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No. 52 "The Principles of Constitutional Democracy and the New Deal" Speech of Raoul E. Desvernine, July 11, 1935. American Liberty League. 400dpi TIFF G4 page images Digital Library Services, University of Kentucky Libraries Lexington, Kentucky Am_Lib_Leag_52 These pages may freely searched and displayed. Permission must be received for subsequent distribution in print or electronically. No. 52 "The Principles of Constitutional Democracy and the New Deal" Speech of Raoul E. Desvernine, July 11, 1935. American Liberty League. American Liberty League. Washington, D.C. 1935. This electronic text file was created by Optical Character Recognition (OCR). No corrections have been made to the OCR-ed text and no editing has been done to the content of the original document. Encoding has been done through an automated process using the recommendations for Level 1 of the TEI in Libraries Guidelines. Digital page images are linked to the text file. Pamphlets|Available â˜… Copies of the following pamphlets and other League literature may be obtained upon application to the League's national headquarters: Statement of Principles and Purposes American Liberty League Its Platform An Analysis of the President's Budget Message Analysis of the $4,880,000,000 Emergency Relief Appropriation Act Economic Security The Bonus Inflation The Thirty Hour Week The Pending Banking Bill The Holding Company Bill Where Are We Going? Speech by James W. Wadsworth Price Control Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow The Labor Relations Bill How Inflation Affects the Average Family Speech by Dr. Ray Bert Westerfield Political Banking Speech by Dr. Walter E. The Bituminous Coal Bill Regimenting the Farmers Speech by Dr. G. W. Dyer Extension of the NRA Human Rights and the Constitution Spe&ch by R. E. Desvernine The Farmers' Home Bill The TVA Amendments The New Deal, Its Unsound Theories and Irreconcilable Policies Speech by Ralph M. Shaw Is the Constitution for Sale? Speech by Capt. William H. Stayton How to Meet the Issue Speech by William E. Borah The Supreme Court and the New Deal The Duty of the Church to the Social Order Speech by S. Wells Utley An Open Letter to the President By Dr. Neil Carothers The Revised AAA Amendments The Return to Democracy Speech by Jouett Shouse The President's Tax Program The American Bar The Trustee of American Institutions Speech by Albert C. Ritchie Fabian Socialism in the New Deal Speech by Demarest Lloyd The People's Money Speech by Dr. Walter E. Spahr â˜… AMERICAN LIBERTY LEAGUE NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING WASHINGTON, D. C. â˜… â˜… The Principles of Constitutional Democracy and the New Deal â˜… â˜… â˜… Speech of RAOUL E. DESVERNINE Member National Advisory Council and Chairman of the National Lawyers Committee of the American Liberty League in Round Table Discussion of "The Constitution and the New Deal" Institute of Public Affairs University of Virginia July 11, 1935 AMERICAN LIBERTY LEAGUE National Headquarters NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING WASHINGTON, D. C. â˜… â˜… Document No. 52 The Principles of Constitutional Democracy and the New Deal â˜… PLACE is more fitting and no moment more necessary to refresh our confused memory as to the principles of constitutional democracy upon which our government was founded, has lived and has its being. This shrine of Jefferson must summon his disciples and all Americans are and must be his disciples to renew their allegiance to his political faith. The shadows of Monticello cast a somber and reviving shade over the blinding and destroying light of gilded promises and deceiving panaceas. This is, in truth, the "grass roots" of democratic principles. The challenge of our constitutional system and our American traditions, whenever made, has always been successfully met, but we must be ever vigilant to meet the issue when and as it has now been again raised, and do not doubt that its fundamental and characteristic precepts are being now seriously threatened. The President's press conference respecting the Schechter decision challenges the adequacy of our Constitution to meet modern social and economic conditions by relegating it to the "horse and buggy age." Under-Secretary Tugwell, held in such confidence by the Administration, said in his University of New Mexico address that the Schechter decision gave rise to a constitutional crisis "quite as great as one of war" and that the industrial revolution moved too fast "for the accommodation of judicial theory." The words "revolution" and more especially "judicial theory," as applied to an unanimous decision of the United States Supreme Court cannot be idly dismissed without serious apprehension. Constitutional amendments have already been introduced, not only to make the Federal government omnipotent in all social and economic fields of action, but also to curb the Supreme 3 Court in its power to declare laws unconstitutional. Some advocate, as a possible political expedient, the passing of laws of doubtful constitutionality to stir up an irresistible public demand for the amendment of the Constitution. This suggestion assumes, of course, that the Constitution must be amended to carry out new "theories," which the public will not support unless further agitated. Congress