a veteran of the war of 1812 and the war with Mexico, was in command near Harper's Ferry, opposed by General Joseph E. Johnston. The Confederate President, Davis, then in Richmond, with General R. E. Lee as military adviser, exercised in person general military control of the Southern forces. The enemy to be engaged by McDowell occupied what was called the " Alexandria line," with head- quarters at Manassas, the junction of the Orange and Alexandria with the Manassas Gap railroad. The stream known as Bull Run, some three miles in front of Manassas, was the line of defense. On Beauregard's right, 30 miles away, at the mouth of Aquia Creek, there was a Confederate bri- gade of 3000 men and 6 guns under General Holmes. The approach to Richmond from the Lower Chesapeake, threatened by General B. F. Butler, was guarded by Confederates under Generals Huger and Magruder. _-.. ,. i; X T I.A-flo o N MA' OF THE VICINITY OF WASHINGTON'. JULY, 1hE1. 172 MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. On Beauregard's left, sixty miles distant, in the Lower Shenandoah a: Valley and separated from him by the Blue h Ridge Mountains, was the Confederate army of the Shenandoah under command of General Johnston. Beauregard's authority (lid not extend over the forces of John- ston, Huger, Magruder, tr; or Holmes, but Holmes w was with him before the s 2 battle of Bull Run, and Cs Cn so wvas Johnstoll, who, . as will appear more fully hereafter, joined at a decisive moment. Early in June Patter- son was pushing his 3 column against Harpers Ferry, and on the 3d of that month McDowell was called upon by Gen- eral Scott to submit " an estimate of the number and composition of a column to be pushed toward Manassas Junc- tion and perhaps the Gap, say in 4 or 5 days, to favor Patterson's attack upoii Harper's Ferry." McDowell had then been in command at Arlington less than a week, his raw regiments south of the Potomac were not yet brigaded, and this was the first FAC-1 The bold signature of "Drake De KayI on the passes issued by General Mansfield while com- manding the Department at Washington, gave ce- lebrity to the young aide-de-camp whose duty it was to sign them. At the outbreak of the war E 1. : : . I I i 4' Il ''I , I I MILE OF THE FACE OF A WASHINGTON PASS OF 1i61.4 Drake De Kay, who was the son of Commodore George C. De Kay, closed his shipping and com- mission office in New York, with no more ceremony than to pin to the door the statement, "Gone to Washington. Back at close of war." He took with i 173 MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. intimation he had of offensive operations. He reportedJune4th, that 12,000 infantry, 2 batteries, 6 or 8 companies of cavalry, and a reserve of 5000 ready to move from Alexandria would be required. John- ston, however, gave up Harper's Ferry to Patterson, and the diversion by Mc- Dowell was not ordered. But the public demand for an advance became impera- tive-stimulated perhaps by the success- ful dash of fifty men of the 2d United States Cavalry, under Lieutenant C. H. Tompkins, through the enemy's outposts at Fairfax Court House on the night of June 1st, and by the unfortunate result of the movement of a regiment under Gen- eral Schenck toward Vienna, June 9th, as well as by a disaster to some of Gen- eral Butlers troops on the 10th at Big Bethel, near Fort Monroe. On the 24th of June, in compliance with verbal in- structions from General Scott, McDowell submitted a "plan of operations and the composition of the force required to carry it into effect." He estimated the Confederate force at Manassas Junc- tion and its dependencies at 25,000 men, assumed that his movements could not be kept secret and that the enemy him a detachment of his employees and offered his own and their services to General Scott " free of charge." Of course he was not allowed to bear the expense of his contingent, but his services were accepted, and he received as lieutenant the first appointment to the army from civil life during the war. He accepted a position on General Mansfield's staff and accompanied that officer to Newport News, where, as captain on the staff, he distinguished himself in several daring adven- tures, sometimes undertaken with the object of getting information of the enemy. In the second Bull Run campaign he was aide-de-camp to General Pope. Afterward he joined his regiment, the 14th Regulars, and he was brevetted major and lieutenant-colonel for gallant service at the Wilderness and at Spotsylvania. We are indebted to Mr. Murat Halstead, editor of the Cincinnati "Commercial Gazette," for the "Drake De Kay Pass,' here reproduced in facsimile. Of the uses of a bold signature on the passes, Mr. Halstead writes with a characteristic touch of humor: "A state- ment I have heard, that the famous Drake De Kay passes were written to be read by torchlight at picket posts, reminds me that I have preserved one among t, M X 4a I A FA-SMII! OFra. IL1 a '12 ' C OF 'HE P ASS my papers. It is inclosed. My recollection is that the pass was gotten up in this style that it might not be easily imitated. It was intended to supersede all other passes, and did so. The effect was to check the promis- cuous running through the lines. It was regarded at the time as something oracular and formidable, and as likely to convey a salutary impression of the power andmajesty of the United States of America. It was said that General Winfield Scott was much im- pressed by it.- EDITORS. 174 MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. would call up additional forces from all quarters, and added: " If General J. E. Johnston's force is kept engaged by Major-General Patterson, and Major-General Butler occupies the force now in his vicinity, I think they will not be able to bring up more than 10,000 men, so we may calculate upon having to do with about 35,000 men." And as it turned out, that was about the number he "had to do with." For the advance, McDowell asked " a force of 30,000 of all arms, with a reserve of 10,000." He knew that Beau- regard had batteries in position at several places in front of Bull Run and defensive works behind the Run and at Manassas Junction. The stream being fordable at many places, McDowell proposed in his plan of operations to turn the enemy's position and force him out of it by seizing or threatening his communications. Nevertheless, he said in his report: " Believing the chances are greatly in favor of the enemy's accepting battle between this and the Junction and that the consequences of that battle will be of the greatest importance to the country, as establishing the prestige in this contest, on the one side or the other, -the more so as the two sections will be fairly represented by regiments from almost every State,-I think it of great consequence that, as for the most part our regiments are exceedingly raw and the best of them, with few exceptions, not over steady in line, they be organized into as many small fixed brigades as the number of regular colonels will admit, . . . so that the men may have as fair a chance as the nature of things and the comparative inexperience of most will allow." This remarkably sound report was approved, and McDowell was directed to carry his plan into effect July 8th. But the government machinery worked slowly and there was jealousy in the way, so that the troops to bring his army up to the strength agreed upon did not reach him until the 16th. Beauregard's Army of the Potomac at Manassas consisted of the brigades of Holmes, Bonham, Ewell, D. R. Jones, Longstreet, Cocke and Early, and of 3 regiments of infantry, 1 regiment and 3 battalions of cavalry, and 6 bat- teries of artillery, containing in all 27 guns, making an aggregate available force on the field of Bull Run of about 23,000 men. Johnston's army from the Shenandoah consisted of the brigades of Jackson, Bee, Bartow, and Kirby Smith, 2 regiments of infantry not brigaded, 1 regiment of cavalry (12 companies), and 5 batteries (20 guns), making an aggregate at Bull Run of 8340. 1 McDowell's army consisted of 5 divisions, Tyler's First Division, containing 4 brigades (Keyes's, Schenck's, W. T. Sherman's, and Richardson's); Hunter's Second Division, containing 2 brigades (Andrew Porter's and Burnside's); Heintzelman's Third Division, containing 3 brigades (Franklin's, Willcox's, and Howard's); Runyon's Fourth Division (9 regiments not brigaded); and Miles's Fifth Division, containing 2 brigades (Blenker's and Davies's),-10 batteries of artillery, besides 2 guns attached to infantry regiments, 49 guns in all, and 7 P Beauregard himself has said that on the 18th 30,000 men of all arms." The figures are probably of July he had "along the line of Bull Run about under the mark, as Hampton's Legion, McRea's 17,000 men; that on the 19th General Holmes joined regiment, a North Carolina "regiment and two him with about 3000 men"; and that be " received battalions of Mississippi and Alabama " joined from Richmond between the 18th and 218t about between the 17th and 21st. Beauregard's force 2000 more "; and that Johnston brought about 8000 may fairly be placed at 32,000; and the opposing more, the advance arriving " on the morning of the armies, both in the aggregate and in the parts 20th and the remainder about noon of the 21st," engaged, were nearer equal in that than in any making his whole force, as he states it, "nearly other battle in Virginia.- J. B. F. W 175 MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. -1l . -. VlIEW OF WAfSIUNTON FROMf rTlE SIGNAL CAMP, ozoft;mTOWx IuE:InTs.-1. companies of regular cavalry. Of the foregoing forces, 9 of the batteries and 8 companies of infantry were regulars, and 1 small battalion was marines. The aggregate force was about 35,000 men. Runyon's Fourth Division was 6 or 7 miles in the rear guarding the road to Alexandria, and, though counted in the aggregate, was not embraced in McDowell's order for battle.\ There was an ill-suppressed feeling of sympathy with the Confederacy in the Southern element of Washingfon society; but the halls of Congress resounded with the eloquence of Union speakers. Martial music filled the air, and war was the topic wherever men met. By day and night the tramp of soldiers was heard, and staff-officers and orderlies galloped through the streets between the headquarters of Generals Scott and McDowell. Northern enthusiasm was unbounded. "On to Richmond" was the war-cry. Public sentiment was irresistible, and in response to it the army advanced. It was a glorious spectacle. The various regiments were brilliantly uniformed according to the aesthetic taste of peace, and the silken banners they flung to the breeze were unsoiled and untorn. The bitter realities of war were nearer than we knew. McDowell marched on the afternoon of July 16th, the men carrying three days' rations in their haversacks; provision wagons were to follow from Alexandria the next day. On the morning of the 18th his forces were con- centrated at Centreville, a point about 90 miles west of the Potomac and \ The average length of service of MeDowell's men prior to the battle was about sixty days. The longest in serviee were the three-months men, and of these he bad fourteen regiments.- J. D. F. 176 MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. 't.W FROM Tiff S'IGNAL CAMP. It. FRUO A SKMIF t MArE AT THE TIME. 6 or 7 miles east of Manassas Junction. Beauregard's outposts fell back without resistance. Bull Run, flowing south-easterly, is about half-way between Centreville and Manasoas Junction, and, owing to its abrupt banks, the timber with which it was fringed, and some artificial defenses at the fords, was a formidable obstacle. The stream was fordable, but all the crossings for eight miles, from Union Mills on the south to the Stone Bridge on the north, were defended by Beauregard's forces. [See map, page 180.] The Warrenton Turnpike, passing through Centreville, leads nearly due west, crossing Bull Run at the Stone Bridge. The direct road from Centre- ville to Manassas crosses Bull Run at Mitchell's Ford, half a mile or so above another crossing known as Blackburn's Ford. Union Mills was covered by Ewell's brigade, supported after the 18th by Holmes's brigade; McLean's Ford, next to the north, was covered by D. R. Jones's brigade; Blackburn's Ford was defended by Longstreet's brigade, supported by Early's brigade; Mitchell's Ford was held by Bonham's brigade, with an outpost of two guns and an infantry support east of Bull Run; the stream between Mitchell's Ford and the Stone Bridge was covered by Cocke's brigade; the Stone Bridge on the Confederate left was held by Evans with 1 regiment and Wheat's special battalion of infantry, 1 battery of 4 guns, and 2 companies of cavalry. The state of General Beauregard's mind at the enemy has assaulted my outposts in heavy force. time is indicated by the following telegram on the I have fallen back on the line of Bull Run and will 17th of July from him to Jefferson Davis: " The make a stand at Mitchell's Ford. If his force is over- VOL. 1. 12 177 MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. rTX AXE C'nuen11, ErTaEVUAX. FROM A PHOTRAPHI TAKN P'S MARCH, 1512. McDowell was compelled to wait at Centreville until his provision wagons arrived and he could issue rations. His orders having carried his leading division under Tyler no farther than Centreville, he wrote that officer at 8: 15 A. M. on the 18th, " Observe well the roads to Bull Run and to Warren- ton. Do not bring on an engagement, but keep up the impression that we are moving on Manassas." McDowell then went to the extreme left of his line to examine the country with reference to a sudden movement of the army to turn the enemy's right flank. The reconnaissance showed him that the country was unfavorable to the movement, and he abandoned it. While he was gone to the left, Tyler, presumably to " keep up the impression that we were moving on Manassas," went forward from Centreville with a squadron of cavalry and two companies of infantry for the purpose of making a recon- noissance of Mitchell's and Blackburn's fords along the direct road to Manas- sas. The force of the enemy at these fords has just been given. Reaching the crest of the ridge overlooking the valley of Bull Run and a mile or so from the stream, the enemy was seen on the opposite bank, and Tyler brought up Benjamin's artillery, 2 20-pounder rifled guns, Ayres's field battery of 6 guns, and Richardson's brigade of infantry. The 20-pounders opened from the ridge and a few shots were exchanged with the enemy's batteries. Desiring more information than the long-range cannonade afforded, whelming, I shall retire to Rappahannoek railroad "overwhelming" strength are not in harmony bridge, saving my command for defense there and with the more recent assurance of the Confederate future operations. Please inform Johnston of this commander, that through sources in Washington via Staunton, and also Holmes. Send forward any treasonable to the Union, and in other ways, he refnforeements at the earliest possible instant and " was almost as well informed of the strength by every possible means." The alarm in this dis- of the hostile army in my [his] front as its com- patch and the apprehension it shows of McDowell's mander."-J. B. F. 178 MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. Tyler ordered Richardson's brigade and a section of Ayres's battery, sup- ported by a squadron of cavalry, to move from the ridge across the open bottom of Bull Run and take position near the stream and have skirmishers " scour the thick woods " which skirted it. Two regiments of infantry, 2 pieces of artillery, and a squadron of cavalry moved down the slope into the woods and opened fire, driving Bonham's outpost to the cover of intrenchments across the stream. The brigades of Bonham and Longstreet, the latter being reen- forced for the occasion by Early's brigade, responded at short range to the fire of the Federal reconnoitering force and drove it back in disorder. Tyler reported that having satisfied himself "that the enemy was in force," and ascertained " the position of his bat- teries," he withdrew.) This unauthorized reconnoissance, i E called by the Federals the affair at Blackburn's Ford, was regarded at the time by the Confederates as a serious attack, and was dignified by the name of the " battle of Bull Run," the engagement of the 21st being called by N them the battle of Manassas. The Confederates, feeling that they had repulsed a heavy and real attack, were encouraged by the result. The Federal troops, on the other hand, were greatly depressed. The regiment which suffered most was completely demoralized, and McDowell thought that the depression of the repulse was felt A throughout his army and produced its effect upon the Pennsylvania regiment and the New York battery which insisted (their terms having expired) upon their NrmORM ow r. llTuI N-Ew discharge, and on the 21st, as he expressed it, " marched RtULW. RUN. FROM J, to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon." Even Illtf'ITIA" Z Tyler himself felt the depressing effect of his repulse, if we may judge by his cautious and feeble action on the 21st when dash was required. The operations of the 18th confirmed McDowell in his opinion that with his raw troops the Confederate position should be turned instead of attacked in front. Careful examination had satisfied him that the country did not favor a movement to turn the enemy's right. On the night of the 18th ) The casualties in the affair were: Union, 1 officer and 18 enlisted men killed; 1 officer and 37 enlisted men wounded; 26enlisted men missing,- aggregate, 83. Confederate (Beauregard in his official report of 1861), " 15 killed and 53 wounded men, several of whom have since died."- J. B. F. t, The 11th New York, or " The First Fire Zou- aves," was recruited in April, 1861, from among the firemen of New York City by Colonel E. Elmer Ellsworth, a young man of twenty-four, who, before the war, had organized in Chicago a fine body of Zouaves and exhibited the Zouave drill in several eities of the North. PresidentLincoln,whohadbeen escorted to Washington by Ellsworth, appointed him to a second lieutenaney in the regular army. On the morning of May 24th, when the Union forces crossed into Virginia, Ellsworth's Zouaves occupied the city of Alexandria. The colonel, with the secretary and the chaplain of the regiment, a correspondent of the New York " Tribune," and a sergeant's squad were proceeding toward the center of the town, when they saw a secession flag flying from the Marshall house. With his two com- panions Ellsworth ascended to the roof, leaving Private Francis E. Brownell at the foot of the garret stairs. On descending those stairs with the flag in his hands, Ellsworth was shot through the heart by James T. Jackson, the keeper of the hotel, who emptied the second barrel of his shot-gun at Brownell. The latter, who was not hit, shot Jackson through the head. Colonel Ellsworth had endeared himself to President Lincoln, who was deeply af- fected by his death. For several hours the remains lay in state in the East Room of the White House. His death made a profound impression and greatly stimulated the war feeling in the North.- EDrroas 179 MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. 44 444 1 4 1 W 44 Wf 3I 44f l A 44.4 X17444 Ct 3330 m ta' J4 4u t4t 4,, N" S. Ia, , , , . 44441 'Si. BASE. BASE OUTLYINE XAP Or THE IIArrIXfIEflEI Or BULL RUN. A, A, A, A, A. tGeneral lint of (ontftnerate disposi- made to rel.el Mlwvell`A flank attack by the Pudley tlon. during the skirtniab at Mittehbeil andf Blaekhbrnu' and Newnmarket Road. Ftrd. 4July lath), and until tbhe orning of the main The Uiton disipoitin are reprea .ented a. tlhey engagemnuent (July 210t). were at the etomax of the lighting on the Henry t, It, 1B. tleneral lint of Confe.erate distp ationa, ldate.. the haversacks of his men were empty, and had to be replenished from the provision wagons, which were late in getting up. Nor had he yet determined upon his point or plan of attack. While resting and provisioning his men, he devoted the 19th and 20th to a careful examination by his engineers of the enemy's position and the intervening country. His men, not soldiers, but civilians in uniform, unused to marching, hot, weary, and footsore, dropped down as they had halted and bivouacked on the roads about Centre- ville. Notwithstanding Beauregard's elation over the affair at Blackburn's Ford on the 18th, he permitted the 19th and 20th to pass without a move- ment to follow up the advantage he had gained. During these two days, McDowell carefully examined the Confederate position, and made his plan i80 or St 4'Z4 444wr 4 0'- 44 114 1 4N\,A/ 44 44 448," I "Il"4, 7am444 .4 -1 i ii I I 2 i SCAMW OF 1,t wpound;W17St 3,/ . j W P MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. to manceuvre the enemy out of it. Beauregard ordered no aggressive move- ment until the 21st, and then, as appears from his own statement, through miscarriage of orders and lack of apprehension on the part of subordinates, the effort was a complete fiasco, with the comical result of frightening his own troops, who, late in the afternoon, mistook the return of one of their brigades for an attack by McDowell's left, and the serious result of inter- fering with the pursuit after he had gained the battle of the 21st. But Beauregard, though not aggressive on the 19th and 20th, was not idle within his own lines. The Confederate President had authorized Johnston, Beauregard's senior, to use his discretion in moving to tihe support of Manassas, and Beauregard, urging Johnston to do so, sent railway trans- portation for the Shenan- doah forces. But, as he states, " he at the same time submit- ted the alter- native proposi- tion to Johnston that, having pass- TH XEiL r O ed the Blue Ridge, r ATTK UON TH: lie should assemble his iFH VIRON Run TmrB forces, press forward by V., A AEW I oDs F ADtIE TFIE HFRD. way of Aldie, north-west of Manassas, and fall upon McDowell's right rear," while he, Beauregard, "prepared for the operation at the first sound of the conflict, should strenuously assume the offensive in front." "The situation and circumstances specially favored the signal success of such an operation," says Beauregard. An attack by two armies moving from opposite points upon an enemy, with the time of attack for one depending upon the sound of the other's cannon, is hazardous even with well- disciplined and well-seasoned troops, and is next to fatal with raw levies. Johnston chose the wiser course of moving by rail to Manassas, thus preserv- ing the benefit of " interior lines," which, Beauregard says, was the " sole military advantage at the moment that the Confederates possessed." The campaign which General Scott required McDowell to make was under- taken with the understanding that Johnston should be prevented from join- ing Beauregard. With no lack of confidence in himself, McDowell was dominated by the feeling of subordination and deference to General Scott which at that time pervaded the whole army, and General Scott, who con- trolled both McDowell and Patterson, assured McDowell that Johnston should not join Beauregard without having "Patterson on his heels., Yet John- ston's army, nearly nine thousand strong, joined Beauregard, Bee's brigade and Johnston in person arriving on the morning of the 20th, the remainder 182 MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. tULUTEY SPRINGS FORD, LA)KINON NtTITI. FROitM A KEXTZI MAlDt IN 1. This stream is the Cat Harpin Run, which empties monition wagons. The retreat, also, was largely by into Bull Run a short distance below the Sumiey Springs this lord. The ruins of the 8udley Sulphur Spring Ford. In making the fank movement the Union troops, ..o.e are shown on the left. The Sudley church, under Generals Hunter and Heintnelman, crossed this which was the main hospital alter the tight, Is a short ford, followed later in the day by the ambulances and distance south.- EDITORS. about noon on the 21st. Although the enforced delay at Centreville enabled McDowell to provision his troops and gain information upon which to base an excellent plan of attack, it proved fatal by affording time for a junction of the opposing forces. On the 21st of July General Scott addressed a dispatch to McDowell, saying: " It is known that a strong reenforcement left Winches- ter on the afternoon of the 18th, which you will also have to beat. Four new regiments will leave to-day to be at Fairfax Station to-night. Others shall follow tomorrow - twice the number if necessary." When this dispatch was penied, McDowell was fighting the " strong reenforcement " which left Winchester on the 18th. General Scott's report that Beauregard had been reinforced, the information that four regiments had been sent to McDowell, and the promise that twice the number would be sent if necessary, all came too late - and Patterson came not at all 4 4 On the 17th of July Patterson, with some 16,000 three-months men, whose terms began to expire on the 24th, was at Charlestown, and John- ston, with about the same number, was at Winches- ter. On that day General Scott telegraphed Patterson, "lMcDowell's first day's workhas driven the enemy behind Fairfax Court House. Do not let the enemy amuse and delay you with a small force it front while he retinforces the Junction with his main body." To this Patterson replied at half- past 1 o'clock in the morning of the 18th, stating his difficulties and asking, " Shall I attack " Gen- eral Scott answered on the same day: "I have certainly been expecting you to beat the enemy," or that you " at least had occupied him by threats and demonstrations. You have been at least his equal and I suppose superior in numbers. Has he not stolen a march and sent reinforcements toward Manassas Junction T" Patterson replied on the same day (18th), " The enemy has stolen no march MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. During the 19th and 20th the bivouacs of McDowell's army at Centreville, almost within cannon range of the enemy, were thronged by visitors, official and unofficial, who came in carriages from Washington, bringing their own supplies. They were under no military restraint, and passed to and fro among the troops as they pleased, giving the scene the appearance of a monster military picnic. L Among others, the venerable Secretary of War, Cameron, called upon McDowell. Whether due to a naturally serious expression, to a sense of responsibil- ity, to a premonition of the fate of his brother who fell upon the field on the 21st, or to other cause, his countenance showed apprehension of evil; but men generally were confident and jovial. McDowell's plan of battle promul- gated on the 20th, was to turn the enemy's left, force him from his de- fensive position, and, "if possible, destroy the railroad leading from Manassas to the Valley of Virginia, where the enemy has a large force." He did not know when he issued .tIDLEV WtRtNS t4itiD, I.-lAKstN TW1VItf TlUtE BATTLE- FIELDl. FTROM I 'AR-TIMBE ItOUT'lttAIll. (hO the right are the rdtus ot the StFnthy Sulphor Sptrilg lt-tmte. The hWldtttg -n the hilt I. tSwltey Chureh. It is tulle hVy the Sdh ory and Mtiana- rotad frteen this order that Johnston had joined-- Beauregard, though he suspected it. Miles's Fifth Division, with Richard- son's brigade of Tylers division, and a strong force of artillery was to upon me. I have caused him to be reenforced"; and at 1 o'clock P.m . on that day he added: "I have succeeded, in accordance with the wishesof the Gen- eral-in-Chief, in keeping General Johnston's force at Winchester." At the very hour that Patterson was writing this dispatch Johnston's advance was leaving Winchester. On the 18th Johnston tele- graphed to Richmond that Pattersonwas at Charles- town, and said: " Unless he prevents it, we shall move toward General Beauregard to-day." He moved accordingly, and the Confederate armies were united for battle. It rested, however, with higher authority than Patterson to establish be- tween his army and McDowell's the relations that the occasion called for. In considering the require- inents for McDowell's movement against Manassas, General Scott gave great weight to the general and irresistible fear then prevailing in Washing- ton that the capital might be seized bya dash. Its direct defense was the first purpose of the three- months militia. The Potomac at Washington was itself a strong barrier, and with the field-works on its south bank afforded security in that quarter. The danger was thought to be from the Shenan- doah, and that induced the Government to keep Patterson in the valley. Indeed, on the 30th of June Colonel C. P. Stone's command was ordered from Point of Rocks to Patterson at Martins- burg, where it arrived on the 8th of July; where- as the offensive campaign against Manassas, ordered soon after, required Patterson to go to Stone, as he proposed to do June 21st, instead of Stone to Patterson. The campaign of McDowell was forced upon General Scott by public opinion, but did not relieve the authorities from the fear that Johnston might rush down and seize Wash- ington. General Scott, under the pressure of the offensive in one quarter and the defensive in another, imposed upon Patterson the double task, difficult if not impossible, of preventing Johnston from moving on the capital and from joining Beau- regard. If that task was possible, it could have been accomplished only by persistent fighting, and that General Scott was unwilling to order; though in his dispatch of the 18th in reply to Patterson's question, " Shall I attack 1" he said, " I have cer- tainly been expecting you to beat the enemy." Prior to that, his instructions to Patterson had enjoined caution. As soon as McDowell advanced, Patterson was upon an exterior line and in a false military position. Admitting that be might have done more to detain Johnston, bad strategy was probably more to blame for the result than anyaction or lack of action on Patterson's part.-J. B. F. b The presence of senators, eongressmen, and other civilians upon the field on the 21st gave rise to extravagant and absurd stories, in which alleged forethought and valor among them are contrasted with a lack of these qualities in the troops. The plain truth is that the non-combatants and their vehicles merely increased the confusion and demoralization of the retreat.-J. B. F. i83 MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. remain in reserve at Centreville, prepare defensive works there and threaten Blackburn's Ford. Tyler's First Division, which was on the turnpike in advance, was to move at 2:30 A. 'A., threaten the Stone Bridge and open fire upon it at daybreak. This demonstration was to be vigorous, its first purpose being to divert attention from the movements of the turning column. As soon as Tyler's troops cleared the way, Hunter's Sec- ond Division, follow- ed by Heintzelman's Third Division, was to move to a point on the Warrenton Turnpike about 1 or 2 miles east of Cen- treville and there take a country road tt. l to the right, cross the Run at Sudley Springs, come down upon the flank and poiton H oft e e rear of the enemy at wa the Stone Bridge, and force him to open theway forTyler's di- vision to cross there and attack, fresh and in full force. Tyler's start was so late and his advance was so slow as to hold Hunter and Heintzel- man 2 or 3 hours on the niile or two of TIIK STON BRItIX,'E OVER BU LL 1117N, IO KINC.TOWAtRD CENTREVILLE. the turnpike between FRMA SKETCH MADL lE IN their camps and the point at which they were to turn off for the flank march. This delay, and the fact that the flank march proved difficult and some 12 miles instead of about 6 as was expected1, were of serious moment. The flank- ing column did not cross at Sudley Springs until 9:30 instead of 7, the long march, with its many interruptions, tired out the men, and the delay gave the enemy time to discover the turning movement. Tyler's opera- tions against the Stone Bridge were feeble and ineffective. By 8 o'clock Evans was satisfied that he was in no danger in front, and perceived the movement to turn. his position. He was on the left of the Confederate line, guarding the point where the Warrenton Turnpike, the great highway to the field, crossed Bull Run, the Confederate line of defense. He had no instruc- 184 MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. tions to guide him in the emergency that had arisen. But he did not hesitate. Reporting his information and purpose to the adjoining commander, Cocke, and leaving 4 companies of infantry to deceive and hold Tyler at the bridge, Evans before 9 o'clock turned his back upon the point he was set to guard, marched a mile away, and, seizing the high ground to the north of Young's Branch of Bull Run, formed line of battle at right angles to his former line, his left resting near the Sudley Springs road, by which Burnside with the head of the turning column was approaching, thus covering the Warrenton Turnpike and opposing a determined front to the Federal advance upon the Confederate left and rear.\ In his rear to the south lay the valley of Young's Branch, and rising from that was the higher ridge or plateau on which the Robinson house and the Henry house were situated, and on which the main action took place in the afternoon. Burnside, finding Evans across his path, promptly formed line of battle and attacked about 9:45 A. M. Hunter, the division commander, who was at the head of Burnside's brigade directing the formation of the first skirmish line, was severely wounded and taken to the rear at the opening of the action. Evans not only repulsed but pursued the troops that made the attack upon him. Andrew Porter's brigade of Hunter's division followed Burnside closely and came to his support. In the mean time Bee had formed a Confederate line of battle with his and Bartow's bri- gades of Johnston's army on the Henry house plateau, a stronger position than the one held by Evans, and 3 desired Evans to fall back to that line; but Evans, probably feeling bound to cover the Warrenton Turn- pike and hold it against Tyler as well as against the flanking column, insisted that Bee should move across the valley to his support, which was done. After Bee joined Evans, the preliminary battle con- tinued to rage upon the ground chosen by the latter. The opposing forces were Burnside's and Porter's bri- gades, with one regiment of Heintzelman's division on the Federal side, and Evans's, Bee's, and Bartow's brigades on the Confederate side. The Confederates FATIG;UE UINI(RM ANT) KILTS were dislodged and driven back to the Henry house OF THE 'Ti1 NEW YORK, plateau, where Bee had previously formed line and where what Beauregard called "the mingled remnants of Bee's, Bartow's, and Evans's commands" were re-formed under cover of Stonewall Jackson's brigade of Johnston's army. \k Evans's action was probably one of the best June, 1861, and on dress-parade occasions in pieces of soldiership on either side during the Washington, but when we went into Virginia it campaign, but it seems to have received no special was laid aside, together with the plaid trousers commendation from his superiors.-J. B. F. worn by all the men on ordinary occasions, and we William Todd, of Company B, 79th New donned the ordinary blue. Captain- was the York (Highlanders), writing to correct a statement only one who insisted on wearing the kilts on the to the effect " that the 79th New York wore the march to Bull Run, but the day before we reached Highland dress at the battle of Bull Run," says: Centreville the kilts were the cause of his drawing " If by that is meant the 'kilts,' it is an error. It upon himself much ridicule, and when we started iq true that all the officers and many of the men forthe battle-fieldon that Sundaymorning he, also, did wear that uniform when we left the city in appeared in ordinary blue uniform."-EDITORS. 185 MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. tHE SVtDYt SPRINGS 10 ZOAD, LOKttI3t NORIT11 'tltFOM TUEL -'Slt'L OF TlIM HtEttNRY ttOtt91 tIILL. to thle noiddl,-g-nt on tile WirruIlttol ttuwoidk, drud n-d fity yards front, the right of the pittor. in "talit the tot, Ito--.. 11 etral lautr dittark inl tooth the firt ibttle tbh tOhtinig iNgt. not the lNatthe.to hill. lt tVtWu of Bullt Rum. The tbnXtk itt tit right Pwnugrountd eun il th. M a Ikgtiountl behintd thie Stone tote. anod e1 a tivto itiring theo btnt 1.th1U for to of the otp wr to Imot desperate 1o1 the tinty hill. Young'.. Btainit ottr. of t(tittt1o' b.wt NIekuttot btdttini- that wert -e.-m ap. pagerto em.. theF aSOUtioty e.idlttjnn- o1 tlit) 11eur , bilt It. th-.t of vahiuh in too Wn liton waith the t-,1unil, noI fit-te otto the Stone bono.'. The time of this repulse, as proved by so accurate an authority as Stone- wall Jackson, was before 11:30 A. 3i., and this is substantially confirmed by Beauregard's official report made at the time. Sherman and Keyes had nothing to do with it. They did not begin to cross Bull Run until noon. Thus, after nearly two hours' stubborn fighting with the forces of Johnston, which General Scott had promised should be kept away, McDowell won the first advantage; but Johnston had cost him dearly. During all this time Johnston and Beauregard had been waiting near Mitchell's Ford for the development of the attack they had ordered by their right upon McDowell at Centreville. The gravity of the situation upon their left had not yet dawned upon them. What might the result have been if the Union column had not been detained by Tyler's delay in moving out in the early morning, or if Johnston's army, to which Bee, Bartow, and Jackson belonged, had not arrived! But the heavy firing on the left soon diverted Johnston and Beauregard from all thought of an offensive movement with their right, and decided them, as Beauregard has said, " to hurry up all available reenforcements, includ- ing the reserves that were to have moved upon Centreville, to our left, and fight the battle out in that quarter." Thereupon Beauregard ordered " Ewell, Jones, and Longstreet to make a strong demonstration all along their front on the other side of Bull Run, and ordered the reserves, Holmes's brigade with i8b MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. six guns, and Early's brigade, to move swiftly to the left," and he and John- ston set out at full speed for the point of conflict, which they reached while Bee was attempting to rally his men about Jackson's brigade on the Henry house plateau. McDowell had waited in the morning at the point on the Warrenton Turnpike where his flanking column turned to the right, until the troops, except Howard's brigade, which he halted at that point, had passed. He gazed silently and with evident pride upon the gay regiments as they filed briskly but quietly past in the freshness of the early morning, and then, remarking to his staff, " Gentlemen, that is a big force," he mounted and moved forward to the field by way of Sudley Springs. He reached the scene of actual confliet somewhat earlier than Johnston and Beauregard did, and, seeing the enemy driven across the valley of Young's Branch and behind the Warrenton Turnpike, at once sent a swift aide-de-camp to Tyler with orders to "press the attack" at the Stone Bridge. Tyler acknowledged that he received this order by 11 o'clock. It was Tyler's division upon which McDowell relied for the decisive fighting of the day. He knew that the march of the turning column would be fatiguing, and when by a sturdy fight it had cleared the Warrenton Turnpike for the advance of Tyler's division, it had, in fact, done more than its fair proportion of the work. But Tyler did not attempt to force the passage of the Stone Bridge, which, after about 8 o'clock, was defended by only four companies of infantry, though he admitted that by the plan of battle, when Hunter and Heintzelman had attacked the enemy in the vicinity of the Stone Bridge, " he was to force the passage of Bull Run at that point and attack the enemy in flank."J Soon after McDowell's arrival at the front, Burnside rode up to him and said that his brigade had borne the brunt of the battle, that it was out of ammunition, and that he wanted per- mission to withdraw, refit and fill cartridge-boxes. McDowell in the excite- ment of the occasion gave reluctant consent, and the brigade, which certainly had done nobly, marched to the rear, stacked arms, and took no further part in the fight. Having sent the order to Tyler to press his attack and orders to the rear of the turning column to hurry forward, McDowell, like Beauregard, rushed in person into the conflict, and by the force of cir- cumstances became for the time the commander of the turning column and the force actually engaged, rather than the commander of his whole army. With the exception of sending his adjutant-general to find and hurry Tyler forward, his subsequent orders were mainly or wholly to the troops under his own observation. Unlike Beauregard, he had no Johnston in rear with full authority and knowledge of the situation to throw forward reserves and reenforcements. It was not until 12 o'clock that Sherman received orders from Tyler to cross the stream, which he did at a ford above the Stone Bridge, going to the assistance of Hunter. Sherman reported to McDowell I After the affair at Blackburn's Ford on the ished for my leniency to that man! If there is 18th and Tyler's action in the battle of the 21st, anything clearer to me than anything else with a bitterness between Tyler and McDowell grew up reference to our operations in that campaign, it is which lasted till they died. As late as 1884, that if we had had another commander for our McDowell, writing to me of Tyler's criticism of right we should have had a complete and brilliant him after the war, said, " How I have been pun- success."- J. B. F. 187 MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. on the field and joined in the pursuit - of Bee's forces across the valley of Young's Braneh. Keyes's brigade, ac- companied by Tyler in person, followed across the stream where Sherman ford- ed, but without uniting with the other forces on the field, made a feeble advance upon the slope of the plateau toward the Robinson house, and then about 2 o'clock filed off by flank to its left and, sheltered by the east front l S ! of the bluff that forms the plateau, marched down Young's Branch out of sight of the enemy and took no further part in the engagement. McDowell did not know where it was, nor did he then know that Schenck's brigade of Tyler's division did not cross the Run at all. The line taken up by Stonewall tCAPTAZ C ILARL4F_ GRIFFIN, AFTERWARD Jackson upon which Bee, Bartow, and Evans rallied on the southern part of the plateau was a very strong one. The ground was high and afforded the cover of a (urvilinear wood with the concave side toward the Federal line of attack. According to Beauregard's official report made at the time, he had upon this part of the field, at the beginning, 6500 infantry, 13 pieces of artillery, and 2 companies of cavalry, and this line was continuously reen- forced from Beauregard's own reserves and by the arrival of the troops from the Shenandoah V alley. To carry this formidable position, McDowell had at hand the brigades of Franklin, Willcox, Sherman, and Porter, Palmer's battalion of regular cav- alry, and Ricketts's and Griffin's regular batteries. Porter's brigade had been reduced and shaken by the morning fight. Howard's brigade was in reserve and only came into action late in the afternoon. The men, unused to field ser- vice, and not yet over the hot and dusty march from the Potomac, had been under arms since midnight. The plateau, however, was promptly assaulted, the northern part of it was carried, the batteries of Ricketts and Griffin were planted near the Henry house, and McDowell clambered to the upper story of that structure to get a glance at the whole field. Upon the Henry house plateau, of which the Confederates held the southern and the Federals the northern part, the tide of battle ebbed and flowed as McDowell pushed in Franklin's, Willcox's, Sherman's, Porter's, and at last Howard's brigades, and as Beauregard put into action reserves which Johnston sent from the right and reenforcements which he hurried forward from the Shenandoah Valley as they arrived by cars. On the plateau, Beauregard says, the disadvantage of his "smooth-bore gums was reduced by the shortness of range." The 18X MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. short range was due to the Federal advance, and the several struggles for the plateau were at close quarters and gallant on both sides. The batteries of Ri('ketts andl Griffin, by their fine discipline, wonderful daring, and matchless skill, were the prime features in the fight. The battle was not lost till they were lost. When in their advanced and perilous position, and just after their infantry supports had been driven over the slopes, a fatal mistake oeeurred. A regiment of infantry came out of the woods on Griffin's right, and as he wvas in the act of opening upon it with eanister, he was deterred by the assurance of Major Barry, the chief of artillery, that it " was a regiment sent by Colonel Heintzelman to support the battery.", A moment more and the doubtful regi- ment proved its identity by a deadly volley, and, as Griffin states in his official report, "every cannoneer was cut down and a large number of horses killed, leaving the battery (which was without support excepting in name) perfectly helpless." The effect upon Ricketts was equally fatal. He, desperately wounded, and Ramsay, his lieutenant, killed, lay in the wreck of the battery. Beauregard speaks of his last advance on the plateau as "1leaving in our final possession the Robinson and Henry houses, with most of Ricketts's and Griffin's batteries, the men of which were mostly shot down whrc they bravely stood by their guns." Having become separated from Me- Dowell, I fell in with Barnard, his chief engineer, and while together we ob- served the New York Fire Zouaves, who had been supporting Griffin's battery, fleeing to the rear in their gaudy uni- MWAJOR-61EUL. forms, in utter confusion. Thereupon ; (Griffin himself told me so as we rode together after leaving Centreville. He and I were class- mates and warm friends.- J. B. F. Major Wm. F. Barry gives, in his report, this explanation of the disaster to the batteries: " Retitrning to the poition o-cupled by Rleketts' and Grifmn's batterie, I received an order from General M,,Dow.'lt to adv:mne two batteries to an eminence [the Henry HIll specially designated by him, about eight hundred ynrds in front of the line previously occupied by our artillery, and very near the positiol first occupied by the ene-my's batteries. I therefore ordered these two batteries to muve forward at once, and, as soon as they were In motion, went for and procured as supports the 11th (Fire Z,,uaves) and the 14th (Brooklyn) New York regimenits I ecomnpanlcd the foruier regiment to gnide it to its proper position, and Cohlnel Yleintzeliuan, 17th U. S. InTantry, performed the same service for the 14tb, ,un the right of the 11th. A squalron of IUnited States eavalry under Captain 'ollurn, Ist Cavalry, was subse- quently ordered as additional support. We were soon ulon the ground deignlatei, and the two batteries at one opened a very effeetive tire upon the enemy's left. The new po.sition had scarcely been occupied when a troop of the enemy's cavalry, deboebhing from a piece of wo.Als close upon our right flank, eharged down upon the New York 11th. The Zouaves, catehing sight of the cavalry a few momnents before they were upon them. broke ranks to sech a degree that the cavalry dashed through without dolng then much barn,. The Zonaves gavethenia scatteringfire as theypassesi,whieh etulltied five saddles and killed three horses. A few minutes after- ward a regiment of the etnem!y's infantry, covered by a high fence, presented it,-elf in line on the left and front of the two batteries at not more than sixty or seventy yards' distanec. and delivered a volley full upon the bat- teties and their supiorts. Lieutenant Rltmsay, Itt Artil- lery, was killed, and Captain Riekette, 1st Artillery, was wounded, and a nuniber of men and horses were killed or disabled by this close and well-directed volley. The 11th and 14th regimients islftantly broke and fled in con- fusion to the rear, and In spite of the repeated and ear- nest efforts of Colonel Eeluitzelman with the latter, andt myself with the former. retused to rally and return to the support of the batteries. The enemy, seeing the gnus thus abandoned by their supports, rushed upon them, and driving off the cannoneera, who, with their oflfers, stood bravely at their posts until the last moment, cap- tnred them, ten in nutnber. These were the only guns taken by the enemy on the iteld."-EDvToRs. 189 MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. THE (N)TET FOR THE UElNRT HILL. Colonel William T. Sherman, who commanded the Third Brigade of Tyler's division, describes as follow. some of the efforts to regain the Henry Hill after the capture of Griffin's and Rieketts's batteries: 'Before reaching the crest of this BHenry] hill, the roadway see picture, page 186] wasworn deepenoughto affordshelter, and I kept the several regiments sit asnIONgas possible; hut when the Wiseonain 2d was abreast of the enemy, by orderof MaJor Wadsworth. of General McDowell's staff. 1 ordered it to leave the roadway by the left flank, and to attack the enemy. This regiment ascended to the brow of the hill steadily, received the severe r.e of the enemy, returned It with spirit, and advanced delivering its fre. This regiment is uniformed In gray cloth, almost identical with that of the great bulk of the sees slan army, and when the regiment fell into contusion and retreated toward the road, there was an universal cry that they were being fired on by our own men. The regiment rallied again, passed the brow of the hill a second time, but wan again repulsed in disorder. By this time the New York 79th had closed up, and in like manner it was ordered to crops the brow of the hill and drive the enemy from eover. It was impossible to get a good view of this ground. In it there was one battery of artillery, which poured an incessant fire upon our advancing columns, and the ground was very irregular, with mail clusters of pines, wording shelter, of which the enemy took good advantage. The fire of riles and musketry wan very severe. The 79th, headed by its colonel (Cameron), charged across the bill, and for a short time the contest wan severe. They rallied several times under fire, but finally broke and gained the cover of the hill. This left the field open to the New York 69th, Colonel Coreoran, who in his turn led his regiment over the crest, and had in full open view the ground so severely contested. The firing was very severe, and the roar of cannon, muskets, and rifles incessant. It was manifest the enemy wan here in great force, far supe- rior to un at that point. The 69th held the ground for some time, but finally fell back in disorder. Here, about 3:30 P. ms, began the scene of confusion and disorder that characterized the remainder of the day." I rode back to where I knew Burnside's brigade was at rest, and stated to Burnside the condition of affairs, with the suggestion that he form and move his brigade to the front. Returning, I again met Barnard, and as the battle seemed to hin and me to be going against us, and not knowing where McDowell was, with the concurrence of Barnard, as stated in his official report, I immediately sent a note to Miles, telling him to move two brigades of his reserve up to the Stone Bridge and telegraph to Washington to send forward all the troops that could be spared. After the arrival of Howard's brigade, McDowell for the last time pressed up the slope to the plateau, forced back the Confederate line, and regained possession of the Henry and Robinson houses and of the lost batteries. But there were no longer cannoneers to man or horses to move these guns that had done so much. By the arrival upon this part of the field of his own reserves and Kirby Smith's brigade of Johnston's army about half-past 3, 190 MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. Beauregard extended his left to outflank McDowell's shattered, shortened, and disconnected line, and the Federals left the field about half-past 4. Until then they had fought wonderfully well for raw troops. There were no fresh forces on the field to support or encourage them, and the men seemed to be seized simultaneously by the conviction that it was no use to do anything more and they might as well start home. Cohesion was lost, the organizations with some ex- ceptions being disintegrated, and the men quietly walked off. There was no special excitement except that arising from the frantic efforts of officers to stop men who paid little or no attention to anything that was said. On the high ground by the Matthews house, about where Evans had taken position in the morning to check Burnside, Mc- Dowell and his staff, aided by other officers, made a desperate but futile effort to arrest the masses and form them into line. There, I went to Arnold's battery as it came by, and advised that he unlimber and make a stand as a rallying-point, which he did, saying he was in fair con- dition and ready to fight as long as there was any fighting TI) I 0 1A to lot1'kLV"'GU -to be done. But all efforts failed. The stragglers moved (t(),.XlXiST past the guns, in spite of all that could be done, and, as stated in his report, Arnold at my direction joined Sykes's battalion of infan- try of Porter's brigade and Palmer's battalion of cavalry, all of the regular army, to cover the rear, as the men trooped back in great disorder across Bull Run. There were some hours of daylight for the Confederates to gather the fruits of victory, but a few rounds of shell and canister checked all the pursuit that was attempted, and the occasion called for no sacrifices or valorous deeds by the stanch regulars of the rear-guard. There was no panic, in the ordinary meaning of the word, until the retiring soldiers, gunsI wagons, congressmen, and carriages were fired upon, on the road east of Bull Run. Then the panic began, and the bridge over Cub Run being rendered impassable for vehicles by a wagon that was upset upon it, utter con- fusion set in: pleasure-carriages, gun-carriages, and am- munition wagons which could not be put across the Run were abandoned and blocked the way, and stragglers broke and threw aside their muskets and cut horses from their harness and rode off upon them. In leaving the field the men took the same routes, in a general way, by which they had reached it. Hence when the men ux1FxlM cwa BLNK.R ru of Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions got back to Cen- YOR VOLNlE. treville, they had walked about 25 miles. That night they walked back to the Potomac, an additional distance of 20 miles; so that these undisciplined and unseasoned men within 36 hours walked fully 45 miles, besides fighting 9MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. from about 10 A. M. until 4 P. I. on a hot and dusty day in July. McDowell in person reached Centreville before sunset, 4 and found there Miles's division with Richardson's brigade and 3 regiments of Runyon's division, and Hunt's, Tidball's, Ayres's, and Greene's batteries and 1 or 2 fragments of batteries, making about 20 guns. It was a formidable force, but there was a lack of food and the mass of the army was completely demoralized. Beauregard had about an equal force which had not been in the fight, consisting of Ewell's, Joness, and Longstreet's bri- gades and some troops of other brigades. McDowell consulted the division and brigade commanders who were at hand upon the question of making a stand or retreating. The verdict was in favor of the latter, but a decision of officers one t way or the other was of no moment; the men had already decided for them- selves and were streaming away to the rear, in spite of all that could be done. They had no interest or treasure in Centreville, and their hearts were not there. Their tents, provisions, baggage, BRGA,,, INEA,,,,,HLSKR. and letters from home were upon the FUOM A POTOmPH banks of the Potomac, and no power could have stopped them short of the camps they had left less than a week before. As before stated, most of them were sovereigns in uniform, not soldiers. McDowell accepted the situation, detailed Richardson's and Blenker's brigades to cover the retreat, and the army, a disorganized mass, with some creditable exceptions, drifted 4I left the field with General Franklin. His brigade had dissolved. We moved first northerly, crossed Bull Run below the Sudley Spring Ford, and then bore south and east. Learning by inquir- ies of the men I passed that McDowell was ahead of me, I leftFranklin and hurried on to Centreville, where I found McDowell, just after sunset, re- arranging the positions of his reserves.