seems to be either pursuing this plan deliberately or is suffering from constitutional "sleeping sickness." Secretary Ickes and "Brain-truster" Berle have rallied to publicly advocate similar views. If ALL of this be but a "trial balloon," it is certainly one inflated with a strange, and from the point of view of American tradition, a foreign and alien "gas," (and I use the word "gas" in its slang, as well as in its scientific connotation). Unless punctured by an aroused public opinion, it will transport us into an unknown political stratosphere. The Constitution is not "strait-jacketed" to the "horse and buggy age." To contend that it is, is to ignore all constitutional history which is replete with multitudinous decisions conclusively demonstrating its flexibility and adaptability. Furthermore, no one challenges the right of amendment, through the orderly processes stipulated by the Constitution, whenever the need for such amendment is demonstrated. Proposed amendments must be carefully scrutinized for there can be amendments, which are dedicated not only to adapt our form of government to new and unforeseen situations, but also to completely destroy or change our fundamental and traditional political philosophy, and result in the establishment of an entirely new and different governmental system. The distinction between the two is fundamental. We must weigh each proposal to see in which class it falls and never lose sight of the distinguishing characteristics of our present constitutional and Jeffersonian system of government. 4 One method is adaptation; the other is nullification. One is reform; the other revolution. The Constitution is indeed a living organism, but every living organism has certain definite physical characteristics and natural attributes, and these attributes cannot be altered. The only escape from them is to substitute an entirely new and different organism. Perhaps, the new social and economic order requires a new political order. That might be a debatable question, but if such is required let us face that issue fearlessly and openly, and weigh the advantages to be gained by any such new order against the sacrifices to be made in departing from the old order. LiET us, therefore, briefly recall the basic precepts of our present constitutional system, which distinguishes it from other forms of democratic government, and which constitute what we cherish as our American political philosophy and tradition. Many forms of democracies have arisen and fallen. Many forms of democracies presently exist. The experiment in democracy has been long carried on in all times and under all conditions and a comprehensive and expensive experience had by patient and long suffering mankind in its struggle to find a political system most expressive of its ideals and needs. Our Founding Fathers were not toying with a new foible in creating our particular kind of democratic government. They made a rational selection based upon historical precedent and their own actual experience. They had certain primary objectives and basic concepts which they not only strove to express, but, more important, to guarantee as a heritage to all Americans, so that an American citizen would forever be the proud possessor of certain rights and liberties not elsewhere enjoyed. Ours is not a pure democracy in which the people rule themselves, either directly or through representatives, and in which the will 5 of the majority alone governs. That system the Founding Fathers wisely rejected. Ours is a constitutional democracy in which the majority is restricted by definite constitutional limitations and the States and individuals are guaranteed certain rights expressly reserved to them as beyond the power of the majority making up the Federal government. In thus analyzing our form of democracy we find the two distinguishing characteristics and basic principles of our system, popularly referred to as (1) A Federal government of limited, not general jurisdiction; and (2) A government of laws, not men. The Constitution clearly establishes and differentiates between the two separate and distinct jurisdictions of the Federal and State governments. We cannot exaggerate the importance of this segregation of jurisdiction. The debates in the Constitutional Convention, the Federalist Papers and other contemporary writings, and above all the reluctance even with which some States ratified the Constitution, feature this as a fundamental characteristic. Court decisions, political platforms and campaigns, even civil war, have revolved around this issue. It is deeply imbedded in our history. Even those who advocated a strong centralized Federal government never sought the complete denial of State sovereignty. CiOULD anything more clearly and definitely state this principle and its objective than the following language of the United States Supreme Court in the Schechter case? "The Constitution established a national government with powers deemed to be adequate, as they have proved to be in war and peace, but these powers of the national government are limited by the constitutional grants. Those who act under these grants are not at liberty to transcend the imposed limits because they believe that more or different power is necessary. Such assertions of extra-constitutional authority were anticipated and precluded by the explicit terms of the Tenth Amendment 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.'" The question is only one of degree; that is to say, the extent to which it is deemed necessary or advisable to implement the Federal government with full and general power to promote the common welfare, at the expense of encroaching upon and curtailing the States' right of local self-government. In a country so vast and with such a myriad of climates and conditions, and such a diversity of social, industrial and economic problems, the necessity of consulting different and peculiar local needs and requirements must not be disregarded. "Absentee Landlordism" in political action was bitterly understood. We are having a renewed experience with some of the implications of this principle today. Geographical boundaries are often arbitrary and do not necessarily constitute economic or social units. The several States were originally more or less self-contained and had a greater economic self-sufficiency and therefore in more respects a clearer political individuality than today. Undoubtedly the expansion of the country and the development of intercommunication have lessened this separateness and tended to economically integrate the States. Our foreign trade and our international interests have increased our need for greater unified national action. All of this is admitted, and obviously the mere form of government must yield to the substance of its objectives. We cannot deny that our courts have clearly recognized this and have greatly expanded the Federal powers to meet the exigencies of new conditions, but always within definite confines and always cautiously preserving the sovereignty of the States and the constitutional division of power. Recent criticisms of the Schechter decision have brought out the feeling of some that our government has now been put far behind the governments of European countries in dealing with problems of social welfare. These criticisms overlook entirely the true nature of our government. They confuse the Federal government with what our government really is a composite of Federal, State and local governments all of which must be taken together in order to understand what actually constitutes our government. A restriction against Federal action in no way shows that our government is impotent to take action. It merely shows that the Federal government is not the proper branch of the government unless, of course, it is also shown that the State or local government is equally unable to take the action. There is no reason to assume that, because some powers are given to State and local governments rather than to the central or Federal government, our government as a whole is less powerful than the more centralized governments of European countries. To show surprise that all governmental powers are not vested in the Federal government fails completely to recognize the true nature of our government, and not only the powers but also the duties of the several States to provide for local matters. The Supreme Court in the Schechter decision clearly recognized that the government of our people consisted of more than just the Federal government and the duties of the State and local branches should be recognized. At no place did the Court indicate that it proposed any limitation on governmental action as such; but it did indicate a dividing line between the powers and the duties of the two branches of our governmental system. When considering the powers of our government, the sovereign powers of the several States are of as much importance as the centralized powers of the Federal government. Each has its proper sphere of action and to look only at one is to overlook the carefully planned system of our government as a whole. The court blocked a recent effort to erect upon a single enumerated power an inverted pyramid of such proportions as to be all-inclusive and to threaten to expand the limited Federal government into a general and complete sovereignty. The Supreme Court said: "In determining how far the Federal government may go in controlling intrastate transactions upon the ground that they 'affect' interstate commerce, there is a necessary and well-established distinction between direct and indirect effects. The precise line can be drawn only as individual cases arise, but the distinction is clear in principle. * * * But where the effect of intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce is merely indirect, such transactions remain within the domain of state power. If the commerce clause were construed to reach all enterprises and transactions which could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate commerce, the Federal authority would embrace practically all the activities of the people and the authority of the State over its domestic concerns would exist only by sufferance of the Federal government. Indeed, on such a theory, even the development of the State's commercial facilities would be subject to Federal control. * * *" If THE possible consequences were not so tragic, it would be intellectually entertaining to observe the extension of such metaphysical conceptions as to the "effect of intrastate obstructions on the so-called flow or current of interstate commerce," as a subterfuge to create a Federal control over practically all local