-J. B. F. I Colonel Louis Blenker, commanding the First Brigade of Miles's division, covered the retreat of the army from Centreville, which he deseribes as follows: "In this position the brigade remained until about 4 o'clock P. x., when I received orders to advance upon the road from Centreville to War- renton. This order was executed with great diffi- culty, as the road was nearly choked up by the retreating baggage-wagons of several divisions, and by the vast numbers of flying soldiers belong- ing to various regiments. . . . The 8th [New York Volunteer) Regiment took position one and a half miles south of Centreville, on both sides of the road leading to Bull Run. The 29th [New York] Regiment stood half a mile behind the 8th, en d6ckiqier by companies. The Garibaldi Guard stood as reserve in line behind the 29th Regiment. The retreat of great numbers of flying soldiers continued till 9 o'clock in the evening, the great majority in wild confusion, but few in collected bodies. Soon afterward several squadrons of the enemy's cavalry advanced along the road and appeared before the outposts. They were chal- lenged by ' Who comes there I' and remaining without any answer, I, being just present at the outposts, called, 'Union forever.' Whereupon the officer of the enemy's cavalry commanded, ' En arant; es arvat. Knock him down!' Now the skirmishers fired, when the enemy turned around, leaving several killed and wounded on the spot. About nine prisoners, who were already in their hands, were liberated by this action. Afterward we were several times molested from various sides by the enemy's cavalry. At about midnight the command to leave the position and march to Washington was given by General McDowell. The brigade retired in perfect order, and ready to repel any attack on the road from Centre- ville to Fairfax Court House, Annandale to Wash- ington."- EDITORS. 192 MCDOWELL'S ADVANCE TO BULL RUN. as the men pleased away from the scene of action. There was no pur- suit, and the march from Centreville was as barren of opportunities for the rear-guard as the withdrawal from the field of battle had been.\ When McDowell reached Fairfax Court Rouse in the night, he was in communica- tion with Washington and exchanged telegrams with General Scott, in one of which the old hero said, "We are not discouraged"; but that dispatch did not lighten the gloom in which it was received. McDowell was so tired that while sitting on the ground writing a dispatch he fell asleep, pencil in hand, in the middle of a sentence. His adjutant-general aroused him; the dispatch was finished, and the weary ride to the Potomac resumed. When the unfortu- nate commander dismounted at Arlington next forenoon in a soaking rain, after 32 hours in the saddle, his disastrous campaign of 6 days was closed. The first martial effervescence of the country was over. The three- months men went home, and the three-months chapter of the war ended - with the South triumphant and confident; the North disappointed but determined. \ The revised losses are as follows: Federal, 16 officers and 444 enlisted men killed; 78 offi- cers and 1046 enlisted men wounded; 50 officers and 1262 enlisted men missing; 25 pieces of artil- The scene in Washington after the battle has been graphically described by Walt Whitman, from whose "Specimen Days andCollect " (Philadelphia: Rees, Welch Co.) we make these extracts: "The defeated troops commenced pouring into Wash- Wigton over the Long Bridge at daylight on Monday, 2id -day drizzling all through with rain. The Saturday and Sunday of the battle (20th, 21st) had been parched and hot to an extreme - the dust, the grime and smoke, in layers, sweated In, foliow'd by other layers again sweated in, absorb'd by those excited souls - their clothes all saturated with the clay-powder illing the air-stirr'd up everywhere on the dry roads and trod- den fields by the regiments, swarming wagons, artillery, etc.- all the men with this coating of murk and sweat and rain, now recoiling back, pouring over the Long Bridge-a horrible march of twenty mites, returning to Washington baffled, humiliated, panic-struck. Where are the vaunts and the proud boasts with which you went forth I Where are your banners, and your bands of music, and your ropes to bring back your prisoners I Well there isnet a band playing - and there Isont a flag but clings ashamed and lank to its staff. The son rises, but shines not. The men appear, at first sparsely and shame-faced enough, then thicker, in the streets of Washington-appear in Pennsylvania Avenue, and on the steps and basemententranees. They come along in disorderly mobs, some in squads, strag- giers, companies. OccasIonally, a rare regiment, in per- feet order, with its Mcers (isome gaps, dead, the true braves), marching in silence, with lowering faces, stern, weary to sinking, all black and dirty, but every man with his musket, and stepping alive; but these are the -eeptlons. Sidewalks of Pennsylvania Avenue, Four- teenth street, etc., crowded, jamm'd with eitisens, dar- kies, clerks, everybody, lookers-on; women in the win- dows, curious expressions from faces, as those swarms f dirt-cover'd returind soldiers there (Will they never e-nd) move by; but nothing said, no comments; bhalt -or lookers-on 'seceshI of the most venomous kind - lery and a large quantity of small arms. Confeder- ate, 25 officers and 362 enlisted men killed; 63 officers and 1519 enlisted men wounded; 1 officer and 12 enlisted men missing.-J. B. F. they say nothing; but the devil snickers in their facca\. During the forenoon, Washington gets all over motley with these defeated soldiers -queer-looking objects, strange eyes and faces, drench'd (the steady rain drizzles on allday) and fearfully worn, hungry, haggard. bhlster'd in the feet. Good people (but not over-many of them either) hurry up something for their grub. They put wash-kettles on the ire, for soup, for coffe. They set tables on the sidewalks-wagon-loads of bread are par- ehas'd, swiftly eat in stout chunks. Here are two aged ladies beautifuL the first in the city for culture and charm, they stand with store of eating and drink at an improvla'd table of rough plank, and give food, and have the store replenish'd from their house every half-hour all that day; and there in the rain they stand, active. silent, white-hair'd, and give food, though the tears stream down their cheeks, almost without intermission, the whole time. Amid the deep excttement, erowds and motion, and desperate eagerness, it seems strangeto see many, very many, of the soldiers sleeping-In the midst of all, sleeping sound. They drop down anywhere, on the steps of houses, up close by the basements or fences, on the sidewalk, aside on some vacant lot, and deeply sleep. A poor seventeen or eighteen year old boy lies there, on the stoop of a grand home; he sleeps so calmly, so profoundly. Some clutch their muskets firmly even in sleep. Some in squads; comrades, brothers. close to- gether-and on them, as they lay, sulkily drips the rain. " But the hour, the day, the night pass'd, and what- ever returns, an hoar, a day, a night like that can never again return. The President, recovering himself, begins that very night -sternly, rapidly met. about the task of reorganizing his forces, and placing himself in positions for future and surer work. If there were nothing ele of Abraham Lincoln for history to stamp him with, it is enough to send him with his wath to the memory of all future time, that he endured that hour, that day, bitterer than gall-indeed a crucifixion day-that it did not conquer him-that he unflinchingly telnmd it, and resolv'd to lift himself and the Union out of it." 'VOL. 1. 13 193 THE OPPOSING ARMIES AT THE FIRST BULL RUN. ITbe ompmdtb n sail lasses of eaeh army s here stated give the gist ot all the lta obtainable in the 01ecil lterds. K stands for killed; w for wounded; m f,,r captured ur .ts1hg; c f',r eaplured.-Eosvoss.] COMPOSITION AND LOSSES OF THE UNION ARMY. Brig.-Gen. Irvin McDowell. Staff loss: w, 1. (Capt. 0. H. Tillinghast, mortally wounded.) FIR" Divistox, Brig.-Gen. Daniel Tyler. Staf loss: W, 2. First Brigade,. Col. Erasmus D. Keyes: 2d Me.. C.I. C. D. Jameson; 1st Conn.. Col. (. S. Burnhan; 2d Conn., Col. A. H. Terry; ad ConD., CoL John L. Chat- field. Brigadeloss: k,19; w, 90; m, 154 =23. Scond Brigade. Brix.-Gen. Robert C. Schenek: 2d N.Y. (militia), Col. 0. W. B. Tompkins; 1st Ohio, Col. A. MeD. MeCook; 2d Ohio. Llet.-Col. Rodney Mason: E. Sd U. S. Arty., Capt. J. H. Carlisle. Brigade loss: k, 21; W, 25; m, 52 = 98. TArd Brigade, Col. W. T. Sherman: I3th N. Y., CoL I. F. Quinby; f9th N. Y., CoL M. Coaroran jw and cI. Capt. James Kelly; 79th N. Y., GOl. James Cameron (/); 2d WsI., Lleut.-Col. H. W. Peck; E, 3d U. S. Arty., Capt. R. B. Ayrea Brigade los: k, 107; w, W5; m,293=605. Fourth Brigade, Col. Isel B. Richardson: lt Mass., CoL Robert Cowdin; 13th N. Y., Col. Ezra L. Waltath; 2d Mich.. Major A. W. Witlians o 3d Mich., Col Daniel McConnell; 0, lt U. S. Arty., Lieut. John Edwards: M, 2d U. S. Arty., Capt. Henry J. Hunt. This brigade was only slightly engaged In front of Blackburn's Ford, with the los of one o.1er killed. SacomD Divisiox, CoL D. Hunter (w), Col. Andrew Porter. 8taff loss: w, 1; in, 1= -Irst Brigade, CoL Andrew Porter: ath N. Y. (militias, CoL Gea. Lyons; 14th N. Y. (mlittia), Colt A. M. Wood 4w and e), Li.ut.-Col. E. B. Fowler; 27th N. Y., Col. H. W. Slocum (w), Major J. J. Bartlett; Battalion U. S. Infantry, Major George Sykes; Battalion U. S. Mrines, Major J. G. Reynolds; Battalion U. S. Cavalry, Major 1. N. Palmer; D, 5th U S. Arty., Capt. Charles Grimfn. Brigade loss: k, 86; w, 177; mn, 201 = 4U4. Ibeond Brigade, Col. Ambrose E. Burnside: 3d N. H., Col. Oilman Maraton 1w), Lieut.-Col. F. S. Fiske; lst R. I., Major J. P. Balch; 2d R. I. (with battery), Col. John S. Slocum (k), Lieut.-CoL. irank Wheaton; 71st N. Y. (with two howitzers), Col. H. P. Martin. Brigade loss: k. 8; w, m1; m, 134 =383 Tula DIvistoI. CoL Samuel P. HeIntzelman. Firal Brigade, CoL W. B. Franklin: bth Mass., Col. S. c. Law- rence; 11th Mass., CGl. George Clark, Jr.; lt Min.., C.o. W. A. German; 1, st U. S. Arty., Capt. J. B. Rick- etts (w and c\, Lieut. Edmund Kirby. Brigade bss k, 70; W, 197; m, 92 = 359. Seceed Brigade, Col. Orlando B. Willeox (w and ci, Col. J. U. H. Ward: 11th N. Y., Lleut.-Col. N. L Farnham; 38th N. Y.. Col. J. U. H. Ward, LIeut.-Col. A. Farnsworth; 1st MIch., Major A. F. Bidwell; 4th Michigan, Col. D. A. Woodbury; D, 3d U. S. Arty., Capt. RIcbard Arnold. Brigade loss; k. 60; w, 177; m, 190=432. Third Brigade, Col. Oliver 0. How- ard: 3d Me.. Major H. (G. Staples; 4th Mc.. Col. B. (. Berry; 5th Me., Col. M. H. Dunnell; 2d Vt., Col. Henry Whiting. Brigade las: k, 27; w, 100; m, 98=225. Fouirri (RtszRvzl Dlvsoion. [Not on the ield of bat- tle.] Brig.-Gen. Theodore Runyon. MiiUUoa let N. J., Col. A. J. Johnson; Rd N. J., Col. H. M. Baker; 3d N. J., Col. Wm Napton: 4th N. J., Col. Matthew Miller. Jr. Volunteers: lt N. J., Col. W. R. Montgomery; 3d N. J., Col. tGea. W. MYLean; 3d N. J., Col George W. Taylor; 41st N. Y., Col. Leopold von Gl0a. FUrH Division. [in reserve at CentrevUle and not engaged in the battle proper. It had some skirmishing during the day and while covering the retreat of the army.] eol. Dixon S. Miles. First Brigade, Col. Louis Blenker: 8th N. Y. (Vo.s.) Lieut.-Col. Julius Stahe-; 29th N. Y., Col. Adolph von Steinwehr; 39th N. Y. (Garibaldi Guard), Cal. F. G. D'Utaaay; 27th Penna.. Col. Max Einstein; A. 2d U. S. Arty., Capt. John C. Tidball; Book- wood's N. Y. battery, Captain Charles Bookwood. Bri- gade loas k,6; w,16; m1,96=118 SeeoudBrigade,Col. Thomas A. Davies: 16th N.Y., Lieut.-Col. Samuel Marsh; 15th N.Y.. CGl. W. A. Jackson; Slat N .Y., Col C. E. Pratt: 32d N. Y., Col. R. Matheson; G, 2d U. S. Arty.. Lient. O. D. Greene. Brigade loss: w, 2; n, I = 3. Totsl loss of the Union army: killed, 40; wounded,1124; captnredor missing,1312,-grand total, 285. STRENGTH OF THE UNION ARMY. General James B. Fry. who was General MeDowell's adjutant-general, prepared In October, 1884, a statement of the strength of the army, in brief as follows: "It was not praticable at the time to ascertain the strength of the army with accuracy; and it is impossible now to make a return which can be pronounced abo- lutely corrt. ", The abstract whihb appears on page 309, voL it., ' o0- cial lIecords. is not a return of McDowell's army at the battle of Bull RUn, and was not prepared by me, but, as I understand, has been compled since the war. It pur- ports to give the strength of the ' Department of North- eastern Virginia,' July 16th and 17th, not of McDeowell's army, July 21st. It does not show the losses resulting from the diseharge of the 4th Pennsylvania Infantry and Varian's New York battery, wrich marched to the rear on the morning of the 21st, nor the heavy losses Inci- dent to the march of the army from the Potomac; it emubraces two regiments-the 21st and 25th New York In- fantry -w hieh were not with the army In the field; and it eontaine the strength of Company E, Seeond United States Cavalry, as a special item. wherea that company is embraced in the strength of the Second (HUnter's) Division, to which it, with the rest of the cavalry, belonged. "In his report of the battle (p. 324, vol. II. IO8icial Records' ) General McDowell says he crossed Bull Run 'with about eighteen thousand men.' I ollected infor- nmatlou to that efect for him at the tune. His statement Is substantially correct. The following in an exhibit 1i detail of the forces actually engaged: ComMANMs. Ojflcera.Entiktd _______ ___ I __ _men. General st at...... ... ....... 19 First Division, two brigades 284 8,068 Second Division, two brigades 252 5,717 Third Division, three brigades 341 ,6 891 Total -seven brigades .....6.. o 17,676 "Only Keyes's and Sherman's brigades of the four brigades of the First Division crossed Bull Ran. " The Fifth Diviioan, wth Rlchardon'sbrigade of the First Division attached, was In reserve at and in front of Centrev il le. Some of it was lightly engaged on our side of Bull Run In repelling a feeble advance of th- enemy. The Fourth (Reserve) Divislon was left In guard our communIcations with the Potomac, Its ad- vanee being seven miles in rear of Centreville. 194 THE OPPOSING ARMIES AT THE FIRST BULL RUN. -That Is to say, McDowell crossed Bul Run with S66 oflcers, 17,676 rank and file, and 24 piece of artillery. ,' The artillerymen who crossed Bull Run are embraced in the figures of the foregoing table. The guns were as follows: Ricketts's Battery, 6 10-pounder rifle gun.; (dffin's Battery. 4 10-pounder rifle guns, 2 12-pounder howitzers; Arnold's Battery, 2 13-pounder rifle guns, 2 6-pounder smooth-b--re-; R. I. Battery, 6 13-pounder rifles; Tist N. Y. Regi'st Battery, 2 Dahlgren howitzers. "'The artillery, in addition to that which crossed BaUl Run, was as follows: Hunt's Battery, 4 12-pounder rifle guna; Carliale's Battery, 2 13-pounder rifle guns, 2 6-pounder smooth-bore guns; Tidball's Battery, 2 6-pounder amooth-bore guns., 2 12-pounder howitzers; Greene.' Battery, 4 10-pounder rife guns; Ayres'a Bat- tery, 2 10-pounder rifle guns, 2 6-pounder smooth-bore guns, 2 12-pounder howitzers; Edwards's Battery, 26' pounder rifle guns, 1 30-pounder rifle gun." COMPOSITION AND LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY. General Joseph E. Johnston. ARMY OF TIME POTOMAC, Brig.-en.. G. T. Beauregard. Pirml BrI=ade, Brig.-Gen. M. Lk Bonham: l1th N. C., Col. W. W. Kirkland; 2d S. C., Col. J. B. Kershaw; 3d S. C., Col. 1. H. Williams; 7th S. C., Col. Thomas 0. Bacon; 8th S. C., Col. E. B. C. Cash. Loss: k, 10: w, 66=764 leend Brigad6 [not actively engaged], Brig.-Gen. R. S. Ewell: ath Ala., CoL R. E. Rodes; 6th Ala., Col. J. J. Seibels; 6th La., Col. J. G. Seymour. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. D. R. Jones: 17th Miss., Col. W. S. Feather- ston; 18th MtIs., Col. E. t. Burt; 5th S. C., Col. M. Jen- kins. Loss: k, 13; w, 62 - 75. Pourth Bride [not act- ively engaged], Brig.-Gen. James Longatreet: 5th N. C., Lieut.-Col. Jones; 1st Vs., MaJor F. G. Skinner; 1lth Va., Col. S. (Garland. Jr.; 17th Va., Colt M. D. Corse. Loss: k. 2; w, 12 = 14. Fifth Brigade, Col. P. St. Geo. Cocke: 8th Va., Col. Eppa lunton; 18th Va., Col. R. E. Withers; 19th Va., Lleut.-Col. J. B. Strange; 28th Va., Col. B. T. Preston; 49th Va. (S cos.1, Col. Wi. Smith. Loss: k, 23; W, 79; m, 2 = 104. Sixth Brigade. CoL Jabal A. Early: 7th La., Col. Htarry T. Hlays; 13th Miss.. CoL Wm. Barkadale; 7th Va., Col. J. LS Ke-per; 2ith Va., Lieut.-Col. P. Hairston, Jr. Loss: I, 12; w, 67 = 79. Ras',ce omand (temporarily organized), CoL N. G. Evans: 1st La. Battalion, Major C. R.Whsst (W); 4th S. C., Col. J. B.E. Sloan; Cavalry, Capt. W. R. Terry; Artillery, Lieut. G-. S. Davidson. Loss: k, 20; w, 118; m, 8 = 146. Rerse Brigade [not actively en- gaged], Brig.-Gen. T. H. Holmes: 1st Arkansas and 3d Tennessee. Unatached Iafaatrs. 8th La.: Col. H. B. Kelly; Bampton's (S. C.) Legion, CoL Wade Hampton. Loss: k, 19; w, 100; m, 2 = 121. Cseeiry.: 30th Virginia, Col. R. C. W. Radford; Harrison's Battalion; Ten inde- pendent companies. Loss: k, 6; w, 8 = 12. ArtUM"r Battalion Washington Artillery (La.), Major J. B. Wal- ton; Alexandria (Va.) Battery, Capt. Del Kemper; La- tham'a (Va.) Battery, Capt. H. (. Latham; Loudoun (Va.) Artillery, Capt. Arthur L Roger.; Shields's iV.) Battery. Capt. J. C. Shields. Lo: k. 2; w, 8=10. Total loss Army of the Potomac: k,106; w, 19; m, 12 = 66. ARMY OF THE SHENANDOAH, General Joseph E. Johnston. irst Brigade, Brig.-Gen. T. J. Jackson: 3d Va., Col. J. W. Allen; 4th Va., Col. J. F. Preston; 6th Va., Col. Kenton Harper; 27th Va., Licat.-CoL John Echols; 33d Vs., CoL A. C. Cummings. Loss: II, 119; w, 442=W61. 8ccond Brigad,Col. F.S. Bartow(kp: 7thGa., CoL Lucius J. Gartrell; 8th Ga., Lieut.-Col. W. M. Gard- ner. Loss: II, 60; w, 293 = 323. Third Brigade, Brig.- Gen. B. E. Bee hk): 4th Ala, CoL Jones (k), CoL S. R. Gist; 3d MlIs., Col. W. C. Falkner; 11th Miss. (2 eos, Lleut.-Col. P. F. Liddell; 6th N. C., Col. C. F. Fisher 1k. Loss: k, 96; w, 309; m, 1 = 406. F.rlh Brigade, Brig.- Gen. E. K. Smith (w), Col. Arnold Elzey: 1st Md. Bat- talion, Lieut.-CoL George H. Steuart; 3d Tennessee, Col John C. Vaughn; 10th Va., Col. S. B. Gibbons; 13th Va., Col. A. P. Hill. LO: I, 8; w, 19 = 27. ArHilleryi: Imboden's, Stanard's, Pendleton'", Alburtis's, and Beck- ham's batteries. Cavalry: lt Va. CoL J. E. B. Stuart. (Los not speciically reported.) Total lis Army of the Shenandoah: k, 232; w, 1063; m, = 1346. Total loss Of the Contederate Army: kiiled, 387; wounded, 1582; captured or missing, 13,_grand total, 1962. STRENGTH OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY. In October, 1884, General Thomas Jordan, who was ARMY OF T General Beauregard's adjutant-general, prepared a Generats and statement of the atrength of the Confederate army at Infantry, Ram BolU Run or Manassas, of which the foliowing is a con- Cavalry, densation: Arti;lery, " So far as the troops of Beauregard's immediate Army of the Potomac are concerned, this statement is con- densed from two that I prepared with the sub-returns Field Guns. of all the commands before me as the adjutant-gen- eral of that army, September 25th, 1861, and I will vouch for Its exactnese. In respect to the Army of the ARMY 01 Shenandoah, I have been obliged to present an estimate Generals and of mio as the total of the rank and file of Johnstonus Infantry, Ran army, my authority for which is a statement written Cavalry, by me in the otflcial report of the battle, and based, as I Artillery, distinctly recollect, upon official documents and returns in my hands at the time, of the accuracy of which I was and am satiafied. The totals of General Beauregard's Field Guns... Army of the Potomac are: RtECAPITULATION. IftfeatrY. Army of the Potomac - Rank and File engaged . .... 8.415 Shenandoah, " " " (estimated) 7684 .. . Total Rank and Flle, both Confederate armies, engaged ..1 6,099 .... HE POTOMAC AVAILABLE ON TUE FIELD. Staffn. . ..... 7 nl and File.. .. ..... . 19,568 . ...... .... ..1,468 21,900 ....................... . . 27 F THE POTOMAC ACTIVELY ENGAGED. Sta.i. 10 k and ile ............ ..... ,415 .............. 1,000 .. ......................... 288 9,713 .......... ..... I................ .. . .......... . 17 Cavalry Artillery. SMa. TotaL. 1e0e0 . 288 1 10 . 9,713 30i 250 6 .. . 8,340 1,300.. 638 .. 16 ... 18,063" 195 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. BY G. T. BEAUREOARD, GENERAL, C. S. A. A OON after the first conflict between the authorities of the S) Federal Union and those of the Confederate States had occurred in Charleston Harbor, by the bombardment of Fort Sumter,-which, beginning at 4:30 A. M. on the 12th of April, 1861, forced the surrender of that fortress within thirty hours thereafter into my hands,-I was called to Richmond, which 0; of by that time had become the Confederate seat of government, and was directed to "assume command of the Confederate troops on the Alexandria line." Arriving at Mfanassas Junction, I took command on the 2d of June, forty-nine days after the evacuation of Fort Sumter. Although the position at the time was strategically of commanding importance to the Confederates, the mere terrain was not only without natural defensive advan- tages, but, on the contrary, was absolutely unfavorable. Its strategic value was that, being close to the Federal capital, it held in observation the chief army then being assembled near Arlington by General McDowell, under the immediate eye of the commander-in-chief, General Scott, for an offensive movement against Richmond; and while it had a railway approach in its rear for the easy accu- mulation of reenforcements and all the necessary munitions of war from the southward, at the same time another (the Manassas Gap) railway, diverging laterally to the left from that point, gave rapid communications with the fer- tile valley of the Shenandoah, then teeming with live stock and cereal subsist- ence, as well as with other resources essential to the Confederates. There was this further value in the position to the Confederate army:- that during the period of accumulation, seasoning, and training, it might be fed from the fat fields, pastures, and garners of Loudoun, Fauquier, and the Lower Shenandoah Valley counties, which otherwise must have fallen into the hands of the enemy. But, on the other hand, Bull Run, a petty stream, was of little or no defen- sive strength; for it abounded in fords, and although for the most part its banks were rocky and abrupt, the side from which it would be approached offensively in most places commanded the opposite ground. At the time of my arrival at Manassas, a Confederate army under General Joseph E. Johnston was in occupation of the Lower Shenandoah Valley, along the line of the Upper Potomac, chiefly at Harper's Ferry, which was regarded as the gateway of the valley and of one of the possible approaches to Rich- mond; a position from which he was speedily forced to retire, however, by a flank movement of a Federal army, under the veteran General Patterson, thrown across the Potomac at or about Martinsburg. On my other or right flank, so to speak, a Confederate force of some 2500 men under General 196 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. Holmes occupied the position of Aquia Creek on the lower Potomac, upon the- line of approach to Richmond from that direction through Fredericks- burg. The other approach, that by way of the James River, was held by Confederate troops under Generals Huger and. Ma- gruder. Establishing small . outposts at Leesburg to ob- \ . serve the crossings of the om o of t r i h Potomac'in that quarter, are an e t hu and at Fairfax Court House smal bi b of r i a in observationof Arlington, r f at with other detachments in s cp bi a nmrubo advanceofManassastowaed oc i c Alexandria on the south emn a s u side of the, railroad, from the very outset I was anx- o iously aware that the sole military advantage at the moment to the Confeder- at th F ates was tat t of holding the h h in HOME OF w ell as r D rt interior lines. On the Fed- of July my p hap- eral or hostile side were all material advantages, including superior numbers, largely drawn from the old militia organizations of the great cities of the North, decidedly better armed and equipped than the troops under me, and strengthened by a small but incomparable body of regular infantry as well as a number of batteries of regular field artillery of the highest class, and a very large and thoroughly organized staff corps, besides a numerous body of professionally educated officers in command of volunteer regiments, j all precious military elements at such a juncture. Happily, through the foresight of Colonel Thomas Jordan,-dwhom General Lee had placed as the adjutant-general of the forces there assembled before my arrival,-arrangements were made which enabled me to receive regularly, from private persons at the Federal capital, most accurate infor- mation, of which politicians high in council, as well as War Department clerks, were the unconscious ducts. On the 4th of July, my pickets hap- pened upon and captured a soldier of the regulars, who proved to be a clerk in the adjutant-general's office of General McDowell, intrusted with the special duty of compiling returns of his army-a work which he confessed, without reluctance, he had just executed, showing the forces under McDowell about the 1st of July. His statement of the strength and composition of that force tallied so closely with that which had been acquired through my Washington -agencies, already mentioned, as well as through the leading Northern news- papers (regular files of which were also transmitted to my headquarters from the Federal capital), that I could not doubt them. I The professionally educated oficers on the Confederate side at Bull Run included Generals Johnston, Beauregard, Stonewall Jackson, Longatreet, Kirby Smith, Ewell, Early, Bee, D. R. Jones, Holmes, Evans, Elzey, and Jordan, all in high positions, besides others not so prominent.- EDITORS. 197 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. In these several ways, therefore, I was almost as well advised of the strength of the hostile army in my front as its commander, who, I may men- tion, had been a classmate of mine at West Point. Under those circumstances I had become satisfied that a well-equipped, well-constituted Federal army at least 50,000 strong, of all arms, confronted me at or about Arlington, ready and on the very eve of an offensive operation against me, and to meet which I could muster barely 18,000 men with 29 field-guns. 1, Previously,-indeed, as early as the middle of June,-it had become appar- ent to my mind that through only one course of action could there be a well- grounded hope of ability on the part of the Confederates to encounter successfully the offensive operations for which the Federal authorities were then vigorously preparing in my immediate front, with so consummate a strategist and military administrator as Lieutenant-General Scott in general command at Washington, aided by his accomplished heads of the large Gen- eral Staff Corps of the United States Army. This course was to make the most enterprising, warlike use of the interior lines which we possessed, for the swift concentration at the critical instant of every available Confederate force upon the menaced position, at the risk, if need were, of sacrificing all minor places to the one clearly of major military value-there to meet our adversary so offensively as to overwhelm him, under circumstances that must assure immediate ability to assume the general offensive even upon his territory, and thus conquer an early peace by a few well-delivered blows. My views of such import had been already earnestly communicated to the proper authorities; but about the middle of July, satisfied that McDowell was on the eve of taking the offensive against me, I dispatched Colonel James Chesnut, of South Carolina, a volunteer aide-de-camp on my staff who had served on an intimate footing with Mr. Davis in the Senate of the United States, to urge in substance the necessity for the immediate concentration of the larger part of the forces of Johnston and Holmes at Manassas, so that the moment McDowell should be sufficiently far detached from Washing- ton, I would be enabled to move rapidly round his more convenient flank upon his rear and his communications, and attack him in reverse, or get between his forces, then separated, thus cutting off his retreat upon Arling- ton in the event of his defeat, and insuring as an immediate consequence the crushing of Patterson, the liberation of Maryland, and the capture of Washington. This plan was rejected by Mr. Davis and his military advisers (Adjutant- General Cooper and General Lee), who characterized it as " brilliant and com- prehensive," but essentially impracticable. Furthermore, Colonel Chesnut came back impressed with the views entertained at Richmond,- as he com- municated at once to my adjutant-general,- that should the Federal army soon move offensively upon my position, my best course would be to retire behind the Rappahannock and accept battle there instead of at Manassas. In effect, it was regarded as best to sever communications between the two chief Confederate armies, that of the Potomac and that of the Shenandoah, with the Z For the forces actually engaged in the campaign and on the field, see pp. 194- 5.-EDITORa i98 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 199 inevitable immediate result that Johnston would be forced to leave Patterson in possession of the Lower Shenandoah Valley, abandoning to the enemy so UAP OF TUEB )tLL MrUN CAMPAIG. where a small detachment was posted large a part of the most resourceful sections of Virginia, and to retreat southward by way of the Luray Val- ley, pass across the Blue Ridge at Thornton's Gap and unite with me after all, but at Fredericksburg, much nearer Richmond than Manas- sas. These views, however, were not made known to me at the time, and happily my mind was left free to the grave problem imposed upon me by the rejection of my plan for the im- mediate concentration of a materially larger force,-i. e., the problem of placing and using my resources for a successful encounter behind Bull Run with the Federal army, which I was not permitted to doubt was about to take the field against me. It is almost needless to say that I had caused to be made a thorough reconnoissance of all the ground in my front and flanks, and had made myself personally acquainted with the most material points, including the region of Sudley's Church on my left, in observation. Left now to my own resources, of course the contingency of defeat had to be considered and pro- vided for. Among the measures of precaution for such a result, I ordered the destruction of the railroad bridge across Bull Run at Union Mills, on my right, in order that the enemy, in the event of my defeat, should not have the immediate use of the railroad in following up their movement against Rich- mond -a railroad which could have had no corresponding value to us eastward beyond Manassas in any operations on our side with Washington as the objective, inasmuch as any such operations must have been made by the way of the Upper Potomac and upon the rear of that city. Just before Colonel Chesnut was dispatched on the mission of which I have spoken, a former clerk in one of the departments at Washington, well known to him, had volunteered to return thither and bring back the latest informa- tion of the military and political situation from our most trusted friends. His loyalty to our cause, his intelligence, and his desire to be of service being vouched for, he was at once sent across the Potomac below Alexandria, merely accredited by a small scrap of paper bearing in Colonel Jordan's cipher the two words, " Trust bearer," with which he was to call at a certain house in I I i AI0:- ;\W - - I A , "; "_ - t I'll",A I Zf "', - "'N" ww- I ,, " ' ' , 1- ..... . -'Z4. - 'Nz'Z , z 4'tI...... ---- --- ___ - __', I _' -A'' I , - "-" I 11, ,, It 41_1-_- ,,1.\R THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. Washington within easy rifle-range of the White House, ask for the lady of the house, and present it only to her. This delicate mission was as fortunately as it was deftly executed. In the early morning, as the newsboys were cry- ing in the empty streets of Washington the intelligence that the order was given for the Federal army to move at once upon my position, that scrap of paper reached the hands of the one person in all that city who could extract any meaning from it. With no more delay than was necessary for a hurried breakfast and the writing in cipher by Mrs. 0- of the words, " Order issued for McDowell to march upon Manassas to-night," my agent was placed in communication with another friend, who carried him in a buggy with a relay of horses as swiftly as possible down the eastern shore of the Potomac to our regular ferry across that river. Without untoward incident the momentous dispatch was quickly delivered into the hands of a cavalry courier, and by means of relays it was in my hands between 8 and 9 o'clock that night. Within half an hour my outpost commanders, advised of what was impending, were directed, at the first evidence of the near presence of the enemy in their front, to fall back in the manner and to positions already prescribed in anticipation of such a contingency in an order confidentially communicated to them four weeks before, and the detachment at Leesburg was directed to join me by forced marches. Having thus cleared my decks for action, I next acquainted Mr. Davis with the situation, and ventured once more to suggest that the Army of the Shenandoah, with the brigade at Fred- ericksburg or Aquia Creek, should be ordered to reenforce me,- suggestions that were at once heeded so far that General Holmes was ordered to carry his command to my aid, and General Johnston was given discretion to do like- wise. After some telegraphic discussion with me, General Johnston was induced to exercise this discretion in favor of the swift march of the Army of the Shenandoah to my relief; and to facilitate that vital movement, I hastened to accumulate all possible means of railway transport at a desig- nated point on the Manassas Gap railroad at the eastern foot of the Blue Ridge, to which Johnston's troops directed their march. However, at the same time, I had submitted the alternative proposition to General Johnston, that, having passed the Blue Ridge, he should assemble his forces, press forward by way of Aldie, north-west of Manassas, and fall upon McDowell's right rear; while I, prepared for the operation, at the first sound of the con- flict, should strenuously assume the offensive in my front. The situation and circumstances specially favored the signal success of such an operation. The march to the point of attack could have been accomplished as soon as the forces were brought ultimately by rail to Manassas Junction; our enemy, thus attacked so nearly simultaneously on his right flank, his rear, and his front, naturally would suppose that I had been able to turn his flank while attacking him in front, and therefore, that I must have an overwhelming superiority of numbers; and his forces, being new troops, most of them under fire for the first time, must have soon fallen into a disastrous panic. Moreover, such an operation must have resulted advantageously to the Con- federates, in the event that McDowell should, as might have been antici- 200 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. pated, attempt to strike the Manassas Gap railway to my left, and thus cut off railway communications between Johnston's forces and my own, instead of the mere effort to strike my left flank which he actually essayed.4 It seemed, however, as though the deferred attempt at concentration was to go for naught, for on the morning of the 18th the Federal forces were massed around JCentreville, but three miles from Mitchell's Ford, and soon were seen advancing upon the roads leading to that and Blackburn's Ford. [See map, page 180.] My order of bat- tie, issued in the night of the 17th, contem- plated an offensive return, particularly from the strong bri- gades;on the right and right center. The Fed- eral artillery opened THE 'tXN HUSI, G NER BRAURWGALUD 11RD URT in front of both fords, and the infantry, while demonstrating in front of Mitchell's Ford, endeavored to force a pas- sage at Blackburn s. Their column of attack, Tyler's division, was opposed by Longstreet's forces, to the reenforcement of which Early's brigade, the reserve line at McLean's Ford, was ordered up. The Federals, after sev- eral attempts to force a passage, met a final repulse and retreated. After their infantry attack had ceased, about 1 o'clock, the contest lapsed into an artillery duel, in which the Washington Artillery of New Orleans won credit against the renowned batteries of the United States regular army. A comical effect of this artillery fight was the destruction of the dinner of myself and staff by a Federal shell that fell into the fire-place of my headquarters at the McLean House. t Our success in this first limited collision was of special prestige to my army of new troops, and, moreover, of decisive importance by so increasing Gezi- eral McDowell's caution as to give time for the arrival of some of General 4 "I am, however, inclined to believe he [the tions with the Potomac through Leesburg and enemy) may attempt to turn my left flank by a Edward's Ferry."-(Extract from a letter ad- movement in the direction of Vienna, Frying- dressed by General Beauregard to Jefferson Davis, pan Church, and, possibly, Gum Spring, and thus July 11th, 1861.) cut off Johnston's line of retreat and commu- ) It is denied that a serious attempt "to force nication with this place [Manassas Junction] a passage" was made on the 18th. (Seepage 178.) cia the Manassas Gap railroad, while threaten- This engagement was called by the Confederates ing my own communications with Richmond the battle of Bull Run, the main fight on the 21st and depots of supply by the Alexandria and being known in the South as the battle of Manassas Orange railroad, and opening his communica- (pronounced Ma-nasa's.a).-Drroxs 201 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. Johnston's forces. But while on the 19th I was awaiting a renewed and gen- eral attack by the Federal army, I received a telegram from the Richmond military authorities, urging me to withdraw my call on General Johnston on account of the supposed impracticability of the concentration -an abiding conviction which had been but momentarily shaken by the alarm caused by McDowell's march upon Richmond.\ As this was not an order in terms, but an urgency which, notwithstanding its superior source, left me technically free and could define me as responsible for any misevent, I preferred to keep both the situation and the responsibility, and continued every effort for the prompt arrival of the Shenandoah forces, being resolved, should they come before General McDowell again attacked, to take myself the offensive. Gen- eral McDowell, fortunately for my plans, spent the 19th and 20th in recon- noissances; and, meanwhile, General Johnston brought 8340 men from the Shenandoah Valley, with 20 guns, and General Holmes 1265 rank and file, with 6 pieces of artillery, from Aquia Creek. As these forces arrived (most of them in the afternoon of the 20th) I placed them chiefly so as to strengthen my left center and left, the latter being weak from lack of available troops. The disposition of the entire force was now as follows [see map, page 180]: At Union Mills Ford, Ewell's brigade, supported by Holmes's; at McLean's Ford, D. R. Jones's brigade, supported by Early's; at Blackburn's Ford, Longstreet's brigade; at Mitchell's Ford, Bonham's brigade. Cocke's bri- gade held the line in front and rear of Bull Run from Bonham's left, covering Lewis's, Ball's, and Island fords, to the right of Evans's demi-brigade, which covered the Stone Bridge and a farm ford about a mile above, and formed part also of Cocke's command. The Shenandoah forces were placed in reserve - Bee's and Bartow's brigades between McLean's and Blackburn's fords, and Jackson's between Blackburn's and Mitchell's fords. This force mustered 29,188 rank and file and 55 guns, of which 21,923 infantry, cavalry, and artillery, with 29 guns, belonged to my immediate forces, i. e, the Army of the Potomac. The preparation, in front of an ever-threatening enemy, of a wholly volun- teer army, composed of men very few of whom had ever belonged to any military organization, had been a work of many cares not incident to the command of a regufar army. These were increased by the insufficiency of my staff organization, an inefficient management of the quartermaster's department at Richmond, and the preposterous mismanagement of the com- missary-general, who not only failed to furnish rations, but caused the removal of the army commissaries, who, under my orders, procured food from \ [TxLzoAx.] RICHMOND, July 19, 1861. as transportation permits. The enemy is advised Grrx z BDXuaoAaD, Manassas, Va. at Washington of the projected movement of Gen- We have no intelligence from General Johnston. erals Johnston and Holmes, and may vary his If the enemy In front of you has abandoned an plans in conformity thereto. immediate attack, and General Johnston has not S. COOPER, Adjutant-General. moved, you had better Withdraw your call upon him, so that he may be left to his full discretion. Lack of rations, as well as the necessity for All the troops arriving at Lynchburg are ordered information, detained MeDowell at Centreville to join you. From this place we will send as fast during these two days.-E1Dlross. 202 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. the country in front of us to keep the army from absolute want-supplies that were otherwise exposed to be gathered by the enemy. So specially severe had been the recent duties at headquarters, aggravated not a little by night alarms arising from the enemy's immediate presence, that, in the even- ing of the 920th, I found my chief-of-staff sunken upon the papers that covered his table, asleep in sheer exhaustion from the overstraining and almost slum- berless labor of the last days and nights. I covered his door with a guard to secure his rest against any interruption, after which the army had the benefit of his usual active and provident services. There was much in this decisive conflict about to open, not involved in any after battle, which pervaded the two armies and the people behind them and colored the responsibility of the respective commanders. The political hostilities of a generation were now face to face with weapons instead of words. Defeat to either side would be a deep mortification, but defeat to the South must turn its claim of independence into an empty vaunt; and the defeated commander on either side might expect, though not the personal fate awarded by the Carthaginians to an unfortunate commander, at least a moral fate quite similar. Though disappointed that the concentration I had sought had not been permitted at the moment and for the purpose preferred by me, and notwithstanding the non-arrival of some five thousand troops of the Shenandoah forces, my strength was now so increased that I had good hope of successfully meeting my adversary. General Johnston was the ranking officer, and entitled, therefore, to assume command of the united forces; but as the extensive field of operations was one which I had occupied since the beginning of June, and with which I was thoroughly familiar in all its extent and military bearings, while he was wholly unacquainted with it, and, moreover, as I had made my plans and dis- positions for the maintenance of the position, General Johnston, in view of the gravity of the impending issue, preferred not to assume the responsi- bilities of the chief direction of the forces during the battle, but to assist me upon the field. Thereupon, I explained my plans and purposes, to which he agreed., SUNDAY, July 21st, bearing the fate of the new-born Confederacy, broke brightly over the fields and woods that held the hostile forces. My scouts, thrown out in the night toward Centreville along the Warrenton Turnpike, had reported that the enemy was concentrating along the latter. This fact, together with the failure of the Federals in their attack upon my center at Mitchell's and Blackburn's fords, had caused me to apprehend that they would attempt my left flank at the Stone Bridge, and orders were accordingly issued by half-past 4 o'clock to the brigade commanders to hold their forces in readiness to move at a moment's notice, together with the suggestion that the Federal attack might be expected in that quarter. Shortly afterward the enemy was reported to be advancing from Centreville on the Warrenton See General Beauregard's postscript (page 226), and General Johnston's consideration of the samne topic in the paper to follow (page 245), and his postscript (page 258).- EDIToRs. 203 34 AEf 0i ' A d I 00 4 I 4.44 2" NW Ii No I KY X!P4 VnK 4 'Iv. ; : K: g 4 4 PI:...f (4 , 4 ,I- K''", f 'K 44 4 g WR k` M M VV24 N 4 '4' 4 p r: F44 4 4444; A 4t 4 TOPOGRAPHICAL MAP OF THE BULL RUN BATEL FFlELD. The original of this map was mad. for (General Beauregard, soon afer the battle, from actual surveys by Captain D. B. Harris, astsd by Mr. John (raut 204 7 1 , ", X .\ i W. 11`1 N ,i 0 14 V! t- f g v He S E all - "e f\:R w THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. Turnpike, and at half-past 5 o'clock as deploying a force in front of Evans. As their movement against my left developed the opportunity I desired, I immediately sent orders to the brigade commanders, both front and reserves, on my right and center to advance and vigorously attack the Federal left flank and rear at Centreville, while my left, under Cocke and Evans with their supports, would sustain the Federal attack in the quarter of the Stone Bridge, which they were directed to do to the last extremity. The center was likewise to advance and engage the enemy in front, and directions were given to the reserves, when without orders, to move toward the sound of the heaviest firing. The ground in our front on the other side of Bull Run afforded par- ticular advantage for these tactics. Centreville was the apex of a triangle- its short side running by the Warrenton Turnpike to Stone Bridge, its base Bull Run, its long side a road that ran from Union Mills along the front of my other Bull Run positions and trended off to the rear of Centreville, where McDowell had massed his main forces; branch roads led up to this one frcm the fords between Union Mills and Mitchell's. My forces to the right of the latter ford were to advance, pivoting on that position; Bonham was in advance from Mitchell's Ford, Longstreet from Blackburn's, D. R. Jones from MeLean's, and Ewell from Union Mills by the Centreville road. Ewell, as hav- ing the longest march, was to begin the movement, and each brigade was to be followed by its reserve. In anticipation of this method of attack, and to prevent accidents, the subordinate commanders had been carefully instructed in the movement by me, as they were all new to the responsibilities of com- mand. They were to establish close communication with each other before making the attack. About half-past 8 o'clock I set out with General John- ston for a convenient position,- a hill in rear of Mitchell's Ford,- where we waited for the opening of the attack on our right, from which I expected a decisive victory by midday, with the result of cutting off the Federal army from retreat upon Washington. Meanwhile, about half-past 5 o'clock, the peal of a heavy rifled gun was heard in front of the Stone Bridge, its second shot striking through the tent of my signal-officer, Captain E. P. Alexander; and at 6 o'clock a full rifled battery opened against Evans and then against Cocke, to which our artillery remained dumb, as it had not sufficient range to reply. But later, as the Federal skirmish-line advanced, it was engaged by ours, thrown well forward on the other side of the Run. A scattering musketry fire followed, and meanwhile, about 7 o'clock, I ordered Jackson's brigade, with Imboden's and five guns of Walton's battery, to the left, with orders to support Cocke as well as Bonham; and the brigades of Bee and Bartow, under the command of the former, were also sent to the support of the left. At half-past 8 o'clock Evans, seeing that the Federal attack did not increase in boldness and vigor, and observing a lengthening line of dust above the trees to the left of the Warrenton Turnpike, became satisfied that the attack in his front was but a feint, and that a column of the enemy was moving around through the woods to fall on his flank from the direction of Sudley Ford. Informing his immediate commander, Cocke, of the enemy's move- 205 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. ment, and of his own dispositions to meet it, he left 4 companies under cover at the Stone Bridge, and led the remainder of his force, 6 companies of Sloan's 4th South Carolina and Wheat's battalion of Louisiana Tigers, with 2 6-pounder howitzers, across the valley of Young's Branch to the high ground beyond it. Resting his left on the Sudley road, he distributed his troops on each side of a small copse, with such cover as the ground afforded, and look- ing over the open fields and a reach of the Sudley road which the Federals must cover in their approach. His two howitzers were placed one at each end of his position, and here he silently awaited the enemy now drawing near. The Federal turning column, about 18,000 strong, with 24 pieces of artil- lery, had moved down from Centreville by the Warrenton Turnpike, and after passing Cub Run had struck to the right by a forest road to cross Bull Run at Sudley Ford, about 3 miles above the Stone Bridge, moving by a long circuit for the purpose of attacking my left flank. The head of the col- umn, Burnside's brigade of Hunter's division, at about 9:45 A. M. debouched from the woods into the open fields, in front of Evans. Wheat at once engaged their skirmishers, and as the Second Rhode Island regiment advanced, supported by its splendid battery of 6 rifled guns, the fronting thicket held by Evans's South Carolinians poured forth its sudden volleys, while the 2 howitzers flung their grape-shot upon the attacking line, which was soon shattered and driven back into the woods behind. Major Wheat, after handling his battalion with the utmost determination, had fallen severely wounded in the lungs. Burnside's entire brigade was now sent forward in a second charge, supported by 8 guns; but they encountered again the unflinch- ing fire of Evans's line, and were once more driven back to the woods, from the cover of which they continued the attack, reenforced after a time by the arrival of 8 companies of United States regular infantry, under Major Sykes, with 6 pieces of artillery, quickly followed by the remaining regiments of Andrew Porter's brigade of the same division. The contest here lasted fully an hour; meanwhile Wheat's battalion, having lost its leader, had gradually lost its organization, and Evans, though still opposing these heavy odds with undiminished firmness, sought reenforcement from the troops in his rear. General Bee, of South Carolina, a man of marked character, whose com- mand lay in reserve in rear of Cocke, near the Stone Bridge, intelligently applying the general order given to the reserves, had already moved toward the neighboring point of conflict, and taken a position with his own and Bar- tow's brigades on the high plateau which stands in rear of Bull Run in the quarter of the Stone Bridge, and overlooking the scene of engagement upon the stretch of high ground from which it was separated by the valley of Young's Branch. This plateau is inclosed on three sides by two small water- courses, which empty into Bull Run within a few yards of each other, a half mile to the south of the Stone Bridge. Rising to an elevation of quite 100 feet above the level of Bull Run at the bridge, it falls off on three sides to the level of the inclosing streams in gentle slopes, but furrowed by ravines of 0 206 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. irregular directions and length, and studded with clumps and patches of young pine and oaks. The general direction of the crest of the plateau is oblique to the course of Bull Run in that quarter and to the Sudley and turnpike roads, which intersect each other at right angles. On the north-western brow, over- looking Young's Branch, and near the Sudley road, as the latter climbs over the plateau, stood the house of the widow Henry, while to its right and for- ward on a projecting spur stood the house and sheds of the free negro Robin- son, just behind the turnpike, densely embowered in trees and shrubbery and environed by a double row of fences on two sides. Around the eastern and southern brow of the plateau an almost unbroken fringe of second-growth pines gave excellent shelter for our marksmen, who availed themselves of it with the most satisfactory skill. To the west, adjoining the fields that sur- rounded the houses mentioned, a broad belt of oaks extends directly across the crest on both sides of the Sudley road, in which, during the battle, the hostile forces contended for the mastery. General Bee, with a soldier's eye to the situation, skillfully disposed his forces. His two brigades on either side of Imboden's battery- which he had borrowed from his neighboring reserve, Jackson's brigade - were placed in a small depression of the plateau in advance of the Henry house, whence he had a full view of the contest on the opposite height across the valley of Young's Branch. Opening with his artillery upon the Federal batteries, he answered Evans's request by advising him to withdraw to his own position on the height; but Evans, full of the spirit that would not retreat, renewed his appeal that the forces in rear would come to help him hold his ground. The newly arrived forces had given the Federals such superiority at this point as to dwarf Evans's means of resistance, and General Bee, generously yielding his own better judgment to Evans's persistence, led the two brigades across the valley under the fire of the enemy's artillery, and threw them into action-1 regiment in the copse held by Colonel Evans, 2 along a fence on the right, and 2 under General Bartow on the prolonged right of this line, but extended forward at a right angle and along the edge of a wood not more than 100 yards from that held by the enemy's left, where the contest at short range became sharp and deadly, bringing many casualties to both sides. The Federal infantry, though still in superior numbers, failed to make any headway against this sturdy van, notwithstanding Bee's whole line was hammered also by the enemy's powerful batteries, until Heintzelman's division of 2 strong brigades, arriving from Sudley Ford, extended the fire on the Federal right, while its battery of 6 10-pounder rifled guns took an immediately effective part from a position behind the Sudley road. Against these odds the Confederate force was still endeavoring to hold its ground, when a new enemy came into the field upon its right. Major Wheat, with characteristic daring and restless- ness, had crossed Bull Run alone by a small ford above the Stone Bridge, in order to reconnoiter, when he and Evans had first moved to the left, and, fall- ing on some Federal scouts, had shouted a taunting defiance and withdrawn, not, however, without his place of crossing having been observed. This dis- 207 d I e I i a t R 4 i t EF- I 4 04 208 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. closure was now utilized by Sherman's (W. T.) and Keyes's brigades of Tyler's division; crossing at this point, they appeared over the high bank of the stream and moved into position on the Federal left. There was no choice now for Bee but to retire - a movement, however, to be accomplished under different circumstances than when urged by him upon Evans. The three leaders endeavored to preserve the stead- iness of the ranks as they withdrew over the open fields, aided by the fire of Im- boden's guns on the plateau and the retiring howitzers; but the troops were thrown into confusion, and the greater part soon fell into rout across Young's Branch and around the base of the height in the rear of the Stone Bridge. Meanwhile, in rear of Mitchells Ford, I had been waiting with General John- ston for the sound of conflict to open in A the quarter of Centreville upon the Fed- eral left flank and rear (making allow- ance, however, for the delays possible to commands unused to battle), when I was chagrined to hear from General D. R. Jones that, while he had been long ready for the movement upon Centre- ville, General Ewell had not come up to form on his right, though he had sent him between 7 and 8 o'clock a copy of his own order which recited that Ewell had been already ordered to begin the movement. I dispatched an immediate order to Ewell to advance; but within a quarter of an hour, just as I received a dispatch from him informing me that he had received no order to advance in A Iou t4 I - P1' 4 the morning, the firing on the left began to increase so intensely as to indi- cate a severe attack, whereupon General Johnston said that he would go personally to that quarter. After weighing attentively the firing, which seemed rapidly and heavily increasing, it appeared to me that the troops on the right would be unable to get into position before the Federal offensive should have made too much progress on our left, and that it would be better to abandon it altogether, maintaining only a strong demonstration so as to detain the enemy in front of our right and center, and hurry up all available reenforcements - includ- ing the reserves that were to have moved upon Centreville - to our left and fight the battle out in that quarter. Communicating this view to General Johnston, who approved it (giving his advice, as he said, for what it was VOL. I. 14 209 . .... r i' THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. worth, as he was not acquainted with the country), I ordered Ewell, Jones, and Longstreet to make a strong demonstration all along their front on the other side of the Run, and ordered the reserves below our position, Holmes's brigade with 6 guns, and Early's brigade, also 2 regiments of Bonham's brigade, near at hand, to move swiftly to the left. General Johnston and I now set out at full speed for the point of conflict. We arrived there just as Bee's troops, after giving way, were fleeing in disorder behind the height in rear of the Stone Bridge. They had come around between the base of the hill and the Stone Bridge into a shallow ravine which ran up to a point on the crest where Jackson had already formed his brigade along the edge of the woods. We found the commanders resolutely stemming the further flight of the routed forces, but vainly endeavoring to restore order, and our own efforts were as futile. Every segment of line we succeeded in forming was again dissolved while another was being formed; more than two thousand men were shouting each some suggestion to his neighbor, their voices mingling with the noise of the shells hurtling through the trees overhead, and all word of command drowned in the confusion and uproar. It was at this moment that General Bee used the famous expression, "Look at Jackson's brigade! It stands there like a stone wall "-a name that passed from the brigade to its immortal commanders The disorder seemed irretrievable, but happily the thought came to me that if their colors were planted out to the front the men might rally on them, and I gave the order to carry the standards forward some forty yards, which was promptly executed by the regimental officers, thus drawing the common eye of the troops. They now received easily the orders to advance and form on the line of their colors, which they obeyed with a general movement; and as General Johnston and myself rode forward shortly after with the colors of the 4th Alabama by our side, the line that had fought all morning, and had fled, routed and disordered, now advanced again into position as steadily as veterans. The 4th Alabama had previ- ously lost all its field-officers; and noticing Colonel S. R. Gist, an aide to General Bee, a young man whom I had known as adjutant-general of South Carolina, and whom I greatly esteemed, I presented him as an able and brave commander to the stricken regiment, who cheered their new leader, and main- tained under him, to the end of the day, their previous gallant behavior. We had come none too soon, as the enemy's forces, flushed with the belief of accomplished victory, were already advancing across the valley of Young's Branch and up the slope, where -they had encountered for a while the fire of the Hampton Legion, which had been led forward toward the Robinson house and the turnpike in front, covering the retreat and helping materially to check the panic of Bee's routed forces. As soon as order was restored I requested General Johnston to go back to Portici (the Lewis house), and from that point -which I considered most favorable for the purpose -forward me the reinforcements as they would come from the Bill Run lines below and those that were expected to arrive from Manassas, while I should direct the field. General Johnston was disin- clined to leave the battle-field for that position. As I had been compelled to 210 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. leave my chief-of-staff, Colonel Jordan, at Manassas to forward any troops arriving there, I felt it was a necessity that one of us should go to this duty, and that it was his place to do so, as I felt I was responsible for the battle. He considerately yielded to my urgency, and we had the benefit of his energy and sagacity in so directing the reinforcements toward the fieldas to be readily and effectively assistant to my pressing needs and insure the success of the day. As General Johnston departed for Portici, I hastened to form our line of battle against the on-coming enemy. I ordered up the 49th and 8th Vir- ginia regiments from Cocke's neighboring brigade in the Bull Run lines. Gartrell's 7th Georgia I placed in position on the left of Jackson's bri- gade, along the belt of pines occupied by the latter on the eastern rim of the plateau. As the 49th Virginia rapidly came up, its colonel, ex-Governor William Smith, was encouraging them with cheery word and manner, and, as they approached, indicated to them the immediate presence of the commander. As the regiment raised a loud cheer, the name was caught by some of the troops of Jackson's brigade in the immediate wood, who rushed out, calling for General Beauregard. Hastily acknowledging these happy signs of sym- pathy and confidence, which reenforee alike the capacity of commander and troops, I placed the 49th Virginia in position on the extreme left next to Gartrell, and as I paused to say a few words to Jackson, while hurry- ing back to the right, my horse was killed under me by a bursting shell, a fragment of which carried away part of the heel of my boot. The Hampton Legion, which had suffered greatly, was placed on the right of Jackson's brigade, and Hunton's 8th Virginia, as it arrived, upon the right of Hampton; the two latter being drawn somewhat to the rear so as to form with Jackson's right regiment a reserve, and be ready likewise to make defense against any advance from the direction of the Stone Bridge, whence there was imminent peril from the enemy's heavy forces, as I had just stripped that position almost entirely of troops to meet the active crisis on the plateau, leaving this quarter now covered only by a few men, whose defense was otherwise assisted solely by the obstruction of an abatis. With 6500 men and 13 pieces of artillery, I now awaited the onset of the enemy, who were pressing forward 20,000 strong, ;, with 24 pieces of superior artillery and 7 companies of regular cavalry. They soon appeared over the farther rim of the plateau, seizing the Robinson house on my right and the Henry house opposite my left center. Near the latter they placed in position the two powerful batteries of Ricketts and Griffin of the regular army, and pushed forward up the Sudley road, the slope of which was cut so deep below the adjacent ground as to afford a covered way up to the plateau. Supported by the formidable lines of Federal musketry, these 2 batteries lost no time in making themselves felt, while 3 more batteries in rear on the high ground beyond the Sudley and Warrenton cross-roads swelled the shower of shell that fell among our ranks. ; According to General Fry (page 188), the Union force in the seizure of the Henry hill consisted of four brigades, a cavalry battalion, and two batteries, or (as we deduce from General Fry's statements of the strength of McDowell's forces, page 195) about 11,000 men.- EDITORS. 211 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. Our own batteries, Imboden's, Stanard's, five of Walton's guns, reenforced later by Pendleton's and Alburtis's (their disadvantage being reduced by the shortness of range), swept the surface of the plateau from their position on the eastern rim. I felt that, after the accidents of the morning, much depended on maintaining the steadiness of the troops against the first heavy onslaught, and rode along the lines encouraging the men to unflinching behavior, meet- ing, as I passed each command, a cheering response. The steady fire of their musketry told severely on the Federal ranks, and the splendid action of our batteries was a fit preface to the marked skill exhibited by our artillerists during the war. The enemy suffered particularly from the musketry on our left, now further reenforced by the 2d Mississippi -the troops in this quarter confronting each other at very short range. Here two companies of Stuart's cavalry charged through the Federal ranks that filled the Sudley road, increasing the disorder wrought upon that flank of the enemy. But with superior numbers the Federals were pushing on new regiments in the attempt to flank my position, and several guns, in the effort to enfilade ours, were thrust forward so near the 33d Virginia that some of its men sprang forward and captured them, but were driven back by an overpowering force of Federal musketry. Although the enemy were held well at bay, their press- ure became so strong that I resolved to take the offensive, and ordered a charge on my right for the purpose of recovering the plateau. The movement, made with alacrity and force by the commands of Bee, Bartow, Evans, and Hampton, thrilled the entire line, Jackson's brigade piercing the enemy's center, and the left of the line under Gartrell and Smith following up the charge, also, in that quarter, so that the whole of the open surface of the plateau was swept clear of the Federals. Apart from its impressions on the enemy, the effect of this brilliant onset was to give a short breathing-spell to our troops from the immediate strain of conflict, and encourage them in withstanding the still more strenuous offensive that was soon to bear upon them. Reorganizing our line of battle under the unremitting fire of the Federal batteries opposite, I prepared to meet the new attack which the enemy were about to make, largely reen- forced by the troops of Howard's brigade, newly arrived on the field. The Federals again pushed up the slope, the face of which partly afforded good cover by the numerous ravines that scored it and the clumps of young pines and oaks with which it was studded, while the sunken Sudley road formed a good ditch and parapet for their aggressive advance upon my left flank and rear. Gradually they pressed our lines back and regained possession of their lost ground and guns. With the Henry and Robinson houses once more in their possession, they resumed the offensive, urged forward by their commanders with conspicuous gallantry. The conflict now became very severe for the final possession of this position, which was the key to victory. The Federal numbers enabled them so to extend their lines through the woods beyond the Sudley road as to outreach my left flank, which I was compelled partly to throw back, so as to meet the attack from that quarter; meanwhile their numbers equally enabled them to outflank my right in the direction of the Stone Bridge, imposing anxious 212 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. watchfulness in that direction. I knew that I was safe if I could hold out till the arrival of reenforcements, which was but a matter of time; and, with the full sense of my own responsibility, I was determined to hold the line of the plateau, even if surrounded on all sides, until assistance should come, unless my forces were sooner overtaken by annihilation. It was now between half-past 2 and 3 o'clock; a scorching sun increased the oppression of the troops, exhausted from incessant fighting, many of them having been engaged since the morning. Fearing lest the Federal of- fensive should se- E E S . = I cure too firm a grip, and knowing the fatal result that might spring from any grave infrac- tion of my line, I determined to make another effort for the recovery of the plateau, and ordered a charge of the en- tire line of battle, TUE RoatxaEag oI"IE. FROW A WAR-TIME TGRAPH. including the re- serves, which at this crisis I myself led into action. The movement was made with such keep- ing and dash that the whole plateau was swept clear of the enemy, who were driven down the slope and across the turnpike on our right and the valley of Young's Branch on our left, leaving in our final possession the Robinson and Henry houses, with most of Ricketts's and Griffin's batteries, the men of which were mostly shot down where they bravely stood by their guns. Fisher's 6th North Carolina, directed to the Lewis house by Colonel Jordan from Manassas, where it had just arrived, and thence to the field by General Johnston, came up in happy time to join in this charge on the left. Withers's 18th Virginia, which I had ordered up from Cocke's brigade, was also on hand in time to follow and give additional effect to the charge, capturing, by aid of the Hampton Legion, several guns, which were immedi- ately turned and served upon the broken ranks of the enemy by some of our officers. This handsome work, which broke the Federal fortunes of the day, was done, however, at severe cost. The soldierly Bee, and the gallant, impetuous Bartow, whose day of strong deeds was about to close with such credit, fell a few rods back of the Henry house, near the very spot whence in the morning they had first looked forth upon Evans's struggle with the enemy. Colonel Fisher also fell at the very head of his troops. Seeing Captain Ricketts, who was badly wounded in the leg, and having known him in the old army, I paused from my anxious duties to ask him whether I could 213 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. do anything for him. He answered that he wanted to be sent back to Wash- ington. As some of our prisoners were there held under threats of not being treated as prisoners of war, I replied that that must depend upon how our prisoners were treated, and ordered him to be carried to the rear. I mention this, because the report of the Federal Committee on the Conduct of the War exhibits Captain Ricketts as testifying that I only approached him to say that he would be treated as our prisoners might be treated. I sent my own surgeons to care for him, and allowed his wife to cross the lines and accompany him to Richmond; and my adjutant-general, Colonel Jordan, escorting her to the car that carried them to that city, personally attended to the comfortable placing of the wounded enemy for the journey. That part of the enemy who occupied the woods beyond our left and across the Sudley road had not been reached by the headlong charge which had swept their comrades from the plateau; but the now arriving reenforce- ments (Kershaw's 2d and Cash's 8th South Carolina) were led into that quarter. Kemper's battery also came up, preceded by its commander, who, while alone, fell into the hands of a number of the enemy, who took him prisoner, until a few moments later, when he handed them over to some of our own troops accompanying his battery. A small plateau, within the south-west angle of the Sudley and turnpike cross-roads, was still held by a strong Federal brigade - Howard's troops, together with Sykes's battalion of regulars; and while Kershaw and Cash, after passing through the skirts of the oak wood along the Sudley road, engaged this force, Kcmper's bat- tery was sent forward by Kershaw along the same road, into position near where a hostile battery had been captured, and whence it played upon the enemy in the open field. Quickly following these regiments came Preston's 28th Virginia, which, passing through the woods, encountered and drove back some Michigan troops, capturing Brigadier-General Willcox. It was now about 3 o'clock, when another important reenforcement came to our aid-Elzey's brigade, 1700 strong, of the Army of the Shenandoah, which, coming from Pied- mont by railroad, had arrived at Manassas station, 6 miles in rear of the battle-field, at noon, and had been without delay directed thence toward the field by Colonel Jordan, aided by Major T. G. Rhett, who that morning had passed from General Bonham's to General Johnston's staff. Upon nearing the vicinity of the Lewis house, the brigade was directed by a staff- officer sent by General Johnston toward the left of the field. As it reached the oak wood, just across the Sudley road, led by General Kirby Smith, the latter fell severely wounded; but the command devolved upon Colonel Elzey, an excellent officer, who was now guided by Captain D. B. Harris of the Engineers, a highly accomplished officer of my staff, still farther to the left and through the woods, so as to form in extension of the line of the preceding reenforcements. Beckham's battery, of the same command, was hurried forward by the Sudley road and around the woods into position near the Chinn house; from a well-selected point of action, in full view of the enemy that filled the open fields west of the Sudley road, it played with 214 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 21 deadly and decisive effect upon their ranks, already under the fire of Elzey's brigade. Keyes's Federal brigade, which had made its way across the turn- pike in rear of the Stone Bridge, was lurking along under cover of the ridges and a wood in order to turn my line on the right, but was easily repulsed by Latham's battery, already placed in position over that approach by Captain Harris, aided by Alburtis's battery, opportunely sent to Latham's left by General Jackson, and supported by fragments of troops collected by staff- officers. Meanwhile, the enemy had formed a line of battle of formidable proportions on the opposite height, and stretching in crescent outline, with flanks advanced, from the Pittsylvania (Carter) mansion on their left across the Sudley road in rear of Dogan's and reaching toward the Chinn house. They offered a fine spectacle as they threw forward a cloud of skirmishers down the opposite slope, preparatory to a new assault against the line on the plateau. But their right was now severely pressed by the troops that had successively arrived; the force in the south-west angle of the Sudley and Warrenton cross-roads were driven from their position, and, as Early's brigade, which, by direction of General Johnston, had swept around by the rear of the woods through which Elzey had passed, appeared on the field, his line of march bore upon the flank of the enemy, now retiring in that quarter. This movement by my extreme left was masked by the trend of the woods from many of our forces on the plateau; and bidding those of my staff and escort around me raise a loud cheer, I dispatched the information to the several commands, with orders to go forward in a common charge. Before the full advance of the Confederate ranks the enemy's whole line, whose right was already yielding, irretrievably broke, fleeing across Bull Run by every available direction. Major Sykes's regulars, aided by Sherman's brigade, made a steady and handsome withdrawal, protecting the rear of the routed forces, and enabling many to escape by the Stone Bridge. Having ordered in pursuit all the troops on the field, I went to the Lewis house, and, the battle being ended, turned over the command to General Johnston. Mounting afresh horse,- the fourth on that day,- I started to press the pursuit which was being made by our infantry and cavalry, some of the latter having been sent by General Johnston from Lewis's Ford to intercept the enemy on the turnpike. I was soon overtaken, however, by a courier bearing a message from Major T. G. Rhett, General Johnston's chief-of-staff on duty at Manassas railroad station, informing me of a report that a large Federal force, having pierced our lower line on Bull Run, was moving upon Camp Pickens, my depot of supplies near Manassas. I returned, and com- municated this important news to General Johnston. Upon consultation it was deemed best that I should take Ewell's and Holmes's brigades, which were hastening up to the battle-field, but too late for the action, and fall on this force of the enemy, while reenforcements should be sent me from the pursuing forces, who were to be recalled for that purpose. To head off the danger and gain time, I hastily mounted a force of infantry behind the cavalrymen then present, but, on approaching the line of march near McLean's Ford, which the Federals must have taken, I learned that the news THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. TthE MAIN HATrLE-GROUND.-NO. 1. View of the Henry house, looking west fron. the apat parallel with the rail fence (in the middle ground on the where General Wee fell. The Boll Run mountains and left. Jelt within the rail fence is where G(riflin, and Thoroughfare (Gap appear In the dietanie. The Sutdley Rickettas batteries were planted. Near the honea road, a few ron beyond the hoste, under the hilt, runs stauds theUnion.Monuent, co.unmeeoratingthebattle. was a false alarm caught from the return of General Jones's forces to this side of the Run, the similarity of the uniforms and the direction of their march having convinced some nervous person that they were a force of the enemy. It was now almost dark, and too late to resume the broken pursuit; on my return I met the coming forces, and, as they were very tired, I ordered them to halt and bivouac for the night where they were. After giving such attention as I could to the troops, I started for Manassas, where I arrived about 10 o'clock, and found Mr. Davis at my headquarters with General Johnston. Arriving from Richmond late in the afternoon, Mr. Davis had immediately galloped to the field, accompanied by Colonel Jordan. They had met between Manassas and the battle-field the usual number of strag- glers to the rear, whose appearance belied the determined array then sweep- ing the enemy before it, but Mr. Davis had the happiness to arrive in time to witness the last of the Federals disappearing beyond Bull Run. The next morning I received from his hand at our breakfast-table my commission, dated July 21st, as General in the Army of the Confederate States, and after his return to Richmond the kind congratulations of the Secretary of War and of General Lee, then acting as military adviser to the President. It was a point made at the time at the North that, just as the Confederate troops were about to break and flee, the Federal troops anticipated them by doing so, being struck into this precipitation by the arrival upon their flank 2i6 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. THE MAIN tAc ME-GstROUND.-NO, '2. View of the nobinson houwe, looking north from the left. The foreground was between the centers of the spot on the Henry plateau where, General Bee fell. At positions. 1 P. x. this ground lay between the hostile lines, which As these two views are taken frow the ante spot, the were (roughly spetaking) parallel with the sides of the reader wilt best understand their relation by holtling pleture : Confederates on the right, Union forces on the the pages at a right angle to each other. of the Shenandoah forces marching from railroad trains halted en route with that aim-errors that have been repeated by a number of writers, and by an ambitious but superficial French author. There were certain sentiments of a personal character clustering about this first battle, and personal anxiety as to its issue, that gladly accepted this theory. To this may be added the general readiness to accept a sentimental or ultra-dramatic explanation-a sorcery wrought by the delay or arrival of some force, or the death or coming of somebody, or any other single magical event-whereby history is easily caught, rather than to seek an understanding of that which is but the gradual result of the operation of many forces, both of opposing design and actual collision, modified more or less by the falls of chance. The personal sentiment, though natural enough at the time, has no place in any military estimate, or place of any kind at this day. The battle of Manassas was, like any other battle, a progression and development from the deliberate counter-employment of the military resources in hand, affected by accidents, as always, but of a kind very different from those referred to. My line of battle, which twice had not only withstood the enemy's attack, but had taken the offensive and driven him back in disorder, was becoming momentarily stronger from the arrival, at last, of the reenforcements provided for; and if the enemy had remained on the field till the arrival of Ewell and 217 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. Holmes, they would have been so strongly outflanked that many who escaped would have been destroyed or captured. Though my adversary's plan of battle was a good one as against a passive defensive opponent, such as he may have deemed I must be from the respec- tive numbers and positions of our forces, it would, in my judgment, have been much better if, with more dash, the flank attack had been made by the Stone Bridge itself and the ford immedi- ately above it. The plan adopted, how- ever, favored above all things the easy execution of the offensive operations I had designed and ordered against his left flank and rear at Centreville. His turning column -18,000 strong, and presumably his best troops-was thrown off by a long ellipse through a narrow forest road to Sudley Ford, from which it moved down upon my left flank, and was thus dislo- cated from his main body. This severed movement of his forces not only left his exposed left and rear at Centreville weak E against the simultaneous offensive of my heaviest forces upon it, which I had or- COLONL F. SIARTOW. FROM A PHOTO(AI. dered, but the movement of his returning column would have been disconcerted, and paralyzed by the early sound of this heavy conflict in its rear, and it could not even have made its way back so as to be available for manceuvre before the Centreville fraction had been thrown back upon it in disorder. A new army is very liable to panic, and, in view of the actual result of the battle, the conclusion can hardly be resisted that the panic which fell on the Federal army would thus have seized it early in the day, and with my forces in such a position as wholly to cut off its retreat upon Washington. But the commander of the front line on my right, who had been ordered to hold himself in readiness to initiate the offensive at a moment's notice, did not make the move expected of him because through accident he failed to receive his own immediate order to advance. + The Federal commander's flanking movement, being thus uninter- rupted by such a eounter-movement as I had projected, was further assisted through the rawness and inadequacy of our staff organization through which I was left unacquainted with the actual state of affairs on my left. The Federal attack, already thus greatly favored, and encouraged, moreover, by the rout of General Bee's advanced line, failed for two reasons: their forces were not handled with concert of masses (a fault often made later on both sides), and the individual action Of the Confederate troops was superior, and for a very palpable reason. That one army was fighting for union and the other for disunion is a political expression; the actual fact on the battle-field, in the face of cannon and musket, was that the Federal troops came as invaders, General B. S. Ewell. See statement of Major Campbell Brown, page 259.-EDITOR. 2i8 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. and the Southern troops stood as defenders of their homes, and further than this we need not go. The armies were vastly greater than had ever before fought on this continent, and were the largest volunteer armies ever assem- bled since the era of regular armies. The personal material on both sides was of exceptionally good character, and collectively superior to that of any subsequent period of the war. D The Confederate army was filled with generous youths who had answered the first call to arms. For certain kinds of field duty they were not as yet adapted, many of them having at first come with their baggage and servants; these they had to dispense with, but, not to offend their susceptibilities, I then exacted the least work from them, apart from military drills, even to the prejudice of important field- works, when I could not get sufficient negro labor; they " had come to fight, and not to handle the pick and shovel," and their fighting redeemed well their shortcomings as intrenchers. Before I left that gallant army, however, it had learned how readily the humbler could aid the nobler duty. As to immediate results and trophies, we captured a great many stands of arms, batteries, equipments, standards, and flags, one of which was sent to me, through General Longstreet, as a personal compliment by the Texan " crack shot," Colonel B. F. Terry, who lowered it from its mast at Fairfax Court House, by cutting the halyards by means of his unerring rifle, as our troops next morning reoccupied that place. We captured also many pris- oners, including a number of surgeons, whom (the first time in war) we treated not as prisoners, but as guests. Calling attention to their brave devotion to their wounded, I recommended to the War Department that they be sent home without exchange, together with some other prisoners, who had shown personal kindness to Colonel Jones, of the 4th Alabama, who had been mortally wounded early in the day. SUBSEQUENT RELATIONS OF MR. DAVIS AND THE WRITER. THE military result of the victory was far short of what it should have been. It established as an accomplished fact, on the indispensable basis of military success, the Government of the Confederate States, which before was but a political assertion; but it should have reached much further. The immediate pursuit, but for the false alarm which checked it, would have con- tinued as far as the Potomac, but must have stopped there with no greater result than the capture of more prisoners and material. The true immediate fruits of the victory should have been the dispersion of all the Federal forces south of Baltimore and east of the Alleghanies, the liberation of the State of Maryland, and the capture of Washington, which could have been made only by the Upper Potomac. And from the high source of this achievement other decisive results would have continued to flow. From my experience in the I This battle was noteworthy for the number ton, Fitzhugh Lee, Thomas Jordan, R. E. Rodes, of participants whose names are now prominently E. P. Alexander, and others. On the Federal side associated with the war. On the Confederate side, were Generals McDowell, W. T. Sherman, Burn- besides Generals Johnston and Beauregard, were side, Hunter, Heintzelman, Howard, Franklin, Generals Stonewall Jackson, Longstreet, Ewell, Slocum, Keyes, Hunt, Barry, Fry, Sykes, Barnard, Early, J. E. B. Stuart, Kirby Smith, Wade Hamp- Wadsworth, and others. -EDITORS. 219 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. Mexican war I had great confidence in intelligent volunteer troops, if rightly handled; and with such an active and victorious war-engine as the Con- federate Army of the Potomac could have immediately been made,- reen- forced, as time went, by numbers and discipline,- the Federal military power in the East could never have reached the head it took when McClellan was allowed to organize and discipline at leisure the powerful army that, in the end, wore out the South. In war one success makes another easier, and its right use is as the step to another, until final achieve- ment. This was the use besought by me in the plan of cam- paign I have men- ' tioned as presented '' to Mr. Davis oon the l4th of July, a few days before the bat- tle, but rejected by him as impractica- ble, and as rather of- fering opportunity FAIRFAX COIRHOSE to the enemy to crush us. To supply the deficiency of transportation (our vehicles being few in number, and many so poor as to break down in ordinary camp service), I myself had assigned to special duty Colonel (since Governor) James L. Kemper, of Virginia, who quickly obtained for me some two hundred good wagons, to which number I had limited him so as not to arouse again the jealousy of the President's staff. If my plan of operations for the capture of Washington had been adopted, I should have considered myself thereby authorized and free to obtain, as I readily could have done, the transportation necessary. As it was-though the difficult part of this "impracticable " plan of operations had been proven feasible, that is, the concentration of the Shen- andoah forces with mine (wrung later than the eleventh hour through the alarm over the march upon Richmond, and discounteneanced again nervously at the twelfth hour by another alarm as to how " the enemy may vary his plans" in consequence), followed by the decisive defeat of the main Federal forces - nevertheless the army remained rooted in the spot, although we had more than fifteen thousand troops who had been not at all or but little in the battle and were perfectly organized, while the remaining commands, in the high spirits of victory, could have been reorganized at the tap of the drum, and many with improved captured arms and equipments. I had already urged my views with unusual persistency, and acted on them against all but an express order to the contrary; and as they had been deliberately 220 F THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. rejected in their ultimate scope by Mr. Davis as the commander-in-chief, I did not feel authorized to urge them further than their execution had been allowed, unless the subject were broached anew by himself. But there was no intimation of any such change of purpose, and the army, consistently with this inertia, was left unprovided for manceuvre with transportation for its ammunition; its fortitude, moreover, as a new and volunteer army, while spending sometimes 24 hours without food, being only less wonderful than the commissary administration at Richmond, from which such a state of affairs could proceed even two weeks after the battle of Manassas. Although certain political superstitions about not consolidating the North may then have weighed against the action I proposed, they would have been light against a true military policy, if such had existed in the head of the Govern- ment. Apart from an active material ally, such as the colonies had afield and on sea in the War of Independence with Great Britain, a country in fatal war must depend on the vigor of its warfare; the more inferior the country, the bolder and more enterprising the use of its resources, especially if its frontiers are convenient to the enemy. I was convinced that our success lay in a short, quick war of decisive blows, before the Federals, with their vast resources, could build up a great military power; to which end a concerted use of our forces, immediate and sustained, was necessary, so that, weaker though we were at all separate points, we might nevertheless strike with superior strength at some chosen decisive point, and after victory there reach for victory now made easier elsewhere, and thus sum up success. Instead of this, which in war we call concentration, our actual policy was diffusion, an inferior Confederate force at each separate point defensively confronting a superior Federal force; our power daily shrinking, that of the enemy increasing; the avowed Federal policy being that of " attrition," their bigger masses grinding our smaller, one by one, to naught. Out of this state we never emerged, when the direction of the Government was, as almost always, necessary, excepting when "Richmond" was immediately in danger. Thus, in the fall of 1861, about three months after the battle of Manassas,- after throwing my whole force forward to Fairfax Court House, with out- posts flaunting our flags on the hills in sight of Washington, in order to chafe the Federals to another battle, but without success,- I proposed that the army should be raised to an effective of 60,000 men, by drawing 20,000 for the immediate enterprise from several points along the seaboard, not even at that time threatened, and from our advanced position be swiftly thrown across the Potomac at a point which I had had carefully surveyed for that purpose, and moved upon the rear of Washington, thus forcing McClellan to a decisive engagement before his organization (new enlistments) was completed, and while our own army had the advantage of discipline and prestige -seasoned soldiers, whose term, however, would expire in the early part of the coming summer. This plan, approved by General Gustavus W. Smith (then imme- diately commanding General Johnston's own forces) as well as by General Johnston, was submitted to Mr. Davis in a conference at my headquarters, but rejected because he would not venture to strip those points of the troops 221 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. we required. Even if those points had been captured, though none were then even threatened, they must have reverted as a direct consequence to so deci- sive a success. I was willing, then, should it have come to that, to exchange even Richmond temporarily for Washington. Yet it was precisely from simi- lar combinations and elements that the army was made up, to enable it the next spring, under General Lee, to encounter McClellan at the very door of Richmond. If that which was accepted as a last defensive resort against an overwhelming aggressive army had been used in an enterprising offensive against that same army while yet in the raw, the same venture had been made at less general risk, less cost of valuable lives, and with greater certain results. The Federal army would have had no chance meanwhile to become tempered to that magnificent military machine which, through all its defeats and losses, remained sound, and was stronger, with its readily assimilating new strength, at the end of the war than ever before; the pressure would have been lifted from Kentucky and Missouri, and we should have maintained what is called an active defensive warfare, that is, should have taken and kept the offensive against the enemy, enforcing peace. No people ever warred for independence with more relative advantages than the Confederates; and if, as a military question, they must have failed, then no country must aim at freedom by means of war. We were one in sentiment as in territory, starting out, not with a struggling administration of doubtful authority, but with our ancient State governments and a fully organized central government. As a military question, it was in no sense a civil war, but a war between two countries-for conquest on one side, for self-preservation on the other. The South, with its great material resources, its defensive means of mountains, rivers, railroads, and telegraph, with the immense advantage of the interior lines of war, would be open to discredit as a people if its failure could not be explained otherwise than by mere material contrast. The great Frederick, at the head of a little people, not only beat back a combination of several great military powers, but conquered and kept territory; and Napoleon held combined Europe at the feet of France till his blind ambition overleaped itself. It may be said that the South had no Fredericks or Napoleons; but it had at least as good com- manders as its adversary. Nor was it the fault of our soldiers or people. Our soldiers were as brave and intelligent as ever bore arms; and, if only for reasons already mentioned, they did not lack in determination. Our people bore a devotion to the cause never surpassed, and which no war-mak- ing monarch ever had for his support; they gave their all-even the last striplings under the family roofs filling the ranks voided by the fall of their fathers and brothers. But the narrow military view of the head of the Govern- ment, which illustrated itself at the outset by ordering from Europe, not 100,000 or 1,000,000, but 10,000 stands of arms, as an increase upon 8000, its first estimate, was equally narrow and timid in its employment of our armies. The moral and material forces actually engaged in the war made our success a moral certainty, but for the timid policy which-ignoring strategy as a science and boldness of enterprise as its ally -could never be brought to 222 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. view the whole theater of war as one subject, of which all points were but integral parts, or to hazard for the time points relatively unimportant for the purpose of gathering for an overwhelming and rapid stroke at some decisive point; and which, again, with characteristic mis-elation, would push a vic- torious force directly forward into unsupported and disastrous operations, instead of using its victory to spare from it strength sufficient to secure an equally important success in another quarter. The great principles of war are truths, and the same to-day as in the time of Cwesar or Napoleon, notwith- standing the ideas of some thoughtless persons-their applications being but intensified by the scientific discoveries affecting transportation and commu- nication of intelligence. These principles are few and simple, however various their deductions and application. Skill in strategy consists in seeing through the intricacies of the whole situation, and bringing into proper com- bination forces and influences, though seemingly unrelated, so as to apply these principles, and with boldness of decision and execution appearing with the utmost force, and, if possible, superior odds, before the enemy at some strategic, that is, decisive point. And although a sound military plan may not be always so readily conceived, yet any plan that offers decisive results, if it agree with the principles of war, is as plain and intelligible as these principles themselves, and no more to be rejected than they. There still remains, of course, the hazard of accident in execution, and the appre- hension of the enemy's movements upsetting your own; but hazard may also favor as well as disfavor, and will not unbefriend the enterprising any more than the timid. It was this fear of possible consequences that kept our forces scattered in inferior relative strength at all points of the compass, each hold- ing its bit of ground till by slow local process our territory was taken and our separate forces destroyed, or, if captured, retained by the enemy without exchange in their process of attrition. To stop the slow consumption of this passive mode of warfare I tried my part, and, at certain critical junctures, proposed to the Government active plans of operation looking to such results as I have described,- sometimes, it is true, in relation to the employment of forces not under my control, as I was the soldier of a cause and people, not of a monarch nor even of a government. Two occasions there were when cer- tain of the most noted Federal operations, from their isolated or opportune character, might, with energy and intelligent venture on the Confederate side, have been turned into fatal disaster; among them Grant's movement in front of Vicksburg, and his change of base from the north to the south of the James River, where I was in command, in his last campaign against Rich- mond. I urged particularly that our warfare was sure of final defeat unless we attempted decisive strokes that might be followed up to the end, and that, even if earlier defeat might chance from the risk involved in the execution of the necessary combinations, we ought to take that risk and thereby either win or end an otherwise useless struggle. But, in addition to the radical divergence of military ideas,- the passive defensive of an intellect timid of risk and not at home in war, and the active defensive reaching for success through enterprise and boldness, according to the lessons taught us in the campaigns of the great masters,- there was a personal feeling that now gave 223 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. EIwoS OF THE STONE IAIVER. LOOKING ALONG THE WARRENTON TUENPIKE TOWARD THE BATTLE-FIELD. ThIsvlewirfroeaphotogralhtasken in March.Itt.,the thebridg e wa plated on the left in the felled tiolber, reghn having teen left open to the Union forees by the which foruted an altisacrosa the road. The battle withdrawal of the Confederates. The Confederate bat- was opened from beyon..d tie small homse, Van Pelts, tery which in the tirst battle of Boll Rua coomnandeud on the right, by the Rhtode 1.4aid troops.- EDITORs. cold hearing, or none, to any recommendations of mine. Mr. Davis's friend- ship, warm at the early period of the war, was changed, some time after the battle of Manassas, to a corresponding hostility from several personal causes, direct and indirect, of which I need mention but one. My report of Manassas having contained, as part of its history, a statement of the submission of the full plan of campaign for concentrating our forces, crushing successively McDowell and Patterson and capturing Washington, Mr. Davis strangely took offense thereat; and, now that events had demonstrated the practica- bility of that plan, he sought to get rid of his self-accused responsibility for rejecting it, by denying that any such had been submitted- an issue, for that matter, easily settled by my production of the contemporaneous report of Colonel James Chesnut, the bearer of the mission, who, moreover, at the time of this controversy was on Mr. Davis's own staff, where he remained. Mr. Davis made an endeavor to suppress the publication of my report of the battle of Manassas. The matter came up in a secret debate in the Confeder- ate Congress, where a host of friends were ready to sustain me; but I sent a telegram disclaiming any desire for its publication, and advising that the safety of the country should be our solicitude, and not personal ends. Thenceforth Mr. Davis's hostility was watchful and adroit, neglecting no opportunity, great or small; and though, from motives all its opposite, it was 224 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. not exposed during the war by any murmurs of mine, it bruited sometimes in certain quarters of its own force. Thus, When in January, 1862, the Western representatives expressed a desire that I should separate myself for a time from my Virginia forces and go to the defense of the Mississippi Valley from the impending offensive of Halleck and Grant, it was furthered by the Execu- tive with inducements which I trusted,-in disregard of Senator Toombs's sagacious warning, that under this furtherance lurked a purpose to effect my downfall, urged in one of his communications through his son-in-law, Mr. Alexander, in words as impressive as they proved prophetic: " Urge General Beauregard to decline all proposals and solicitations. The Blade of Joab. Verbuin Sapienti." After going through the campaign of Shiloh and Corinth, not only with those inducements unfulfilled, but with vital drawbacks from the Government, including the refusal of necessary rank to competent subor- dinates to assist in organizing my hastily collected and mostly raw troops, I was forced, the following June, in deferred obedience to the positive order of my physicians, to withdraw from my immediate camp to another point in my department for recovery from illness, leaving under the care of my lieuten- ant, General Bragg, my army, then unmenaced and under reorganization with a view to an immediate offensive I had purposed. In anticipation and exclu- sion of the receipt of full dispatches following my telegram, the latter was tortuously misread, in a manner not creditable to a school-boy and repug- nant to Mr. Davis's exact knowledge of syntax, so as to give pretext to the shocking charge that I had abandoned my army, and a telegram was sent in naked haste directly to General Bragg, telling him to retain the permanent command of the army. The "Blade of Joab"had given its thrust. The repre- sentatives in Congress from the West and South-west applied to Mr. Davis in a body for my restoration; and when, disregarding his sheer pretext that I had abandoned my army, they still insisted, Mr. Davis declared that I should not be restored if the whole wvorld should ask it ! This machination went to such length that it was given out in Richmond that I had softening of the brain and had gone crazy. So carefully was this report fostered (one of its tales being that I would sit all day stroking a pheasant \) that a friend of mine, a member of the Confederate Congress, thought it his duty to write me a special letter respecting the device, advising me to come directly to Rich- mond to confound it by my presence -a proceeding which I disdained to take. I had not only then, but from later, still more offensive prov- ocation, imperative cause to resign, and would have done so but for a sense of public obligation. Indeed, in my after fields of action the same hostility was more and more active in its various embarrassments, reckless that the strains inflicted upon me bore upon the troops and country depending on me and relatively upon the cause, so that I often \ This silly tale was borrowed from an incident to place it in a cage, as I intended sending it aR a of Shiloh. Toward the end of the first day's bat- pleasant token of the battle to the family of Judge tle a soldier had found a pheasant cowering, ap- Milton Brown, of Jackson, Tennessee, from whom parently paralyzed under the ceaseless din, and I had received as their guest, while occupying that brought it to my headquarters as a present to place, the kindest attentions; but in the second me. It was a beautiful bird, and I gave directions day's conflict the poor waif was lost.- G. T. B. VOL. 1. 15 225 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. dreaded failure more from my own Government behind me than from the enemy in my front; and, when success came in spite of this, it was acknowl- edged only by some censorious official " inquiry " contrasting with the repeated thanks of the Congress. I was, however, not the only one of the highest military rank with whom Mr. Davis's relations were habitually unwholesome. It is an extraordinary fact that during the four years of war Mr. Davis did not call together the five generals [see page 241] with a view to determining the best military policy or settling upon a decisive plan of operations involv- ing the whole theater of war, though there was often ample opportunity for it. We needed for President either a military man of a high order, or a politician of the first class without military pretensions, such as Howell Cobb. The South did not fall crushed by the mere weight of the North; but it was nibbled away at all sides and ends because its executive head never gathered and wielded its great strength under the ready advantages that greatly reduced or neutralized its adversary's naked physical superiority. It is but another of the many proofs that timid direction may readily go with physical cour- age, and that the passive defensive policy may make a long agony, but can never win a war. PosTrsciPT.