matters. Recent legislation opens with a prelude self-declaratory of its own constitutionality, but the Supreme Court has stuck to time honored definitions and limitations and has not been carried away by these social metaphysicians. The case of the Board of Trade v. Olsen is not a Juggernaut to mercilessly ride over and crush all State and individual rights. The Supreme Court has now clearly denned its restricted application. Another striking illustration of this method of expanding the Federal powers by broadening the application of a simple power by interpretation is the use being made of the taxing power. Taxation has been and is increasingly being used as not only a means to raise revenue for purposes and objects within the scope of the enumerated functions of the Federal government, but also as a punitive weapon, and as an instrument of social control. It is now proposed to utilize "taxation" against the concentration of wealth, the concentration of economic power, the "bigness" of business. Expanding the Federal government from a political instrumentality into an agency for social service for each individual citizen, is certainly a far departure from the early limited conception of our Federal government, but when that social service embarks it on undertakings never contemplated by and in violation of constitutional prescriptions, then we must pause and reflect. The power to tax is not only the power to destroy, but apparently the power to amend. Government funds are being appropriated to a multitude of purposes not restricted to objects germane to its other delegated powers, on the principle that the Federal government has unlimited power to appropriate money for the promotion of the "general welfare," and especially that emergency conditions justify many abnormal expenditures, even for private enterprises, State and local developments and relief, which are not per se national in character. Government is competing with private business. Agricultural production and distribution is being regulated by processing taxes. Private enterprises are being penalized to their destruction, if they do not submit to government regimentation and nationalization. This is not an appropriate occasion to debate the wisdom or propriety of any of these, but it 10 is important to cite them as methods which in their practice and consequences certainly enlarge, if not change, our heretofore conceptions of the functions of our Federal government, and they must be carefully watched as they contain germs for destroying our concepts of constitutional government. We will soon be hearing from the United States Supreme Court on these matters. SOME legislation, such as the recent appropriation of $4,880,000,000 of general Treasury funds to various purposes selected by uncontrolled and undefined Executive discretion, even if employed for uses never contemplated to be within the scope of the Federal government, seems immune to judicial review. Unless the Supreme Court in several pending cases finds a way to review these appropriations, the people will have no means of protection against an all-embracing and unchallengeable Executive power, making possible the negation of individual rights and liberties. Recent proposals far transcend present needs and frankly purport to transfer sovereign powers residing in the States to the Federal government, even in matters which are per se purely local and which cannot by any reasonable stretch of economic or social theory, to say nothing of political principle, be translated into a "national" as distinguished from a "local" subject. When we go to the extreme recently proposed, it is nothing more or less than a proposal to change our system of constitutional government, not to adapt our present system to existing conditions. Our courts have so wisely and adequately met each situation when it has arisen that it would seem wisdom and experience to continue to entrust them with the Working out of this problem, rather than to impulsively set up a new form of government under such highly emotionalized and volatile conditions as at present. 11 Another expression of this characteristic principle of our constitutional democracy is the division and segregation of the Federal government into three distinct co-equal departments the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. This segregation and allocation of power was not designed purely as a matter of mechanical and procedural convenience, but as a further check and restraining influence on the possibility of abusive or excessive exercise of delegated power. This is another evidence of the distrust of the Founding Fathers of the concentration of power in a highly centralized government; and showed an effort to dilute that power by splitting it up into separate, independent and equalizing units. It is also an attempt to guard against coercive practices or the dominating influence of a too strong executive or an over-zealous or "politics ridden" legislature. TilE sanctity of the separateness of these three governmental functions has been again upheld and the attempt of one department to abdicate its jurisdiction to another has been again checked in the following ringing words of the United States Supreme Court in the Schechter case: "The Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested." "Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President