-Since the publication of the foregoing pages in " The Century" for November, 1884, General J. E. Johnston, in the course of a paper also con- tributed to " The Century" [see page 240], took occasion, for the first time, to set up with positiveness and circumstantiality the claim to having exercised a controlling connection with the tactics of all the phases of the battle of the 21st of July, 1861. Respecting such a pretension I shall be content for the present to recall that, while entirely at variance with the part I have ascribed to him in relation to that field, it is logically untenable, at this day, when confronted with the records of the period. In my own official report of the battle closely contemporaneous with the events narrated -a report that was placed in his hands for perusal before transmission- it is distinctly related that for certain reasons, chiefly military, General Johnston had left in my hands for the impending conflict the command of the Confederate forces. The precise cir- cumstances of my direct conduct of and responsibility for the battle are stated in such terms that, had I not been in actual direction of the day's operations on the part of the Confederates, General Johnston must have made the issue squarely then and there in his own official report. And all the more incumbent upon him was the making of such an issue, it seems to me, then or never, in view of the fact that the Confederate Secretary of War on the 24th of July, 1861, wrote me in these words: "1M y DEAR GENERAL: Accept my congratulations for the glorious and most brilliant victory achieved by you. The country will bless and honor you for it. Believe me, dear General, " Truly your friend, L. P. WALDuR." Further, General Lee thus addressed me: "MY DEAR GENERAL: I cannot express the joy I feel at the brilliant victory of the 21st. The skill, courage, and endurance displayed by yourself excite my highest admiration. You and your troops have the gratitude of the whole country, and I offer to all my heartfelt congratula- tions at their success. . . . Very truly yours, R. E. Lzz." 226 THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. Of the exact purport of these two letters General Johnston could not have been ignorant when he wrote his report of the battle. Nor could he have been unaware that the leading Southern newspapers had in effect attributed to me the chief direction of that battle on the Confederate side. Therefore, if it were the gross historical error which, twenty odd years after the affair, General Johnston characterizes it to be, and one that imputed to him the shirking of a duty which he could not have left unassumed without personal baseness, certainly that was the time for him by a few explicit words in his official report to dispose of so affronting an error. In that report, however, no such exigent, peremptory statement of his relation to the battle is to be found. On the other hand, upon page 57 of his "Narrative" published in 1874 (D. Appleton Co.), may be found, I fear, the clew to the motive of his actual waiver of command in this curious paragraph: " If the tactics of the Federals had been equal to their strategy, we should have been beaten. If, instead of being brought into action in detail, their troops had been formed in two lines, with a proper reserve, and had assailed Bee and Jackson in that order, the two Southern brigades must have been swept from the field in a few minutes, or enveloped. General McDowell would have made such a formation, probably, had he not greatly underestimated the strength of his enemy." Coupled with the disquieting, ever-apprehensive tenor of his whole corre- spondence with the Confederate War Department, from the day he assumed command in the Valley of Virginia in May, 1861, down to the close of the struggle in 1865, the fair inference from such language as that just cited from his " Narrative " is that General Johnston came to Manassas beset with the idea that our united forces would not be able to cope with the Federal army, and that we should be beaten- a catastrophe in which he was not solicitous to figure on the pages of history as the leading and responsible actor. Origi- nally and until 1875, I had regarded it as a generous though natural act on the part of General Johnston, in such a juncture, to leave me in command and responsible for what might occur. The history of military operations abounds in instances of notable soldiers who have found it proper to waive chief com- mand under similar conditions CONVrERATE QtTAKK GUNS. VROM X PHOTOGRAPH. isdnted blaWk anw the breech was covered with brusa to conceal its ehauretrtr frow owervatihui by bltho'nit 227 22.9 INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. BY JOHN D. IMBODEN, BRIGADIER-GENERAL, C. S. A. FROM the day of his arrival at Winchester [see page 124], General John- ston was ceaseless in his labors to improve the efficiency of his little army, in which he was greatly assisted by several staff-officers who afterward rose to high distinction. The two most active of these subordinates were Majors W. H. C. Whiting and E. Kirby Smith, the former of whom as a major-general fell mortally wounded at the capture of Fort Fisher in North Carolina, and the latter as a lieutenant-general commanded the Trans- Mississippi army when the final collapse came. During our withdrawal from Harper's Ferry, on June 16th, we were deflected from our direct line of march, and held in line of battle a day at Bunker Hill, a few miles north of Winchester, to receive an expected assault from General Patterson, who had crossed the Potomac, but who went back without attacking us. Again on July 92d we were marched to Darksville, about midway to Martinsburg, to meet Patterson, where we lay in line of battle till the 5th, when General Patterson, after a slight "brush" with Jackson, again recrossed the Potomac. We returned to Winchester, and to our arduous drilling. After midnight of July 17th, General Bee, my brigade commander, sent for me to go with him to headquarters, whither he had been summoned. Several brigade commanders were assembled in a room with General Johnston, and a conference of one or two hours was held. When General Bee joined me on the porch to return to our quarters, I saw he was excited, and I asked him, " What is up" He took my arm, and, as we walked away, told me we would march next day to the support of General Beauregard. He repeated a telegram General Johnston had received from Adjutant-General Cooper about mid- night. This was the famous dispatch that has led to so much controversy between Mr. Davis and General Johnston, as to whether it was a peremptory order, or simply permission to Johnston to go to Beauregard's support. I quote it, and leave the reader to his own construction: " General Beauregard is attacked; to strike the enemy a decisive blow, a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to Culpeper Court House, either by railroad or by Warrenton. In all the arrange- muents exercise your discretion." 229 INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. On the next day, the 18th of July, we left Winchester for Manassas. It was late in the afternoon before my battery took up the line of march-as I now recollect, with the rear-guard, as had been the case when we left Harper's Ferry a month before. It was thought probable that Patterson, who was south of the Potomac, and only a few miles distant, would follow us. But J. E. B. Stuart and Ashby with the cavalry so completely masked our movement that it was not suspected by Patterson until July 20th, the day before the Bull Run fight, and then it was too late for him to interfere. On the second day of the march an order reached me at Rectortown, Virginia, through Brigadier-General Barnard E. Bee, to collect the four field- batteries of Johnston's army into one column, and, as senior artillery captain, to march them by country roads that were unobstructed by infantry or trains as rapidly as possible to Manassas Junction, and to report my arrival, at any hour, day or night, to General Bee, who was going forward by rail with his brigade. Having assembled the batteries in the night, I began the march at dawn of Saturday, July 20th, the day before the battle. About 8 in the morning we reached a village in Fauquier county -Salem, I think it was. The whole population turned out to greet us. Men, women, and children brought us baskets, trays, and plates loaded with their own family breakfasts. With the improvidence of raw campaigners, we had finished the night before our three days' cooked rations; so I ordered a halt for thirty minutes to enjoy the feast. The Staunton ArtilleryJ (my own battery) was at the head of the column, and, being largely composed of young men of high social standing, was especially honored by the ladies of the village, conspicuous among whom were the young daughters of Colonel John A. Washington, late of Mount Ver- non. I noticed that some of the young fellows of the battery, lingering round the baskets borne by these young ladies, who bade them die or conquer in the fight, seemed very miserable during the remainder of the march. No doubt many of them, during the battle, felt that it would be better to die on the field than retreat and live to meet those enthusiastic girls again. I make special note of that breakfast because it was the last food any of us tasted till the first Bull Run had been fought and won, 36 hours later. It was 1 o'clock that night when the head of my little column reached General Bee's headquarters, about one mile north-east of Manassas Junction. He was established in the log-cabin to which afterward he was brought when he was mortally wounded, and to which I shall again allude. General Bee ordered us to unharness the horses and bivouac in the fence corners, adding, " You will need all the rest you can get, for a great battle will begin in the morning." A little after daybreak we were aroused by the sharp, ringing report of a great Parrott gun across Bull Run, two miles away, and the whizzing of a 30-pounder elongated shell over the tree-tops, 400 or 500 yards to our left. Instantly every man was on his feet, and in five minutes the horses were ) It numbered 140 officers and men. Six were col- chanics, whose mechanical skill was of much ser- lege graduates, and several had left college to enter vice. I had providedthem with red flannel shirts at the army. The majority were young men of leisure Harper's Ferry, because our uniforms were too fine or mercantile clerks. About forty were young me- for camp life and for service in the field.-J. D. L 230 INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. harnessed and hitched to the guns and caissons. General Bee beckoned to me to come up to the porch, where he was standing in his shirt-sleeves, having also been aroused by the shot. He rapidly informed me of the disposition of our troops of Johnston's army so far as they had arrived at Manassas. His own brigade had been brought forward by rail the evening before. Above all, he was dissatisfied at the prospect of not participating prominently in the battle, saying that he had been ordered to the Stone Bridge, three or four miles away on our extreme left, to cover the left flank of the army from any movement that might be made against it. And as he had been directed to take a battery with him, he had selected mine, and wished me to move at once. He gave me a guide, and said he would follow immediately with his infantry. When I told him we had been 24 hours without food for men or horses, he said he would order supplies to follow, remarking, " You will have plenty of time to cook and eat, to the music of a battle in which we shall probably take little or no part." Away we went, retracing our steps to the Junction, and by a westerly detour striking into the Sudley road, at a point half-way between the Junction and the scene of the battle. After an hour or so we ascended the hill to the Lewis house, or " Portici." Here a courier at full speed met us with news that the whole Federal army seemed to be marching north-westerly on the other side of Bull Run. Halting my men, I rode to the top of the hill, and had a full view of a long column of glittering bayonets moving up on the north side of the creek. Glancing down the valley, I saw Bee's brigade advancing, and galloped to meet him and report what I had seen. He divined the plans of cOEDWusRATE FORTtFICATtON AWLT MANASSAS JaunetFN ThL viesw t tri,,, a photograph taken in Marec.h 12. It trpnaete thi -nrk. antwttAialLy a" they were at tie tine f the battle. 231 INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUJN. NPW7;S o' TUE STONE hOUSE ON TU E TUURNPIKE. RON A. PIIoTOGtRAlI'l TAKEN IN MASRC'II, M1. The strean in the foreground Ig Youngts Braneh. The oStdley road rtwUe. a little to the left of the pieture. See map. page 204. McDowell, and, asking me to accompany him, rode rapidly past the Lewis house, across the hollow beyond it, and up the next hill through the pines, emerging on the summit immediately east of the Henry house. As the beau- tiful open landscape in front burst upon his vision, he exclaimed with enthu- siasm: " Here is the battle-field, and we are in for it I Bring up your guns as quickly as possible, and I'll look round for a good position." In less than twenty minutes I and my battery had passed the Lewis house, when I discovered Bee coming out of the pines. He stopped, and, placing his cap on his sword-point, waved it almost frantically as a signal to hurry for- ward. We went at a gallop, and were guided to a depression in the ground about one hundred yards to the north-east of the Henry house, where we unlimbered. With his keen military eye, General Bee had chosen the best possible position for a battery on all that field. We were almost under cover by reason of a slight swell in the ground immediately in our front, and not fifty feet away. Our shot passed not six inches above the surface of the ground on this " swell," and the recoil ran the guns back to still lower ground, where as we loaded only the heads of my men were visible to the enemy. We went into position none too soon; for, by the time we had unlimbered, Captain Ricketts, appearing on the crest of the opposite hill, came beautifully and gallantly into battery at a gallop, a short distance from the Matthews 232 233 INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. house on our side of the Sudley road, and about fifteen hundred yards to our front. I wanted to open on him while he was unlimbering, but General Bee objected till we had received a fire, and had thus ascertained the character and caliber of the enemy's guns. Mine, four in number, were all brass smooth- bore 6-pounders. The first round or two from the enemy went high over us. Seeing this, General Bee directed us to fire low and ricochet our shot and shrapnel on the hard, smooth, open field that sloped toward X the Warrenton turnpike in the valley between us. We did this, and the effect was very destruc-Z tive to the enemy. The rapid massing of Federal troops in our front soon led to very heavy fighting. My lit- tle battery was under a pitiless fire for a long time. Two guns from an Alexandria battery- Lathaints, I think - PLAN OF THE BULL RVX BA" 1FIX1.0. Itgibwdenl's seeend poygtlou iso t1nth linze of the Cotntf e,1'rtf frmtt as fttna took part in the conflict by Jaeksnn F01allY the Cnu'ftlerate line retevhed from 1lwhin ' ti on the north side of Zreetn the of the Mfill, a;d Ks resn on toe north sloe or flreement" ""'l UP) .13,100 a etrnva-t a-t to It Point bebhilid the Cshinn Young's Branch to our houn tNenudalz vxilv whe Gnffilt gt1d light and across the Rieketts had tfiell poition Gear the Henry houe-. Emos. turnpike, so long as Bee, Bartow, Evans, and Wheat were on that side, we firing over their heads; and about 11 o'clock two brass 12 pounder Napoleons from the New Orleans Washington Artillery unlimbered on our right, retiring, however, after a few rounds. We were hardly more than fairly engaged with Ricketts when Griffin's splen- did battery came to his aid, and took position full five hundred yards nearer to us, in a field on the left of the Sudley road. Ricketts had 6 Parrott guns, and Griffin had as many more, and, I think, 2 19-pounder howitzers besides. These last hurt us more than all the rifles of both batteries, since the shot and shell of the rifles, striking the ground at any angle over 15 or 20 degrees, almost without exception bored their way in several feet and did no harm. It is no exaggeration to say that hundreds of shells from these fine rifle-guns exploded in front of and around my battery on that day, but so deep in the ground that the fragments never came out. After the action the ground looked as though it had been rooted up by hogs. tv : I venture the opinion, after a good deal of or, at 1500 to 1800 yards, a similar battery of 12- observation during the war, that in open ground, pounder Napoleons, well handled, will in one hour at 1000 yards, a 6-pounder battery of smooth guns, discomfit double the number of the best rifles ever 234 INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. For at least a half-hour after our forces were driven across Young's Branch no Confederate soldier was visible from our position near the Henry house. The Staunton Artillery, so far as we could see, was " alone in its glory." Gen- eral Bee's order had been, " Stay here till you are ordered away." To my surprise, no orders had come, though, as I afterward learned, orders to with- draw had been sent three-quarters of an hour before through Major Howard, of Bee's staff, who had fallen, desperately wounded, on the way. Infantry was now massing near the Stone house on the turnpike, not five hundred yards away, to charge and capture us. On making this discovery and learning from the sergeants of pieces that our ammunition was almost entirely exhausted, there remained but one way to save our guns, and that was to run them off the field. More than half of our horses had been killed, only one or two being left in several of my six-horse teams. Those that we had were quickly divided among the guns and caissons, and we limbered up and fled. Then it was that the Henry house was riddled, and the old lady, Mrs. Henry, was mortally wounded; 4 for our line of retreat was so chosen that for 200 or 300 yards the house would conceal us from Griffin's battery, and, in a measure, shelter us from the dreaded fire of the infantry when they should reach the crest we had just abandoned. Several of Griffin's shot passed through the house, scattering shingles, boards, and splinters all around us. A rifle-shot from Ricketts broke the axle of one of our guns and dropped the gun in the field, but we saved the limber. The charging infantry gained the crest in front of the Henry house in time to give us one volley, but with no serious damage. We crossed the summit at the edge of the pines, midway behind the Henry and Robinson houses, and there met " Stonewall" Jackson at the head of his brigade, marching by the flank at a double-quick. Johnston and Beauregard had arrived upon the field, and were hurrying troops into position, but we had not yet seen them. When I met Jackson I felt very angry at what I then regarded as bad treat- ment from General Bee, in leaving us so long exposed to capture, and I expressed myself with some profanity, which I could see was displeasing to Jackson. He remarked, "I'll support your battery. Unlimber right here." We did so, when a perfect lull in the conflict ensued for 20 or 30 minutes- at least in that part of the field. It was at this time that McDowell committed, as I think, the fatal blunder of the day,by ordering both Ricketts's and Griffin's batteries to cease firing and move across the turnpike to the top of the Henry Hill, and take position on the west side of the house. The short time required to effect the change enabled Beauregard to arrange his new line of battle on the highest crest of the hill, put in the field. A smooth-bore gun never buries the battle opened near the Matthews house, Mrs. its projectiles in the ground, as the rifle does inva- Henry was carried into a ravine below the Sudley riablywhenfiredagainstslopingground. Ofeourse, road. A little later the house seemed to be the this advantage of the smooth-bore gun is limited safest place, and she was carried back to her bed. to its shorter range, and to an open field fight, de- For a time the house was in the line of the artillery fensive works not being considered.- J. D. I. fire from both sides. Mrs. Henry received five 4 Mrs. Judith Henry, bedridden from old age, wounds from fragments of shells, and died two was living in the house with her children. When hours after the battle.-EDITOR8. INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. southeast of the Henry and Robinson houses, in the edge of the pines. If one of the Federal batteries had been left north of Young's Branch, it could lli4ESE.4:EN. IttlAl have so swept the hill-top where we re-formed, that it would have greatly delayed, if not wholly have prevented, us from occupying the position. And if we had been forced back to the next P2 hill, on which stands the Lewis house, uring tellifrSherman, who had crossed Bull Run and food, andblcknot far above the Stone Bridge at a Z farm ford, would have had a fair swing at our right flank, to say noth- ing of the effect of the artillery playing When my retiring battery met Jack- son, and he assumed command of us, I reported that I had remaining only three rounds of ammunition for a sin- gle gun, and suggested that the cais- was-N cut E. ready) a Ind R Om A sons be sent to the rear for a supply put inOthe priNFATr OF pull her V IforgotHe said, "No, not now -wait till other m FRzle, ad asIwGanted tosee guns get here, and then you can with- draw your battery, as it has been so torn to pieces, and let your men rest." During the lull in front, my men lay about, exhausted from want of water and food, and black with powder, smoke, and dust. Lieutenant Harman and I had amused ourselves training one of the guns on a heavycolumn of the enemy, who were advancing toward us, in the direction of the Chinn house, but were still 1200 to 1500 yards away. While we were thus engaged, General Jackson rode up and said that three or four batteries were approaching rapidly, and that we might soon retire. I asked permission to fire the three rounds of shrapnel left to us, and he said, " Go ahead." I picked up a charge (the fuse was cut and ready) and rammed it home myself, remarking to Harman, " Tom, put in the primer and pull her off." I forgot to step back far enough from the muzzle, and, as I wanted to see the shell strike, I squatted to be under the smoke, and gave the word "Fire." Heavens! what a report. Finding myself full twenty feet away, I thought the gun had burst. But it was only the pent-up gas, that, escaping sideways as the shot cleared the muzzle, had struck my side and head with great violence. I recovered in time to see the shell explode in the enemy's ranks. The blood gushed out of my left ear, and from that day to this it has been totally deaf. The men fired the other two rounds, and limbered up and moved away, just as the Rockbridge Artillery, under Lieutenant Brockenbrough, came into position, followed a moment later by the Leesburg Artillery, under Lieutenant Henry Heaton. Pendleton, supposed by me still to be captain of the first, as Rogers was of the second, were not with 23 5 236 INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. their batteries when they unlimberedt But Heaton and Brockenbrough were equal to the occasion. Heaton had been under my command with his battery at the Point of Rocks, below Harper's Ferry, the previous May, and was a brave and skillful young officer. Several other batteries soon came into line, so that by the time Griffin and Ricketts were in position near the Henry house, we had, as I now remember, 26 fresh guns ready for them. The contest that ensued was terrific. Jackson ordered me to go from bat- tery to battery and see that the guns were properly aimed and the fuses cut the right length. This was the work of but a few minutes. On returning to the left of the line of guns, I stopped to ask General Jackson's permis- sion to rejoin my battery. The fight was just then hot enough to make him feel well. His eyes fairly blazed. He had a way of throwing up his left hand with the open palm toward the person he was addressing. And as he told me to go, he made this gesture. The air was full of flying missiles, and as he spoke he jerked down his hand, and I saw that blood was streaming from it. I exclaimed, " General, you are wounded." He replied, as he drew a handkerchief from his breast-pocket, and began to bind it up, " Only a scratch - a mere scratch," and galloped away along his line. To save my horse, I had hitched him in a little gully some fifty yards or more in the rear. And to reach him, I had to pass the six hundred infantry of Hampton's Legion, who were lying down in supporting distance of our artillery, then all in full play. While I was untying my horse, a shell exploded in the midst of Hampton's infantry, killing several and stampeding 13 or 20 nearest the spot. I tried to rally them; but one huge fellow, musket in hand, and with bayonet fixed, had started on a run. I threw myself in his front with drawn sword, and threatened to cut him down, whereupon he made a lunge at me. I threw up my left arm to ward off the blow, and the bayonet- point ran under the wristband of my red flannel shirt, and raked the skin of my arm from wrist to shoulder. The blow knocked me sprawling on the ground, and the fellow got away. I tore off the dangling shirt-sleeve, and was bare-armed as to my left, the remainder of the fight. I overtook my battery on the hill near the Lewis house, which was used as a hospital. In a field in front I saw General Johnston and his staff grouped on their horses, and under fire from numerous shells that reached that hill. I rode up to him, reported our ammunition all gone, and requested to know where I could find the ordnance wagons and get a fresh supply. Observing the sorry plight of the battery and the condition of the surviving men and horses, he directed me to remove them farther to the rear to a place of perfect safety, and return myself to the field, where I might be of some service. I took the battery back perhaps a mile, where we found a welcome little stream of water. Being greatly exhausted, I rested for perhaps an hour, and returned to the front with Sergeant Thomas Shumate. I Captain, afterward General, Pendleton had the Rockbridge Artillery. Captain Rogers, I also recently been made a colonel and chief of artillery learn, had a section somewhere lower down on to General Johnston, which separated him from Bull Run with the troops at the fords.- J. D. I. INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. When we regained the crest of the Henry plateau, the enemy had been swept from it, and the retreat had begun all along the line. We gazed upon the scene for a time, and, hearing firing between the Lewis house and the Stone Bridge, we rode back to see what it meant. Captain Lindsay Walker had arrived from Fredericksburg with his six-Parrott-gun battery, and from a high hill was shelling the fugitives beyond Bull Run as they were fleeing in wild disorder to the shelter of the nearest woods. Colonel J. E. B. Stuart, at the head of a body of yelling cavalry with drawn sabers, was sweeping round the base of the hill we were on, to cross the Run and fall upon the enemy. When Stuart disappeared in the distance, Shumate and I rode slowly back toward the battery. Nearing the Lewis house, we saw General Johnston and his staff coining toward us slowly, preceded a little by a gentleman on horse- back, who was lifting his hat to every one he met. From the likeness I had seen of President Jefferson Davis, I instantly recognized him and told Shumate who it was. With the impulsiveness of his nature, Shumate dashed up to the President, seized his hand, and huzzaed at the top of his voice. I could see that Mr. Davis was greatly amused, and I was convulsed with laughter. When they came within twenty steps of me, where I had halted to let the group pass, Shumate exclaimed, to the great amusement of all who heard him: " Mr. President, there's my captain, and I want to introduce you to him." The Presi- dent eyed me for a moment, as if he thought I was an odd-looking captain. I had on a battered slouch hat, a red flannel shirt with only one sleeve, cordu- roy trousers, and heavy cavalry boots, and was begrimed with burnt powder, dust, and the blood from my ear and arm, and must have been about as hard-looking a specimen of a captain as was ever seen. Nevertheless, the President grasped my hand with a cordial salutation, and after a few words passed on. We found our battery refreshing themselves on fat bacon and bread. After a hasty meal, I threw myself on a bag of oats, and slept tin broad daylight next morning, notwithstanding a drenching rain which beat upon me during the night. In fact, I was aroused in the morning by a messenger from ex-Governor Alston, of South Carolina, summoning me to the side of my gallant com- mander, Brigadier-General Bee, who had been mortally wounded near the Henry house, where Bartow had been instantly killed almost at the same moment. When I reached General Bee, who had been carried back to the cabin where I had joined him the night before, he was unconscious; in a few minutes, while I was holding his hand, he died. Some one during the night had told him that I had reflected on him for leaving our battery so long exposed to capture; and, at his request, messengers had been for hours hunting me in the darkness, to bring me to him, that I might learn from his own lips that he had sent Major Howard to order me to withdraw, when he was driven back across Young's Branch and the turnpike. I was grieved deeply not to have seen him sooner. Possibly the failure of his order to reach me was providential. For full three-quarters of an hour we had kept up 237 INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. a fire that delayed the enemy's movement across Young's Branch. But for that, they might have gained the Henry plateau, before Jackson and Hamp- ton came up, and before Bee and Bartow had rallied their disorganized troops. Minutes count as hours under such circumstances, and trifles often turn the scale in great battles. General Jackson's wound became very serious when inflammation set in. On hearing, three days after the fight, that he was suffering with it, I rode to his quarters, a little farm-house near Centreville. Although it was barely sunrise, he was out under the trees, bathing the hand with spring water. It was much swollen and very painful, but he bore himself stoically. His wife had arrived the night before. Of course, the battle was the only topic dis- cussed at breakfast. I remarked, in Mrs. Jackson's hearing, " General, how is it that you can keep so cool, and appear so utterly insensible to danger in such a storm of shell and bullets as rained about you when your hand was hit " He instantly became grave and reverential in his manner, and answered, in a low tone of great earnestness: " Captain, my religious belief teaches me to feel as safe in battle as in bed. God has fixed the time for my death. I do not concern myself about that, but to be always ready, no matter when it may overtake me." He added, after a pause, looking me full in the face: " Captain, that is the way all men should live, and then all would be equally brave." I felt that this last remark was intended as a rebuke for my profanity, when I had complained to him on the field of the apparent abandonment of my battery to capture, and I apologized. He heard me, and simply said, "Nothing can justify profanity." \ The battle was mainly fought by Johnston's troops from the Shenandoah. Two-thirds of the killed and wounded were his men and officers. Beau- regard's troops were strung out for several miles down the valley of Bull Run, and did not get up to our aid till near the end of the day. General Beauregard himself, who was in the thickest of the fight, came upon the field long before any of his troops arrived, except those he had posted under Evans to guard the Stone Bridge, and which, with Bee's troops, bore the brunt of the first attack. N I neverknewJackson to let profanity pass with- out a rebuke but once. The incident was reported to me by the chief actor in it, Major John A. Harman, who wasJackson'schief quartermaster. Ithappened at Edwards Ferry, on the Potomac, when our army was crossing into Maryland in the Antietam cam- paign. On the march to the river, for some in- fraction of orders about the manner of marching his division, Major-General A. P. Hill had been ordered in arrest by Jackson. This probably had put Jackson in a rulfled frame of mind. The day was very hot, and the ford was completely blocked with a wagon train, either of Hill's or some other division. On seeing the state of affairs, Jackson turned to Major Harman, and ordered him to clear the ford. Harman dashed in among the wagoners, kicking mules, aid apparently inextricable mass of wagons, and, in the voice of a stentor, poured out a volume of oaths that would have excited the admiration of the most scientific mule-driver. The effect was electrical. The drivers were frightened and swore as best they could, but far below the major's standard. The mules caught the inspira- tion from a chorus of familiar words, and all at once made a break for the Maryland shore, andin five minutes the ford was cleared, Jackson wit- nessed and heard it all. Harman rode back to join him, expecting a lecture, and, touching his hat, said: "The ford is clear, general! There's only one language that will make mules under- stand on a hot day that they must get out of the water." The general smiled, and said: "Thank you, major," and dashed into the water at the head of his staff, and rode across.- J. D. L 238 wICDENTS OF THE FIRST BuLL RUN. The uninformed, North and South, have wondered why Johnston and Beau- regard did not follow on to Washington. General Johnston, in his " Nar- rative," has clearly and conclusively answered that question. It was simply impossible. We had neither the food nor transportation at Manassas neces- sary to a forward movement. This subject was the cause of sharp irritation between our commanding generals at Manassas on the one hand, and Mr. Davis and his Secretary of War, Mr. Benjamin, on the other. There was a disposition in the quartermaster's and commissary departments at Richmond to deny the extent of the destitution of our army immediately after the bat- tle. To ascertain the exact facts of the case, General Johnston oranized a board of officers to investigate and report the condition of the transportation and commissariat ot the army at Manasas on the 21st of July, and their daily condition for two weeks thereafter. That Board was composed of Lieutenant-Colonel Robert B. Lee (a cousin of General R. E, Lee), represent, ing the commissary department, Major (afterward Major-General) W. L. Cabell, representing the quartermaster's department, and myself from the line. My associates on this Board were old United States army officers of acknowledged ability and large experience. We organized early in August, and made an exhaustive investigation and detailed report. I have a distinct recollection that we found that on the morning of the battle there was not at Manassas one full day's rations for the combined armies of Johnston and Beauregard, and that on no single day for the succeeding two weeKs was there as much as a three days' supply there. We found that there were not wagons and teams enough at any time to have transported three days' sup- plies for the troops if they had been put in motion away from the railroad. We found that for weeks preceding the 21st of July General Beauregard had been urgent and almost importunate in his demands on the quartermaster and commissary generals at Richmond for adequate supplies. We found that Colonel Northrop, the commissary general, had not only failed to send forward adequate supplies for such an emergency as arose when General Johnston brought his army from the valley, but that he had interfered with and inter- dicted the efforts of officers of the department who were with General Beau- regard to collect supplies from the rich and abundant region lying between the hostile armies. After reporting the facts, we unanimously concurred in the opinion that they proved the impossibility of a successful and rapid pursuit of the defeated enemy to Washington. This report, elaborately written out and signed, was forwarded to Richmond, and in a few days was returned by Mr. Judah P. Benjamin, Secretary of War, with an indorsement to the effect that the Board had transcended its powers by expressing an opinion as to what the facts did or did not prove, and sharply ordering us to strike out all that part of the report, and send only the facts ascertained by us. We met and complied with this order, though indignant at the repri- mand, and returned our amended report. This was the last I ever heard of it. It never saw daylight. Who suppressed it I do not knew. See statement from Colonel Northrop, page 261.-EDITORS. 239 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. BY JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, GENERAL, C. S. A. XVTHEN the State of Virginia seceded, being a citizen of that State, I resigned my office in the United States Army; and as I had seen a good deal of military service, in the Seminole and Mexican wars and in the West, the President of the Confederacy offered me a commission in the highest grade in his army. I ac- cepted the offer because the invasion of the South was inevitable. But I soon incurred Mr. Davis's dis- pleasure by protesting against an illegal act of his by which I was greatly wronged. 1 Still he retained me in important positions, although his official letters were harsh. In 1864, how- ever, he degraded me to the utmost of his power by summarily removing me from a high command. Believing that he was prompted to this act by animosity, and not by dispassionate opinion, I undertake to prove this ani- mosity by many extracts from his " Rise and Fall of the Confederacy" (D. Appleton Co.: 1881), and my comments thereon. Mr. Davis recites ("R. and F.," I., p. 307) the law securing to officers who might leave the United States Army to enter that of the Confederacy the same relative rank in the latter which they had in the former, provided their resignations had been offered in the six months next following the 14th of March, and then adds: " The provisions hereof are in the view entertained that the army was of the States, not of the Government, and was to secure to officers adhering to the Confederate States the same relative rank which they had before those States had withdrawn from the Union.... " How well the Government of the Confederacy observed both the letter and spirit of the law will be seen by reference to its action in the matter of appointments." Those of the five generals were the most prominent, of course. All had resigned within the time prescribed. Their relative rank in the United States , The letter of protest covered nine sheets of letter-paper, and the ninth sheet (to quote from the original) sums up the matter in these words: " My commission is made to bear such a date that my once inferiors in the service of the United States and of the Confederate States shall be above me. But it must not be dated as of the 21st of July nor be suggestive of the victory of Manassas. I return to my first position. I repeat that my right to my rank as General is estab- lished by the Acts of Congress of the 14th of March, 1861, and the 16th of May, 1861, and not by the nomination and confirmation of the 31st of August, 1861. To deprive me of that rank it was necessary for Congress to repeal those laws. That could be done by express legislative act alone. It was not done, it could not be done, by a mere vote in secret session upon a list of nominations. If the action against which I have protested be legal, it is not for me to question the expediency of degrading one who has served laboriously from the commencement of the war on this frontier, and borne a prominent part in the only great event of that war for the benefit of persons neither of whom has yet struck a blow for this Con- federacy. These views and the freedom with which they are presented may be unusual. So likewise is the occasion which calls them forth. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, " J. E. JOHNSTON, General. "To His Excellency, Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States, Richmond." This ninth sheet is all of the original letter that can be found by the present owner, Mrs. Bledsoe, widow of Dr. 'Albert T. Bledsoe, who, at the time the letter was written, was Assistant-Secretary of War. Dr. Bledsoe told his wife that President Davis handed the letter to him, with the remark that it would not go upon the official files, and that he might keep it if he liked.- EDITORS. t0 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. Army just before secession had been: 1st, J. E. Johnston, Brigadier-General; 2d, Samuel Cooper, Colonel; 3d, A. S. Johnston, Colonel; 4th, R. E. Lee, Lieu- tenant-Colonel; and 5th, G0. T. Beauregard, Major. All of them but the third had had previous appointments, when, on the 31st of August, the Confederate Government announced new ones: Cooper's being dated May 16th, A. S. Johnston's May 28th, Lee's June 14th, J. E. Johnston's July 4th, and Beauregard's July 21s9t. So the law was violated, 1st, by disregard- ing existing commissions; 2d, by giving different instead of the same dates to commis- sions; and 3d, by not recogniz- ingprevious rankin the United States Army. The only effect of this triple violation of law was to reduce J. E. Johnston from the first to the fourth - place, which, of course, must A \A' AN' have been its object.Mr. ADavis continues: three highest officers in rank .. " k21Y were all so indifferent to any ques- ' tinof personal interest that they - had received their appointment be- fore they were aware it was to be conferred"I (p. 3017). - This implies that the con- duct described was unusual. On the contrary, it was that of the body of officers who left tM4E RAL SAMUEL C'01t:)PUR. AX)itTAXT AD INSPLCTtGENERAL, the United States Army to en- C, S. A., RANKING OFFICER iN 10 kI1NFEPEHUATE AumN , APHOTOGRAPH. ter that of the Confederacy. It is strange that the author should disparage so many honorable men. He states ("R. and F.," I., 309) that General Lee, when ordered from Richmond to the South for the first time, asked what rank he held in the army: " So wholly had his heart and his mind been consecrated to the public service that he had not remembered, if he ever knew, of his advancement." As each grade has its duties, an officer cannot know his duty if ignorant of his rank. Therefore General Lee always knew his rank, for he never failed in his duty. Besides, his official correspondence at the time referred to shows that he knew that he was major-general of the Virginia forces until May 25th, 1861, and a Confederate general after that date. Vol.. 1. 16 241 C RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. Describing the events which inunediately preceded the battle of Manassas, Mr. Davis says (" Rise and Fall," I., 340): " The forces there assembled [in Virginia) were divided into three armies, at positions the most important and threatened: one, under General J. E. Johnston, at Harper's Ferry, cover- ing the valley of the Shenandoah. . . . Harper's Ferry was an important position both for military and political considerations. . . . The demonstrations of General Patterson, com- manding the Federal army in that region, caused General Johnston earnestly to insist on being allowed to retire to a position nearer to Winchester." Harler's Ferry is 22 miles east of the route into the Shenandoah Valley, and could be held only by an army strong enough to drive an enemy from the heights north and east of it. So it is anything but an important position. These objections were expressed to the Government two days after my arrival, and I suggested the being permitted to move the troops as might be necessary. All this before Patterson had advanced from Chambersburg. Onl page 41, " R. and F.," Mr. Davis quotes from an official letter to me from General Cooper, dated June 13th, 1861, which began thus: " The opinions expressed by Major Whiting in his letter to you, and on which you have indorsed your concurrence, have been duly considered. You hal, been heretofore instructed to exercise your diseretion as to retiring from your position at Harper's Ferry." A This latter statement is incorrect. No such instructions hall been given. The last instructions on the subject received by me were in General Lee's letter of June 7th. 4 On page 341 Mr. Davis says: " The temporary occupation [of Harper's Ferry] was especially needful for the removal of the valuable machinery and material in the armory located there." The removal of the machinery was not an object referred to in General Cooper's letter. But the presence of our army anywhere in the Valley within a day's march of the position, would have protected that removal. That letter (page 341) was received two days after the army left Harper's Ferry to meet General McClellan's troops, believed by intelligent people of Win- chester to be approaching from the west. On page 345 Mr. Davis says it was a difficult problem to know which army, whether Beauregard's at Manassas or Johnston's in the Valley, should be reenforced by the other, because these generals were " each asking reenforce- ments from the other." All that was written by me on the subject is in the letter (page 345) dated July 9th: "I have not asked for reenforcements because I supposed that the War Department, informed of the state of affairs everywhere, could best judge where the troops at its disposal This letter of Major Whiting to General John- per's Ferry giving him permission to use his dis- ston, and General Johnston's letter (probably re- eretion which is to be found in the Official Records, ferred to as the indorsement), are both dated May is the one of June 7th from General Lee, in which 28th. 1861. The phrase of General Cooper, "You he says: "It is hoped that you will be able to be had been heretofore instructed," should have read timely informed of the approach of troops against either, "You had been theretofore [before May you, and retire, provided they cannot be success- 28th] instructed," or, " You hare been heretofore fully opposed. You must exercise your discretion [before June 13th] instructed." The latter is and judgment in this respect."-EDITORs. probably what was meant, as the only letter of instructions to General Johnston received at Har- 4" Official Records," H., 910. 242 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN are most required. . . . If it is proposed to strengthen us against the attack I suggest as soon to be made, it seems to me that General Beauregard might with great erpedition furnish 5il00 or 6000 men for a few days." Mr. Davis says, after quoting from this letter: " As soon as I became satisfied that Manassas was the objective point of the enemy's move- ment, I wrote to General Johnston urging him to make preparations for a junction with General Beauregard." There is abundant evidence that the Southern President never thought of transferring the troops in the "Valley" to Manassas until the proper time to do it came -that is, when McDowell was known to be advancing. This fact is shown by the anxiety he expressed to increase the number of those troops. D And General Lee, writing [from South Carolina] to Mr. Davis, November 24th, 1861 (" Official Records," II., 515), says in regard to General Beauregard's suggestion that he be reenforced from my army: " You decided that the movements of the enemy in and about Alexandria were not suf- ficiently demonstrative to warrant the withdrawing of any of the forces from the Shenandoah Valley. A few days afterward, however,-I think three or four,- the reports from General Beauregard showed so clearly the enemy's purpose, that you ordered General Johnston, with his effective force, to march at once to the support of General Beauregard." This letter is in reply to one from Mr. Davis, to the effect that statements had been widely published to show that General Beauregard's forces had been held inactive by his (Mr. Davis's) rejection of plans for vigorous offen- ive operations proposed to him by the general, and desiring to know of General Lee what those plans were, and why they were rejected. "On the 17th of July, 1861," says Mr. Davis ("R. and F." I., 346), "the following telegram was sent by the adjutant-general" to General Johnston, Winchester, Va.: " General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive blow, a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to Culpeper Court House, either by railroad or by Warrenton. In all the arrange- ments exercise your discretion. S. COOPER, Adjutant and Inspector-General" Mr. Davis asserts that I claim that discretion was given me by the words "all the arrangements." I claimed it from what he terms the only positive part of the order, viz., "If practicable, make the movement, sending your sick to Culpeper Court House." Mr. Davis adds: " The sending the sick to Culpeper Court House might have been after or before the effect- ive force had moved to the execution of the main and only positive part of the order." "Make the movement" would have been a positive order, but "if prac- ticable " deprived it of that character, and gave the officer receiving it a cer- tain discretion. But, as the movement desired was made promptly, it was surely idle to discuss, twenty years after, whether the officer could lawfully have done what he did not do. At the time the decision of such a question might have been necessary; but, as Mr. Davis will give no more orders to generals, and as the officer concerned will execute no more, such a discussion I See "Official Records, II., 924, 935, 940, 973, 976-977. 243 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. is idle now. The use of the wagons required in the march of the army would have been necessary to remove the sick to the railroad station at Strasburg, eighteen miles distant; so this removal could itot have been made after the march. There being seventeen hundred sick, this part of their transportation would have required more time than the transfer of the troops to Manas- sas, whit h was the important thing. The sick were, therefore, properly and quickly provided for in Winchester. I was the only judge of the " practicable"; and " if lpracticable" refers to the whole sentence -as much to sending the sick to Culpeper as to " make the movemeiit." Still he says (" R. and F.," I., 347): - His [my] letters of the 12th and PIth expressed his doubts about his power to retire front before the superior force of General Patterson. Therefore, the word 'practicable I was in that connection the equivalent of 'possible."' It is immaterial whether "if practicable" or "if possible" was written. I was the only judge of the possibility or practicability; and, if General Pat- terson had not changed his position after the telegram was received, I might have thought it necessary to attack him, to " make the movement practicable." But as to my power to retire. On the 13th General Patterson's forces were half a day's march from us, and on the 12th more than a day's march; and, as Stuart's cavalry did not permit the enemy to observe us, retreat would have been easy, and I could not possibly have written to the contrary. \ As to Mr. Davis's telegram ("R. and F.," I., 348), and the anxiety in Mr. Davis's mind lest there should be some unfortunate misunderstanding between General Beauregard and me,-my inquiry was intended and ealcu- lated to establish beyond dispute our relative positions. As a Confederate blrigadier-general I had been junior to General Beauregard, but had been created general by act of Congress. But, as this had not been published to the army, it was not certain that it was known at Manassas. If it was not, the President's telegram gave the information, and prevented what he seems to have apprehended. THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN. ON page .349, to the end of the chapter, the President describes his visit to the field of battle near Manassas. "As we advanced," he says, " the storm of battle was rolling westward." But, in fact, the fighting had ceased before he left Manassas. He then mentions meeting me on a hill which commanded a general view of the field, and proceeding farther west, where he saw a Federal " column," whieh a Confederate squadron charged and put to flight. But the \ Mr. Davis has a few words of praise for (ien- "Richmond, July 20, 1861. General J. E. John- eral Johnston, which, in this connection, will be ston, Manassas Junction, Virginia: You are a gen- of interest to the reader: " It gives me pleasure eral in the Confederate Army, possessed of the to state that, from all the accounts received at the power attaching to that rank. You will know how time, the plans of General Johnston for masking to make the exact knowledge of Brigadier-Gen- his withdrawal to form a junction with General eral Beauregard, as well of the ground as of the Beauregard were (ondueted with marked skill " troops and preparation, avail for the success of (oR. and F.,' I., 347).-EDITOaS. the object in which you cooperate. The zeal of This telegram, sent in response to an inquiry both assures me of harmonious action. Jrrzsasox from General Johnston, read as follows: DAVIS.' 244 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. captain in command of this squadron I says in his report that the column seen was a party of our troops. Mr. Davis also dilates on the suffering of our troops for want of supplies and camp equipage, and on his efforts to have them provided for. After the battle ended, officers were duly directed by me to have food brought to the ground where the troops were to pass the night. I was not in the conference described by Mr. Davis ("R. and F.," I., 353, :154, 355). Having left the field after 10 o'clock, and ridden in the dark slowly, it was about half-past 1I when I found the President and General Beauregard together, in the latter's quarters at Manassas. We three conversed an hour or more without referring to pursuit or an advance upon Washington. The "conference" described by him must have occurred before my arrival, and Mr. Davis may very well have forgotten that I was not present then. But, when the President wrote, he had forgotten the subject of the confer- enjce he described; for the result, as he states it, was an order, not for pursuit by the army, but for the detail of two parties to collect wounded men and abandoned property near the field of battle. This order (pages 355, 356) is "to the same effect," Mr. Davis says, as the one he wrote, and which he terms a direction to pursue the Federal army at early dawn. It is asserted (" R. and F.," I., 354) I that I left the command over both Con- federate armies in General Beauregard's hands during the engagement. Such conduct would have been as base as flight from the field in the heat of battle, and would have brought upon me the contempt of every honorable soldier. It is disproved by the fact that General Beauregard was willing to serve under me there, and again in North Carolina, near the close of the war; and that he associated with me. As this accusation is published by the Southern Pres- ident, and indorsed by General Beauregard, it requires my contradiction. Instead of leaving the command in General Beauregard's hands, I assumed it over both armies immediately after my arrival on the 20th, showing General Beauregard as my warrant the President's telegram defining my position. The usual order k assuming command was written and sent to General Beauregard's office for distribution. He was then told that as General Patterson would no doubt hasten to join General McDowell as soon as he discovered my movement, we must attack the Federal army next morning. General Beauregard then pointed out on a map of the neighborhood the roads leading to the enemy's camp at Centreville from the different parts of our line south of the stream, and the positions of the brigades near each road; and a simple order of march, by which our troops would unite near the Federal position, was sketched. Having had neither sleep nor recumbent rest since the morning of the 17th, I begged General Beauregard to put this order of march on paper, and have the necessary copies made and sent to me for inspection in a grove, near, where I expected to be resting-this in time Zi Captain John F. Lay. See "Official Records," events, says: "During the 20th, General Johnston 11., 573.- EDITORS. arrived at Manassas Junction by the railroad, and J Not by Mr. Davis, but in a letter from Gen- that day we received the order from him assuming 'mral Thomas Jordan, quoted by Mr. Davis for an- command of the combined armies of General other purpose.- EDITORS. Beauregard and himself."- J. E. J. I General J. A. Early, in his narrative of these 245 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. for distribution before night. This distribution was to be by him, the imme- diate commander of most of the troops. Seeing that 8 brigades were on the right of the line to Centreville, and but 1 to the left of it at a distance of 4 miles, I desired General Beauregard to have Bee's and Jackson's brigades placed in this interval near the detached brigade. The papers were brought to me a little before sunrise next morning. They differed greatly from the order sketched the day before; but as they would have put the troops in motion if distributed, it would have been easy then to direct the course of each division. By the order sketched the day before, all our forces would have been concentrated near Ceutreville, to attack the Federal army. By that prepared by General Beauregard but 4 brigades were directed " to the attack of Centreville," of which one and a half had not yet arrived from the Valley, while 6 brigades were to move forward to the Union Mills and Centreville road, there to hold themselves in readiness to support the attack on Centreville, or to move, 2 to Sangster's cross-roads, 2 to Fairfax Station, and 2 to Fairfax Court House. The two and a half bri- gades on the ground, even supported by the half brigade of the reserve also on the ground, in all probability would have been defeated by the whole Federal army before the three bodies of 2 brigades each could have come to their aid, over distances of from 3 to 5 miles. Then, if the enemy had provi- dentially been defeated by one-sixth or one-eighth of their number, Sangster's cross-roads and Fairfax Station would have been out of their line of retreat. Soon after sunrise on the 21st, it was reported that a large body of Federal troops was approaching on the Warrenton Turnpike. This offensive move- ment of the enemy would have .frustrated our plan of- thle dai, before, if the orders for it had been delivered to the troops. It appears from the reports of the commanders of the six brigades on the right that but one of them, General Longstreet, received it. Learning that Bee's and Jackson's brigades were still on the right, I again desired General Beauregard to transfer them to the left, which he did, giving the same orders to Hampton's Legion, just arrived. These, with Coeke's brigade then near the turnpike, would necessarily receive the threatened attack. general Beauregard then suggested that all our troops on the right should move rapidly to the left and assail the attacking Federal troops in flank. This suggestion was accepted; and together we joined those troops. Three of the four brigades of the first line, at Mitchell's, Blackburn's, and McLean's fords, reported strong bodies of United States troops on the wooded heights before them. This frustrated the second plan. Two Federal batteries - one in front of Bonham's brigade at Mitehell's Ford, the other before Longstreet's at Blackburn's Ford -were annoying us, although their firing was slow. About 8 o'clock, after receiving such information as scouts could give, I left General Beauregard near Longstreet's position, and placed myself on Lookout Hill, in rear of Mitchell's Ford, to await the development of the enemy's designs. About 9 o'clock the signal officer, Captain Alexander, reported that a column of Federal troops could be seen crossing the valley of Bull Run, two miles beyond our left. 246 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. General McDowell had been instructed by his general-in-chief to pass the Confederate right and seize the railroad in our rear. But, learning that the district to be passed through was rugged and covered with woods, and there- fore unfavorable to a large army, he determined, after devoting three days to reconnoissance, to operate on the open and favorable ground to his right, and turn our left. He had another object in this second plan, and an impor- tant one-that this course would place his between the two Confederate armies, and prevent their junction; and if it had been made a day or two sooner, this maimruvre would have accomplished that object. General McDowell marched from Centreville by the Warrenton Turnpike with three divisions, sending a fourth division to deceive us by demonstra- tions in front of our main body. Leaving the turnpike a half mile from the Stone Bridge, he made a long detour to Sudley Ford, where he crossed Bull Run and turned toward Manassas. Colonel Evans, who commanded fourteen companies near the Stone Bridge, discovered this manceuvre, and moved with his little force along the base of the hill north of the turnpike, to place it before the enemy near the Sudley and Manassas road. Here he was assailed by greatly superior numbers, which he resisted obstinately. General Beauregard had joined me on Lookout Hill, and we could distinctly hear the sounds and see the smoke of the fight. But they indicated no hostile force that Evans's troops and those of Bee, Hampton, and Jackson, which we could see hurrying toward the conflict in that order, were not adequate to resist. On reaching the broad, level top of the hill south of the turnpike, Bee, appreciating the strength of the position, formed his troops (half of his own and half of Bartow's brigade) on that ground. But seeing Evans struggling against great odds, he crossed the valley and formed on the light and a little in advance of him. Here the 5 or 6 regiments, with 6 field-pieces, held their ground for an hour against 10,000 or 12,000 United States troops,\ when, find- ing they were overlapped on each flank by the continually arriving enemy, General Bee fell back to the position from which he had moved to rescue Evans -crossing the valley, closely pressed by the Federal army. Hampton with his Legion reached the valley as the retrograde movement began. Forming it promptly, he joined in the action, and contributed greatly to the orderly character of the retreat by his courage and admirable soldier- ship, seconded by the excellent conduct of the gentlemen composing his command. Imboden and his battery did excellent service on this trying occasion. Bee met Jackson at the head of his brigade, on the position he had first taken, and he began to re-form and Jackson to deploy at the same time. In the mean time I had been waiting with General Beauregard on Lookout Hill for evidence of General McDowell's design. The violence of the firing on the left indicated a battle, but the large bodies of troops reported by chosen scouts to be facing our right kept me in doubt. But near 11 o'eloek reports that those troops were felling trees showed that they were standing onl the \ General Fry (page 185) states that these troops Reckoning by the estimate of strength given by were Andrew Porter's and Burnside's brigades, General Fry on page 194 these would have made and one regiment of Heintzelman's division. a total of about 45OO men-EDITORS. 247 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. defensive; and new clouds of dust on the left proved that a large body of Federal troops was arriving on the field. It thus appeared that the enemy's great effort was to be against our left. I expressed this to General Beaure- gard, and the necessity of reienforeing the brigades engaged, and desired him to send immediate orders to Early and Holmes, of the second line, to hasten to the conflict with their brigades. General Bonhami, who was near me, was desired to send up two regiments and a battery. I then set off at a rapid gallop to the scene of action. General Beauregard joined me without a word. Passing on the way Colonel Pendleton with two batteries, I directed him to follow with them as fast as possible. It now seemed that a battle was to be fought entirely different in place and circumstance from the two plans previously adopted and abandoned as impracticable. Instead of taking the initiative and operating in front of our line, we were compelled to fight on the defensive more than a mile in rear of that line, and at right angles to it, on a field selected by Bee,- with no other plans than those suggested by the changing events of battle. While we were riding forward General Beauregard suggested to me to assign him to the immediate command of the troops engaged, so that my supervision of the whole field might not be interrupted, to which I assented. So he commanded those troops under me; as elsewhere, lieutenant-generals commanded corps, and major-generals divisions, under me. When we were near the ground where Bee was re-forming and Jackson deploying his brigade, I saw a regiment in line with ordered arms and facing to the front, but 200 or 300 yards in rear of its proper place. On inquiry I learned that it had lost all its field-officers; so, riding on its left flank, I easily marched it to its place. It was the 4th Alabama, an excellent regiment; and I mention this because the circumstance has been greatly exaggerated. After the troops were in good battle order I turned to the supervision of the whole field. The enemy's great numerical superiority was discouraging. Yet, from strong faith in Beauregard's capacity and courage, and the high soldierly qualities of Bee and Jackson, I hoped that the fight would be main- tained until I could bring adequate reenforcements to their aid. For this Holmes and Early were urged to hasten their march, and Ewell was ordered to follow them with his brigade with all speed. Broken troops were reorganized and led back into the fight with the help of my own and part of General Beauregard's staff. Cocke's brigade was held in rear of the right to observe a large body of Federal troops in a position from which Bee's right flank could have I een struck in a few minutes. After these additions had been made to our troops then engaged, we had 9 regiments of infantry, 5 batteries, and 300 cavalry of the Army of the Shenandoah, and about 2 regiments and a half of infantry, 6 companies of cavalry, and 6 field-pieces of the Army of the Potomac, holding at bay 3 divisions of the enemy. The Southern soldiers had, however, two great advan- tages in the contest: greater skill in the use of fire-arms, and the standing on the defensive, by which they escaped such disorder as advancing under fire produced in the ranks of their adversaries, undisciplined like themselves. 248 RESPONSIBILITIFiS OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. A report received about 2 o'clock from General Beauregard's office that another United States army was approaching from the north-west, and but a few miles from us, caused me to send orders to Bonham, Longstreet, and Jones to hold their brigades south of Bull Run, and ready to move. When Bonham's two regiments appeared soon after, Cocke's brigade was ordered into action on our right. Fisher's North Carolina regiment coming up, Bonham's two regiments were directed against the Federal right, and Fisher's was afterward sent in the same direction; for the enemy's strong- est efforts seemed to be directed against our left, as if to separate us from Manassas Junction. About 3:30 o'clock, General E. K. Smith arrived with three regiments of Elzey's brigade, coming from Manassas Junction. He was instructed, through a staff-officer sent forward to meet him, to form on the left of our line, his left thrown forward, and to attack the enemy in flank. At his request I joined hlim, directed his course, and gave him these instructions. Before the forma- tion was completed, he fell severely wounded, and while falling from his horse directed Colonel Elzey to take command. That officer appreciated the manceuvre and executed it gallantly and welL General Beauregard promptly seized the opportunity it afforded, and threw forward the whole line. The enemy was driven from the long-contested hill, and the tide of battle at length turned. But the first Federal line driven into the valley was there rallied on a second, the two united presenting a formidable aspect. In the mean time, however, Colonel Early had come upon the field with his brigade. He was instructed by me to make a detour to the left and assail the Federal right in flank. He reached the ground in time, accompanied by Stuart's cav- alry and Beckham's battery, and made his attack with a skill and courage which routed the Federal right in a moment. General Beauregard, charging in front, made the rout complete. The Federal right fled in confusion toward the Sudley Ford, and the center and left marched off rapidly by the turnpike. Stuart pursued the fugitives on the Sudley road, and Colonel Radford, with two squadrons which I had held in reserve near me during the day, was directed to cross Bull Run at Ball's Ford, and strike the column on the turn- pike in flank. The number of prisoners taken by these parties of cavalry greatly exceeded their own numbers. But they were too weak to make a serious impression on an army, although a defeated one. At twenty minutes before 5, when the retreat of the enemy toward Centre- ville began, I sent orders to Brigadier-General Bonham by Lieutenant-Col- onel Lay, of his staff, who happened to be with me, to march with his own and Longstreet's brigade (which were nearest Bull Run and the Stone Bridge), by the quickest route to the turnpike, and form them across it to intercept the retreat of the Federal troops. But he found so little appearance of rout in those troops as to make the execution of his instructions seem impractica- ble; so the two brigades returned to their camps. When the retreat began, the body of United States troops that had passed the day on the Centreville side of Bull Run made a demonstration on the rear of our right; which was repelled by Holmes's brigade just arrived. 249 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. Soon after the firing ceased, General Ewell reported to me, saying that his brigade was about midway from its camp near Union Mills. He had ridden forward to see the part of the field on which he might be required to serve, to prepare himself to act intelligently. The victory was as complete as one gained in an open country by infantry and artillery can be. Our cavalry pursued as far as they could effectively; but when they encountered the main column, after dispersing or capturing little parties and stragglers, they could make no impression. General Beauregard's first plan of attack was delivered to me by his aide- de-camp, Colonel Chisolm, when I was thirty-four miles from Manassas. It was, that I should leave the railroad at Piedmont station, thirty-six miles from the enemy at Centreville, and attack him in rear, and when our artillery announced that we had begun the fight, General Beauregard would move up from Bull Run and assail the enemy on that side. I rejected the plan, because such a one would enable an officer of ordinary sense and vigor to defeat our two armies one after the other. For McDowell, by his numerical superiority, could have disposed of my forces in less than two hours; that is to say, before Beauregard could have come up, when he also could have been defeated and the campaign ended. An opinion seems to prevail with some persons who have written about the battle, that important plans of General Beauregard were executed by him. It is a mistake; the first intention, announced to General Beauregard by me when we met, was to attack the enemy at Centreville as early as possible on the 21st. This was anticipated by McDowell's early advance. The second, to attack the Federals in flank near the turnpike with our main force, sug- gested by General Beauregard, was prevented by the enemy's occupation of the high ground in front of our right. As fought, the battle was made by me; Bee's and Jackson's brigades were transferred to the left by me. I decided that the battle was to be there, and directed the measures necessary to maintain it; a most important one being the assignment of General Beauregard to the immediate command of this left, which he held. In like manner the senior officer on the right would have commanded there, if the Federal left had attacked. These facts in relation to the battle are my defense against the accusation indorsed by General Beauregard and published by Mr. Davis. In an account of the battle published in " The Century" for November, 1884, General Beauregard mentions offensive operations which he " had designed and ordered against his [adversary's] left flank and rear at Centreville," and censures my friend General R. S. Ewell for their failure. At the time referred to, three of the four Federal divisions were near Bull Run, above the turn- pike, and the fourth facing our right, so that troops of ours, going to Centre- ville then, if not prevented by the Federal division facing them, would have found no enemy. And General Ewell was not, as he reports, "instructed in the plan of attack"; for he says in his official report: ". . . I first received orders to hold myself in readiness to advance at a moment's notice. I next received a copy of an order sent to General Jones and furnished me by him, 250 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. Ilx 'UTUN\IVN T "LUIE MKRIII S- EWEL, C. . A. FRIM A M10TN -R.Eit in which it was stated I had been ordered at once to proceed to his support." Three other orders, he says, followed, each contradictory of its predecessor. General Ewell knew that a battle was raging; but knew, too, that between him and it were other unengaged brigades, and that his commander was near enough to give him orders. But he had no reason to suppose that his com- mander desired him to move to Centreville, where there was then no enemy. There could have been no greater mistake on General Ewell's part than mak- ing the movement to Centreville. A brief passage in my official report of this battle displeased President Davis. In referring to his telegraphic order I gave its meaning very briefly, but accurately-"directing me, if practicable, to go to [General Beauregard's] assistance, after sending my sick to Culpeper Court House." Mr. Davis objected to the word after. Being informed of this by a friend, I cheerfully consented to his expunging the word, because that would not affect the meaning of the sentence. But the word is still in his harsh indorsement. He also had this passage stricken out: " The delay of sending the sick, nearly 251 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. seventeen hundred in number, to Culpeper, would have made it impossible to arrive at Manassas in time. They were therefore provided for in Winches- ter "; and substituted this: "Our sick, nearly seventeen hundred in number, were provided for in Winchester." Being ordered to send the sick to Cul- peper as well as to move to Manassas, it was necessary to account for disobedience, which my words did, and which his substitute for them did Hot. Mr. Davis ("SR. and F.," I., 359) expresses indignation that, as he says, "among the articles abandoned by the enemy . . . were handcuffs, the fit appendage of a policeman, but not of a soldier." I saw none, nor did I see any one who had seen them. Mr. Davis says (page 359): "On the night of the 22d, I held a second con- ference with Generals Johnston and Beauregard." I was in no conference like that of which account is given on page 360. And one that he had with me on that day proved conclusively that he had no thought of sending our army against Washington; for in it he offered me the command in West Virginia, promising to increase the forces there adequately from those around us. He says (page 361): ' What discoveries would have been made, and what results novild have ensued from the establishment of our guns upon the south bank of the river to open fire upon the capital, are speculative questions upon which it would be useless to enter." Mr. Davis seems to have forgotten what was as well known then as now- that our army was more disorganized by victory than that of the United EStates by defeat; that there were strong fortifications, well manned, to cover the approaches to Washington and prevent the establishment of our guns on the south bank of the river. He knew, too, that we had no means of can- nonading the capital, nor a disposition to make barbarous war. He says (" iR. and F.," I., 362): - When the smoke of battle had lifted from the field . . . some . . . censoriously asked why the fruits of the victory had not been gathered by the capture of Washington City. Then some indiscreet friends of the generals commanding in that battle . . . induced the allega- tion that the President bad prevented the generals from making an immediate and vigorous pursuit of the routed enemy." Mr. Davis has no ground for this assertion; the generals were attacked first and most severely. It was not until the newspapers had exhausted themselves upon us that some of them turned upon him. On November 3d he wrote to me that reports were circulated to the effect that he prevented General Beauregard from pursuing the enemy after the battle of Manassas, and had subsequently restrained him from advancing upon Washington City. . . . I call upon you, as the commanding general, and as a party to all the conferences held by me on the 21st and 22d of July, to say whether I obstructed the pursuit of the enemy after the victory at Manassas, or have ever objected to an advance or other active operation which it was feasible for the army to undertake." (" R. and F.," 1., 363.) I replied on the 10th, answering the first question in the negative, and added an explanation which put the responsibility on myself. I replied to the second question, that it had never been feasible for the army to advance farther RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. toward Washington than it had done, and referred to a conference at Fairfax Court House [October 1st, 1861] in reference to leading the army into Maryland, in which he informed the three senior officers that he had not the means of giving the army the strength which they considered necessary for offensive operations. Mr. Davis was displeased by my second reply, because in his mind there was but one question in his letter. I maintain that there are two; namely, (1) Did he obstruct the pursuit of the enemy after the victory at Manassas (2) Had he ever objected to an advance or other active operation which it was feasible for the army to undertake! The second matter is utterly unconnected with the battle of Manassas, and as the question of advance or other active operation had been discussed nowhere by him, to my knowledge, but at the conference at Fairfax Court House, I supposed that he referred to it. He was dissatisfied with my silence in regard to the conferences which he avers took place on July 21st and 22d, the first knowledge of which I have derived from his book. THE WITHDRAWAL FROM CENTREVILLE TO THE PENINSUILA. MR. DAVIS refers (" Rise and Fall," I., 444-5) to the instructions for the reorganization of the army given by him to the three general officers whom he met in conference at Fairfax Court House on October 1st, 1861. But the colTespondence urging the carrying out of the orders was carried on with Generals Beauregard and G. W. Smith (my subordinates) in that same October. He neither conversed nor corresponded with me on the subject then, the letter to me being dated May 10th, 1862. The original order was dated October 22d, 1861, to be executed "as soon as, in the judgment of the commanding general, it can be safely done under present exigencies." As the enemy was then nearer to our center than that center to either flank of our army, and another advance upon us by the Federal army was not improbable on any day, it seemed to me unsafe to make the reorganization then. From May 10th to 26th, when the President renewed the subject, we were in the immediate presence of the enemy, when reorganization would have been infinitely dangerous, as was duly represented by me. But, allud- ing to this conference at Fairfax Court House, lie says (p. 449): "When, at that time and place, I met General Johnston for conference, he called in the two generals next in rank to himself, Beauregard and G. W. Smith." These officers were with Mr. Davis in the quarters of General Beauregard, whose guest he was, when I was summoned to him. I had not power to bring any officer into the conference. If such authority had belonged to my office, the personal relations lately established between us by the President would not have permitted me to use it. He says (pp. 448-9): " I will now proceed to notice the allegation that I was responsible for inaction of the Army of the Potomac in the latter part of 1861 and in the early part of 1862." I think Mr. Davis is here fighting a shadow. I have never seen or heard of the "allegation" referred to; I believe that 25,3 RESPONSIBILITJES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. that conference attracted no public attention, and brought criticism upon no one. I have seen no notice of it in print, except the merely historical one in a publication made by me in 1874, without criticism or comment. In the same paragraph Mr. Davis expresses surprise at the weakness of the army. He has forgotten that in Richmond he was well informed of the strength of the army by periodical reports, which showed him the prevalence of epidemics which, in August and part of September, kept almost thirty per cent. of our number sick. He must have forgotten, too, his anxiety on this subject, which induced him to send a very able physician, Dr. Cartwright, to find some remedy or preventive. He asserts also that "the generals " had made previous suggestions of a "purpose to advance into Maryland." There had been no such purpose. On the contrary, in my letter to the Secretary of War, suggesting the conference, I wrote: " Thus far the numbers and condition of this army have at no time justified our assuming the offensive.... The difficulty of obtaining the means of establishing a battery near Evans- port ) . . . has given me the impression that you cannot at present put this army in condition to assume the offensive. If I am mistaken in this, and you can furnish those means, I think it important that either his Excellency the President, yourself, or some one representing you, should here, upon the ground, confer with me on this all-important question." In a letter dated September 9th, 1861, the Secretary wrote that the Presi- dent would reach my camp in a day or two for conference. He came for that object September 30th, and the next evening, by his a(pp)oifltnlent, he was waited on by Generals Beauregard, Gustavus W. Smith, and myself. In discussing the question of giving our army strength enough to assume the offensive in Maryland, it was proposed to bring to it from the South troops enough to raise it to the required strength. The President asked what was that strength. General Smith thought 50,000 men, General Beauregard 60,000, and I 60,000, all of us specifying soldiers like those around us. The President replied that such reenforcements could not be furnished; he could give only as many recruits as we could arm. This decided the question. Mr. Davis then pro- posed an expedition against Hooker's division, consisting, we believed, of 10,000 men. It was posted on the Maryland shore of the Potomac, opposite Dumfries. [See map, p. 199.] But I objected that we had no means of ferrying an equal number of men across the river in a day, even if undis- turbed by ships of war, which controlled the river; so that, even if we should succeed in landing, those vessels of war would inevitably destroy or capture our party returning. This terminated the conference. Mr. Davis says, in regard to the reenforcements asked for ("R. and F.," I., 449): "I had no power to make such an addition to that army without a total disregard of the safety of other threatened positions We had no threatened positions; and we could always discover promptly the fitting out of naval expeditions against us. And he adds (p. 451), with reference to my request for a con- ference in regard to reinforcements: See " Johnston's Narrative" (New York: D. Appleton Co.), pp. 78, 79. Evansport is on the Potomac below Alexandria, at the mouth of Quantico Creek. 254 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. " Very little experience, or a fair amount of modesty without any experience, would serve to prevent one from announcing his conclusion that troops could be withdrawn from a place or places without knowing how many were there, and what was the necessity for their presence." The refutation of this is in General G. W. Smith's memorandum of the dis- cussio i G"eneral Johnston said that lie did not feel at liberty to express an opinion of the practica- bility of reducing the strength of our forces at points not within the limits of his command." On page 452 [referring to possible minor offensive operations. - E .r.RS Mr. Davis says he "e particularly indicated the lower part of Maryland, where a small force was said to be ravaging the country." He suggested nothing so impossible. Troops of ours could not have been ferried across the broad Potomac then. We had Department o theShenandoahrelievingGeneralUnitedState no steamer oi that river, Patterson in command of the armyatnor could we have used one. Mr. Davis says (" R. _ and F.," I., 452): ...Previously, General Johnston's attention had been called to possibilities in _ the Valley of the Shenandoah, and that these and other like things were not done, was surely due to other causes than 'the policy ,TONEWAJL JAC'KSON AS FIRST LIEtUTENANT OF1 ARTILLERY,1 U. S. of the Adiitain" FROM AN AMBROTYIPE TAKENI At-OS W, ISM7. Then he quotes from a letter to me, dated August 1st, 1861, as follows: "1.. The movement of Banks 4 will require your attention. It may be a ruse, but if a real movement, when your army has the requisite strength and mobility, you will probably find an opportunity, by a rapid movement through the passes, to strike him in rear or flank.' It is matter of public notoriety that no incursion into the " Valley " worth the notice of a Confederate company was made until March, 1862. That the 4 By orders dated Julyl19th,1861i, GeneralN.P. Frey, General Patterson being bythe same orders Banks had been assigned to the command of the "honorably discharged from the service of the Department of the Shenandoah, relieving General United States," on the expiration of his term of Patterson in command of the army at Harper's duty.-EDITORS. 2S5 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. Confederate President should be ignorant of this is inconceivable. Mr. Davis says (p. 462): ' . . . I received from General Johnston notice that his position [at Centrevillel was consid- ered unsafe. Many of his letters to me have been lost, and I have thus far not been able to find the one giving the notice referred to, but the reply which is annexed clearly indicates the sub- stance of the letter which was answered: ' General J. E. Johnston: . . . Your opinion that your position may be turned whenever the enemy chooses to advance,' ete." The sentence omitted by him after my name in his letter from which he quotes as above contains the dates of three letters of mine, in neither of whieh is there allusion to the safety (or reverse) of the position. They are dated 22d, 23d, and 25th of February, and contain complaints on my part of the dreadful condition of the country, and of the vast accumulation by the Gov- ernment of superfluous stores at Manassas. There is another omission in the President's letter quoted, and the omission is this: -. . . with your present force, you cannot secure your communications from the enemy, and may at any time, when he can pass to your rear, be compelled to retreat at the sacrifice of your sege train and army stores. . .. Threatened as we are by a large force on the south-east, you must see the hazard of your position, by its liability to isolation and attack in rear." By a singular freak of the President's memory, it transferred the substanee of these passages from his letter to my three. Referring again to the conference at Fairfax Court House [Oetober 1st], Mr. Davis says (p. 464): " Soon thereafter, the army withdrew to Centreville, a better position for defense, but not for attaek, ad thereby suggestive of the abandonment of an intention to advance." The President forgets that in that conference the intention to advance was abandoned by him first. He says on the same page: " On the 10th of March I telegraphed to General Johnston: 'Further assurance given to me this day that you shall be promptly and adequately reinforced, so as to enable you to maintain your position, and resume first policy when the roads will permit.' The first policy was to earry the war beyond our own border." The roads then permitted the marching of armies, so we had just left Manassas. L On the 20th of February, after a discussion in Richmond, his Cabinet being present, the President had directed me to prepare to fall back from Manassas, and do so as soon as the condition of the country should make the marching of troops practicable. I returned to Manassas February 21st, and on the 22d ordered the proper officers to remove the public property, which was begun on the 23d, the superintendent of the railroad devoting himself to the work under the direction of its president, the Hon. John S. Barbour. The Government had collected three million and a quarter pounds of provisions there, I insisting on a supply of but a million and a half. It also had two million pounds in a meat-curing establishment near at hand, and herds of b Between the 7th and I1th of March, 1862, the the Rappahannock. On the 11-12th Stonewall Confederate forces in north-easternVirginia, under Jackson evacuated Winchester and fell back to General Johnston, were withdrawn to the line of Strasburg.-EDITORS. 2S(3 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. live stock besides. On the 9th of March, when the ground had become firm enough for military operations, I ordered the army to march that night, thinking then, as I do now, that the space of fifteen days was time enough in which to subordinate an army to the Commissary Department. About one million pounds of this provision was abandoned, and half as much more was spoiled for want of shelter. This loss is represented (" R. and F.," I., 468) \ as so great as to embarrass us to the end of the war, although it was only a six days' supply for the troops then in Virginia. Ten times as much was in North Carolina railroad stations at the end of the war. Mr. Davis says (p. 467): " It was regretted that earlier and more effective means were not employed for the mobiliza- tion of the army, . . . or at least that the withdrawal was not so deliberate as to secure the removal of our ordnance, subsistence, and quartermaster's stores." The quartermaster's and ordnance stores were brought off; and as to sub- sistence, the Government, which collected immediately on the frontier five times the quantity of provisions wanted, is responsible for the losses. The President suggested the time of the withdrawal himself, in the interview in his office that has been mentioned. The means taken was the only one available,- the Virginia Midland Railroad. Mr. Davis says ("R. and F.," I., 465): ' To further inquiry from General Johnston as to where he should take position, I replied that I would go to his headquarters in the field, and found him on the south bank of the river, to which he had retired, in a position possessing great natural advantages." There was no correspondence in relation to selecting a defensive position. I was not seeking one; but, instead, convenient camping-grounds, from which my troops could certainly unite with other Confederate forces to meet McClellan's invasion. I had found and was occupying such grounds, one division being north of Orange Court House, another a mile or two south of it, and two others some six miles east of that place; a division on the south bank of the Rappahannock, and the cavalry beyond the river, and about 13,000 troops in the vicinity of Fredericksburg. Mr. Davis's narrative [of a visit to Fredericksburg at this time, the middle of March.-EDrroiis] that follows is disposed of by the proof that, after the army left Manassas, the President did not visit it until about the 14th of May. But such a visit, if made, could not have brought him to the conclusion that the weakness of Fredericksburg as a military position made it unnecessary to find a strong one for the army. Mr. Davis (" R. and F.," II., 81) credits me with expecting an attack which he shows General McClellan never had in his mind: " In a previous chapter, the retreat of our army from Centreville has been described, and ref- erence has been made to the anticipation of the commanding general, J. E. Johnston, that the enemy would soon advance to attack that position." This refers, I suppose, to a previous assertion (" R. and F.," I., 462), my comments upon which prove that this " anticipation" was expressed in the \ Not by Mr. Davis, but in a statement quoted In "The Century" magazine for May, 1885, at the above page from General J. A. Early, who General Johnston, to support his assertion, quoted said, "The loss .. . was a very serious one to us, statements by Major J. B. Washington, Dr. A. M. arid embarrassed us for the remainder of the war, Fauntleroy, and Colonel E. J. Harvie, which are as it put us at once on a running stock."-EDITOR. now omitted for want of space.- EDITORS. VOL. I. 17 257 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN. President's letter to me, dated February 28th, 1862. He says (" R. and F.," II., 83): " The withdrawal of our forces across the Rappahannock was fatal to the [Federal] programme of landing on that river and marching to Richmond before our forces could be in position to resist an attack on the capital." This withdrawal was expressly to enable the army to unite with other Con- federate troops to oppose the expected invasion. I supposed that General McClellan would march down the Potomac on the Maryland side, cross it near the mouth of Aquia Creek, and take the Fredericksburg route to Rich- mond. The position of Hooker, about midway between Washington and this crossing-place, might well have suggested that he had this intention. POSTCRIPT.- In the first paragraph of General Beauregard's postcript, it is asserted that I did not claim to have commanded in the first battle of Manas- sas until May, 1885, and that my offieial report of that action contains no such claim. It is, nevertheless, distinctly expressed in that report-thus: " In a brief and rapid conference, General Beauregard was assigned to the command of the left, which, as the younger officer, he claimed, while I returned to that of the whole field." And in "Johnston's Narrative," published in 1871, it is expressed in these words, on page 49: "After assigning General Beauregard to the command of the troops immediately engaged, which he properly suggested belonged to the second in rank, not to the commander of the army, I returned to the supervision of the whole field." So much for my not having claimed to have commanded at the "first Manassas" until May, 1885. General Beauregard in his official report states the circumstance thus: " . . .I urged General Johnston to leave the immediate conduct of the field to me, while he, repairing to Portici, the Lewis house, should urge reenforcements forward." This language would certainly limit his command as mine does. He did not attempt to command the army, while I did command it, and disposed of all the troops not engaged at the time of his assignment. In his official report of the battle, General Beauregard further states: " Made acquainted with my plan of operations and dispositions to meet the enemy, he gave them his entire approval, and generously directed their execution under my command." The only " plan" that he offered me [to move via Aldie] was rejected - on the 14th, before my arrival. The battle fought was on McDowell's plan, not General Beauregard's. The proof of this is, that at its commencement little more than a regiment of Beauregard's command was on the ground where the battle was fought, and, of his 7 brigades, 1 was a mile and 6 were from 4 to 7 or 8 miles from it. The place of the battle was fixed by Bee's and Jackson's brigades, sent forward by my direction. At my request General Beauregard did write an order of march against the Federal army, finished a little before sunrise of the 21st. In it I am invariably termed commander-in- chief, and he (to command one of the wings) " second in command," or General Beauregard-conclusive proof that the troops were not "under his command." 258 GENERAL EWELL AT BULL RUN. Two letters, from General Lee and Mr. Walker, Secretary of War, are cited as evidence that General Beauregard commanded. Those gentlemen were in a position to know if I relinquished the command or not. But I had this letter from General Lee: " RICHMOND, July 24th, 1861. MY DEAR GENERAL: I almost wept for joy at the glorious victory achieved by our brave troops. The feelings of my heart could hardly be repressed on learning the brilliant share you had in its achievement. I expected nothing else, and am truly grateful for your safety. . In conclusion, I cannot discover that my unfavorable opinion of the Fed- eral general's tactics, quoted by General Beauregard, indicates a fear to command against him. GENERAL EWELL AT BULL RUN.) BY MAJOR CAMPBELL BROWN, AIDE-DE-CAMP AND ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL TO GENERAL EWELL. IN General Beauregard's article on Bull Run, in "The Century" for November [1884], is this severe criticism of one of his subordinates, the late Lieutenant-General R. S. Ewell: Meanwhile, in rem of Mitchell's Ford, I had been waiting with General Johnston for the sound of enflict to open In the quarter of Centreville upon the Federal left flank and rear (making allowance, however, for the delays possible to commands unused to battle), when I was chagrined to bear from General D. R. Jones that, while he had been long ready for the movement upon Centreville, General Ewell had not come up to form on his right, though he had sent him between 7 and 8 o'cloek a copy of his own order, whtih recited that Eweli had been already ordered to begin the movement. I dis- patched an immediate order to Ewell to advance; but within a quarter of an hour, just as I received a dispatch from him informing me that he had received no order to advance In the morning, the firing on the left began to increase so intensely as to indicate a severe attack, whhereupon General Johnston said that he would go personally to that quarter." ) This article appeared substantially as here printed in The Century " for March, 1885.- EDITORS. 4 [CoRRESPONDENCE.] UNION MILLS, July 25th, 1861. GENERAL BEAUREGARD. SIR: In a conversation with Major James, Louisiana 6th Regiment, he has left the ilupresslon on my mind that you think some of your orders on the 21st were either not carried out or not received by me. My first order on that day was to hold myself In readi- 1rsa to attack-this at sunrise. About 10, General Jones cnt a copy of an order received by him In which it was elated that I had been ordered tn cross and attack, and onl receipt of this I moved on until receiving the fol- lowIng: 10 1-2 A. u. On a.coumtof the diffliulties of the ground in our front, it thought dvisable to fall back to our former postion tAddressed) General Ewell. (Signed) G. T. B. This contains at least three errors, so serious that they should not be allowed to pass uncor- rected among the materials from which history will one day be constructed: 1. That Ewell failed to do what a good soldier would have done-namely, to move forward im- mediately on hearing from D. R. Jones. 2. That Beauregard was made aware of this sup- posed backwardness of Ewell by a message from D. R. Jones. 3. That on receiving this message he at once ordered Ewell to advance. The subjoined correspondence, s now (March, 1885] first in print, took place four days after the battle. It shows that Ewell did exactly what Beauregard says he ought to have done -namely, move forward promptly; that his own staff-officer, sent to report this forward movement, carried also to headquarters the first intelligence of the failure If any other order was sent to me, I should like to have a copy of it, as well as the name of the courter who brought it. Every movement I made was at onee reported to you at the time, and this across Bull Run, as well as the advance In the afternoon I thought were explained in my report sent in to-day. If an order were sent earlier than the copy through General Jones, the courier should be held responsible, as neither General Holmes nor myself reveetld It. I send the original of the order to fatl back in the Scorn- ing. The second advance in the afternoon and call to Stone Bridge were in consequence of verbal orders. My chief object in writing to you is to ask you to leave nothing doubtful in your report, both as regards my crossing In the morning and recall-and not to let it be inferred by any possibility that I blundered on that day. I moved forward as soon as notified by General Jones that I was ordered and he had been. 259 GENERAL EWELL AT BULL RUN. of orders to reach him; that no such message was received from D. R. Jones as is here ascribed to him; and that the order sent back by Beauregard to Ewell was not one to advance, but to retire from an advance already begun. It is not easy to understand these mistakes, as General Beauregard has twice given a tolerably ac- curate though meager account of the matter -once in his official report, and once in his biography pub- lished by Colonel Roman in 1884. Neither of these accounts can be reconciled with the later attitude. Upon reading General Beauregard's article, I wrote to General Fitzhugh Lee, who was Ewell's assistant adjutant-general at Manassas, asking his recollection of what took place. I have liberty to make the following extracts from his reply. After stating what troops composed the brigade, he goes on: "These troops were all In position at daylight on the 215t July, ready for say duty, sad held the extreme right of General Beauregard's line of battle along Bull Run, at Union Wills. As hour after hour passed. General Ewell grew impatient at not receiving any orders (be- yond these to be ready to advance, which came at sun- rise). ad sent me between 9 and 10 A. Y. to ace General D. Rx Jones, who commanded the brigade next on his left at McLean's Ford. to ascertain If that officerbad any news or had received any orders from army headquar- ters. I found General Jones making preparations to coss Bun Bun. and was told by him that, In the order be bad received to do so. it was stated that General Ewell had been seat similar instructions. "Upon my report of these facts. General Ewell at once issued the orders for his command to crow the Bun an move out on the road to Centreville." General Lee then describes the recall across Bull Run and the second advance of the brigade to make a demonstration toward Centreville, and adds that the skirmishers of Rodes's 5th Alabama Regi- ment, which was in advance, had actually become engaged, when we were again recalled and ordered to " move by the most direct route at once, and as rapidly as possible, for the Lewis house "-the field of battle on the left. Ewell moved rapidly, If there was an order sent me to advance before the one I received through General Jones, it Is more than likely it would have been given to the same express RepectfUlly, R. S. EwxLT. B. G. MANASUAS. VA., July 26th, 181. G(zAL: Your letter of the 25th inst. 1s received. I do not attach the slightest blame to you for the failure of the movement on Centreville, bet to the guide who did not deliver the order to move forward, sent at about 8 A. N. to General Holmes and then to you - correspond- ing In every respect to the one sent to Generals Jones, Bonham, and Longatreet-only their movements were subordinate to yours. Unfortunately no copy, in the hurry of the moment, was kept of said orders; and so many guides, about a dozen or more, were sent off in different directions, that It is next to impossible to fnd out who was the bearer of the orders referred to. Our guides ad eourlers were the worst set I ever employed, whether freon Ignorance or over-anxiety to do wel and quickly I cannot say; bet many regiments lost their way repeatedly on their way toward the feld of battle, and of curse I can attach no more blame to their com- manding ofeers than I could to you for not executing an order whieh I am convinced you did not get. I an fally aware that you did all that could have been expected of you or your eommand. I merely expressed sending General Lee and another officer ahead to report and secure orders. On his arrival near the field they brought instructions to halt, when he immediately rode forward with them to General Beauregard, " and General Ewell begged General Beauregard to be allowed to go in pursuit of the enemy, but his request was refused." As to the real causes of the miscarriage of Gen- eral Beauregard's plan of attack there need be little doubt. They are plainly stated by his imme- diate superior in command, General Joseph E. Johnston, in his official report, as being the " early movements of the enemy on that morning and the non-arrival of the expected troops" from Harper's Ferry. He adds: " General Beauregard afterward proposed a modification of the abandoned plan, to attack with our right, while the left stood on the defensive. This, too, became impractica- ble, and a battle ensued, different in place and circumstances from any previous plan on our side." There are some puzzling circumstances con- nected with the supposed miscarriage of the order for our advance. The delay in sending it is unex- plained. General Beauregard says it was sent " at about 8 A. x.," but D. R. Jones had received his corresponding order at 10 minutes past 7, and firing had begun at half-past 5. The messenger was strangely chosen. It was the most important order of the day, for the move- ments of the army were to hinge on those of our brigade. There was no scarcity of competent staff-officers; yet it was intrusted to "a guide," presumably an enlisted man, perhaps even a citi- zen, whose very name was unknown. His instructions were peculiar. Time was all- important. He was ordered not to go direct to Ewell, but first to make a detour to Holmes, who lay in reserve nearly two miles in our rear. His disappearance is mysterious. He was never heard of after receiving the order; yet his route lay wholly within our lines, over well-beaten roads and far out of reach of the enemy. my regret that my original plan could not be carried into effect, as It would have been a most complete victory with only half the trouble and fighting. The true cause of countermanding your forward move- ment after you had crossed was that it was (Am too late, as the enemy was about to annihilate our left flank, and had to be met and checked there, for otherwise he would have taken us in flank and rear and al would have been lost. Yours truly, G. T. Be-BRASS General IL 8. EWeLL, Union Mills, Va. P. S. Please read the above to Major James. N. B. The order sent you at about 8 A. M., to com- mence the movement on Centreville, was addressed to General Holmes and yourself, as he was to support you, but being nearer Camp Pickens, the headquartem than Union Mills, where you were, it was to be communicated to him first, and then to you; but he has informed me that it never reached him. With regard to the order sent you in the afternoon to reeroas the Bun Run (to march toward the Stone Bridgei, It was sent you by General J. R. Johnston, as I am informed by him, for the purpo-e of supporting our left, If necessary . G. T. B. Do not publish until we know what the enemy is going to do -or reports are out -which Y think will make It alu right. B. 260 THE CONFEDERATE COMMISSARIAT AT MANASSAS. Lastly, General Beauregard, in his official report, gives as his reason for countermanding the move- ment begun by Ewell at 10 o'clock, that in his judgment it would require quite three hours for the troops to get into position for attack. Had the messenger dispatched at 8 been prompt, Ewell might have had his orders by 9. But at 9 we find Beauregard in rear of Mitchell's Ford, waiting for an attack which, by his own figures, he should not have expected before 12. It is not for me to reconcile these eontradic- tions. THE CONFEDERATE COMMISSARIAT AT MANASSAS. BY COLONEL L. B. NORTHROP, COXMIMARY-OKNERAL, C. S. A. GENERALS Beauregard, Imboden, and Johnston in the foregoing articles [see pages 221, 239, and 2560] criticise the management of my department in the matter of supplies for the Confederate army at Manassas either before or after the first battle. In the statements of these generals, there is some conflict, but they all concur in making me appear a preposterous imbecile, whom Mr. Davis was guilty of retaining. General Imboden in effect charges Mr. Benjamin with suppressing, in order to shield my incapacity, an official report of a board of officers convened by Johnston. July 29th, 1861, General Beauregard wrote to his aides, Colonels Chesnut and Miles,-the latter read the letter in the Confederate Congress,- about his vision of capturing Washington, and thus laid the foundation of the cabal against Mr. Davis which made the Confederate Government a "divided house." It produced a resolution of inquiry, followed soon by a standing committee, and afterward, in January, 1865, by a unanimous resolution, in secret session of both houses, to appoint a joint select committee to investigate the condition and management of all the Bureaus of the War Department. The session of this com- mittee on commissary affairs was held January 23d, 1865. During the war the investigations of the standing committee into my policy and methods were frequent; several were long taking testimony, for one member, H. S. Foote,-who when I was myself in prison published me as cruel to Federal prisoners,-was ever zealous to attack. Every investigation ended in approval. I have a letter from Mr. John B. Baldwin, chairman of the joint select committee, stating that he had declared in Congress, as the result of their examination, "that the commissary department of subsistence, under the control of Colonel Northrop, the Commis- sary-General, had been managed with a foresight and sagacity, and a far-reaching, comprehensive grasp of its business, such as we had found in no other bureau connected with the army supply, with perhaps a single exception." The facts are that the engineer, General Beau- regard, neglected his communications, so that " troops for the battle " and " supplies " were "retarded" ; but the supplies were at the depot. " Eighteen heavy cannon, called for two weeks before," occupied unloaded cars at Fredericksburg, where there was a large supply of flour that had been accumulating since early June. Numerous ears were retained as stationary storehouses "for provisions," "useless baggage," and "trunks'; one hundred and thirty-three cars were abstracted by the "military" power from the use of the rail- roads for two weeks and more before the battle until returned by the Quartermaster-General and Mr. Ashe, the Government agent. There was plenty of lumber available to construct a storehouse. Gen- eral Beauregard was not " urgent on the Commis- sary-General for adequate supplies before the bat- tle," for there was no ground of complaint. It was after the battle, when the vision of capturing Wash- ington had seduced him, that he tried to construct a ground of complaint anterior to the battle. General Beauregard made but one demand on me (July 8th, by a telegram which I have) for a com- missary of the old service. Lieutenant-Colonel Robert B. Lee was added; no one was removed. On the 6th day of July I ordered Fowle to buy all the corn-meal, and soon after all the bacon, he could. July 7th, Beauregard ordered him to keep in advance a two weeks' supply for 25,000 men, and Major Noland was ready to supply any nssber of beeves. The findings of the Board (on which Colonel Lee sat) are incoherent as stated by Imboden. The interdictions alleged by him are refuted by Colonel Ruffin (my chief assistant), and by all the letters sent officially to me in August, 1861. I have Fowle's detailed report of the ra- tions at Manassas; there was plenty of provision for a march on Washington. If I had removed his commissaries as he alleges, or had " interdicted I them as General Imboden states, General Beau- regard need not have been hampered, in a country which all the generals have declared abounded in the essentials of food. General Johnston's comments on the commis- sariat are unfounded. He "requested" an in- crease of provisions which his commissary alone could determine, and allowed the accumulation to go on for twelve days after he knew that he had more than he wanted. When I was informed, I did what he should have done - telegraphed the shippers to stop. Two weeks before his move he promised my officer, Major Noland, the transpor- tation deemed sufficient, and of which he had as- sumed direct control. Empty trains passed the meat whieh had been laid in piles, ready for ship- ment. Empty trains lay idle at Manassas for days, in spite of Noland's efforts to get them. General Johnston says the stores of the other de- partments were brought off. Eight hundred new army saddles, several thousand pairs of new shoes, and a large number of new blankets were burned- Quartermaster's stores then difficult of attainment. 