to exercise an unfettered discretion to make whatever laws he thinks may be needed or advisable for the rehabilitation and expansion of trade or industry." Again, in the Humphrey case, the United States Supreme Court said: "The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been 12 stressed and is hardly open to serious question. So much is implied in the very fact of the separation of the powers of these departments by the Constitution; and in the rule which recognizes their essential co-equality. The sound application of a principle that makes one master in his own house precludes him from imposing his control in the house of another who is master there." Furthermore, and still more significant, is the doctrine that the United States Supreme Court was given the power, not expressly by the Constitution, but as an absolutely indispensable prerogative by implication, to challenge acts of both the Executive and Legislative, as the only means by which the system established by the Constitution could be possibly maintained. This is an unique characteristic of our governmental system, significantly distinguishing it from all others, and conclusively demonstrates the extent to which our system goes to keep the government within strict constitutional confines and to protect State and individual rights. Judicial review of legislation, a doctrine not clearly envisaged by the authors of the Constitution, may well prove our most important contribution to the science of government. But recent experience has demonstrated an effort to avoid even this safeguard by preventing and postponing the adjudication of constitutional issues. The consequent crystallization of economic, industrial and financial situations, pending such delayed determination, has been costly and has not encouraged respect for law. The worst indictment which can be made against the present Administration is these indirect and subtle attempts to change the fundamental principles of our constitutional system in such a manner as to conceal their true purpose from the people and thereby deprive the people of their sovereign right to determine the form and substance of their government. Even if this be not the motive, the very suspicion of it has dangerous implications. 13 We now come to the second characteristic and the cornerstone of our constitutional system the Rights of Man as guaranteed by a Government of Laws, not Men. This is the Jef-fersonian principle Jefferson's priceless gift to our constitutional philosophy. I have briefly shown how the limitations on Federal power, the splitting up of conferred Federal power into three co-equal governmental units each a check and balance on the other, and the sanctity of State sovereignty in local matters, were all clearly and deliberately designed as a protection against autocracy, tyrannical majorities or a dictatorial bureaucracy. But all of these safeguards are vain if American citizens are not guaranteed the full enjoyment of their God-given and natural inalienable human rights. These constitutional forms were conceived as mechanical and procedural devices to make encroachment upon or denial of certain basic rights more difficult. For instance, if the Federal government encroaches upon or usurps rights or functions exclusively belonging to the States, it, in some respects, only raises an issue of jurisdiction. But if the Federal government, or, as a matter of fact, any State government, attempts to interfere with inalienable human rights, reserved specifically to the people and not delegated to the Government, then each citizen is threatened with the loss or spoliation of his constitutional liberty and traditional freedom, and the very substance and cornerstone of our political system is challenged. These rights emanate from (1) divine endowment and (2) the long historic struggle of mankind for his freedom. Man as a creature of God has been endowed by the Creator with certain physical characteristics, attributes, and natures and to these certain rights appertain, in fact are inherent in, and an integrated part of, man's very nature itself. Let us illustrate. As man has been en-14 dowed by his Creator with reason and free will, he is possessed of a natural right to personal liberty, which is simply the exercise of free will. As man is endowed with the duty and instinct to worship, he must be free to perform this duty and to exercise this instinct according to the dictates of his own conscience, which gives rise to the natural right of freedom of religious worship. As man has been endowed with the capacity and duty to propagate his species and as his children are physically incapable of self-sustenance during infancy, then clearly nature has ordained that he may fulfill his obligation by the most suitable means, to wit, the family. As nature obliges man to sustain himself, he must have the natural right to produce, acquire and possess those physical things property necessary to his sustenance. As man has the thirst for knowledge and the capacity to impart instruction to others, he must have the natural right to education. As "Man is older than the State," these natural rights of his likewise are pre-existent to the State, and therefore cannot be said to have originated with the State or to be grants or franchises of the State. Other rights