261 THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI. BY COL01OEL THOMAS L SNEAD. S OUTH CAROLINA had just seceded and the whole coun- S try was in the wildest excitement when the General Assembly of Missouri met at Jefferson City on the last day of the year 1860. Responding to the recommenda- tions of Governor Jackson and to the manifest will of the people of the State, it forthwith initiated measures for ranging Missouri with the South in the impending conflict. A State Convention was called; bills to organize, arm, and equip the militia were introduced; and the Fed- eral Government was solemnly warned that if it sent an army into South Carolina, or into any other slavehold- ing State, in order to coerce it to remain in the Union, or to force its people to obey the laws of the United States, " the people of Missouri would instantly rally on the side of such State to resist the invaders at all hazards and to the last extremity.7 The most conspicuous leader of this movement was Claiborne F. Jackson, who had just been inaugurated Governor. He had for many years been one of the fore- most leaders of thA Democrats of Missouri, and had been elected Governor is August. InI the late canvass he had supported Douglas for President, not because he either liked him or approved his policy on the slavery question, but because Douglas was the choice of the Missouri Democrats, and to have opposed him would have defeated his own election; for in August, 1860, the people of Missouri were sincerely desirous that the questions at issue between the North and the South should be compromised and settled upon some fair basis, and were opposed to the election to the Presidency of any man-whether Lincoln or Brec1- inridge-whose success might intensify sectional antipathies and imperil the integrity of the Union. But while loyally supporting the candidacy of Douglas, Jackson abated none of his devotion to the political principles which had been the constant guide of his life. He was a true son of the South, warmly attached to the land that had given him birth, and to her people, who were his own kindred. He was now nearly fifty-five years of age, tall, erect, and good-looking; kind- hearted, brave, and courteous; a thoughtful, earnest, upright man; a political leader, but not a soldier. The Governor urged the people of Missouri to elect to the Convention men who would place Missouri unequivocally on the side of the South. He was Colonel Snead was at different times aide-d-amp to Governor Jackson, acting Adjutant-General of the Missouri State Guard, Chief-of-Staff of the Army of the West, and member of the Confederate Congress. He was made by General Price the custodian of his private and official papers.-EDITORS. so2 THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI. disappointed. Francis P. Blair, Jr., banded together the unconditional Union men of the State; while the St. Louis "Republican," Sterling Price, Hamilton R. Gamble, James S. Rollins, William A. Hall, and John B. Clark consolidated the conservatives, and together these elected on the 18th of February a Con- vention not one member of which would say that he was in favor of the secession of Missouri. To the courage, moderation, and tact of Francis P. Blair this result was greatly due. Blair was just forty years of age. His father, the trusted friend of Andrew Jackson, had taken him to Washington City when he was about seven years old, and there he had been bred in politics. In 1843 he had come to St. Louis, where his brother Montgomery was already practicing law. For that profes- sion, to which he too had been educated, Frank had no taste, and, having in it no success, quickly turned his attention to politics. In 1852 he was elected to the Legislature as a Benton Democrat. Shortly afterward he and B. Gratz Brown established the St. Louis "Democrat." When the Kansas conflict broke out in 1854, he identified himself with the Free-soil party, and in 1856 supported Fremont for the Presidency, though Senator Benton, Fremont's father-in-law, refused to do this. He was elected to Congress that year, for the first time. In the presidential canvass of 1860 he had been the leader of the Republicans of Missouri, and it was through him chiefly that Lincoln received 17,000 votes in the State. Immediately after the secession of South .263 THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI. Carolina, he had begun to organize his adherents as Home Guards and had armed some of them, and was drilling the rest for the field, when the election of delegates to the State Convention took place. To complete the arming of these men was his first aim. In the city of St. Louis the United States had an arsenal within which were more than enough arms for this purpose- 60,000 stand of arms and a great abundance of other munitions of war. So long as Buchanan was President, Blair could not get them, but the 4th of March was near at hand and he could well wait till then, for the Southern- rights men had been so demoralized by the defeat which they had sustained in the election of delegates to the Convention, that they were in no condition to attack the arsenal, as they had intended to do if the election had gone in their favor. It was, indeed, more than a month after the inauguration of Lincoln before the Southern-rights men ventured to make any move in that direction. The Governor then came to St. Louis to concert with I General D. M. Frost (who commanded a small brigade of volunteer militia) meas- ures for seizing the arsenal in the name of the State. While the matter was still under AF consideration the bombardment of Fort Sumter took place, and the President called for 75,000 troops to support the Govern- meat. To his call upon Missouri for her quota of such troops, the Governor replied that the requisition was, in his opinion, "illegal, unconstitutional, and revolution- ary in its object, inhuman and diabolical" and that Missouri would not furnish one GOVIRNtOht CLAti h F. Jams -N. man "to carry on such an unholy crusade." FUQX A P1lMOlIUM. A few days later he convened the General Assembly, to adopt measures for the defense of the State. In the consultation with Frost it had been decided that the Governor, in pursuance of an existing law of the State, should order all its militia into encampment for the purpose of drill and discipline; and that, under cover of this order, Frost should camp his brigade upon the hills adjacent to and com- manding the arsenal, so that when the opportunity occurred he might seize it and all its stores. A great difficulty in the way of the execution of this plan was the want of siege-guns and mortars. To remove this difficulty the Governor sent Captains Colton Greene and Basil W. Duke to Mont- gomery, Alabama, and Judge Cooke to Virginia to obtain these things By Mr. Davis's order the arms were turned over to Duke and Greene at Baton Rouge, and were by them taken to St. Louis. Before they arrived there, however, the scheme to seize the arsenal had been completely frustrated by its commandant, Captain Nathaniel Lyon, who distributed a part of the 264 THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI. coveted arms to Blair's Home Guards and removed the rest to Illinois, and then occupied with his own troops the hills around the arsenal. Frost con- sequently established Camp Jackson in a grove in the western part of the city, remote from the arsenal, and was drilling and disciplining his men there in conformity to the laws of the State and under the flag of the Union, when Jefferson Davis's gift to Missouri was taken into the camp. Blair and Lyon, to whom every de- tail of the Governor's scheme had been made known, had been waiting for this opportunity. They had made up their minds to capture the camp and to hold the officers and men as prisoners of war. A Frost went into camp on the 6th of May. The arms from the Confederacy 2\ : were taken thither on the 8th. On Sat- urday, the 11th, the camp was to break up. Lyon had no time to lose. On Thursday he attired himself in a dress and shawl and other apparel of Blair's mother-in-law, Mrs. Alexander, and RU AIEi,. I M ERAL," D.t V. FRST . .A having completed his disguise by hid- P R( a A ftOc. PM i\. ing his red beard and weather-beaten features under a thickly veiled sun-bonnet, took on his arm a basket, filled, not with eggs, but with loaded revolvers, got into a barouche belonging to Blair's brother-in-law, Franklin A. Dick, and was driven out to Camp Jackson and through it. Returning to the city, he called the Union Safety Committee together, and informed them that he intended to capture the camp the next day. Some of the committee objected, but Blair and James 0. Broadhead sustained him, and he ordered his men to be in readiness to move in the morning. Just as they were about to march, Colonel John S. Bowen came to Lyon with a protest from Frost. Lyon refused to receive it, and, marching out to the camp with about 7000 men, surrounded it and demanded its surrender. Frost, who had only 635 men, was obliged to comply. While the surrender was taking place a great crowd of people, among whom were U. S. Grant and W. T. Sherman, hurried to the scene. Most of the crowd sympathized with the prisoners, and some gave expression to their indignation. One of Lyon's German regiments thereupon opened fire upon them, and twenty-eight men, women, and children were killed. The prisoners were then marched to the arsenal, and paroled the next day. The capture of Camp Jackson and the bloody scenes that followed-the shooting down then and the next day of unoffending men, women, and children - aroused the State.), The General Assembly, which had reconvened in extra session, enacted instantly a law for organizing, arming, and equip- ) Lyon officially states that on both days the firing was in response to attacks by mobs.-EDToRos. 265 THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI. ping the Missouri State Guard, created a military fund, and conferred dic- tatorial power upon the Governor. Hardly less important than these things -for it was what gave effect to them all-was the fact that the capture of the camp caused ex-Govenjor Sterling Price, President of the State Convention, and up to that time a Union man, to tender his services to the Governor. The General Assembly forthwith authorized the Governor to appoint a major-general to command all the forces which the State might put into the field, and Price was appointed to that position. ; In the Convention Price had been opposed under all circumstances to the secession of Missouri, but just as earnestly opposed to the invasion and con- quest of the South by the Federal Government. To that position he still adhered even when Mr. Lincoln, after the bombardment of Fort Sumter, had called for troops with which to repossess the Federal forts and enforce the laws of the Union within the seceded States. But considering Lyon's attack upon the State militia and his killing peaceable citizens an "unparalleled insult and wrong to the State," he believed it was the duty of Missouri to resent such wrongs. The State now sprang to arms. Volunteers began to crowd the streets of Jefferson City, and everything indicated the opening of hostilities. Blair and Lyon would have met these demonstrations with force, would have driven Jackson and Price from the capital, would have dispersed the militia wherever it dared to show itself, would have occupied the State with Federal garrisons, and would have held her in unresisting obedience to the Union; but, unfor- tunately for the execution of their plans, General William S. Harney, who commanded the Military Department of the West, of which Missouri was part, had returned to St. Louis the day after the capture of Camp Jackson, and had resumed command there. Instead of using force Harney used con- ciliation. Instead of making war he made a truce with Price. Blair now caused Harney to be relieved of the command of the Federal troops in Missouri, and on the 31st of May he was superseded by Lyon. As soon as this was made known to the Governor and General Price, they ordered the militia to be gotten in readiness for the field, for they knew that ;Born in Prince Edward County, Virginia, in 1809, Price was now fifty-one years of age. He had been carefully educated in the schools of his native State and at Hampden-Sidney College, and had afterward attended the Law School of one of the most eminent jurists of Virginia, the venerable Chancellor Creed Taylor. He removed with his father's family to Chariton County, Missouri, in 1831, and had resided there ever since. Elected to the Legislature in 1840, he was at once chosen Speaker of the House, an honor rarely conferred upon so young a man, and particularly upon one who had never before been a member of a delibera- tive assembly. But he was prelminently fitted for the position. Well born and well bred, courteous and dignified, well educated, and richly endowed with that highest of all mental faculties, common sense; tall,traight, handsome, and of a command- iug presence,- he was also a parliamentarian by instinct, understood intuitively the rules that govern deliberative. bodies, and knew how to enforce them with promptness and vigor. He occupied this position till 1844, and was then elected to Congress. He took his seat in December, 1845; but when the war with Mexico broke out, a few months later, he left Congress, returned to Missouri, raised a regiment and led it to New Mexico, where he was placed in command. For his good conduct and gallantry in several battles that he fought and won there, and in recognition of the military and civic ability which he displayed in completing the conquest of that part of the Mexican territory, he was appointed brigadier- general by President Polk. In 1852 he was elected Governor of Missouri, and he held that office till the beginning of 1857.-T. L. S. 266 THE FIRS T YEAR OF THE WAR IN MiSSOURI. FAC-SIMtLI OF WAR SUIr ISSUED BY TItI CONFEDERATE LEG1(4LATURE OF MXIt- II. Blair and Lyon would quickly attack them. Some well-meaning gentlemen, who vainly imagined that Missouri could maintain her neutrality in the midst of war, now sought to establish a truce between Price and Lyon. Through them a conference was agreed upon, and the Governor and General Price came to St. Louis under Lyon's safe conduct. They met him and Blair at the Planters' House. Lyon was accompanied by his aide-de-camp, Major Horace A. Conant, and I was present as the Governor's aide. The interview,. which lasted several hours, was at last terminated by Lyon's saying that he would see every man, woman, and child in Missouri under the sod before he would consent that the State should dictate to "his Government" as to the movement of its troops within her limits, or as to any other matter however unimportant. "This," said he, "means war. One of my officers will conduct you out of my lines in an hour." So saying, he left without another word, without even a salutation. He had hardly left us when he was issuing orders for the movement of his troops. Sweeny and Sigel were sent with about 3000 men to the south-west to intercept the retreat of Jackson and Price if they should undertake to effect a junction with General Ben. McCulloch, who was believed to be con- centrating a Confederate army in north-western Arkansas for the invasion of Missouri. Lyon would himself move up the Missouri after Jackson. The conference was held on the 11th of June. On the 13th Lyon was on his way to Jefferson City with about 2000 men. Arriving there the next day, he found that the Governor had fled to Boonville. Leaving a garrison at Jefferson City, he pushed on to Boonville, where some 1300 militia had ren- dezvoused. Attacking these on the 17th, he dispersed them and drove the Governor southward with some two or three hundred men who still adhered to him and to the cause which he represented. General Price had meanwhile gone to Lexington, where several thousand militia had assembled. From a military standpoint the affair at Boonville was a very insignificant thing, but it did in fact deal a stunning blow to the Southern-rights men of 267 THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI. Missouri, and one which weakened the Confederacy during all of its brief existence. It was indeed the consummation of Blair's statesmanlike scheme to make it impossible for Missouri to secede, or out of her great resources to contribute liberally of men and material to the South, as she would have done could her people have had their own way. It was also the most brilliant achievement of Lyon's well-conceived campaign. The capture of Camp Jackson had disarmed the State, and completed the conquest of St. Louis and all the adjacent counties. The advance upon Jefferson City had put the State government to flight and taken away from the Governor the prestige which sustains established and acknowledged authority. The dis- persion of the volunteers that were flocking to Boonville to fight under Price for Missouri and the South extended Lyon's conquest at once to the borders of Iowa, closed all the avenues by which the Southern men of North Missouri could get to Price and Jackson, made the Missouri River a Federal highway from its source to its mouth, and put an end to Price's hope of holding the rich and friendly counties in the vicinity of Lexington till the Confederacy could send an army to his support, and arms and supplies for the men whom he was concentrating there. Price had, indeed, no alternative now but to retreat in all haste to the south-western part of the State, so as to organize his army within supporting distance of the force which McCulloch was assembling in western Arkansas for the protection of that State and the Indian Territory. He accordingly ordered Brigadier-General James S. Rains to take command of the militia at and near Lexington, and to move southward so as to effect a junction with the Governor in the vicinity of Lamar, toward which place the latter was retreating with Generals M. M. Parsons and John B. Clark and what was left of their commands. General Price himself, accompanied by his staff and a small escort, hastened rapidly toward Arkansas in order to bring McCulloch to the rescue of both the Governor and Rains. On the way he was joined, almost daily, by squads or companies, and by the time he reached Cowskin Prairie, in the extreme south-western corner of the State, he had collected about 1200 men. On the 3d of July Rains reached Lamar, near which place the Governor and his followers were already encamped. The combined force amounted to about 6000 men, of whom 4000 were armed, and they had seven pieces of artillery. Halting until the 5th in order to rest and organize, they pushed on that morning toward Carthage, having heard that a Federal force had occu- pied that place, which lay in their line of retreat. They had marched but a few miles when, as they were passing through the open prairie, they descried, some three miles away, on the declivity of a hill. over which they had them- selves to pass, a long line of soldiers with glistening bayonets and bright guns. These were part of the force which Lyon, on marching against Jeffer- son City, had sent under General Sweeny and Colonel Sigel to the south-west to intercept the Governor's retreat toward Arkansas. Sigel, in executing this plan, had first attempted to intercept Price. Failing in that, he had now, with more boldness than discretion, thrown himself, with about 1100 268 THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI. men and eight pieces of artillery, in front of the Governor, hoping either to defeat him or to hold him in check till Lyon could arrive and destroy him. Halting his column in the prairie, and deploying his armed men (about 4000), the Governor awaited Sigel's attack. The fight (known as the battle of Carthage) did not last long, for Sigel was outnumbered four to one, and the Missourians quickly put him to flight. He retreated, however, in perfect order, carrying off almost everything that he had brought with him. But he did not stop running till he had made forty miles. That night the State troops rested in Carthage. The next day they resumed their southward march, and soon met Price and McCulloch. Price now assumed command of the Missourians and led them to Cowskin Prairie, in the south-western corner of the State, while McCulloch went into camp near Maysville in Arkansas. Lyon left Boonville in pursuit of the Governor, on the 3d of July, with about 2350 men, and directed his course toward Clinton in Henry county, where he had ordered Major Sturgis, who was following Rains with about 2500 regulars and Kansas troops, to unite with him. The two columns came together near Clinton on the 7th of July and pushed on after the Missourians. Lyon did not learn till the 9th that they had defeated Sigel and effected a junction with McCulloch. He then made in all haste for Springfield, fearing that the Confederates would attack that place. Arriving there on the 13th of July, he made it his headquarters. Lyon, on the one hand, and Price on the other now began to get their armies in readiness for active operations. For Lyon this was a simple under- taking; for Price it was one of great complexity and great difficulty. Of the 7000 or 8000 men that he had, only a few had been organized into regiments. Several thousand of them had no arms of any kind. The rest were for the most part armed with the shot-guns and rifles which they had brought from their homes. Of powder and lead they had an abundance, but no fixed ammunition for either their seven pieces of artillery or for their small-arms. Tents they had none, nor camp equipage of any kind. There were no quar- termasters' supplies, nor subsistence; and neither the quartermaster-general nor the chief commissary had a dollar of funds. The men were not fighting for pay, they wanted none, nor did they get any; but they and their thou- sands of horses and mules had to be fed. For their animals there was nothing but the grass of the prairies, and for themselves nothing but a scant supply of lean beef and coarse corn-meal. There were enough good officers to organize and command the men; but it would have puzzled almost any one to drill a company of raw recruits, armed, some with shot-guns, some with rifles, a few with old-fashioned flint-lock muskets, and here and there a man with a percussion musket. No better proof could be given of the dearth of material for the Staff, than the fact that I was myself assigned to duty by Gen- eral Price as chief of ordnance of the army, though I told him at the time that I did not know the difference between a howitzer and a siege-gun, and had never seen a musket-cartridge in all my life; and a few days later I was assigned to the still more important position of acting Adjutant-General of 269 THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI. the State Guard, though I had never then heard of a " morning report," and did not know the right of a company from its left. Had Hardee or any other West Pointer been in command, he would have kept us in camp six months, drilling and disciplining us, getting together wagons and teams, tents and cartridge-boxes, uniforms and haversacks, quartermasters and red tape, and all the other equipments and impedimenta of an army in the field, and then we would have gone into winter quarters; Lyon would have had his own way in Missouri, and the Federal armies that were sent thither to whip us would have been sent to fight in Virginia or in Tennessee instead, and the Confederacy might have been vanquished sooner than it was. But Price had us all ready for the field in less than three weeks. We had no tents, it is true, but tents would only have been in our way; we had no uniforms, but a bit of flannel or calico fastened to the shoulder of an officer designated his rank sufficiently for all practical purposes; the ripening corn-fields were our depots of subsistence; the prairies furnished forage, and the people in defense of whose homes we were eager to fight gladly gave us of all their stores. McCulloch, one of the bravest of men and best of scouts, looking at us through the eyes of the young army officers whom Mr. Davis had sent to teach him how to organize, equip, and fight an army scientifically, saw in the Missourians nothing but a half-armed mob, led by an ignorant old militia general, but he consented to go with Price in search of Lyon, who was at Springfield and not hard to find. General N. B. Pearce, commanding a brigade of Arkansas State troops, agreed to go along with them. Hardee, who was at Pitman's Ferry, Arkansas, within a few hundred yards of the Missouri line, and almost as near to Springfield as were Price and McCulloch, and who had with him several thousand good soldiers, was begged by both Price and McCulloch to cooperate in the movement against Lyon, but he replied that he " did not wish to march to their assistance with less than 5000 men, well appointed, and a full complement of artillery"! By order of General Polk, made at the earnest personal solicitation of Governor Jackson, who had gone to Memphis for that purpose, General Pillow moved into Missouri from Tennessee, with twelve thousand men, and occupied New Madrid on the 28th of July, with the intent to unite in the effort to repossess the State. On the same day, Price, MeCulloch, and Pearce, relying upon the cooper- ation of both Hardee and Pillow, concentrated their forces at Cassville, within about fifty miles of Springfield. There Price was reinforced by General McBride's command, consisting of two regiments of foot and three companies of mounted men, about 700 in all. They had come from the hill country lying to the south and south-east of Springfield, and were a unique body of soldiers. Very few of the officers had any knowledge whatever of military principles or practices, and only the most superficial experience in company tactics. The staff was composed chiefly of country lawyers who took the ways of the court-room with them into the field. Colonels could not drill their regiments, nor captains their companies; a drum and a fife-the only ones in the entire command-sounded all the calls, 270 THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI. and companies were paraded by the sergeant's calling out, " Oh, yes ! Oh, yes! all you who belong to Captain Brown's company fall in here." Officers and men messed together, and all approached McBride without a salute, lounged around his quarters, listened to all that was said, and when they spoke to him called him " Jedge." Their only arms were the rifles with which they hunted the squirrels and other small game that abounded in their woods, but these they knew how to use. A powder-horn, a cap-pouch, " a string of patchin'," and a hunter's knife completed their equipment. I doubt whether among them all there was a man that had ever seen a piece of artillery. But, for all this, they were brave and intelligent. Like all frontiersmen, they were shrewd, quick-witted, wary, cunning, and ready for all emergencies, and like all backwoodsmen, their courage was serene, steady, unconscious. While there was no attempt at military discipline, and no pretense of it, the most perfect order was maintained by McBride's mere force of character, by his great good sense, and by the kindness with which he exercised his patriarchal authority. Leaving Cassville on the 31st of July, the combined Southern armies, nearly 11,000 strong, advanced toward Springfield. On the way they encountered Lyon, who had come out to meet them. McCulloch, who could not compre- hend the Missourians or the able soldier who commanded them, refused to attack unless Price and. Pearceq would confer upon him the chief command. Price had been a brigadier-general in Mexico, when McCulloch was but a cap- tain of scouts, and had won more battles there than McCulloch had ever wit- nessed; he was now a major-general with more than 5000 men, and McCulloch had barely 3000; and in intellect, in experience, and in generalship he was worth a dozen McCullochs; nevertheless, he cheerfully placed himself and his army under the Texan's command. The order to advance was then given. Lyon had been encamped six miles in front with between 5000 and 6000 men. McCulloch moved at midnight, hoping to fall upon him unexpectedly, and to defeat him. To his amazement he learned, on approaching the spot, that Lyon had left twenty hours before, and must now be almost in sight of Springfield. The Confederates kept on, and on the 6th of August went into camp on Wilson's Creek, within ten miles of Springfield. They were still lying there on the morning of the 10th of August, when they were surprised and suddenly attacked on the north by Lyon, and on the south by Sigel.4 One of the stubbornest and bloodiest battles of the war now took place. Lyon's main attack was met by Price with about 32N00 Missourians, and Churchill's regiment and Woodruffs battery, both from Arkansas. His left was met and driven back by McIntosh with a part of McCulloch's brigade (the Third Louisiana and McIntosh's regiment). McCulloch then took some companies of the Third Louisiana and parts of other commands, and with them attacked and routed Sigel (who had been sent to attack the rear), capturing five of his guns. This done, Pearce's Arkansas brigade, which up to this time had not fired a gun, was sent to reenforce Price. Lyon, seeing that 4 For maps and more specific descriptions of see the papers by Generals Pearce and Wherry, the three chief engagements of this " first year," Colonel Mulligan, and General Sigel, to follow.- -Wilson's Creek, Lexington, and Pea Ridge,- EDITORS. 271 THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI. M'.JOlR ENRAL STERLING PRICE, C. SI A. "rOM A PHOTOG)RAPU. the supreme moment had come, and that the day would be surely lost if he did not overwhelm Price before the Arkansans could reinforce him, now brought forward every available man, and was putting them into the fight, when his horse was killed, and himself wounded in the head. Dazed by the blow, dazed and stunned, his heart gave way for a moment under the sudden shock, but quickly coming to his senses he mounted another horse, and, swinging his hat in the air, called on his men to follow. Closing around him they daslhed with him into the thick of the fight. But a moment later a bullet pierced his heart, and he fell from his horse into the arms of his orderly, and in an instant was dead. It was vain that the Federals tried to prolong the battle. Sturgis, on whom the command devolved, ordered a retreat, and before the Confederates knew that the battle was ended he was a mile away, having withdrawn his men unseen through the dense undergrowth of the woods in which the battle mainly was fought. In the 272 THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI. haste of their retreat, the Federals left Lyon's dead body on the field. I delivered it myself an hour or two later to a flag-of-truce party that had been sent to ask for it. I saw it again the next day in Springfield, where it had been again abandoned by his men. [See foot-note, page 297.] Rarely have I met so extraordinary a man as Lyon, or one that has interested me so deeply. Coming to St. Louis from Kansas on the 6th of February, this mere captain of infantry, this little, rough-visaged, red-bearded, weather-beaten Connecticut captain, by his intelligence, his ability, his energy, and his zeal, had at once acquired the confidence of all the Union men of Missouri, and had made himself respected, if not feared, by his enemies. In less than five months he had risen to the command of the Union armies in Missouri, had dispersed the State government, had driven the Governor and his adherents into the extremest corner of the State, had almost conquered the State, and would have completely conquered it had he been supported by his Government; and now he had given his life willingly for the Union which he revered, and to the cause of Human Freedom to which he was fanatically devoted. The Federal force in the battle amounted to about 5400 officers and men. The Confederates had over 10,000 armed men on the ground, but 3000 of them took little or no part in the fight. The Confederates lost 279 killed and 951 wounded. The Federal loss was 258 killed, 873 wounded, and 186 captured or missing. McCulloch refused to pursue, and Price resumed command of the Missouri troops. The next day he took possession of Springfield, and sent Rains with a mounted force to clear the western counties of the State of the marauding bands that had come into them from Kansas. On the 25th of August he moved northward with his army. On the 2d of September he met a part of Lane's Kansas Brigade under Colonel Montgomery on the banks of the Big Dry Wood. Montgomery had about 500 men and gave battle, but was forced to retreat before Price's superior force. The loss on either side was trifling. Price now hastened toward Lexington, joined at every step by recruits. Reaching the city on the 12th of September with his mounted men, he drove Colonel Mulligan within his intrenchments, and as soon as his main body came up, completed the investment of the place. On the 20th he caused a number of hemp-bales saturated with water to be rolled to the front and converted them into movable breastworks, behind which his men advanced unharmed against the enemy. Colonel Mulligan was forced to surrender the next day. Price's loss was 25 killed and 72 wounded. Fremont reported to the War Department that the Union loss was 39 killed and 120 wounded. The Missourians captured about 3500 prisoners, five pieces of artillery, two mortars, 3000 stand of small-arms, a large number of sabers, about 750 horses, many sets of cavalry equipments, ammunition, many wagons and teams, more than 100,000 worth of commissary stores, and a large amount of other property. Price also recovered 900,000 that had been taken by the enemy from the Bank at Lexington, and restored it to the Bank. His force amounted to about 18,000 men, Mulligan's to about 3600. VOI. I. 18 273 THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI. In order to obtain the cooperation of the Confederate armies, the Governor anti General Price sent me to Richmond, after the capture of Lexington, as a special commissioner to explain to President Davis the condition of affairs in Missouri, and to negotiate a treaty of alliance with the Confederate States, inasmuch as Missouri had not seceded nor been admitted into the Confederacy. BY their direction I went by way of MeCulloch's headquarters, in order to make one more effort to secure his cooperation, and failing in that, to get from him certain supplies which General Price greatly needed, particularly caps for the muskets which we had captured at Lexing-:f ton. To all my entreaties McCulloch replied that Price had gone to the Missouri against his advice; that the movement was unwise and would re- suit in disaster, and that he would not endanger his own army by going to his assistances; and that as for musket-caps, he had none to spare. p General John C. Fremont, who had assumed command of the Union ar- mies in the Wiest on the 25th of July, A afte DaviD HUNTER. FROMA PhiOTOuRAPHe now began to concentrate his forces against Price Sending about 40 000 men, with 100 pieces of artillery, to attack him in front, and others to cut off his retreat, he took the field himself. His plan was magnificent-to capture or disperse Price's army; march to Little Rock and occupy the place; turn the Confederates under Polk, Pillow, Thompson, and Hardee, and compel them to fall back southward; push on to Memphis with his army and Foote's flotilla; capture that city; and then make straight for New Orleans. Price left Lexington on the 29th of September, after advising his unarmed men to return to their homes, and to wait for a more convenient time to rise. Marching as rapidly as his long train would permit, he reached the Osage on the 8th of October with about 7000 men. To cross his troops and trains over that difficult river on a single fiat-boat. was a tedious operation, but Frmont gave him all the time that he needed, and he got them safely over. After crossing the Osage, Price marched quickly to Neosho, where the General Assembly had been summoned by Governor Jackson to meet. Fr6miont continued to follow till the 2d of November, when he was super- seded by Major-General David Hunter, who immediately stopped the pursuit and turned the army back to St. Louis. On the 19th of November Major- General Halleek assumed command of the Federal Department. When I returned from Richmond, Price had gone into winter quarters on the Sac River near Osceola. Many of his men had been furloughed so that they might go to their homes, where they could subsist themselves during 274 THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI. the winter and provide for their families. McCulloch's brigade was on the Arkansas River, and Pearce's had been disbanded. Under the treaty which had been negotiated at Richmond, the enlistment of Missourians in the Confederate army was at once begun and was continued at Springfield, whither Price moved his army just before Christmas. Before the end of January, 1862, two regiments of infantry (Burbridge's and Rives's), one regi- ment of cavalry (Gates's), and two batteries (Wade's and Clark's) had been mustered into the Confederate service, and on the 28th I started to Richmond to deliver the muster-rolls to the Secretary of War, and to inform the President as to the strength and condition of the army in Missouri, and to communi- cate to him Price's views as to the future conduct of the war in that State. On the way I met Major-General Earl Van Dorn at Jacksonport in Arkansas. He had just assumed command (January 29th) of the District of the Trans- Mississippi, constituting a part of General Albert Sidney Johnston's extensive department. He was a dashing soldier, and a very handsome man, and his manners were graceful and fascinating. He was slight of stature and his features were almost too delicately refined for a soldier, but this defect, if it was a defect, was converted into a charm by the martial aspect of his mustache and imperial, and by an exuberant growth of brownish hair. Quitting the United States army when Mississippi seceded, he first entered her service, and was afterward appointed to that of the Confederacy and placed in com- mand of Texas. Transferred thence to Virginia in September, 1861, he was commissioned major-general and ordered to report to General J. E. Johnston, commanding the Army of the Potomac. Johnston ordered him to Beau- regard, and Beauregard assigned him to the command of a division, October 4th, 1861. He was assigned to the command of the Trans-Mississippi District, January 10th, 1862. We Missourians were delighted; for he was known to be a fighting man, and we felt sure he would help us to regain our State. I explained to him the condition of affairs in Missouri, and General Price's views. Van Dorn had already decided upon a plan of campaign, and in execution of it ordered General Albert Pike, a few days afterward, to Lawrence county, Missouri, with a mixed command of whites and Indians estimated at 7000 men; ordered McIntosh to report to Price at Springfield with McCulloch's infantry; ordered McCulloch to Pocahontas with his mounted men; and called upon Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas to send reenforcements. Hope- ful and enthusiastic by nature, he believed that Price would have 15,000 effective men at Springfield by the last of March, and himself 18,000 at Poca- hontas, and that they could then march against St. Louis. The two col- umns were to effect a junction north of Ironton, and, moving thence rapidly without tents or baggage, take the city by assault. Possession of the city would give him possession of the State, and the enemy would supply the arms for the thousands of volunteers that would flock to his standard. From this day-dream he was rudely awakened a few days later by news that Price had been driven from Springfield on the 12th of February, and was hotly pursued by a Federal army which Halleck had sent against him under General S. R. Curtis. With this army was Captain P. H. Sheridan, doing duty 275 THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI. XAJOR-GENERAL HENRY W. HALLECK. FROM A PHOTORAPH. as quartermaster. Price sought refuge in the mountains of Arkansas, and February 21st was within thirty miles of Van Buren, near which place was MeCulloch. On learning all this Van Dorn hastened to Van Buren and thence to Price's headquarters, which he reached on the 1st of March. After a hurried consultation with Price and McCulloch, he decided to instantly attack Curtis, who had taken a strong position among the mountains near Bentonville. He moved on the 4th of March with about 16,000 men, of whom 6800 were Missourians under Price, and the rest Confederates under McCulloch and Pike. When almost within reach of Curtis (who reported his own strength at 10,500 infantry and cavalry and forty-nine pieces of artillery) Van Dorn unwisely divided his army, and leaving McCulloch with his own command and Pike's to attack Curtis in front, himself made with Price and the Mis- sourians a long circuit to the rear of Curtis, and out of communication with McCulloeh. Both columns attacked about the same time on the 7th. Price was completely successful and carried everything before him, taking during 276 THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR IN MISSOURI. the afternoon seven pieces of cannon and about 200 prisoners, and at night bivouacked near Elkhorn Tavern. But morning revealed the enemy in a new and stroig position, their forces united and offering battle. The Confederates soon learned that McCulloch and McIntosh had been killed the day before and their force routed and dispersed. The battle was renewed nevertheless, and the Missourians fought desperately and were still holding their ground when about 10 o'clock Van Dorn ordered a retreat, and the army leaving Missouri to her fate began to fall back toward Van Buren. In this battle, sometimes called the battle of Pea Ridge, and at other times the battle of Elkhorn, the Federal general reported his losses at 203 killed, 980 wounded, and 201 missing. Van Dorn's were probably greater, and he lost heavily in good officers. McCulloch and McIntosh were killed; General Price was again wounded and narrowly escaped death; General W. Y. Slack, whom his men idolized and whom the whole army held in honor, was fatally wounded; and Colonel B. A. Rives, one of the knightliest of sol- diers and bravest of gentlemen, and Churchill Clark, a heroic boy, were killed. Halleck, who had determined to make the Tennessee " the great strategic line of the Western campaign," now began to concentrate all of his forces on that river and the Mississippi, in order "to fight a great battle on the Tennessee," one which would "settle the campaign in the West." He con- sequently ordered Curtis not to advance aiiy farther into Arkansas; and sent out of Missouri all the troops that could be safely taken thence, some of them to Pope on the Mississippi, and others to Grant on the Tennessee. The concentration of Federal armies onl the Mississippi portended such danger to Beauregard, who had lately assumed command of the defenses of that river, that General Albert Sidney Johnston ordered Van Dorn to move his army to within supporting distance of Beauregard. This Van Dorn began to do on the 17th of March, on which day he wrote to General Johnston that he would soon " relieve Beauregard by giving battle to the enemy near New Madrid," or, by marching "boldly and rapidly toward St. Louis, between Ironton and the enemy's grand depot at Rolla." While he was executing this plan, and while the greater part of the army that had survived Elkhorn was on the march across the mountains of North Arkansas toward Jacksonport, Van Dorn was suddenly ordered by General Johnston on the 23d of March to move his entire command by " the best and most expeditious route" to Memphis. His forces, to which he had given the name of "the Army of the West," were accordingly concentrated in all haste at Des Arc, on the White River, whence they were to take boats for Memphis. The first division of this army, to the command of which General Price had been assigned, was the first to move, Little's Missouri Brigade embark- ing on the 8th of April for Memphis, just as Pope was taking possession of Island No. 10, and Beauregard was leading Johnston's army back to Corinth from the fateful field of Shiloh. 277 IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI. BY JOHN C. FRPMONT, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A. AT the outbreak of the war, in the spring of '61, being then in England, I offered my services to the Government, and was appointed one of the four major-generals of the regular army. General McClellan and myself were commissioned of even date, ranking next after General Scott. On my arrival I reported to the President, using a few days to arrange in some order the business which had carried me abroad. There was great confusion and indeci- sion in affairs, and the people in power were slow to realize the actuality of war; it was long before they realized its magnitude. Several commands in the East were suggested to me, but I preferred the West, which I knew, and I held the opinion that the possession of the immediate valley of the Mississippi river would control the result of the war. Who held the Mississippi would hold the country by the heart. A command was agreed upon between President Lincoln, Montgomery Blair, his Postmaster-General, who was a graduate of West Point, and myself, of which the great object was the descent of the Mississippi river. Necessary to this was first the firm possession of the State of Missouri, freed and protected from the secession forces within and around it. In pursuance of this plan "The Western Department" was created, comprehending, with Illinois, the states and territories west of the Mississippi river to the Rocky Mountains, including New Mexico. For reasons not wholly military, the President reserved the State of Kentucky, but assured me that so soon as I had succeeded in raising and organizing an army for the descent of the Mississippi river, he would extend my command over that State and the left bank of the Mississippi. The President had gone carefully over with me the subject of my intended campaign, and this with the single desire to find out what was best to do and 278 IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI. how to do it. This he did in the unpretending and kindly manner which invited suggestion, and which with him was characteristic. When I took leave of him he accompanied me down the stairs, coming out to the steps of the portico. I asked him then if there was anything further in the way of instruction that he wished to say to me. "No," he answered. "I have given you carte blanche. You must use your own judgment and do the best you can. I doubt if the states will ever come back." Governor Yates, of Illinois, then in Washington, informed me fully of the unarmed and unprepared condition of the West. I immediately began a search for arms at Washington, and out of those at hand was able to obtain an order for only seven thousand stand. Arriving at New York, I found that the order for the seven thousand stand of arms had been countermanded. Upon my complaint to Washing- ton, and through the personal interposition of the President, Major Peter V. Hagner was sent to aid me in procuring what I judged immediately necessary for my department. With him I arranged for gathering from various arsenals and forwarding to St. Louis arms and equipments for 23,000 men. This detained me some weeks in New York. Before leaving, I telegraphed to Lieutenant-General Scott, to ask if he had any instructions to give me. He replied that he had none. At Philadelphia we heard the news of the disaster of Bull Run. On the 25th of July I reached St. Louis, and at the start I found myself in an enemy's country, the enemy's flag displayed from houses and recruiting offices. St. Louis was in sympathy with the South, and the State of Mis- souri was in active rebellion against the national authority. The Bull Run defeat had been a damaging blow to the prestige of the Union. In this condensed sketch I can give only the strong outline of the threaten- ing situation I found, and, in part, the chief measures I adopted to convert our defensive position into one that was vigorously oflensive, going into detail only enough to show some of the difficulties that beset me. There was a wide difference between the situation here and that at Wash- ington. The army of the East was organized under the eyes of the President and Congress; in the midst of loyal surroundings and loyal advisers where there was no need to go outside of prescribed military usage, or to assume responsibilities. But in Missouri all operations had to be initiated in the midst of upturned and revolutionary conditions and a rebellious people, where all laws were set at defiance. In addition to the bodies of armed men that swarmed over the State, a Confederate force of nearly 50,000 men was already on the Southern frontier: Pillow, with 12,000, advancing upon Cairo; Thompson, with 5000, upon (Girardeau; Hardee, with 5000, upon Iron- tonI; and Price, with an estimated force of 25,000, upon Lyon, at Springfield. Their movement was intended to overrun Missouri, and, supported by a friendly population of over a million, to seize upon St. Louis and make that 'ity a center of operations for the invasion of the loyal States. To meet this advancing force I had 23,000 men of all arms. Of this only some 15,000 were available, the remainder being three-months men whose 279 IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI. term of service was expiring. General John Pope was fully occupied in North Missouri with nearly all my disposable force, which was required to hold in check rebellion in that quarter. For the defense of Cairo B. M. Prentiss had 8 regiments, but 6 were three-months men, at the end of their term, unpaid, and unwilling to reenlist. At Springfield General Lyon had about 6000 men, unpaid and badly fed, and in need of clothing. In this condition he was in hourly expectation of being attacked by the enemy, who was advanc- ing in three times his nominal strength. This was the situation to be met at the outset. The arms and equipments for 23,000 men which I had gathered at New York I now found had been diverted from my department and sent to Virginia. I had no money and the Government no credit; but the chief difficulty was the want of arms. There was no want of men. The loyal population of the North-western States flocked to the Union standard; the German population with a noble unanimity. Having these conditions to face, on the 26th of July I telegraphed my needs to Montgomery Blair, whom I had known intimately. In reply he telegraphed, " I find it impossible to get any attention to Missouri or Western matters from the authorities here. You will have to do the best you can and take all needful responsibility to defend and protect the people over whom you are specially set." Two days afterward Secretary Seward telegraphed to ask what disposition I had made of the arms I had purchased in Europe, asking for an invoice. I telegraphed him that I needed to use these arms for my department, that I had absolutely no arms, and that the situation of the State was critical. On the 30th I sent to the President, as had been arranged, an unofficial letter setting forth the condition of my command. I informed him that the treasurer of the United States at St. Louis had 300,000 entirely unappropriated, but had refused my request for 100,000 to be delivered to my paymaster-general. I said to him that there were three courses open to me: "First, to let the enemy possess himself of some of the strongest points in the State and threaten St. Louis, which is insurrectionary; second, to force a loan from the secession banks here; third, to use the money belonging to the Government which is in the treasury. . . . This morning I will order the treasurer to deliver the money in his possession to General Andrews and will send a force to the treasury to take the money, and will direct such payments as the exigency requires. I will hazard everything for the defense of the department you have confided to me, and I trust to you for support." To the propositions of this letter the President gave the tacit approval of not replying, and I acted upon it. I had no time to lose. The situation of Lyon at Springfield was critical, and the small disintegrating garrison at Cairo was hourly exposed to assault by an overpowering force. Among the various points threatened, Cairo was the key to the success of my operations. The waterways and the district around Cairo were of first importance. Upon the possession of this district depended the descent and control of the Mississippi Valley by the Union armies, or the inroad by the Confederate forces into the loyal States. 280 IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI. I now sent within the Con- federate lines a capable en- gineer officer possessed of the necessary military knowledge, with instructions to go into the States of Kentucky and Tennessee to observe the situ- ation of the enemy, ascertain his strength and probable plans, and make rough maps of important localities occu- pied by troops or likely to be. N w FFive days after my arrival, hearing that Pillow was mov- ing upon Cairo, I left St. N00000000000000 5\7tit0 7\ ; Louis for that place, with all my available force, 3800 men. I distributed my command NJf3tENKB.,tkl; FltP N tover a transport fleet of eight large steamboats, in order to create in the enemy an im- pression of greater strength than I possessed. I found the garrison demoralized. From Ca Iro Fwas P. mostIR uhath y AP the chief of artillery I learned there were only about six hundred effective men under arms. These troops had enlisted for three months, which had now expired. They had not been paid, and there was much sickness among them. The resnforcement I brought, and such assurances as I was able to give, restored confidence; and I prevailed on one of the garrison regiments to remain. Cairo was the most unhealthy post within my command. Fever and dysen- tery were prevailing. The roomy, shaded decks and convenient cabins of the large steamboats which brought the reenforcements, and the breeze from the water blowing through them, were in strong contrast with the steaming heat of the low, moist grounds of Cairo. This suggested the idea of floating hospi- tals. Before the sun went down the greater number of the sick were carried to one of the roomiest boats, thus securing good ventilation and perfect drainage. The sudden relief of Cairo and the exaggerated form in which the news of it reached Pillow had the intended effect. He abandoned his proposed attack, and gave time to put it effectually beyond reach of the enemy, and eventually to secure a firm hold on the whole of that important district. Having secured the initial point in my campaign, I returned to St. Louis on August 4th. Meantime I had ordered Stevenson's 7th Missouri regiment from Boonville, and Montgomery's Kansas regiment near Leavenworth, to the support of Lyon at Springfield. Amidst incessant and conflicting demands, my immediate care was to provide aid for him. 28i IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI. Governor Oliver P. Morton, of Indiana, answering my urgent request for troops, telegraphed that if leave were granted from Washington he would send five regiments made up of river boatmen, well adapted for the Mississippi expedition. In answer to my request they were ordered to me. But the order was changed, and instead of joining me they were sent to General Robert Anderson, then in command at Louisville. The same day I asked Senator Latham, at Washington, to aid my application for three thousand men from California, to be plaied at El Paso, to operate against Texas troops moving into Arkansas. On the 5th Marsh reported from Girardeau that the enemy was close upon him, 5000 strong, and would attack him before morning. At midnight a heavy battery of 6 twenty-four-pounders and 1000 men were embarked to his aid under experienced officers, and Prentiss further reenforced him from below the same morning. On the 6th General Scott telegraphed me that he had ordered all the troops out of New Mexico, and directed me to confer immediately with the governor of Kansas, and arrange for the safety of New Mexico, sending two regiments " without delay," as the first detachment would leave on the 15th. On the 9th I informed the Government that the greater part of the old troops were going out of service, while the new levies, totally unacquainted with the rudiments of military training, would be unmanageable before an enemy. Therefore, I asked authority from the President to collect through- out the states educated officers who had seen service. With them I could make a framework on which to organize an army. My request was granted, and I acted upon it at once. On the 10th Prentiss reported from Cairo that the enemy were again con- centrating and intrenching at New Madrid about ten thousand strong. Before my arrival at St. Louis General Lyon had borne a decisive and important part in Missouri. Together with Francis P. Blair, the younger, he had saved Missouri from secession. For this reason I had left his movements to his own discretion, but had myself made every possible effort to reenforce him. The defeat at Bull Run had made a change in affairs from that which was existing when General Lyon left Boonville for Springfield on the 5th of July. To any other officer in his actual situation, I should have issued per- emptory orders to fall back upon the railroad at Rolla. On the 6th I had sent an officer by special engine to Rolla, with dispatches for Lyon, and for news of him. In his letter of August 9th, the day before the battle, Lyon states, in answer to mine of the 6th, that he was unable to determine whether he could maintain his ground or would have to retire. At a council of war a fortnight before the battle, the opinion of his officers was unanimous for retreating upon Rolla. On the 13th news reached me of the battle fought at Wilson's Creek on the 10th between about 6000 Union troops, under Lyon, and a greatly superior force under Price and McCulloch. I was informed that General Lyon had been killed, and that the Union troops under Sigel were retreating unmolested upon Rolla. In telegraphing a report of the battle to Washington, I informed the Department of the need of some organized force to repel the enemy, reported 282 IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI. to be advancing on other points in considerable strength. I again asked the Secretary of War for Groesbeck's 39th Ohio regiment, and to order from the governors of Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin their disposable force. I informed him that we were badly in want of field artillery and that few small-arms had arrived. I also asked the President to read my dispatches. Dissensions in the camp of the enemy prevented them from using their success, and I made and pushed forward as rapidly as possible dispositions for the defense of the city and State. I reenforced Rolla, which was the receiving-place for troops destined for the South-west. The plan of defense adopted was to fortify Girardeau and the termini of the railroads at Iron- ton, Rolla, and Jefferson City, with St. Louis as a base; holding these places with sufficient garrisons and leaving the army free for operations in the field. These points I connected by telegraph lines centering at headquarters. St. Louis was the base and center of operations and depot of reserves. Six thousand men, working night and day, were employed upon the fortifications, which commanded the city itself, as well as the surrounding country, upon a line of about ten miles. All the railroads entering the city I connected at one depot, more cars were added, and on twenty-four hours' notice 10,000 men could have been moved upon them from any one point to the opposite side of the State. The officer who had been sent within the Confederate lines had returned, bringing important information concerning the position of the enemy, together with the rough maps required, indicating, among other points, the positions of Forts Henry and Donelson, then in course of construction. I sent him back immediately to make examinations of the Tennessee and Cum- berland with reference to the use of those rivers by gun-boats, and also to watch the enemy's moves toward the Cairo district. In answer to my appeal to the loyal governors for troops, regiment after regiment arrived at St. Louis from the whole North-west, but they were entirely without tents or camp equipage. The chief quartermaster of my department was an officer of the regular army, Major McKinstry, experienced, able, and energetic. But there were no supplies on hand, of any kind, to meet the necessities of the troops arriving without notice, and entirely unpro- vided. In this exigency he made requisition on the head of his department in Washington, but was informed in reply that the department could not meet the requisitions that were being made by the Army of the Potomac; that the preservation of the capital was deemed of more importance than the State of Missouri; that their entire time and attention was devoted to meet- ing requisitions made upon them; that General Fremont had full power, and that he, as Fr6mont's chief quartermaster, must use his own judgment and do the best he could toward meeting the wants of the department. In July, at Washington, the subject of mortar-boats for the Mississippi expedition had been discussed between General M. C. Meigs, Gustavus V. Fox, afterward the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and myself, and had been referred to me for decision, as having in charge military operations on the Mississippi. On the 31st of July the Secretary of War directed 283 IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI. that the 16 nine-inch guns made at Pittsburg for the navy should be forwarded to me with the great- est dispatch, and that 30 thirteen- inch mortars be made as soon as possible and forwarded to me, to- gether with shells for both guns and mortars. On the 24th of August I directed the construction of 38 mortar-boats, and later of 8 steam-tugs to move them, and the purchase and alteration into gunh boats of two strongly built river vessels,-the New Era, a large ferry-boat, and the Submarine, a powerful snag-boat; they were re- con named Essex and Benton. At my suggestion and order, the sides of Ut all these vessels were to be clad with iron. On the 3d of September General Meigs advised me to order from Pittsburg fifteen-inch guns for my gun-boats, as "able to empty any battery the enemy could make.,, Work on these gun-boats was driv- en forward night and day. As in f the case of the fortifications, the wau work was carried on by torchlight. \\ August 25th an expedition was ordered under Colonel G. Waagner with one regiment, accompanied FRM lPOTGRPH by Commander John Rodgers with two gun-boats, to destroy the enemy's fortifications that were being con- structed at Belmont. [See map, page 263.1 August 28th I assigned Brigadier-General U. S. Grant to the command of South-east Missouri, with headquarters at Cairo. He was fully instructed concerning the actual and intended movements on the Mississippi and the more immediate movements upon the Kentucky shore, together with the intention to hold the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. In his written instructions General Grant was directed to act in concert with Coin mander Rodgers and Colonel Waagner, and to take possession of points threatened by the Confederates on the Missouri and Kentucky shores. August 31st Captain Neustadter was ordered to Cairo, to select a site opposite Paducah for a battery to command the mouth of the Teninessee river. September 4th I sent heavy gnuns and an artillery officer to Cairo, where General Grant had just arrived from Girardeau. I telegraphed the President informing him that the enemy was beginning to occupy, on the Kentucky 284 IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI. shore, every good point between Paducah and Hickman, and that Paducah should be occupied by us. I asked him now to include Kentucky in my command. September 5th I sent to General Grant a letter of instruction, in which I required him to push forward with the utmost speed all work on the' point selected on the Kentucky shore ten miles from Paducah, to be called Fort Holt. In this letter I directed him to take possession of Paducah if he felt strong enough to do so; but if not, then to plant a battery opposite Paducah on the Illinois side to command the Ohio River and the mouth of the Tennes- see. On the evening of the day on which this letter was sent to General Grant, the officer who had been sent by me within the Confederate lines reached Cairo on his way to St. Louis to let me know that the enemy was advancing on Paducah. He judged it right to inform General Grant, urging him to take Paducah without delay. General Grant decided to do so, and in accordance with his instructions of the 28th immediately moved on Paducah with an adequate force and two gun-boats. He reached the town on the morning of the 6th, having only about six hours' advance of the enemy. Taking undis- puted possession, he returned to Cairo the same day. In answer to my persistent application for Colonel C. F. Smith he was ordered to join me, having meantime been made by the President a brigadier- general at my special request. I at once sent him forward to the command I had designed for him,-Paducah and the Kentucky shore of the Mississippi. His letter of instructions made known to him all the previous measures taken to hold the Kentucky shore and the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumber- land. The execution of this part of my plans broke in upon the Confederate lines, drove them back, and dispersed their combinations for transferring the war to the loyal States. I now on the 8th of September wrote to the President, giving him in the following extract the general features of my plan of campaign: "As the rebel forces outnumber ours, and the counties of Kentucky between the Mississippi and Tennessee rivers, as well as those along the latter and the Cumberland, are strongly secessionist, it becomes imperatively necessary to have the cooperation of the loyal Union forces under Generals Anderson and Nelson, as well as of those already encamped opposite Louisville, under Colonel Rousseau. I have reenforced, yesterday, Paducah with two regiments, and will continue to strengthen the position with men and artillery. As soon as General Smith, who commands there, is reenforced sufficiently to enable him to spread his forces, he will have to take and hold Mayfield and Lovelaceville, to be in the rear and flank of Columbus, and to occupy Smithland, controlling in this way the mouths of both the Tennessee and the Cumberland rivers. At the same time Colonel Rousseau should bring his force, in- creased if possible, by two Ohio regiments, in boats to Henderson, and, taking the Henderson and Nashville railroad, occupy Hopkinsville; while General Nelson should go with a force of five thousand by railroad to Louisville, and from there to Bowling Green. As the population in all the counties through which the above railroads pass are loyal, this movement could be made without delay or molestation to the troops. Meanwhile General Grant would take possession of the entire Cairo and Fulton railroad, Piketon, New Madrid, and the shore of the Mississippi opposite Hickman and Columbus. The foregoing disposition having been effected, a combined attack will be made upon Columbus, and, if successful in that, upon Hickman, while Rousseau and Nelson will move in concert by railroad to Nashville, Tenn., occupying the State capital, and, with an adequate force, New Providence. The conclusion of this movement would be a combined advance toward Memphis, on the Mississippi, as well as the Memphis and Ohio railroad." 285 IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI. Meantime the untoward and obstructing conduct of the people of Missouri had decided me to assert the power of the Government. Accordingly, on the 30th of August, I issued a proclamation affixing penalties to rebellion and extending martial law over the State of Missouri. By this proclamation the property of persons in rebellion against the United States was held to be confiscated, and their slaves were declared free. As a war measure this, in my opinion, was equal to winning a deciding battle. The President disap- proved it, as likely to lose us Kentucky, the loyalty of which was so strained and t the temper of which was so doubtful, that he had agreed to the neutral atti- tude Kentucky demanded. He desired me to withdraw it as of my own motion. Unwilling to put myself in this position, I asked him to order it withdrawn, which he did. Shortly following upon this act, I was in many ways made to feel the with- drawal from me of the confidence and l support of the Administration, but, ac- ceding to strong representations from n leading citizens of St. Louis, I did not resigu my command. I had already been brought into col- IOR-MNLRAL ItANZ SIGEL. lision with the intrigues of men who were Fatt A PIRM)GHAR11l in confidential relations with the President, and the occasion was promptly seized by them to urge misrepresentations which were readily accepted as reasons for my removal. The visits of high officers charged with inquiry into the affairs of my department, and the simultaneous and sustained attacks of leading journals, accumulated obstructions and weakened my authority. In fact, my command at the end of August had virtually existed little over a month; but the measures which I had initiated had already taken enduring shape, and eventually worked their intended result. The inadequate space to which I am restricted compels me to pass over here the circumstances which made inevitable the loss of Lexington, upon which Price advanced after his victory at Wilson's Creek. An possible efforts were made to relieve Colonel Mulligan, but, notwithstanding the large concen- tration of troops for his relief, these efforts were baffled by absolute want of transportation and by river obstructions. To the Confederate general it was a barren success, and he was shortly forced to retreat to the south-west. As a military position Lexington was of no value to him. In the midst of the demand for troops for Lexington, I was on the 14th ordered by General Scott to " send five thousand well-armed infantry to Washington without a moment's delay." Two thousand were sent. At the end of September I left St. Louis to take the field against Price. The army numbered 38,000 men. To complete the defenses of St. Louis, after 286 IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI. the advance of the army, I left 5 regiments of infantry, with 1 battalion of cavalry, and 2 batteries of field artillery. The five divisions which com- posed it were assigned positions, their lines of march converging to Spring- field; and in the beginning of October I moved against Price. Transportation and, consequently, supplies were very inadequate; but in exigencies an army sometimes moves without either. The September rains were over; the fine weather of the Indian summer had come; the hay was gathered, and the corn was hardening, and we were about to carry out the great object of the cam- paign with fewer hardships from exposure, and fewer impediments from want of transport, than could have been expected at any other season. The spirit of the army was high. A finer body of men could not have been brought together, and we had every reason to believe that the campaign would open with a signal victory in the defeat or dispersion of the enemy, with a move on Memphis as the immediate result. Had I possessed means of transport when Price moved on Lexington I should have compelled him to give me battle on the north side of the Osage; as he could not cross the Missouri without exposing himself to certain defeat, no other course would have remained open to him. In fact, when I did go forward, the appearance of my advance at Sedalia was the signal for his precipitate retreat. The first contact now with the enemy was at Fredericktown and Springfield,- the former one of the most admirably conducted engagements of the war, and the latter action a glorious victory. Along the whole extent of our lines we were uniformly successful against the enemy. At the end of October I was in Springfield with 21,000 effective men. Price had terminated his retreat, and his movements showed that he had decided to offer battle. This was confirmed by information obtained from his headquarters that the Missourians were refusing to leave the State. Recognizing the rights of humanity, and remembering that this conflict was among our own people, and that the whole State of Missouri was a battle-field, General Price and myself had been engaged in arranging the terms of a con- vention which was concluded and signed by us on the 1st of November. It provided: 1st, for an exchange of prisoners, hitherto refused by our Govern- ment; 2d, that guerrilla fighting should be suppressed, and the war confined to the organized armies in the field; 3d, that there should be no arrests for opinion, the preservation of order being left to the State courts. Generals Asboth and Sigel, division commanders, now reported that the enemy's advance-guard was at Wilson's Creek, nine miles distant, several thousand strong; his main body occupying the roads in the direction of Cass- vile, at which place General Price had his headquarters with his reserves. On November 2d the dispositions for the expected battle were being planned, when late in the evening a messenger arrived bearing an order from General Scott which removed me from my command. This order had been hurried forward by General Hunter, who superseded me, and who was behind with his division. The next day, Hunter not arriving, the plan of battle was agreed on, the divisions were assigned conformably, and in the evening the troops began to occupy their positions. About 10 o'clock at night 287 IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI. Hunter arrived at my headquarters, where the officers were assembled. I handed to him the plan of battle and turned over my command. The ordler which gave my command to General Hunter was dated Octo- her 24th, and had been sent to one of my sub- ordinate officers in St. quent information. MyexendiurestoLouis, to be served on me at his discretion. Ac- companying it was a letter from the President in whichhe directed that defense iddisefre ntait should not be served west and th o h tkn oon me if Iwhad fought a battle or was about to fight one. His intention was disregarded; the or- der was put in force when both ourselves and the enemy were MAJH-GNEBL JHINC. tMNT.FRO A rEK PLTE ready and intending bat- POSSE11IN F Mft FftfUONT.tle. In the face of posi- tive knowledge, General Hunter assumed that there was no enemy near and no battle possible, and withdrew the army. The correctness of the operations in this campaign to meet the intended movements of the enemy, have all been corroborated and proved by subse- quent information. My expenditures to raise and equip this army were vindicated and sustained by decisions of the United States courts. The establishment of martial law at St. Louis, which was denounced as arbitrary and unnecessary, was maintained and acted upon by all my successors until peace was declared, and the fortifications of that city, upon which all lines of defense rested, aided its enforcement and made the dyke between the North- west and the South. The taking of Paducah, for which Ii was censured, has since been made the pivot of success to others. And the gunu-boats, for the preparation of which, also, I was censured, the work being countermanded as a "useless extravagance," became historic in the progress of the war. In support of the facts, I quote from the report of General McCulloch to his Secretary of War, at the close of this Missouri campaign: "We met next day at a point between the two armies where it was agreed upon by all the Missouri gen- erals that we should wait an attack from the enemy, the ground to be selected by General Price and myself." Official Records, III., 748.-J. C. F. Hunter's withdrawal was in pursuance of in- structions of a general nature from President Lin- coln, dated October 24th, 1861, and accompanying the orders relieving General Frdmont.- EDITORS. 288 WILSON'S CREEK, AND THE DEATH OF LYON. BY WILLIAM M. WHERRY, SIXTH U. S. INFANTRY, BREVET BRIGADIER-iENERAL, U. S. V.. AT WILSON'S CREEK AIDF-DE-CAMP T( GENERAL LYON. . ABOUT the middle of July, 1861, the Army of the Union in - south-west Missouri, under General Nathaniel Lyon, was encamped in and near the town of Springfield, and num- bered approximately 6200 men, of whom about 500 were ill-armed and undisciplined "Home Guards." The organ- ' W l w ized troops were in all 5868, in four brigades. By the 9th of August these were reduced to an aggregate of about 5300 men, with the 500 Home Guards additional. Of these troops, the 1st Iowa regiment was entitled to discharge on the 14th of August, and the 3d and 5th Missouri, Sigel's and Salomon's, at different periods, by companies, from the 9th to the 18th of August. All except the regulars had been enrolled since the attack on Sumter in April, and but little time had been possible for drill and instruction. They had been moved and marched from St. Louis and points in Kansas, taking part in sev- eral spirited but minor engagements, and were ill-provided with clothing and food, but their spirits were undaunted, and they were devoted to their leader. The latter part of July was spent by Lyon in drilling his troops and procuring supplies, the mills in the neighborhood having been seized and employed in grinding flour for the troops. He continued to send urgent appeals to St. Louis for rebnforcements. On the 1st of August, however, having received info- mation of an advance by the enemy, in superior numbers, Lyon moved down the Fayetteville road (also known as the Cassville road) to meet and attack the largest and most advanced force, hoping to drive it back and then strike the others in detail. A lively skirmish with Price's advance-guard, under Rains, took place at Dug Springs on the 2d of August; and on the 3d a more insignificant affair occurred with the rear-guard of Rains's forces at McCullah's farm, which had been his headquarters, but from which he retired without resistance. Here Lyon became convinced he was being drawn farther and farther from his base, without supplies, and he determined to fall back to Springfield, which place he reached on the 5th. During those blistering August days the men inarched with bleeding feet and parched lips, Lyon himself urging forward the weary and footsore stragglers. On the 8th a march in force was planned for the following night, to make an attack on the enemy's front at Wilson's Creek at daylight. From this intention General Lyon was dissuaded, after having called together the principal officers to receive their instructions. Miany of the troops were exhausted, and all were tired; moreover, some supplies having arrived from VOL. 1. 19 289 290 WILSON'S CREEK, AND THE DEATH OF LYON. YL...rt, . E X4 BATTLE OF WILSONS CREEK ORt OAK HILLS, AUG41USTJOW11861 Z"V10h C01'1 .DCf.fVATC - NOTE TO Txl )Ar. The engagement began at 5:30 A. l., Lyon'a ad- vance driving Rains over Bloody Hill. Price's line as formed to confront the main attack by Lyou about 6: 20 was, from left to right, as follows: MC- Brile, Psons (with Guibor'sbattery), Clark, Slack. and Rains. This force numbered 5168 men with 4 gun, and was opposed by nearly 200 men with 10 guns. The right of the first Union line was held by the lat Missouri; on its left were Totte,'s battery Osterhaus's battalion, the 1st Kanas, DuBois's bat- tery, and 8teele's battalion. Later, the lot Kansa was relieved by the 1st Iowa ito), and the 1st Mis- sourl by the 2d Kansas (MO), and by Hteele. This brought the Union strength at this point up to 3000 Meanwhile, HElbert'. 3d Louisiana and MtIntosh's regiment and McRae's battalion, together num- bering 1320, moved down from their encampment _ (marked " MeCulloch's bri- gade "). crossed the road, and repulsed Plummer's 30o In the corn-field, but were drivenbackbyDuBo.W'sbat- tery. By this hour (8 o'clock) / s f 1Sigel had attacked on the rear andhad driven Church- ill'r infantry and Greer's and Major's cavalry out of their camps. MeCulloch now gathered up part of the 3d Louisiana and routed Sigel's troops, who were at 8harp' farm. He wasalded In this by the fire of Reid's and Bledsoe's batteries. Woodruff's battery had from the start chiefly en- gaged Totten; and now Churehill, and next; Gre-r's and Carroll's cavalry, and W twD-w 2rrvaafterwardGratiot's regi- ment (of Pearcebs brigade) were conducted to the aid [ \ of Price, raising his force u t - t \ , to 4239, exclusive of Greer and Carroll, who bad been quickly repulsed byTotten; Lyon's being as above, 30a, exclusive of 220 of Plummer's and 3co of the Mounted Reserve. General Lyon was killed at 10:.30. just as Pear e's fresh regi- ments (under Walker and A r Doekery) and the 3d Loui- sdana were coming up. At g 11:20 Major Sturgls with- drew the Unionarmy, which was then outaumbered two to one. EDITOnt. I SILS 7 t NSr A t X h X GEN, SIGEI: ' Et. Ks, i i i 0 I k i I I a I i i I I i i i I I 4! I i I 1-1, I el , -V Ar - I 'V ,,, '' ,, , r, p I I I I ,1' , I N;"- A , A-it-i-, 11 _'. Ir 1, t WILSON'S CREEK, AND THE DEATH OF LYON. Rolla, it was deemed wise to clothe and shoe the men as far as practicable, and to give them another day for recuperation. On the 9th it was intended to march that evening with the whole force united, as agreed upon the 8th, and attack the enemy's left at daylight, and Lyon's staff were busied in visiting the troops and seeing that all things were in order. During the morning Colonel Sigel visited Lyon's headquarters, and had a prolonged conference, the result of which was that Colonel Sigel was ordered to detach his brigade, the 3d and 5th Missouri, one six-gun bat- tery, one company of the 1st U. S. Cavalry, under Captain Eugene A. Carr, and one company of the 2d Dragoons, under Lieutenant Charles E. Farrand, for an attack upon the enemy from the south, while Lyon with the remainder of his available force should attack on the north. The troops were put in march in the evening; those about Springfield immediately under General Lyon moving out to the west on the Little York road until joined by Sturgis's command from their camps, when they turned to the south across the prairie. The head of the main column reached the point where the enemy's pickets were expected to be found, about 1 A. M., and went into bivouac. Sigel's force, consisting of 1200 men and six pieces of artillery, moved four miles down the Fayetteville road, and then, making a long d6tour to the left by a by-road, arrived within a mile of the enemy's camp and rear at daylight. In the vicinity of the Fayetteville road crossing, the creek acquires con- siderable depth, and in most places has rough, steep, and rather high banks, rendering fording difficult. On the left side the hills assume the proportion of bluffs; on the right or western bank the ground is a succession of broken ridges, at that time covered for the most part with trees and a stunted growth of scrub oaks with dense foliage, which in places became an almost impene- trable tangle. Rough ravines and deep gullies cut up the surface. The Confederates were under command of General Ben. McCulloch. On the west side of the stream, "Old Pap" Price, with his sturdy Missourians, men who in many later battles bore themselves with a valor and determina- tion that won the plaudits of their comrades and the admiration of their foes, was holding the point south of Wilson's Creek, selected by Lyon for attack. Price's command consisted of five bodies of Missourians, under Slack, Clark, Parsons, McBride, and Rains, the last-named being encamped farther up the stream. On the bluffs on the east side of the creek were H6bert's 3d Louisiana and McIntosh's Arkansas regiment, and, farther south, Pearce's brigade and two batteries, while other troops, under Greer, Churchill, and Major, were in the valley along the Fayetteville road, holding the extreme of the Confederate position. Lyon put his troops in motion at early dawn on the 10th, and about 4 o'clock struck Rains's most advanced picket, which escaped and gave warning of the attack, of which General Price was informed just as he was about to breakfast. Captain Plummer's battalion of regular infantry was the advance, followed by Osterhaus's two companies of the 2d Missouri Volunteers, and Totten's battery. A body of 200 mounted Home Guards was on Plummer's left. 291 292 WILSON'S CREEK. AND THE DEATH OF LYON. Having reached the enemy's pickets, the infantry was deployed as skirmish- ers, Plummer to the left and Osterhaus to the right, and Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews, with the 1st Missouri Infantry, was brought up in support of the battery. Advancing a mile and a half and crossing a brook tributary to the creek, the Union skirmishers met and pushed the Confederate skirmishers up the slope. This disclosed a considerable force of the enemy, along a ridge per- pendicular to the line of march and to the valley of the creek, which was attacked by the 1st Missouri and the 1st Kansas, assisted by Totten's battery, who drove back the Confederates on the right to the foot of the slope beyond. Plummer on the left early became separated from the main body by a deep ravine terminating in a swampy piece of ground, beyond which lay a corn- field which he entered, encountering a large force, the main part of which was the Louisiana regiment. These troops fought with determined valor and checked Plummer's progress. DuBois's battery was moved up to a hill on the left, supported by Osterhaus's battalion, the 1st Iowa, and the 2d Kan- sas, and opened a deadly fire with shells upon the corn-field, with such marked effect as to throw the Confederates into disorder and enable Plum- mer to draw off his command in good order across the ravine. A momentary lull occurred at this time, except on o'ir extreme right, where Price's Missourians opposed the 1st Missouri and attempted to turn that flank, but the 2d Kansas by its timely arrival and gallant attack bore back Price's overwhelming numbers and saved the flank. Meanwhile Totten's battery, which had been brought into action by section and by piece as the conforma- tioni of the ground would admit, performed extraordinary service. Steele's regular infantry was added to its support. Price's troops had fought with great bravery and determination, advancing and retiring two or three times before they were compelled to give way on the lower slope of the ridge they had occupied. Many times the firing was one continuous roar. The lull enabled the enemy to re-adjust his lines and bring up fresh troops, having accomplished which, Price made a determined advance along nearly the whole of Lyon's front. He charged fiercely in lines of three or four ranks, to within thirty or forty yards, pouring in a galling fire and directing his most determined efforts against Totten's battery, for which Woodruff's, which was pitted against it, was no match at all. J Every available man of Lyon's was now brought into action and the bat- tle raged with redoubled energy on both sides. For more than an hour the balance was about even, one side gaining ground only to give way in its turn to the advance of the other, till at last the Confederates seemed to yield, and a suspension of the fury took place. General Lyon had bivouacked near the head of his column on the night of the 9th, sharing a rubber-coat with Major (now Major-General) John M. Schofield, his chief of staff, between two rows of corn in a field by the roadside, his other staff-officers near by. He did not seem hopeful, but was Woodruff's Little Rock battery was composed had been ill eommand. Woodruff and his gun- of guns which had been captured at the seizure of ners had, in faet, been drilled and instructed by the Little Rock arsenal, of which Captain Totten Totten.-EDITORS. god - Vw J tl\Cw /11D r7G L IF711 r LruiN. 293 oppressedwith the responsibility of his situation, with anxiety for the cause, and with sympathy for the Union people in that section, when he should retreat and leave to their fate those who could not forsake their homes. He repeat- edly expressed himself as having been abandoned by his superi- ors. When the troops were put in motion, he went at the head Ny\ of the column, and when the N J action opened he kept his place N ;\ at the front, entering the heat of the engagement with the line, near Totten's battery. He main- in teta wientlntthl taied an imperturbable cool- ness, and his eye shone with the ardor of conflict. He directed, en- and hereeve sihtwonihelg.Scouraged, and rallied his troops in person, sending his staff in all directions, and was frequently '4 1I( Il (s1 NI, lIRJ4114 M (4lomt rnx mfnGlr without an attendant except one or two faithful orderlies. Early in the attack while on the line to the left of Tottens battery, rallying a part of the 1st Missouri Infantry, his horse, which he was leading, was killed and he received a slight wound in the leg. Shortly afterward he was wounded in the head. He continued dismounted during the contest above described, and walking a few paces toward the rear with his chief of staff, Major Scho- field, who had also lost his horse, shot under him, Lyon said, "I fear the day is lost." Schofield encouraged him to take a more hopeful view of the case, assuring him that the troops were easily rallied and were gaining confidence, and that the disorder was only temporary, and then proceeded to another part of the line in search of a mount. About 9 o'clock, during a brief cessation in the firing, Lyon started toward the top of the ridge, accompanied by an aide, who was urging him to arcept his horse, when they met Major Sturgis and a few troopers. One of these was dismounted, and his horse was given to General Lyon. Lyon also expressed himself despondingly to Sturgis, and was by him encouraged. S8turgis proceeded to another quarter, and Lyon toward DuBois's battery. About this time great anxiety began to be felt for the fate of Sigel's command. Shortly after Lyon's attack the sound of battle had been heard in the rear of the enemy's line. It continued but ashor-ttime, and was renewed shortly after- ivard for a very brief period only, when it ceased altogether. Sigel had pro- (eeded to within a mile of the camps, and his cavalry had cut off the enemy's stuall parties and thus suppressed information of his coming. He then U/11CI-IMIC I-DrCLI A.T- 'I- --- __ I-, 294 WILSON'S CREEK, AND THE DEATH OF LYON. advanced his infantry toward the point where the by-road crosses the creek, his flanks supported by the cavalry on the right and dragoons on the left, four guns being placed on a hill overlooking the tents. At about 5:30 A. M., hear- . ing the musketry on Lyon's front he opened fire with his guns, pushing his infantry across the creek and into the lower camp, whence they had fled, over- i whelmed by the suddenness of the at- tack. Sigel crossed his guns and pushed A with infantry and artillery forward a short distance in pursuit, meeting with slight resistance. He advanced from his first position near the creek, by a road west of the deserted camp, and formed line of battle in a field between the road and the camp. Afterward he advanced to Shar'as house. The Ar- kansans and Texans retired to the northward, fell in with Price's Missouri line, and assisted in the fight against Lyon. Meanwhile McCulloch called upon a battalion of mounted Missouri- ans, and upon a part of the Louisiana regiment which had been confronting Plummner in the corn-field, and with these attacked Sigel's men, who were in line at Sharp's farm, and drove them from the field. When the attack by the Confederates, from the direction of Lyon's front, was made, the confusion of Sigel's men was brought about by the enfilading fire of iReid's battery east of the creek, and by the belief that the infantry in their front were friends. Sigel went back the way he came with a part of his command, including Carrs cavalry. All but the cavalry, who were 4E ahead, were ambuscaded and, for the most part, killed or captured; Sigel narrowly escaped capture. Colonel Sal- omion with 450 of the troops retreated, by a d6tour to the west, to the Litl York road, as did also Lieutenant Far- WILSON'S CREEK, AND THE DEATH OF LYON. rand, with the dragoons. The latter, finding himself with his company alone, forcibly detained a guide, and made up teams for one gun and one caisson of the abandoned artillery. He was finally compelled to unhorse and leave the caisson, in order to put the animals to the gun. Thus by 10 o'clock Sigel was out of the fight, and the enemy could turn his whole force upon Lyon. Meantime a body of troops was observed moving down the hill on the east bank of Wilson's Creek toward Lyon's left, and an attack by other troops from that direction was anticipated. Schofield deployed eight companies of the 1st Iowa and led them in person to repel this. They did so most gallantly after a sanguinary contest, effectually assisted by the fire from DuBois's bat- tery, which alone drove back the column on the opposite side of the stream before it began a crossing. Lyon, accompanied by an aide s and his six or eight orderlies, followed closely the right of the Iowa regiment. After proceeding a short distance, his atten- tion was called by the aide to a line of men drawn up on the prolongation of the left of our main line and nearly perpendicular to the 1st Iowa as it moved to the eastward. A party of horsemen came out in front of this line of the enemy and proceeded to reconnoiter. General Price and Major Emmett Mac Donald (who had sworn that he would not cut his hair till the Confed- eracy was acknowledged) were easily recognized. General Lyon started as if to confront them, ordering his party to " draw pistols and follow" him, when the aide protested against his exposing himself to the fire of the line, which was partly concealed by the mass of dense underbrush, and asked if he should not bring up some other troops. To this Lyon assented, and directed the aide to order up the 2d Kansas. The general advanced a short distance, joining two companies of the 1st Iowa, left to protect an exposed position. Colonel Mitchell of the 2d Kansas, near DuBois's battery, sent his lieutenant- colonel, Blair, to Lyon to ask to be put in action, and the two messengers passed each other without meeting. Lyon repeated his order for the regiment to come forward. The regiment moved promptly by the flank, and as it approached Lyon he directed the two companies of Iowa troops to go forward with it, himself leading the column, swinging his hat. A murderous fire was opened from the thick brush, the 2d Kansas deployed rapidly to the front and with the two companies of the 1st Iowa swept over the hill, dislodging the enemy and driving them back into the next ravine; but while he was at the head of the column, and pretty nearly in the first fire, a ball penetrated Lyon's left breast, inflicting a mortal wound. He slowly dismounted, and as he fell into the arms of his faithful orderly, Lehmann, he exclaimed, " Leh- mann, I am killed," and almost immediately expired. Colonel Mitchell was also severely wounded about the same time and removed to the rear. Lieutenant Gustavus Schreyer and two of his men of the 2d Kansas bore the body of Lyon through the ranks, Lehmann bearing the hat and loudly bemoaning the death of his chief. In the line of file-closers the returning aide was met, who, apprehensive of the effect upon the troops, stopped the clamor 4 The writer.-EDIToRs. 295 296 WILSON'S CREEK, AND THE DEATH OF LYON. of the orderly, covered the general's features with his coat, and had the body carried to a sheltered spot near DuBois's battery. Surgeon Florence M. Cornyn was found and called upon to examine the lifeless body of the dead general, and having pronounced life extinct, the aide went to seek Schofield and inform him of the calamity. He was met return- ing from the successful charge he had led, and at once announced that Major Sturgis should assume command, but vis- ited the remains of Lyon on his way to v find Sturgis. These were taken charge l of by the aide, and conveyed to the field- hospital, where the body was placed in a wagon and carefully covered. Strict or- ders were given that under no circum- stances was the body to be removed till the army returned to Springfield, after which the aide returned to the front to report to Major Sturgis for duty. The engagement on different pailts of the line lasted about half an hour after Lyon's death, when the Confederates gave way, and silence reigned for nearly the same length of time. Many of the senior BR, I,,, , GI,, NE ALX LPAC, C.S. officers having been disabled, Sturgis as- ,WXAPOMAPI sumed command, and the principal officers were summoned for consultation. This council and the suspended hostilities were soon abruptly terminated by the appearance of the Confederates along our entire front, where the troops had been readjusted in more compact form and were -now more determined and cooler than ever. A battery planted on a hill in the front began to use shrapnel and canister, a species of ammunition which, so far as I know, the enemy had not fired before at the troops who were with General Lyon. DuBois's battery continued on the left supported by Osterhaus's battalion and the 1st Missouri; the 1st Iowa, 1st Kansas, and the regular infantry sup- ported Totten's battery in the center, and the 2d Kansas held the extreme right. With unabated ardor and impetuosity the Confederates assailed this front and endeavored to gain the rear of the right flank, but Totten's battery in the center was the main point of assault. For the first time during this bloody day, the entire line maintained its position without flinching, the inexperienced volunteers vieing with the seasoned regulars in tenacity and coolness. b The flash and roar were incessant, and the determined Southrons repeatedly advanced nearly to the muzzles of the pieces of their foes, only to D This engagement is considered one of the se- fought upon American soil; seldom has a bloodier vereat of the war. Colonel Snead (in "The Fight one been fought on any modern field." Another for Missouri") says: "Never before-considering participant, a Confederate officer, described it the number engaged-had so bloody a battle been as " a mighty mean-fowt fight."-EDITORS. WILSON'S CREEK, AND THE DEATH OF LYON. be hurled back before the withering fire as from the blast of a furnace and to charge again with a like result. At a moment when the contest seemed evenly balanced, except for the overwhelming numbers of the Confederates on the field, Captain Gordon Granger, noted for his daring and intrepidity, rushed to the rear and brought up the supports of DuBois's battery, hurling them upon the enemy's right flank, into which they poured a murderous, deadly volley, which created a perfect rout along the whole front.\ Our troops continued to send a galling fire into the disorganized masses as they fled, until they disappeared, and the battle was ended. The order to withdraw was then given, and DuBois's battery with its sup- ports was moved to a hill and ridge in rear to cover the movement. Before the withdrawal of the main body took place, Captain Granger and others urged remaining on the ground, but Sturgis had received information of Sigel's rout, and in view of his depleted, worn-out forces and exhausted ammunition, persisted in a return to Springfield. The infantry and artillery, as soon as Totten's disabled horses were replaced, left the scene of conflict, and, passing through the troops placed in rear, took up the march for Spring- field. On reaching the Little York road, a body of horsemen was seen to the west, which proved to be Lieutenant Farrand with his dragoons, leading in a remnant of Sigel's brigade, with the one piece of artillery he had saved. In his hand he carried a captured flag, which he trailed by his side. He was received with vociferous cheering, and became for the time the admiration of all, having marched around both armies and brought his command in safe. On reaching Springfield, Sturgis found that Sigel had arrived there half an hour earlier. Regarding him as the senior, the command was given over to him. On the following morning the army withdrew. \ In his report Major Sturgis gave great praise to Gordon Granger, saying that he was "now sight- ing a gun of DuBois's battery, and before the smoke had cleared away sighting one of Totten's; at one moment reconnoitering the enemy, and the next either bringing up reenforcements or rallying some broken line. To whatever part of the field I might direct my attention, there would I find Captain Granger, hard at work at some important service."-EDITOaS. About this time, too, it was discovered that in order to gather up the wounded on the field the body of General Lyon had been taken from the wagon in which it was placed and had been left at the field-hospital. Lieutenant Canfield with his company B, 1st Cavalry, was dispatched with a wagon to recover the general's body, and the army moved on into Springfield, arriving about 5 P. m. Lieutenant Canfield proceeded to the battle-field, and before reaching there found the Confederates had returned and engaged in gath- ering their own wounded, and had found General Lyon's body. It was delivered by the enemy and was brought into the town to the house occupied as Lyon's headquarters, and was placed in charge of the late general's staff, who carefully cared for it. The house belonged to Governor John S. Phelps, and as it had been determined early in the even- ing that the troops would take up the retreat for Rolls before daylight the next morning, Mrs. Phelps, a warm personal friend of General Lyon during his sojourn in the town, was communicated with at her home in the country, and asked to have the remains buried on her farm till they could be removed. To this she gladly consented. The body was left in custody of surgeons who were to remain behind, and the next day Mrs. Phelps took posses- sion of it, and General Lyon was laid to rest in her garden, just outside the town. His body was sub- sequently removed to his home in Connecticut and buried with military and civic honors.- W. M. W. Lyon was born in Ashford, Conn., July 14th, 1518. He was graduated at West Point in S41, and served in the army in Florida and in the war with Mexico. He was brevetted captain for gallant conduct at Churubusco and Contreras. From 1849 to 1853 he served in California, winning special mention for his services in frontier warfare. He served afterward in Kansas, and from that State was ordered to St. Louis inJanuary, I 86l-EDIToRS. 