are not intrinsically a part of man's physical nature and therefore not of divine endowment, but have been won by man through the centuries in his struggle for freedom against his political masters. Human experience has demonstrated that certain rights are indispensable to the individual if he be not a political slave. These basic human and individual rights are not abstract and imaginary ideals. They are specifically enumerated in the first ten amendments to the Constitution in words which are so clear as to require no further explanation. Religious liberty; freedom of speech and the press; right of assembly and petition; the right to bear arms; the sanctity of the home free from search and seizure; the right of trial by jury 15 and freedom from excessive fines and cruel punishments; and finally that no one shall be "deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." The Declaration of Independence is not only an indictment against tyrannical government, specifying definite violations and abuses of individual human rights, but is also a declaration of the historic and natural rights of man, essential to his liberty and part of his American birthright. It is significant to note that the Declaration of Independence itself proclaims it as a self-evident truth that man was endowed by his Creator with certain inalienable rights. This is certainly an unequivocable declaration as to the divine affirmation and origin of these basic rights. Although the Supreme Court of the United States has said that the Declaration of Independence cannot he considered as having "the force of organic law, or to be made the basis of judicial decision as to the limit of right and duty, and while in all cases reference must be made to the organic law of the nation for such limits," nevertheless the organic law "is but the body and the letter," of which the Declaration of Independence "is the thought and the spirit, and it is always safe to read the letter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence." In spite of the fact that the reservation of these basic rights was considered implicit in the original Constitution, nevertheless when Jefferson returned from France, where he had been an eye-witness not only to the tyranny of monarchy but to the tyranny and chaos of revolutionary majorities, he insisted that these basic rights were so fundamental to freedom that their preservation should not be entrusted to implication or interpretation but should be expressly safeguarded by constitutional reservation, and at his insistence the first ten amendments to the Constitution, popularly called the "Bill of Rights," were adopted. 16 It IS inconceivable how the Founding Fathers could have more dogmatically and unequivo-cably proclaimed and established the principle that there are certain individual rights above and beyond the power and jurisdiction of government, and that this was not only a fundamental principle of, but even in the nature of a condition precedent to, the very creation of our constitutional system. To directly or even indirectly impair or even challenge this principle is to deny the American constitutional system of government and to remove the only protection which individuals and minorities have against the power of numbers. Even at the expense of monotonous repetition I will point out again, as I have so often in recent addresses, how this principle is being subtly attacked. The argument has recently been too often made that the Federal government has all the unlimited powers and attributes of general sovereignty and the so-called "general welfare clause" in the Preamble and in Section 8 of Article I is pointed to as the constitutional justification for this theory. This legalistic sophistry is not even novel or original. The courts have long since and repeatedly held that "the Preamble never can be resorted to, to enlarge the powers confided in the general government or any of its departments. It cannot confer any power per se." And the phrase "general welfare" in Section 8 of Article I has been held to be purely a limitation upon the taxing power by defining the purpose for which taxes can be collected. Their argument, therefore, must be predicated on the premise (1) that the Preamble is the entire Constitution and that everything that follows the Preamble must be totally disregarded as an irrelevant postscript, or (2) that the words "general welfare" in Section 8 of Article I confer a general power instead of being a limitation of the taxing power. If the latter be the correct interpretation, how can you explain away the enumera-17 tion of specific powers, because if the phrase "general welfare" can be construed to grant any power, this phrase is so broad that it would unquestionably comprehend all sovereign powers and then there would be no need to enumerate or specify any particular powers. Thus attempting to remove the obstacles of the Constitution, they next attempt to free themselves from the interference of "law." Recently a leading expositor of the new system, enjoying the prestige and power of high governmental office, with Machiavellian logic epitomized the thought of his school by contending that law emanated from the will of the majority of the people. To the contrary notwithstanding, I maintain that our political tradition and our constitutional law establish, and