297 ARKANSAS TROOPS IN THE BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK. BY N. B PEARCE, BRIGADIER-OEsERAI. C. S. A. I STYLE this short account of my personal recollections of the battle of "Oak Hills" (as the Confederates named the engagement) as above, because I was identified with the State of Arkansas and her soldiers. I also believe that subsequent events, developed by the prominence of some of the commanders engaged in this fight, have had a tendency to obscure that just recognition which the Arkansas troops so nobly earned in this, one of the first great battles of our civil war. The ninth day of August, 1861, found the Confederate army under General Ben. McCulloch, camped on Wilson's Creek, ten miles south of Springfield, in south-west Missouri. It consisted of a Louisiana regiment under Colonel Louis 116bert (a well-drilled and well-equipped organization, chiefly from the north part of the State); Greer's Texas regiment (mounted); Churchill's Arkansas cavalry, and McIntosh's battalion of Arkansas mounted rifles Lieutenant-Colonel Embry), under the immediate charge of the commanding general; General Price's command of Missouri State Guards, with Bledsoes and Guibor's batteries, and my three regiments of Arkansas infantry, with Woodruff's and Reid's batteries. More than half the Missourians were mounted, and but few of the troops in the whole command were well armed. The army numbered in all about 11,500 men,- perhaps, 6000 to 7000 of whom were in semi-fighting trim, and participated in the battle. The Federal forces under General Nathaniel Lyon, between 5000 and 6000 strong, occupied the town of Springfield, and General McCulloch was expect- ing them to advance and give him battle. General MeCulloch's headquarters were on the right of the Springfield road, east of Wilson's Creek, rather in advance of the center of the camp. General Price occupied a. position immediately west, and in the valley of the creek, with his command mostly north of the Springfield road. I had established my headquarters on the heights east and south of Wilson's Creek and the Springfield road, with my forces occupying the elevated ground immediately adjacent. Detailed reports as to the strength and movements of Lyon's command were momentarily expected, through spies sent out by General Price, as 218 ARKANSAS TROOPS IN THE BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK. 299 McCulloch relied upon the native Missourians to furnish such knowledge; but it was not until late in the afternoon that two "loyal" ladies succeeded in passing out of the Federal lines, by permission of General Lyon, and, coming in a circuitous route by Pond Springs, reached General Price's head- quarters with the desired information. General McCulloch at once called a council of war of the principal officers, where it was decided, instead of wait- ing for the enemy, to march with the whole command, at 9 o'clock that night, and attack General Lyon at Springfield. As soon as the orders of General McCulloch had been properly published by his adjutant-general, Colonel McIntosh, the camp was thrown into a ferment of suppressed excitement. It was ordered that the advance be made in three divisions, under the separate commands of General Price, Adjutant-General McIntosh, and myself. The scene of preparation, immediately following the orders so long delayed and now so eagerly welcomed by the men, was picturesque and animating in the extreme. The question of ammunition was one of the most important and serious, and as the Ordnance Department was imperfectly organized and poorly supplied, the men scattered about in groups, to impro- vise, as best they could, ammunition for their inefficient arms. Here, a group would be molding bullets-there, another crowd dividing percussion-caps, and, again, another group fitting new flints to their old muskets. They had little thought then of the inequality between the discipline, arms, and accouterments of the regular United States troops they were soon to engage in battle, and their own homely movements and equipments. It was a new thing to most of them, this regular way of shooting by word of command, and it was, per- haps, the old-accustomed method of using rifle, musket, or shot-gun as game- sters or marksmen that won them the battle when pressed into close quarters with the enemy. All was expectancy, and as the time sped on to 9 o'clock, the men became more and more eager to advance. What was their disappointment when, as the hour finally arrived, instead of the order to march, it was announced that General McCulloch had decided, on account of a threatened rain, which might damage and destroy much of their ammuni- tion, to postpone the movement. The men did not " sulk in their tents," but rested on their arms in no amiable mood. This condition of uncertainty and suspense lasted well through the night, as the commanding officers were better informed than the men of the risks to be encountered, and of the prob- able result, in case they should make an aggressive fight against disciplined forces when only half prepared. Daybreak, on the 10th of August, found the command still at Wilson's Creek, cheerlessly waiting, many of the troops remaining in position, in line of march, on the road, and others returning to camp to prepare the morning meal. Perhaps it was 6 o'clock when the long-roll sounded and the camp was called to arms. A few minutes before this, Sergeant Hite, of my body-guard, dashed up to my headquarters, breathless with excitement, hatless, and his horse covered with foam, exclaiming hurriedly, " General, the enemy is com- ing! " "Where I" said I, and he pointed in the direction of a spring, up a ravine, where he had been for water. He had been fired at, he said, by a 300 ARKANSAS TROOPS IN THE BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK. picket of some troops advancing on the right flank. I ordered the sergeant to ride in haste to General MeCulloch with this information, and proceeded to place my command in position. I was the better enabled to do this with- out delay, because I had on the day before, with Colonel R. H. Weightman, made a careful reconnoissance of the ground in the direction from which the enemy was said to be approaching. The colonels commanding were imme- diately notified, and the regiments were formed and posted so as to meet his advance. Captain Woodruffs Lit- tle Rock (Ark.) battery was ordered to occupy a hill commanding the road to Springfield, and the 3d Ar- kansas Infantry (Colonel John R. Gratiot) was ordered to support him. I placed Captain Reid's Fort Smith (Ark.) battery on an eminence to command the approaches to our right and rear, and gave him the 5th Ar- A kansas Infantry (Colonel T. P. Dock- i cry) as a support. I then advanced o the 4th Arkansas Infantry (Colonel 7a., J. D. Walker) north of this battery to watch the approach down the ravine, through which Sergeant Hite had reported that the enemy was coming. Thus, the Arkansas troops MAJOR-09NERA REV. MWCUI UA ('6S A. KULLE 1 under my command had all been FROM A ther gala Mso placed in favorable position, ready for action, within a very short time after the first alarm. While these events were takn'g place under my immediate notice, General McCulloch had been actively makting disposition of the troops more nearly opposed to the first advance of the enemy, under General Lyon. He had posted the 3d Louisiana Infantry (Colonel H6bert) and McIntosh's 2d Arkansas Rifles (dismounted) to meet the earliest demonstration from the direetion of Springfield. General Price had also been industriously engaged in placing his troops to intercept the advancing foe. General Rains's (Mis- souri) command had the honor of giving the first reception to the main col- umn under General Lyon. He was ably supported by the gallant Missouri generals, Slack, McBride, Parsons, and Clark, with their respective brigades. The fighting at this juncture - perhaps about 7 o'clock - was confined to the corn-field north of Wilson's Creek, where the Louisiana infantry, with Lieutenant-Colonel Embry's 2d Arkansas Mounted Rifles (dismounted), all under the immedia te command of Colonel McIntosh, effectually charged and drove back the enemy. Simultaneously the battle opened farther west and south of Wilson's Creek, where the Missouri troops were attacked by the main column or right wing of the enemy. Totten's (Federal) battery was pushed ARKANSAS TROOPS IN THE BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK. 3o forward, and took its first position on the side of Oak Hill, north of where the main fight afterward took place. I had directed Captain Woodruff, who was posted within easy range, to give attention to Totten, and the two batteries were soon engaged in a lively artillery duel, being well matched in skill and mettle. Lieutenant Weaver, of Woodruff's battery, was killed, and 4 of Totten's men were killed and 7 wounded in this engagement. General Lyon's right, although it had gained a temporary advantage in the early morning by surprising the Missourians, was roughly handled when they had recovered themselves. They were reinforced by Churchill's regiment, which had moved up from the extreme right, and the battle raged several hours while they held their ground. At this juncture a gallant charge was made by Greer's and Carroll's mounted regiments on Totten's battery, but it was not a complete success, as the gunners turned about and recovered their guns. In the early morning, perhaps simultaneously with the advance of Lyon, General Sigel, commanding the left column of the advance from Springfield, came upon our right and rear, first attacking Colonel Churchill's camp, as the men were preparing for breakfast, obliging them to retreat to an adjacent wood, where they were formed in good order. The surprise resulted from the movement of the night before, when pickets had been withdrawn that were not re-posted in the morning. Sigel did not wait for a fight, however, but advanced to, and had his battery unlimbered near, the Fayetteville road, west of Wilson's Creek, opposite and within range of Reid's battery as it was then in position as originally placed. Before he had discovered us, and perhaps in ignorance of our position, Reid attacked him, under my personal orders and supervision. Sigel's movement was a bold one, and we really could not tell, on his first appearance (there having been no fight with Churchill), whether he was friend or foe. An accidental gust of wind having unfurled his flag, we were no longer in doubt. Reid succeeded in getting his range accurately, so that his shot proved very effective. At this juncture, General McCulloch in person led two companies of the Louisiana infantry in a charge and capt- ured five of the guns. General Sigel was himself in command, and made vain attempts to hold his men, who were soon in full retreat, back over the road they came, pursued by the Texas and Missouri cavalry. This was the last of Sigel for the day, as his retreat was continued to Springfield. As a precau- tion, however, not knowing how badly we had defeated Sigel, I immediately posted the 4th Arkansas Infantry (Colonel Walker) along the brow of the hill, commanding the road over which he had fled, which regiment remained on duty until the battle was over. There seemed now to be a lull in the active fighting; the bloody contest in the corn-field had taken place; the fight " mit Sigel', had resulted satisfac- torily to us, but the troops more immediately opposed to General Lyon had not done so well. General Price and his Missouri troops had borne the brunt of this hard contest, but had gained no ground. They had suffered heavy General McCulloch's report says: " When we and soon the Louisianians were gallantly charging arrived near the enemy's battery we found that among the guns and swept the cannoneers away. Reid's battery had opened upon it, and it was Five guns were here taken." already in confusion. Advantage was taken of it, 302 ARKANSAS TROOPS IN THE BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK. losses, and were running short of ammunition. I had watched anxiously for signs of victory to come from the north side of the creek, but Totten's bat- tery seemed to belch forth with renewed vigor, and was advanced once or twice in its position. The line of battle on our left was shortening, and the fortunes of war appeared to be sending many of our gallant officers and soldiers to their death. There was no de- moralization -no signs of wavering or retreat, but it was an hour of great anxiety and suspense. No one then knew what the day would bring forth. As the sun poured down upon our devoted comrades, poised and rest- ing, as it were, between the chapters of a mighty struggle not yet com- pleted, the stoutest of us almost weakened in our anxiety to know the outcome. Just at this time, General Lyon X appeared to be massing his men for a final and decisive movement. I had been relieved of Sigel, and Reid's battery was inactive because it could not reach Totten. This was fortu- nate, for my command, in a measure fresh and enthusiastic, was about -G- WM. Y. LAK, X s.S A., MVfmmLLY to embrace an opportunity-such a WOU"EV AT PR-DGE. FROM A PORAPH. one as will often win or lose a battle-by throwing its strength to the weakened line at a critical moment and winning the day. Colonel McIn- tosh came to me from General MeCulloch, and Captain Greene from General Price, urging me to move at once to their assistance. General Lyon was in possession of Oak Hill; his lines were forward, his batteries aggres- sive, and his charges impetuous The fortunes of the day were balanced in the scale, and something must be done or the battle was lost. My men were eager to go forward, and when I led the 3d Arkansas Infantry (Colonel Gratiot) and the right wing of the 5th Arkansas Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel Neal) across the creek, and pushed rapidly up the hill in the face of the enemy, loud cheers went up from our expectant friends that betokened an enthusiasm which, no doubt, helped to win the fight. Colonel McIntosh, with two pieces of Reid's battery, and with a part of Dockery's 5th Arkansas Infantry, sup- ported my right; the Federal forces occupied two lines of battle, reaching across the crest of Oak Hill; and at this juncture our troops in front were composed of the Missouri forces, under General Price (occupying the center); Texas and Louisiana troops, under General MeCulloch (on the right), and my forces thrown forward (on the left), when a combined advance was ordered by General MeCullch. This proved to be the decisive engagement, and as volley after volley was poured against our lines, and our gallant boys were ARKANSAS TROOPS IN THE BA TTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK. 303 cut down like grass, those who survived seemed to be nerved to greater effort and a determination to win or die. At about this time (11:30 A. M.) the first line of battle before us gave way. Our boys charged the second line with a yell, and were soon in possession of the field, the enemy slowly withdrawing toward Springfield. This hour decided the contest and won for us the day. It was in our front here, as was afterward made known, that the brave com- mander of the Federal forces, General Lyon, was killed, gallantly leading his men to what he and they supposed was victory, but which proved (it may be because they were deprived of his enthusiastic leadership) disastrous defeat. In the light of the present day, even, it is difficult to measure the vast results had Lyon lived and the battle gone against us. General McCulloch, myself, and our staff-officers now grouped ourselves together upon the center of the hill. Woodruff's battery was again placed in position, and Totten, who was covering the retreat of Sturgis (who had. assumed command of the Federal forces after the death of General Lyon), received the benefit of his parting shots. We watched the retreating enemy through our field-glasses, and were glad to see him go. Our ammunition was exhausted, our men undisciplined, and we feared to risk pursuit. It was also rumored that reenforcements were coming to the Federal army by forced marches, but it was found the next day that the disaster to the retreating army was greater than we had supposed, and a few fresh cavalry troops could doubtless have followed and captured many more stragglers and army stores. Next day the enemy evacuated Springfield, and Price, with his Missouri troops, occupied it, and had his supplies and wounded moved to that point. The Arkansans in this battle were as brave, as chivalrous, and as successful as any of the troops engaged. They bore out, on many a hard-fought field later on in the struggle, the high hopes built upon their conduct here. The body of the army remained at Springfield until the beginning of General Price's march upon Lexington, on the 25th of August. A few days after the battle Pearce's brigade of Arkansas mili- tia was disbanded on the expiration of their term of enlistment. General McCulloch moved west- ward with his own brigade, and then to Maysvllle, Arkansas, being influenced in his return by the general tenor of his instructions from the Confed- erate Government to avoid, if possible, operating in the State of Missouri, which had not seceded. General Price, upon beinginformed of hisdecision, issued an order re-assuming command, and the operations in the State which followed, including the capture of Lexington, were conducted with Missouri troops alone. At this time the Federal troops held the Missouri river by a cordon of mili- tary posts. The object of this line was to prevent the crossing of the river by the secessionists of north Missouri, who, to the number of 5000 or 6000, were armed and organized and desirous of joining the army of General Price in south-west Missouri. To break this blockade became the ob- ject of General Price. Of the four Federal posts, Jefferson City, Boonville, Lexington, and Kansas City, Lexington was the easiest and most impor- tant one to take. General Price left Springfield on the 25th of August, dispersed Lane's forces at Drywood, September 2d, and reachedWarrensburg in pursuit of Colonel Peabody at daybreak, Sep- tember 1 0th; Peabody getting into Lexington first, Price, after a little skirmishing with Mulligan's outpost, bivouacked within 2 ir miles of Lexington. In the morning (12th) Mulligan sent out a small force which burnt a bridge in Price's path. Price then crossed to the Independence Road, and waited for his infantry and artillery. These came up in the afternoon, and Price then advanced to- ward Lexington, and drove Mulligan behind his defenses. There was a little skirmishing in a corn-field and in a cemetery through which Price advanced, and in the streets of Lexington, where he opened upon Mulligan with 7 pieces of artil- lery. Price's movement into Lexington in the af- ternoon of September 12th was only a reconnois- sance in force. Toward dark he retired to the Fair Ground, and waited for his trains to come up, and for reinforcements that were hurryingto him from all directions, including Harris's and Green's com- mands from north of the Missouri. The invest- ment of Mulligan's position was made as shown on. the map, page 309.-EDITORS. THE FLANKING ('OLI-N' AT WILSON"S CREEK. BY FRANZ SIGEL. MAJOR-GENERAL, 1'. a. V. N Agust tath, 161, the day before the battl- 0 at Wilson's ('reek, my brigade, consisting ot the 3d anld Oth Missouri Infantry, commandedl re- spectively by Lieutenant-Colonel Anselna Albert and Chnarles E. Salomoan, and two batteries of artil- lery, each of 4 piece"s, ulnder the coinnmalad anf Licutennants Schaefer and Schuetzenbahb, was ean- camped on the south side of Springfield, near the Yokermill road. (n our right was encamped the 1st Iowa Infantry, a regiment clad in militia gray. The bulk of General Lyon's forces were on the west side of the city. During the morning I sent a staff-oficer to General Lyon's headquarters for orders, and on his return he reported to me that a forward movement would take place, and that we must hold ourselves iln readiness to march at a moment's warning directly from our camp, toward the south, to attack the enemy from the rear. I immediately went to General Lyon, who said that we would move in the evening to attack the enemy in his position at Wilson's Creek, and that I was to be prepared to move with my brigade; the 1st Iowa would join the main column with him, while I was to take the Yokermill (Forsyth) road, then turn toward the south-west and try to gain the en- emy's rear. At my request, he said that he would procure guides and some cavalry to assist me; he would also let me know the exact time when I should move. I then asked him whether, on oaar arrival near the enemy's position, we should attack immediately or wait until we were apprised of the fight by the other troops. He reflected a moment and then said: " Wait until you hear the firing on our side." The conversation did not last longer than about ten anianutes. Between 4 and 5 o'clock in the afternoon I received the order to move at 6:310 P. m. At Ii o'elock two compannies of cavalry, under Captain Eugene A. Carr and Lieutenant Charles E. Farraand, joinead ans, also several guides. My whnote farce now consisted of S companies of the tnd and 93 companies of the 5th Missouri (91 2 mean), Ii pieces of artillery (8.5 men), and the 2 compalans of -avalry (1 21),- in all, 1 I s mea. Pra-vi-ely at 6i: 3(1 o'clock the brigade moved out of its camp; after following the Yokermill road for about five miles we turned south-west into the woonis, and found our way, with difficulty, to a point south of the eanemy's eamp, where we arrived be- tween 1 1 and 1 o'cloek at aight. There we rested. It was a dark, cloudy night, and a drizzling rain be- gan to fall. So far no news of our movement had reached the eaneany's camp, as the cavalry in ad- vannee hadl arrested every person on the road, and put guards before the houses in its neighborhood. At the first dawn of day we continued our advance for aaout a mile and a half, the cavalry patrols in front capturing forty men who had strolled into oanr lun- while looking for food and water, and who said that twenty regiments of Missouri, Arkaansas, and Louisiana troops were encamped not far distant ial the valley beyoa..l. Moving on, we sudddenly founa ourselves near a hill, froan wlnich we gained a full view of the camp. We halted a few momenatna, when I directed four pieces of our artillery to take position on the top of the hill, commanding the canmp, while the infantry, with the other two pieces and preceded by Lieutenant Farranad's cavalnry compaty, continued its anarch down the road to the crossing of Wilson's Creek. It was anow 5: 30 A. M. At this moannent soane musket-firiang was heard from the anorth-west, aaa- anounciang the approach of Geaneral Lyoan's troops; I therefore ordered the four pieces to open tire against the camp, which had a " stirring" effect on the enemy, who were preparing breakfast. The surprise was complete, except that one of the enemy's cavalrymen made good his retreat from Lieuteanant Farrand's dragoons and took the news of our advance to the other side (Geaneral Pearce's headquarters). I became aware of his escape, and believing that no time should be lost to lend assistance to our friends, we crossed Wil- son's Creek, took down the fences at Dixona's farm, passed through it and crossed Terrel (or Tyrel) Creek. (See map, page 290.) Not kanow- ing whether it would be possible to bring all our pieces along, I left the four pieces on the hill, with a support of infantry, and continued our march until we reached the south side of the valley, which extends northward to Sharp's house, about :i000 paces, and from west to east about 1000. We took the road on the west side of the valley, along the margin of the woods, and within a fence ran- aiang nearly parallel with the open fields. During this time a large body of the enemy's cavalry, about 2500 strong, was forming across the valley, not far distant from its northern ex- tremity; I therefore halted the column on the road, sent for the four pieces left on the other side of the creek, and, as soon as their approach was reported to me, I directed the head of our column to the right, left the road, and formed the troops in line of battle, between the road and the enemy's deserted camp,- the infantry on the left, the artillery on the right, and the cavalry on the extreme right, toward Wilson's Creek. A lively cannonade was now opened against the dense masses of the hostile cavalry, which lasted about twenty minutes, and forced the enemy to retire in disorder toward the north and into the woods. We now turned back into the road, and, advancing, made our way through a number of cattle near Sharp's house, and suddenly struck the Fayette- ville road, leading north to that part of the battle- field on which General Lyon's troops were engaged. We were now on the principal line of retreat of the enemy, and had arrived there in perfect order and discipline. Up to this time we had made fifteen miles, had been coaastaantlyin motion, had had a suc- cessful engagement, and the troops felt encouraged 304 THE FLANKING COLUMN AT WILSON'S CREEK. by what they had accomplished. It is, therefore, totally false, as rumor had it after the battle, that -Sigel's menl" gave themselves up to plundering the camp, Ibecanie scattered, and were for this reason surprised by the " rettiriting enemy." Wheti we had taken our position on the plateau ..ea.r Sharp's, a cannonade was opened by me against a part of the enemay's troops, evidently forming the left of their line, confronting Lyon, as we could observe from the struggle going on itl that direction. The firing lasted about ;io minutes. ) Suddenly the tiring on the enemy's side ceased, and it seemed as if we had directed our own fire against Lyon's forces. I therefore ordered the pieces to cease firing. Jtnst at this time -it was between 1) and I t o'clock - there was a lull in the fight on the north side, and not a gun was heard, while squads of the enemy's troops, unarmed, came streanmitig up the road from Skegg's Branch toward us and were captured. Meanwhile a part of MeCitlloch's force was advancing against us at Sharp's farm, while Reid's battery moved into po- sition on the hill east of Wilson's Creek, and oppo- site our right flank, followed by some cavalry. All these circumstances- the cessation of the firing in Lyon's front, the appearance of the ene- toy's deserters, and the movement of Reid's artil- lery and the cavalry toward the south - led us into the belief that the enemy's forces were retreating, and this opinion became stronger by the report of I)r. Melcher, who was in advance on the road to Skegg's Branch. that " Lyon's troops " were coming up the road and that we must not fire. So uncertain was I in regard to the character of the approaching troops, now ottly a few rods dis- tant, that I did not trust to my own eyes, but sent Corporal Tod, of the 3d Missouri, forward to chal- lenuge them. He challetiged as ordered, but was immediately shot and killed. I instantly ordered the artillery and infantry to fire. But it was too late -the artillery fired one or two shots, but the imifantry, as though paralyzed, did not fire; the 3d Louisiana, which we had mistaken for the gray- clad 1st Iowa, rushed up to the plateau, while Bledsoe's battery in front and Reid's from the heights on our right flank opened with canister at loint-blank against us. As a matter of precaution I had during the last moment brought four of our pieces into battery on the right against the troops on the hill and Reid's battery; but after atnswering Reid's fire for a few minutes, the horses and drivers of three guns suddenly left their posi- tion, and with their caissons galloped down the 'ayetteville road, in their tumultuous flight carry- tag panic into the ranks of the infantry, which turned back in disorder, and at the same time re- aiv-d the fire of the attacking line. Ott our retreat the right wing, consisting mostly uf the 3d Missouri Infantry and one piece of artil- IFry, followed the road we came, while the left I Colottl Graves. eounmanllng the First Brigade, Mo. state tttnlsa , says In his report: -colonel itosser, com- 'uuanutitig the tat Regitment and Fourth Battalion, with a lttain Bledsoe's artillery, tueiltg statIoned en the cx- tetmic left, was attacked by Colottel Sigel's battery, and its uenexposed to a deadlyfire forthirtytminutes."'-F. S. VOL. 1. 20. wing, cotisistimug of the 5th Missoutri Infantry and amn.ther piece, went dowmn the Fayetteville road, theti, turning to tie right (north-west), made its way toward Little York and Springfield : on its way the latter columntnti was joined by Lieutetuant Farrand's cavalry cottupatny. Colonel Salomon was also with this colttmnu, coinsistitig iti all of about 45t) mett, with 1 piece and caisson. I retaiteud with the right wing, the 3d Missouri, which was consid- erably scattered. I re-formed the men duringtheir retreat into 4 comopatties, itl all about 254)c ue, and, turning to the left, into the Fayetteville road, was joined by Captain Carr's company of cavalry. After considering that,by following the left wing toward Little York, we might be etit off from Springfield and not be able to join General Lyon's forces, we followed the Fayetteville road it..til we reached a road leading north-east toward Springfield. This road we followed. Captain Carr, with his cavalry, was leading; he was instructed to remain in ad- vance, keep his flankers out, and report what might occur in front. One company of the 3d Missotiri was at the head of our little column of infantry, followed by the piece of artilleryatid two caissons, hehimidthem the remainder of the infantry, the whole flanked on each side by skirmishers. So we marched, or rather dragged along as fast as the exhausted men could go, until we reached the ford at James Fork of the White River. Carr had al- ready crossed, but his cavalry was not in sight; it had hastened along without waiting for us; a part of the infantry had also passed the creek; the piece and caissons were just crossing, whemi the rattling of musketry announced the presence of hostile forces on both sides of the creek. They were detachments of Missouri and Texas cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colottel Major, Captaitis Mabry and Russell, that lay in ambush, and now pounced upon our jaded and extended column. It was in vain that Lieutenant-Colonel Albert and myself tried to rally at least a part of them; they left the road to seek protection, or make good their escape in the woods, and were followed and hunted down by their pursuers. In this chase the greater part of our men were killed, wounded, or made prisoners, among the latter Lieutenant-Colonel Albert and my orderly, who were with me in the last moment of the affray. I was not taken, probably because I wore a blue woolen blanket over my uniform and a yellowish slouch-hat, giving me the appearance of a Texas Ranger. I halted on horseback., pre- pared for defense, in a small strip of corn-field on the west side of the creek, while the hostile cavalrymen swarmed around and several times passed close by me. When we had resumed our way toward the north-east, we were immediately recognuized as enemies, and pursued by a few horsemen, whose number increased rapidly. It was a pretty lively race for about six miles, when our pursuers gave up the chase. We reached Spring- Colonel Carr says il his offMical report: "It is a subject of regret with me to have left' huti [Sigel] blehfhtd, bitt I suppmosed all thie time that hen was close behInd me till I got to the creek, and It would have done nu good for my company to have been cut to pieces also."-EDITORS. 305 THE OPPOSING FORCES AT WILSON'S CREEK. field at 4: 30 in the afternoon, in advance of Stur- gis, who with Lyon's troops was retreating from the battle-field, and who arrived at Springfield, as he says, at 5 o'elock. The circunmstance of my arrival at the time stated gave rise to the insinua- tion that I had forsaken my troops after their re- pulse at Sharp's house, and had delivered them to their fate. Spieed with the accusation of " plun- der," this and other falsehoods were repeated be- fore the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and a letter defamatory of me was dispatched to the Secretary of WVar (dated February 14th, 1862, six months after the battle of Wilson's Creek). I had no knowledge of these ealumnies against me until long after the war, whene I found them in print. In support of my statements, I would direct at- tention to my own reports oR the battle and to the Confederate reports, especially to those of Lieu- tenant-Colonel Hyams and Captain Vigilini, of the .Id Louisiana; also to the report of Captaini Carr, in which he frankly states that be abandoned me immediately before my column was attacked at the crossing of James Fork, without notifying me of the approach of the enemy's cavalry. I never mentioned this fact, as the subsequent career of General Carr, his coiperatiomi with me dluring the campaigns of General Frdmont, and his behavior in the battle of Pea Ridge vindi- eated his character and ability as a soldier and commander. THE OPPOSING FORCES AT WILSON'S CREEK, MO. Thle - spl. - Wi smt l-sd is ., i-srI arm-- y as her .- s gii-t glee lie git of all hit.- lat. .litaiast i1 the fu0ial recurds. K st4s- 1 fli- killi- , w w li... ..iin d; ;m wia s"i -tafi ly we....li-t t ;.li for caspet-il ,.r -.sos g e tsr calte l.fEirlis . COMPOSITION AND LOSSES OF THE UNION AR.MY. Rri. -(tin. Nathani. i,- l, tk), Malor Sam.uel D. sturgiS. First Briga./e, Major tiSiiiel D. Sturgis: Regmlar Bat- talion (B, C, ainid D, Ist titautry asd Wiod's coumpatly Rifle Rern-mite). ('apt Jo.ephi B. Plumo I.r; Battalion 2d Mo. Infantry, Maj-r P. J. Osti-rbaus; F, 2d U. S. Arty., Capt. Jam-e Totten; EaRisas Rangers, Capt. S. N. Wnod; B, let U. S. Cavalry, Lb-ut. Charles W. Canfleld. Seeosd Brigade, Lieut.-Col. George L. Andrews: Regular Bat- talion (Ii and E, 2d Infanf.try, Lsthsl- 'i-np lliiiiy General Bervi' Itecrita, and M.rine's -onipaiiy Rifle Rce-ruits), Capt. Fred-ir-k Steele; DuRots's Battery iutprov-isd), Llent. Job,, V. IDiuBoiS; let Mo. Infantry, IAent -C.l. Gee. L. Andrews. Third Brig.ae, Col. Gee. W. Deitzler: 1st Kansas, Col. Ge-o. W. Deitzler tw, Major .J. A Halder- Rean; 2d Ka.sas, Col. R. B. Mitchell Iw), Li,-ut.-Col. Chua. WV. Blair. Misour-i lot, Ite-ra. Seou.li Br-igade, CuIt-i Franz Sig.-I: 3d Mi,.. Lirut.-Col. An-seIm Albert; lth Mll., Ci. C. E. Saleimiou; 1. 1st t'. S. Cavalry, Capt. Eugene A. Carr; C, 2di U. S. Dragoons. Iieut. C. E. Farrand; Barkof's Mo. Arty. (detachuimtnt, Lieutenants G. A. 8chaefer and Edward Sehuitzentiach. Canattaehed Or- ga-.uatoiia: iSt lowa Infantry, Lieut.-Cul. Wtilslmn H. Merritt; Wright'.s ad Rvritzler'e o. H-,e Guard Cav- airy; detachmuent 1), 1st U. S. Ca-islry; Me. Pioneers., Capt. J. D. Voerster. The Untlit lo.., as otticially reported, ws- 223 killed, 721 weoulded, anud 291 muisig,- total, 1235.5 COMPOSITION AND LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY. Brig.-Gen. Ben. 51Culloetb. MISSOURI ST.ATE GUARD, Major-Gen. Sterling Price. RANSs DlvXsloN. Brig.-Get,. J--me S. Rains. First Bri- gade,. CoL R. 11. Wei-ghtmnan (to w., Col. Jo.hn R. tiravee: 1lt Infantry, Liut.-Col. Thomas H. Rosser; 3d Infantry, Col. Edgar V. IHorst; 4th Infantry (hittalioo), Major Thomas H. Mmtrray; 5th tufantry, Col. J. J. Clarkaon; G(taves's lifafitry, Cot. John R. Graves, Mtjor Bra-h-ar; Bledsoe'e Battery, CtlIpt. Itirsie Bledsoe. Secod Bri- gade. Cutl. Cawtihon o w). tem.positio. of brigade not giv-n in the uotfleis ri eords.) PARfoN8s' BRatAtiE, Brig.- (en NI. M. Par.omis: Kelly's Infantry, Col. Kelly (wi; Brown's Cavalry, Cot. Ben. Brown ik); Glibor's Battery. Capt. Itemly Gutiltor. CLAR1'S DI-Islox, Brig.-Gen. John B. Clark: Barbridgi-'. Imifantry. Col. J. Q. Burbridige (v, Major Johi, B. (Cisrk, Jr.; 1st Cavalry (battalion,. Uient.-Col. J. P. Malor. SmAI-'S DIvIsIoN, Brig.-Gen. W. Y. Slack (w,: llghe-'s tmtfantry, Col. John T. Huighies; Thtoruton's Infantry (iattateion), Major J. C. Thornton; Rives's Cavalry, Cut. B. A. Rives. MBRBaiD's Dtvisto,. Brig.-Gen. James It. McBride: Wlngu's infantry; Fes- icr's Infantry, C,-t. Foster (w); Campbell's Cavalry. Capt. Caitmpbell. ARKANSAS FORCEs. Brig.-Gen. N. B. Pearce, 1Pt Cav- alry. Col. De Rosey Carroll; Carroll's Comopany Cavalry. alpt. Charles A. Carill; 3d Infanitry, Col. John H. Gratlot; 4th Intfantry, Col. J. D. Walker; 5th Infantry. eOL. Tom P. Ditekery; Woodritff's Battery, Capt. W. E. Wxomruff; Reid's Battery, Capt. J. Gi. Reid. MCCt-LMOClt'g BRIGADE: 1st Ark. Mounted Riflemuen,. Col. T. J. Chuirhill; 2d Ark. Mounted Rifemen. Col. James Mcintosh, Lient-Cul. B. T. Ebilbry; Arkansas Imifantry (battatton). Llemut.-C,,l. Bandrldge MeRae: Sotith Kansas-Texas Motunte Regiment, Col. F. Greer; 3d La. Infantry, Col. Lonis H'bert. TIhe Confederate loss, as oMtcally reported, was 265 killed, 8a0 wsuned, and 30 mtising,- total. 1095.1 STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING FORCES. Thi' Uiiohu fur-ca are estiniatid from official ritutrns at 5400 (Will, 16 gsll). Of these 1118 were with Sig-l and 3S0 u.nmited riserve. The Ctontederateftorreare. ilore difficllIt to eatinite, bht ('olounel Snead, General Price's adjutant-general during the battle. gives In his volume, 11 The Fight for Mislurt " (Charles Ecribner'g Sons), thi following estb htate. whi-h is domlitless as near the facts as it IS possible to get: Price's forre iMlsouri Stati Guard). 5231; M2-2ll0,lt'shrtgade, 2T20. amid Pearce's bri- gade, 2234,-total. 10,175 (with 15 gust). Ntr.- teomi ri1 Anrad, til, it n.aa.I tar-litse8 fer hareetailm ilg i f 1t. 0 -si mlii- lt sses as fi llv- V-l's. k), 258 1r). 873; (i), 16.-tiital. 1317. Canteilerale, (k), 279: (w). 961.-total, 1230. T1r Uiiii ri-1ti .1t .., i..t finelu.le Osti haaa'ehattalisn. vsbeI. l-t (k), 15; (w), 40; a-d give Sigelsloss at 26 less t..an C,'l-nelaead'sesiaie.-EluTOS. 306 THE SIEGE OF LEXINGTON, MOJ B1 COLONEL JAMES A. MrLLIGA.. ( )N the night of the 30th of August, 1861, as the " Irish Brigade" (23d Illinois 0 Volunteers) lay encamped just outside of Jefferson City, Mo., I received orders to report to General Jefferson C. Davis, commanding in the townl. On doing so, I was informed by General Davni that the cavalry regiment of Colonel Thomas A. Marshall, which had left for the South-west some days before, had reached Tipton, where it was hemmed in by the enemy, and could neither advance nor return, and that he wished me to go to Tipton, join Colonel Marshall, take cominand of the combined forces, cut my way through the enemy, go to Lexington, anld hold it at all hazards. The next morning the " Irish Brigade " started with forty roun(ls of ammu- ilition and three days' rations for each mall. We marched for nine days without meeting an enemy, foraging upon the country for support. We eached Tipton, lbut found neither Colonel Marshall nior the enemy, and we passed on to a pleasant spot near Lexington where we prel)ared for our entry into the (Xity. The trouble was not so much the getting into Lexington as the getting out. At Lexington we found Coloniel Mlarshall's eavalry regiment and iabout 350 of a regiment of Home Guards. On the 10th of September we received a letter from Colonel Everett Peabody, of the 13th Missouri Regi- imiint, saying that he was retreating from Warrensburg, 34 miles distant, anid that the rebel General Price was in full l)ursuit with an army of 10,000 mlein. A few hours later Colonel Peabody joined us. There were then at this post the " Irish Brigade," Colonel Marshall's Illinois eavalry regiment (full), Colonel Peabody's regiment, and a part of the 14th Mlissouri- in all about 2780 men, with one six-pounder, 4 forty rounds of Reprinted, with revision, from newspaper re- + Doubtless an accidental mistake. Colonel Muii- ports of a lecture by Colonel Mulligan, who was ligan had 7 six-poutders (Waldsehmidt, 2; Adams, hllled during the war (see page :31:1). In cer- :, and Pir-er, 2); Pirner also hall 2 brass -or- tfai important particulars, the text has been tars for throwing six-inch spherical shells, of whilh altered to free it from clearly demonstrable er- he had but 40, which were soon exhausted. The lors.- EDITORS. Confederate artillery consisted of 143 guns in five no, THE SIEGE OF LEXINGTON. ammunition, and but few rations. We then dispatched a courier to Jefferson City to inform General Davis of our condition, and to pray for reenforcements or even rations, whereupon we would hold out to the last. At noon of the 11th we commenced throwing up intrenchments on College Hill, an eminence overlooking Lexington and the broad Missouri. All day long the men worked untiringly with the shovel. That evening, but six or eight hours after we had commenced, our pickets were driven in and intimation was given that the enemy were upon us. Colonel Peabody was ordered out to meet them, and two six-pounders were planted in a position to command a covered bridge by which the enemy were obliged to enter the town. It was a night of fearful anxiety; none knew at what moment the enemy would be upon our deveted little band, and the hours passed in silence. We waited until the morning of the 12th, vigilantly and without sleep, when a messenger rushed in, saying, " Colonel, the enemy are pushing across the bridge in overwhelm- ing force." With a glass we could see them as they came, General Price riding up and down the lines, urging his men on. Two companies of the Missouri 13th were ordered out, and, with Company K of the Irish Brigade, quickly checked the enemy, drove him back, burned the bridge, and gallantly ended their work before breakfast. The enemy now made a detour, and approached the town once more, by the Independence road. Six companies of the Missouri 13th and the Illinois Cavalry were ordered out, and met them in the Lexington Cemetery, just outside the town, where the fight raged furiously over the dead. We suc- ceeded in keeping the enemy in check, and in the mean time the work with the shovel went bravely on until we had thrown up breastworks three or four feet high. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon the engagement opened with artillery. A volley of grape from the enemy was directed at a group of our officers who were outside the breastworks. Our men returned the volley. The contest raged about an hour and a half, when we had the satisfaction, by a lucky shot, of knocking over the enemy's big gun, exploding a powder caisson, and other- wise doing much damage. The fight was continued until dusk, and, as the moon rose, the enemy retired to camp in the Fair Ground, two miles away, and Lexington was our own again. On Friday, the 13th, though a drenching rain had set in, the work of throwing up intrenchments went on, and the men stood almost knee-deep in mud and water, at their work. We had taken the basement of the Masonic College, a building from which the eminence took its name; powder was obtained, and the men commenced making cartridges. A foundry was fitted up, and 130 rounds of shot - grape and canister - were cast for each of our six-pounders. batteries, as follows: Bledsoe, 4 guns; Churchill not include in his estimate either his officers or the Clark,2; Guibor, 4; Kelly, 4; Kneisley, 2.-(" His- body of Home Guards who assisted in the defense. tory of Lafayette County, Missouri.") Colonel Snead states positively that, as adjutant- The lack of agreement between the numbers of general of the Missouri troops, he paroled about the Union forces as here stated, and as given by Col- 3500 prisoners. Among these may have been onel Snead on page 273, is accounted for by the many not reckoned as effeetives by Colonel Mulli- latter on the supposition that Colonel Mulligan did gan.-EDITORS. 308 THE SIEGE OF LEXINGTON. 309 SIEGE O So 1410-CS :66..Y S I'I 0 Captain Joseph A. Wilson, of Lexington, thus describes the Union posi- tion: " The college is on a bluff about loS feet above low-water mark, and from 15 to SO feet higher than North or Main street. Third street runs along . trc top of the bluff. Close to and surrounding the aollege building Wh; wit re taoular of the buf andf e to andsbuout2nfeg thickadll2feet higdi with a bastions at the angles and embrasures for guns. At a distance of 200 to V 800 feet was an irregular line of earthworks protected by numerous tray- eres, occasionalredoubt, agoodditeh, trou.-deo-loup wires, ete., et. Still 5 t farther on the west and north were rifle-pits. The works would have re- quired 10,l00 or 15,000 men to occupy them fully. All the ground from the fortifications to the river was then covered with scattering timber. The spring Just north and outside of fortifications, was in a deep wooded ra- vine, and was the scene of some sharp skirmishing at night, owing to the attempts of the garrison to get water there when their cbterns gave out." Explanation of the Diagram of the Hospital Positlon: -a is the Anderson house or hospital; b a smaller brick house hack of it; e an ontlying low earthwork, projecting down nearly into the ravine, represented by the dotted line, while the inclosed earthwork was built up around the head of the ravine, as shown by the plain line; d the sally-port in the earthworks, about one hundred yards from the hospital; e a canal-like carriageway leading up to the house, and in which the sharp-shooters lay secure, only about eighty feet from the front door of the hospital; the brackets represent Federal picket-guard stations with a little dirt thrown up for protection; the dotted ine s- hows deep gorge or ravine which was full of Confederate sharp-shooters" Sunday had now arrived. We had found no provisions at Lexington, and our 2700 men were getting short of rations. Father Thaddeus J. Butler, our chaplain, celebrated mass on the hillside, and all were considerably strength- ened and encouraged by his words, and after services were over we went back to work, actively casting shot and stealing provisions from the inhabitants round about. Our pickets were all the time skirmishing with the enemy, while we were making preparations for defense against the enemy's attack, which was expected on the morrow. At 9 o'clock on the morning of the 18th the enemy were seen approach- ing. The Confederate force had been increased to 18,000 men with 16 pieces of cannon. They came as one dark moving mass, their guns beaming in the sun, their banners waving, and their drums beating- everywhere, as far as we could see, were men, men, men, approaching grandly. Our earth- works covered an area of about eighteen acres, surrounded by a ditch, and protected in front by what were called " confusion pits," and by mines. Our men stood firm behind the breastworks, none trembled or paled, and a solemn THE SIEGE OF LEXINGTON. mR j3ArLEWLXINTo EO.. I.ATR- A -R IRA WIG. '"M SlA1TLI Of' LEXlNOTON, MOl., AS SIREN From orN sane 'AwwNW rsmox. Anymt, coNcrowrt DuwiG. silence prevailed. As Father Butler went round among them, they asked his blessing, received it with uncovered heads, then turned and sternly cocked their muskets. The enemy opened a terrible fire with their cannon on all sides, which we answered with determination and spirit. Our spies had brought intelligence, and had all agreed that it was the intention of the enemy to make a grand rush, overwhelm us, and bury us in the trenches of Lexington. At noon, word was brought that the enemy had taken the hospital. We had not fortified that; it was situated outside the intrenchments, and I had supposed that the little white flag was sufficient protection for the wounded and dying soldiers who had finished their service and were powerless for harm. The hospital contained our chaplain, our surgeon, and a number of wounded. The enemy took it without opposition, filled it with their sharp-shooters, and from every window, every door, from the scuttles in the roof, poured right into our intrenchments a deadly drift of lead. A company of the Home Guards, then a company of the Missouri 14th, were ordered to retake the hospital, but refused. The Montgomery Guards, a company of the Irish Brigade, was then ordered out. Their captain admonished them to uphold the gallant name they bore, and the order was given to charge. The distance across the plain from the intrenchments to the hospital was about eighty yards. They started; at first quick, then double-quick, then on a run, then 310 THE SIEGE OF LEXING TON. faster. Still the deadly fire poured into their ranks. But on they went; a wild line of steel, and, what is better than steel, irresistible human will. They reached the hospital, burst open the door, without shot or shout, until they encountered the enemy within, whom they hurled out and sent flying down the hill. t Our surgeon was held by the enemy, although we had released the Con- federate surgeon on his mere pledge that he was such. It was a horrible thing to see those brave fellows, mangled and wounded, without skillful hands to bind their ghastly wounds; and Captain David P. Moriarty, who had been a physician in civil life, was ordered to lay aside his sword and go into the hospital. He went, and through all the siege worked among the wounded with no other instrument than a razor. Our supply of water had given out and the scenes in the hospital were fearful to witness, wounded men suffering agonies from thirst and in their frenzy wrestling for the water in whieh the wounded had been bathed.\ On the morning of the 19th the firing was resumed, and continued all day. Our officers had told the men that if they could hold out until the 19th we should certainly be reinforced, and all through that day the men watched anxiously for the appearance of the friendly flag under which aid was to reach them, and listened eagerly for the sound of friendly cannon. But they looked and listened in vain, and all day long they fought without water, their parched lips cracking, their tongues swollen, and the blood running down their chins when they bit their cartridges and the saltpeter entered their blis- tered lips. But not a word of murmuring. The morning of the 20th broke, but no reenforcements had come, and still the men fought on. The enemy appeared that day with an artifice which , The Union force held the building an hour or two, when they were again dislodged. In regard to the capture of the hospital by the Confederates, and to its recapture by the Union forces, we find the following in the "History of Lafayette County, Missouri" (St. Louis: Missouri Historical Com- pany, 1881), a work which, in its treatment of the siege of Lexington, exhibits impartiality and a painstaking research, the more valuable by reason of the meagerness of the official reports of the engagement: "This hospital matter has been much animadverted upon by partisan writers on both aides. Colonel Mulli- gan -ared that the Confederates were guilty of a breach of civilized warfare In firing on a hospital; and, consequently, when his men retook the building, having this belief firmly fixed ill their minds, they gave no quarter, but killed every ariiied man caught in the building. Some of the minor Confederate ofers seemed to labor under the same impression, and claimed, as an excuse orjustiiieation for the capture, that the Federals had fired upon them from inside the building; but this was positively denied at the time by the surgeon, Dr. Cooley, and the priest, Father Butler, who were in the hospital, and by Major Meet, Mr. H. Boothman, and others, stil living in LexIngton, who were at the time in that part of the intrenuhment nearest the hospital. But, aside from this, the offialcreportof General Harris, made at the time, shows that there was no such reason for the capture; but that it was deliberately planned and ordered asa rightful military movement. The Fed- erals had no military right to expect that a strategic position so important to their opponents as the Anderson house and premises manifestly were, would or should be left in quiet possession merely because they had seen lit to use some partof it forhospital purposes. Nevertheless, that first false scent has been followed and barked after for twenty years -the Federala erroneously claiming an unjustifiable attack on the hospital, and the Confed- erates erroneously claiming that they were first fired on by Federals from inside the building, and that for that reats. the attack was made." EDITORS. After the investment, the Union forces being entirely cut off from the river, "Marshall's cavalry- men and some of the teamsters had watered their -horses out of the cisterns at the college, and there was but little water left, what there was being muddy. Two springs at the foot of the bluffs- one on the north and one on the south - were closely guarded by the enemy. . . . One of Colonel Mulligan's men, in an accouint of the battle, said: 'On the morning of the 19th it rained heavily for about two hours, saturating our blankets, which we wrung out into our canteens for drinking'" (" History of Lafayette County, Missouri" ).-EDITORS. No reenforcements reached Colonel Mulligan, though efforts were made to relieve him. Septem- ber 16th, Sturgis with 1100 men, but without ar- tillery or cavalry, was ordered by General Pope to 311 THE SIEGE OF LEXING TON. was destined to overreach us and secure to them the possession of our intrenchments. They had conistrueted a movable breastwork of hemp bales, rolled them before their lines up the hill, and advanced under this cover. All our efforts could not retard the advance of these bales. Round-shot and bullets were poured against them, but they would only rock a little and then settle bak. Heated shot were fired with the hope of setting them on fire, but they had been soaked and would not burn. Thus for hours the fight continued. j Our cartridges were now nearly used up, many of our brave fellows had fallen, and it was evident that the fight must soon cease, when 4iK at 3 o'clock an orderly came, saying that the enemy had sent a flag of truce. With the flag came a note from General Price, asking "1why the firing had ceased." I returned it, with the reply written on the back, "i en- eral, I hardly know, unless you have surrendered." He at once took pains to assure me that this was not the case. I then discovered that the ma- ; jor of another regiment, in spite of orders, had raised a white flag. Our ammunition was about gone. We were out of rations, and had been without water for days, and many of CaOLONE JAMES A. MltttlLA the men felt like giving up the post, which it seemed impossible to hold longer. They were ordered back to the breastworks, and told to use up all their powder, then defend themselves as best they could, but to hold their place. Then a council of war was held in the college, and the question of proceed from Macon City for the purpose. He did so, but his messenger to Mulligan being intercepted by General Price, the latter, on the 19th, dispatebed a force of 3000 men or more under General Par- sons and Colonel Congreve Jackson across the river to repel Sturgia's advance, then within fifteen miles of Lexington. Sturgis, being informed of Mulligan's situation, retreated to Fort Leaven- worth. Parsons recrossed the river and took part in the fighting during the afternoon.-EDITORS. ) There are many claimants for the credit of having first suggested the hemp-bale strategy. General Harris's official report says: 1I directed the bales to be wet In the river to protect them against the casualties of fire of our troops and of the enemy. but it was soon found that the wetting so materially increased the weight as to prevent our men. in their exhausted condition, from rolling it to the crest of the hill. I then adopted the Idea of wetting the hemp aster it had been traunsported to its position." As to the date of the use of these, which is given both by Colonel Mulligan and by Colonel Snead as the morning of the 20th, we quote the follow- ing circumstantial account from the official report of Colonel Hughes: "On the morning of the lath, we arose from our bivouac' upon the hills to renew the attaek. This day we ountinned the flighting vigorously alt day, holding possession of the hospital buildings, and throwing large wings from both sides of the house. built up of bales of hemp saturated with water, to keep them from taking fire. These portable hemp-hale. were extended, like the wings of a partridge ijet, so as to cover and protect several hundred men at a time, and a most terrible and galling and deadly fire was kept up from them upon the works of the enemy by my men. I divided my force' intoreltefs snd kept some three hundred of them pouring In a heavy Are ine-santly upon the enemy, supplying the places of the weary with fresh troops. On the night of the 19th we enlarged and advanced our defensive works very near to the enemy's intrenchments. and at daybreak opened upon their line with most fatal efect. EDITORS. ;12 THE SIEGE OF LEXINGTON. a, surrender was put to the officers, and a ballot was taken, only two out of six votes being cast in favor of fighting onl. Then the flag of truce was sent out with our surrender. Colonel Snead (see page 262) writes us as follows in regard to the circumstances of the surrender: "Te surrender of Le.ingtoun was negotiated on the part of Colonel Mulligan by Colonel Marsball of the 1st Illiols Ccavalry. and on the part of General Prie- by me. We met i-lide of the Union line-. Of co-rse I demanded the onconditional surrender of the post, with it. offieers and men and material of war. Colonel Mar- shall hesitated, and at last said that he would have to.uh- mit the matter to Coltnel Mulligan. As we knew that reTnf oreenents wer en the way to Mulligan, and as feared that Mulligan was only praeticing a ruse in order to gain time. I said to Colonel Marshall that if the terms which I offered were not accepted within ten minutes I should return to our uie-s and order fire to he reopened. He left me. ht r-turned Just as the ten minutes were expiring and said that the surrender would be made as demanded. I immediately sent one of the off.cers, whom I had taken with me. to announce the fnct to General Price and to ask when he would accept the surrender. He came over at once, and notifled Colonel Mulligan that he would himself accept the surrender of him and his field-officers forthwith, and assign one of his division commanders to accept the surrender of the men and their company officers. Mulligan and his field-oficers came forward Immediately, on foot and offered to sur- render their swords. General Price (next to whom I was sttinu) replied instantly I You gentlemen have fought so bravely that it would be wrong todeprive you of your swords. Keep them. Order. to parole you and your men will be issued, Colonel Mulligan, without un- necessary delay.' The only offlicer or man that was not paroled, and the only one who was taken South, was Colonel M.Uigan." Colonel Mulligan was held as a prisoner until the 30th of October, being accompanied by his wife, who had been an eye-witness of the siege from the town. They journeyed in General Price's private carriage, and (Mrs. Mulligan says) received "every possible courtesy from the general and his staff." They returned to St. Louis under escort of forty men and a flag of truce. In Chicago and elsewhere Colonel Mulligan was received with en- thusiastic honors. Colonel Mulligan, after his exchange, was placed in command along the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- road, in western Virginia. During this period he engaged in many skirmishes with the enemy. In the battle of Winchester, July 24th, 1 864, Colonel Mulligan received three mortal wounds. Some of the officers, among whom was his brother-in-law, Lieutenant James H. Nugent, nineteen years of age,attempted to carrvhim from the field. Seeing the colors in danger the colonel said: "Lay me down and save the flag." Lieutenant Nugent res- cued the colors and returned to the colonel's side, but in a few moments fell, mortally wounded. Col- onel Mulligan dlied forty-eight hours after, at the age of thirty-four. After his death, his willow re- ceived from President Lincoln Colonel Mulligati's commission of Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V., dated July 24th, "for gallant and meritorious ser- vices at the battle of Winchester."- EDITORS. NOTE: The seizure of the money of the Lexing- ton Bank referred to by Colonel Snead on page 273 is treated in full in the "History of Lafayette County," from which we condense the following statement: Governor Jackson having appropri- ated the school fund of the State to the arming and equipment of the State troops, and the pro- posal having been made to force loans from certain banks for the same purpose, General Frdmont, in order to checkmate this action of the Governor, ordered the funds of certain banks to be sent to St. Louis, not for the use of the Federal author- ities, but to prevent their employment to aid the enemy. By his order, Colonel Marshall secured the funds of the State Bank of Lexington against the protest of the officers, giving a receipt for the amount, which was 960,159.60, of which 16.5,- 659.60 was in gold. The money was buried in the fort under Colonel Mulligan's tent, and upon the surrender every dollar of the gold was delivered to General Price, but 15,000 in notes of the bank was missing. Governor Jackson and General Price ordered all the money to be restored to the bank, but on the 30th of September made a demand upon the bank for, and under threat of foree re- ceived, the sum of 37,337.20 in gold, claimed to be due to the State under an act of the Legislature of Missouri, which permitted of the suspension of certain banks on the condition that they should loan the State on its bonds a certain portion of their fund. At the time of the capture of Lexing- ton the State Convention of Missouri had deposed Governor Jackson and elected in his place Hamil- ton R. Gamble. The Union State Government made demand afterward for the same sum, which was paid and bonds of the State issued therefor, which were redeemed at their face value when due. The sum given to Governor Jackson was charged by the bank to "profit and loss." See also page 280 for General Frdmont's declaration of policy in this respect. " The funds of other banks of the State were taken possession of by the Federal authorities, transported to St. Louis, and in due time every dollar returned."- EDITORS. THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN. BY F!RANZ RlGEL. MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V. H HE battle of Pea Ridge (or Elkhorn Tavern, as the Confed- T erates named it) was fought on the 7th and 8th of March, 1862, one month before the battle of Shiloh. It was the first clear and decisive victory gained by the North in a X : 00pitched battle west of the Mississippi River, and until Price's Av : :invasion of 1864 the last effort of the South to carry the z . 0 war into the State of Missouri, except by abortive raids. Since the outbreak of the rebellion, Missouri, as a border and slave State, had represented all the evils of a bitter civil strife. The opening events had been the protection of the St. Louis arsenal, the capture of Camp Jackson, the minor engagements at Boonville and Carthage, the sanguinary struggle at Wilson's Creek on the 10th of August, forever memorable by the heroic death of General Lyon. The re- treat of our little army of about 4500 men to Ro