our basic law recognizes, the exact opposite as the fact. The Constitution expressly recognizes pre-existing and basic individual rights, and such rights cannot rightfully be impaired by other laws they are beyond the power of the majority or any other group of individuals or officials of the government. That is why our system has been characterized as a government of laws, not men. You find here the fundamental issue presented. To hold that all law emanates from popular will would imply that the decision of the majority would by its very nature be impartial and just toward all and that no restrictions to protect minorities and individuals would be needed. Historical experience shows that that is contrary to the fact. Our Bill of Rights and our Constitution were designed by this experience and to prevent violation by majorities or powerful governmental groups of the basic individual rights recognized as beyond governmental interference. If this were not the fact, man would exist and live at the will of a transient majority and his natural and inalienable rights would exist in name only. All human institutions and individual rights would be the creatures of mass emotionalism, and would have no protection against the foibles of each fleeting moment. 18 We are not only told that our constitutional system is inadequate for the existing situation but that we must relinquish or waive our individual rights for the paramount common good in an emergency. No one will deny that individual rights cannot be arbitrarily exercised without due regard to the promotion of the common welfare. But, unless the accommodation of individual rights to the public welfare is voluntary, the very right is denied. Certainly the Federal government has no constitutional power to abrogate or suspend these rights even in an emergency. Beware of the sycophants, who convert their ambitions into emergencies by their own self-serving declarations, and beguile us into an unnecessary sacrifice of principle under false promises or misrepresentation of true fact. The Supreme Court of the United States has clearly enunciated this principle in the Schechter case: "We are told that the provision of the statute authorizing the adoption of codes must be viewed in the light of the grave national crisis with which Congress was confronted. Undoubtedly, the conditions to which power is addressed are always to be considered when the exercise of power is challenged. Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies. But the argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action which lies outside the sphere of constitutional authority. Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power." To impose the will of the majority in derogation of constitutionally reserved rights by legislative fiat or executive dictation is tantamount to establishing the omnipotent or totalitarian State possessed of unlimited power. This doctrine is clearly alien and foreign to our constitutional philosophy. It destroys our American system and substitutes the European system. I am not debating the relative merits of these 19 totally different systems or the comparative utility of either under emergency or new conditions, but am only attempting to point out the principles of our constitutional democracy so that all current political action may be measured by their standard and a rational choice, based on a full understanding, made by the people. Under our system the people, not the State, are the ultimate source and repository of sovereign power, and the government must, therefore, justify its exercise of any power by the express consent of the people. The Constitution clearly provides how that consent may be obtained and any departure therefrom is a breach of the solemn compact between the people and their government and a denial of the mandate of the sovereign people. all generations. We can be well proud of our Jeffersonian tradition. Its incorporation in our organic law is our only bulwark against all of the modern false panaceas and isms which tempt us to forsake our birthright for the "flesh-pots of Egypt." Let us be eternally vigilant of our American liberties as thereby we can alone protect ourselves from the slavery of the modern tyrant the Totalitarian State. Therefore, if I were asked to state in synthesis the principle of our constitutional democracy, which requires the most emphasis under present conditions, I would say that it is the preservation of reserved individual rights above and beyond the power of government, and that the Federal government has no sovereign powers except those justly derived from the people and expressly, and by necessary implication, prescribed by the Constitution. I have avoided burdening you with the monotony of repeated quotations from authorities confirming these principles, but I can assure you that the books substantiate every principle enunciated. I have used a few quotations to evidence how timely a reaffirmation of these principles is and have made selections from United States Supreme Court decisions only a month old, so as not to be accused of searching antediluvian archives to prove modern principles. If Jefferson could view our contemporary political action he would be confirmed in his political faith and would be convinced that he had written a charter of liberty for free men of